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ABSTRACT 
 
Deadly, inter-ethnic group conflict remains a threat to international security in a 
world where the majority of armed violence occurs not only within states but in the most 
ungoverned areas within states. Conflicts that occur between groups living in largely 
ungoverned areas often become deeply protracted and are difficult to resolve when the 
state is weak and harsh environmental conditions place human security increasingly 
under threat. However, even under these conditions, why do some local conflicts between 
ethnic groups escalate, whereas others do not? To analyze this puzzle, the dissertation 
employs comparative methods to investigate the conditions under which violence erupts 
or stops and armed actors choose to preserve peace. The project draws upon qualitative 
data derived from semi-structured interviews, focus group dialogues, and participant 
observation of local peace processes during field research conducted in six conflict-
affected counties in Northern Kenya.  
Comparative analysis of fifteen conflict episodes with variable outcomes reveals 
the conditions under which coalitions of civic associations, including local peace 
committees, faith-based organizations, and councils of elders, inter alia, enhance 
informal institutional arrangements that contain escalation. Violence is less likely to 
escalate in communities where cohesive coalitions provide platforms for threat-
monitoring, informal pact making, and enforcement of traditional codes of restitution. 
 iii 
However, key scope conditions affect whether or not informal organizational structures 
are capable of containing escalation. In particular, symbolic acts of violence and the use 
of indiscriminant force by police and military actors commonly undermine local efforts to 
contain conflict. The dissertation contributes to the literatures on civil society and 
peacebuilding, demonstrating the importance of comparing processes of escalation and 
non-escalation and accounting for interactive effects between modes of state and non-
state response to local, inter-ethnic group conflict.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
In August of 2012, in Tana River County of rural, Northeastern Kenya, a clash 
between Orma and Pokomo communities over land and grazing rights caused twenty-five 
fatalities. Over the next four months, the conflict escalated and spread across the county 
through multiple towns, leading to 160 casualties and over 15,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). In contrast, in July of 2014, a clash between Pokot and Turkana 
communities over land rights in Turkana County triggered inter-ethnic group violence 
with 15 fatalities. The conflict, however, stopped short of further escalation. These 
conflicts represent a larger puzzle related to inter-ethnic group conflict in areas of limited 
state presence: Why do some local conflicts between ethnic groups escalate whereas 
others do not?  
Although total levels of global armed conflict declined significantly after 1991, 
the majority of armed conflict today occurs within states rather than between them (see, 
Themnér and Wallensteen 2014).1 Armed conflicts between rebel movements and states, 
such as the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq, remain major global problems. Non-state 
                                                
1 For detail on the persistence of intra-state conflicts see also, James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No.1 (February 2003).  
  
2 
conflicts2 between groups divided along identity lines are persistent threats to 
international security, as well. As Sundberg et al. show, “the numbers of state-based and 
non-state conflicts have converged since 2000” (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012, 354). 
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), non-state conflict causes, on 
average, 4,000 fatalities per year across many regions of the world. The spectrum of 
cases includes inter-tribal clashes in Pakistan, fighting in India between Hindu and 
Muslim communities, identity-based conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as clashes 
between Muslim and Christian groups in Nigeria (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012, 
355).3  
The problem is global. Non-state conflict, however, concentrates in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Between 1989 and 2008, 74% of total fatalities related to non-state conflicts (or 
58,940 deaths) occurred in states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 
2012, 357). In 2014, half of the top 15 states that experienced intra-state conflict were in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, 
Libya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were the most severe cases (see, Themnér 
and Wallensteen 2014). India was the only state outside of Sub-Saharan Africa in the top 
six most severe cases. In Somalia, Sudan, and DR Congo, non-state conflict led to more 
fatalities than conflict between the state and armed rebel groups. Across all of these 
                                                
2 The UCDP definition is as follows: “The use of armed force between two organized armed groups, 
neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year,” 
see: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ 
 
3 The global death toll due to conflict between social groups from 1983 – 2014 is over 80,000. Pew Forum 
data analysis indicates identity-based violence with religious dimensions increased over the past six years, 
reversing a historical downward trend (see, Pew Research Center 2014). 
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cases, the problem is related directly to state fragility,4 or the absence of formal state 
institutions with capacity5 to provide basic security and public goods (Hendrix 2010; 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012).  
Global and regional armed conflict trends make Kenya a critical case study of 
sub-state fragility with persistent non-state conflict. UCDP data indicate that over the past 
15 years Kenya experienced roughly 6,000 fatalities due to non-state violence.6 
Compared to its neighbors—Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda, Kenya is the most 
stable country in the Horn of Africa. The country has achieved relatively consistent 
economic growth, and marked improvements in governance performance (see, World 
Bank 2015). Notwithstanding positive economic and political outcomes, similar to other 
rapidly growing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as South Africa, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, Kenya remains vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict due to sub-state 
fragility. The more severe cases, such as South Sudan and DR Congo, experience both 
state-based7 and non-state conflict, making the two phenomena difficult to distinguish.  
Kenya, in contrast, has not experienced state-based conflict, yet continues to 
experience high rates of inter-ethnic group conflict, especially across the Northern rural 
                                                
4 Conceptually, state fragility refers to the absence of state authority, capacity, and legitimacy, or the state’s 
failure to provide security, rule of law, and basic services for citizens. 
 
5 On measuring state capacity, see, Hendrix, Cullen. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and 
Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 273–85. See 
also, Bertocchi, Graziella, and Andrea Guerzoni. 2012. “Growth, History, or Institutions What Explains 
State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa?” Journal of Peace Research 49 (6): 769–83. 
 
6 The number is closer to 8,000 according to SCAD data. 
 
7 The UCDP definition is as follows: conflict between, “government and non-governmental party.” 
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periphery8 also known as the Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASALs).9 The map below 
portrays the relatively high rate of armed violence across the counties of Northern Kenya.  
Figure 1: Kenya’s Counties by Level of Armed Violence Volatility10 
 
 
 
 
Source: Small Arms Survey 2012 
                                                
8 For overviews of the concept of core-periphery cleavages and civil wars, see, David Mason, “Insurgency, 
Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant.” Public Choice (1996) 86 (1-2); Susan Olzak, 
“Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (January 1996): 355–74; and, Sidney 
Tarrow, “Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics 5 
(2007): 587–600. 
 
9 Seventy-five percent of the landmass of Kenya is classified as Arid and Semi-arid Land (ASALs), with 
harsh climatic and environmental conditions not conducive to sustainable agricultural production. These 
areas of the country are also the poorest regions in the country. The ASALs have the highest poverty, the 
lowest human development scores. Up to 80% of the Kenyan population living across the ASALs lives on 
less than one dollar per day (World Bank 2015). The ASALs lack modern infrastructure, and have very 
few, if any, government services. The lack of state capacity and formal security institutions generates 
conditions conducive to high levels of armed violence. 
 
10 Map source: Wepundi, Mannasseh. 2012. Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in 
Kenya: An Assessment. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, 39.  
5 
However, patterns of violence vary significantly at the local level. This is common for 
intra-state conflicts. In the Greek civil war, riots in India, the war in Bosnia, and inter-
clan clashes in Somalia, violence escalated in some areas yet not others, even with similar 
demographic features and conflict pressures (Kalyvas 2006; Varshney 2002; Ron 2000; 
Shortland, Christopoulou, and Makatsoris 2013).11 The Kenya context is no exception. 
Under very similar conflict pressures, some inter-ethnic group conflicts escalate to 
include acts of mass collective violence, while others do not. 
One part of the puzzle of intra-state conflict in deeply divided African states is 
related to group motivations for engaging in violence. Why some actors choose to use 
increasingly severe forms of violence against rival ethnic groups is a key question. 
However, explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not involves a more 
complex question related to patterns of response, or the warning-response problem 
(George and Holl 1997).  
Even in the most remote regions of what was once called the Northern Frontier 
District (NFD), a broad spectrum of actors including local civic groups, peacebuilding 
committees, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government agencies respond 
to inter-ethnic group conflicts in attempts to prevent mass atrocities. Local peace 
committees with linkages to District Peace Committees (DPCs) are in place even in very 
remote locations across Northern Kenya. It is not inevitable that collective violence will 
escalate in the absence of formal state policing. Early warning, rapid response, and 
preventive operations coordinated through non-governmental organizations and local 
                                                
11 Shortland et al. use innovative satellite imaging of light emissions to show variation in local violence 
patterns in Somalia. 
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civic associations may contain it (George and Holl 1997; Carnegie Commission 1998). 
Therefore, why some responses to outbreaks of violence contain12 escalation and others 
fail to do so is also a critical part of the puzzle.  
 
Patterns and Consequences of Ethnic Violence 
The study finds that the relationship between modes of state and non-state 
response to local inter-ethnic group conflicts affect patterns of escalation. In the absence 
of state authority, capacity, and legitimacy, coalitions13 of civic associations limit 
escalation across multiple inter-ethnic group conflicts. Persistent insecurity due to sub-
state fragility triggers the formation of cohesive,14 albeit highly informal, organizational 
structures for communal protection and rapid response to outbreaks of violence. 
Containing the escalation of conflict rarely hinges upon one particular organizational 
structure. Containment depends upon relationships among multiple civic associations that 
align with a particular long-term peacebuilding agenda, or align with resisting threats 
from particular violent actors. Local peacebuilding coalitions commonly contain 
                                                
12 Following the insights of Lake and Rothchild, fully resolving and eliminating inter-ethnic group conflict 
under conditions of state fragility, extreme human insecurity, and inter-group fear and mistrust is not 
possible; however, containing it is possible (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 203). The containment concept 
relates to the pressures external organizations and actors use to prevent violence from escalating or 
spreading. The study also deals with the concept of restraint, or internal pressures that prevent armed actors 
from engaging in violence, such as fear of consequences, or a “mutually hurting stalemate,” inter alia 
(Horowitz 1985; Zartman 2001).  
 
13 The coalition concept refers to relationships among civic associations that are “deliberately constructed,” 
yet operate, “independent of formal organizational structures” (Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter 1985, 256 – 
257). 
 
14 Cohesion, building from Pearlman’s conceptual framework includes two observable characteristics: 1) 
unified local elites, and 2) the presence of local institutions (formal or informal) with clearly articulated and 
accepted rules for conflict prevention (Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012). 
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escalation through the establishment of informal threat-monitoring networks, providing 
multiple platforms for preventive negotiation and pact making, and enforcing traditional 
codes of restitution. In otherwise hostile environments, coalitions comprised of diverse 
combinations of civic organizations play significant roles in containing the escalation of 
inter-ethnic group violence.  
However, the study also finds that a set of particular conditions affects the extent 
to which informal organizational structures are capable of containing escalation. In 
conflicts where state actions undermine trust between local organizations and militia 
leaders, coalitions commonly fail to contain escalation. Highly symbolic acts of violence 
and the use of indiscriminant force by police and military actors create windows for 
conflict escalation and undermine the preventive efforts of local civic groups. In this way, 
the relationship between modes of state and non-state response explains variable patterns 
of escalation and non-escalation across non-state conflicts in Kenya’s rural periphery.  
The study analyzes fifteen conflicts across six counties in Northern Kenya, 
including Mandera, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu, Turkana, and West Pokot. The 
dissertation addresses the critical problem of collective action to contain violence. Prior 
research, such as Rothchild’s research on ethnic bargaining, recognizes the role of the 
state in formulating strategies to manage inter-ethnic group conflict across various Sub-
Saharan countries (1995). However, the dissertation looks at the relationship between 
state and non-state responses to ethnic conflict to account for interactive effects among 
various modes of response. Extant studies of collective violence compare episodes of 
escalation with other episodes of escalation (Kiernan 2009; Semelin and Hoffman 2009; 
Goldhagen 2009; Valentino 2013). These forms of comparative analysis focus on drivers 
8 
of collective violence, often overlooking the dynamics of containment and restraint 
(Straus 2012). They also overlook empirical evidence from cases in which conditions are 
rife for escalation, but mass atrocities do not occur.  
Empirically, the study makes two main contributions to the field. First, the 
dissertation demonstrates the importance of comparing episodes of escalation and non-
escalation and adds case study evidence to the research program on sub-state violence 
dynamics (King 2004; Straus 2012). Second, the study also contributes to the literature 
on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Conflict that begins in periphery areas, like the 
current cases of Mali and the Central African Republic, can quickly transform into large-
scale civil war. The prevention of social conflict requires better understanding of 
conditions that help constitute relatively secure communities in otherwise highly insecure 
environments. Very few studies address the ways in which state actions and civic actions 
may compliment or compromise one another within processes of conflict prevention.  
 
 
Escalation and Containment of Ethnic Violence 
According to Fearon and Laitin, intra-group policing is the key mechanism that 
prevents conflict between ethnic groups from erupting and spiraling out of control 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). The theory posits that conflict rarely escalates because in the 
day-to-day each community polices itself to avoid the high cost of violence for the larger 
group. Evidence from Kenya challenges this approach. Intra-group policing, alone, may 
not be sufficient to contain escalation. Within the rural periphery, armed youth militias 
travel long distances, operate largely undetected outside of their home territories, and 
cross international boundaries through shifting inter-ethnic group alliances. To contain 
9 
escalation, it is likely that multiple groups, organizations, and actors need to be involved. 
Without basic forms of inter-group policing and collective action among multiple civic 
organizations, escalation may be more likely. 
Civil society theories also provide a plausible explanation of why some inter-
ethnic group conflicts escalate and others do not (Varshney 2002; Paffenholz 2010). Case 
study research related to civil society theories tends to analyze the relationship between 
specific types of associations and violence prevention, such as trade associations in India 
and Nigeria (Jha 2008; Meagher 2007), churches and faith-based organizations in 
Rwanda (Longman 2009), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in 
Eastern Europe and East Timor (McMahon 2007; Robinson 2009). Focusing on specific 
types of associations does not capture the empirical reality of what civil society looks like 
on the ground in conflict-affected communities. Even in small villages in the most remote 
regions of Northern Kenya, there is commonly a set of diverse organizations engaged in 
responding to outbreaks of violence. This gap in the literature motivates analysis of the 
main factor—cohesive coalitions. The study contributes to the civil society literature 
through analysis that accounts for the strengths of civic coalitions involved in preventive 
action, as well as their limitations.  
A third major approach in the literature on sub-state conflict claims political elites 
and ethnic entrepreneurs determine whether or not violence escalates. Fearon and Laitin 
identify elite theory as the most dominant narrative (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Political 
elites, some suggest, decide whether or not to arm local militias and incite ethnic 
constituencies to engage in collective violence, or decide whether or not to allocate state 
resources to protect certain ethnic groups over others (Bates 2008; Boege, Brown, and 
10 
Clements 2009). For example, Wilkinson argues political elites in India protect minority 
groups from acts of violence only when the majority ethnic group depends upon the 
minority group to win an election (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Wilkinson 2006). 
Violence, from this perspective, is an instrument for gaining political support and 
personal power. When political parties and their leaders have little to lose from violence, 
or a lot to gain, escalation may be more likely (Gagnon 2006; Laitin 2007).  
Elite theory explains a number of conflict events in the Kenya context. For 
example, evidence suggests political elites played direct roles in escalating post-election 
violence in Kenya in 2007-2008. Elite theories, however, do not fully explain sub-state 
variation. In some cases, there is evidence of elites escalating violence for political or 
personal gain, but in others, there is not. Most importantly, in some cases, political elites 
play significant roles in preventive responses and peace processes to contain conflict. 
Overall, predominant theories of sub-state, inter-ethnic group violence explain 
variation in relation to political entrepreneurs who draw upon and exacerbate identity-
based grievances, the absence of integrated civic organizations, and the failure of formal 
state policing. This particular combination of stress factors contributes to relatively 
higher levels of armed conflict in the periphery region of Kenya, yet, under all of these 
conditions, patterns of escalation are variable and large-scale acts of collective violence 
remain rare. This study, therefore, critiques the capacity of theories of sub-state ethnic 
violence to explain variation in patterns of conflict escalation across Northern Kenya.  
 
 
11 
Methods 
The structure of the analysis for the study includes country-level assessment of 
the Kenya context, as well as comparing sub-state, inter-ethnic group conflicts. Four 
methods are used: case studies, analytic narratives, process tracing, and structured, 
focused comparison (Bates 1998; George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Elman 2006). 
Following Brass’s methodological approach to the study of ethnic violence in India, 
conflict narratives draw significantly upon local interpretations and viewpoints on 
escalation dynamics (Brass 1997). Each case study investigates informants’ claims to 
identify the most plausible explanations of why conflict did or did not escalate in 
particular situations. Process tracing of state, civic, and communal responses to outbreaks 
of conflict allows for assessment of the relationship between state and non-state efforts to 
contain violence. In each case, conflict events, corresponding responses, and critical 
outcomes are recorded and then subjected to comparative analysis.  
The counterfactual problem is inherent in the research question. How is it possible 
to know with confidence whether or not particular preventive actions caused further 
violence not to happen? As Rubin describes, “The problem of counterfactual hypotheses 
is endemic in social science and policy, both of which deal with nonreplicable events. It 
is not peculiar to or uniquely prominent in the problem of conflict prevention” (Rubin 
2002, 211). Solving the research puzzle requires comparative analysis of positive cases 
where escalation occurred, alongside negative cases where escalation did not occur but 
easily could have due to the presence of conditions that commonly trigger escalation.  
There are two methodological strategies for testing hypotheses through case study 
analysis—counterfactual thought experiments to rewrite histories imagining how 
12 
outcomes would change in the absence of particular factors, or comparing similar 
historical cases (Fearon 1991). Rather than constructing counterfactual narratives, the 
study matches historical cases that share most similar conditions. To gauge the extent to 
which cohesive civic coalitions may or may not contain escalation, most similar cases are 
matched and used, as Levy describes, to compare “worlds that are as close to each other 
as possible” (Levy 2008).  
All of the cases provide evidence of actors engaging in observable actions 
intentionally selected to contain conflict and prevent further escalation (Rubin 2002). The 
first set of cases analyzes escalatory dynamics in the absence of preventive intervention 
through civic coalitions, or conflict outcomes that result from the absence of the primary 
variable under investigation (Fearon 1991). The second set of cases assesses conflict 
outcomes with the presence of a cohesive coalition of civic associations involved in 
significant preventive efforts (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Case studies analyze the 
ways in which collective efforts impact conflict outcomes across multiple settings. As a 
third test of the cohesive coalition concept, the final set of cases includes mixed 
outcomes. Civic organizations had success in containing violence in past conflicts, but 
then collapsed due to various pressures. In sum, to facilitate comparative analysis, 
conflict episodes are matched and grouped in three sets: cases of escalation with minimal 
preventive action, cases in which preventive intervention contained violence, and cases in 
which preventive intervention failed to contain violence. 
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Table 1: Case Studies 
 
 
Escalation 
1. Turkana: Turkana – Samburu Range War (1996 – 1997) 
2. Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (November 2012) 
3. Samburu: The Maralal Riots (October 2013) 
4. Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (May 2011)  
5. Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2012 – 2013) 
 
Limited Escalation 
6. Samburu: Nyrio Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014) 
7. Marsabit: Sarimo Settlement: Gabra – Turkana (2010 – 2014) 
8. West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (2014)  
9. Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014) 
10. Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014) 
 
Recurring Escalation 
11. Marsabit: Turbi Massacre (2002 – 2005) 
12. West Pokot: Pokot – Turkana Range War (2013 – 2014) 
13. Isiolo: The Isiolo Triangle (2008 – 2012) 
14. Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008) 
15. Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014) 
 
 
In order to select and assess sub-state conflict events for the study, I initially 
conducted two months of state-level field research engaging over 35 national and 
international organizations involved in security governance and peacebuilding in Kenya. 
During the first stage of field research, I noted conflict events and locations where 
peacebuilding and security actors identified variation in terms of escalation and non-
escalation, as well as variation in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of preventive 
responses coordinated through local organizational structures.  
Next, I conducted an additional four months of field research across six counties 
in Northern Kenya. Working with at least one and sometimes two research assistants in 
each county, I engaged over 300 research participants in interviews and focus group 
dialogues, and in the form of participant observation. Accompanying peacebuilding 
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actors during responses to clashes provided access to observational data related to 
informal practices used for rapid response and preventive bargaining. Interviews and 
focus group discussions, ranging from one to four hours in length, were semi-structured. 
A standardized questionnaire guided each conversation with intervening questions asked 
to clarify key points and allow actors to speak in depth about issues related to their 
particular area of expertise (Berry 2002). Perspectives and insights derived from 
interviews and focus group discussions were triangulated against data from a variety of 
international organizations’ reports, news articles, scholarly publications, and policy 
documents related to each conflict under analysis (Höglund and Öberg 2011). 
Using field research findings as a foundation, conflict narratives follow a common 
format. The format includes assessment of the conflict context, patterns of response, key 
outcomes, and conclusions. In each case, context analysis identifies parties to the conflict, 
major conflict events and historical grievances, and causal factors described by local 
informants and conflict assessments for each case. Proximate conflict triggers for the 
initial shift from latent to deadly conflict are identified. Using insights from first-hand 
sources, where available, the section on patterns of response describes as accurately as 
possible the dynamics of state, civic, and communal responses following the initial 
outbreak of conflict. Narratives draw upon interviews with leaders of peacebuilding 
organizations, local political leaders, and security actors involved in responding to the 
threat of escalation in each case.  
The conclusion section identifies preliminary findings regarding conditions 
related to escalation or containment. The cases do not identity all of the possible 
conditions that could play a role in the conflict; rather, the goal of each narrative is to 
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identify specific components of each episode relevant to the theoretical argument under 
investigation—the relationship between state actions, informal peacebuilding coalitions, 
and patterns of escalation.  
 
Overview 
Chapter one assesses the extent to which prevailing theories are useful for 
explaining variation in patterns of escalation, and why some responses to outbreaks of 
inter-ethnic group conflict may be more successful than others in containing it. Overall, 
research on ethnic violence focuses heavily on formal institutions such as state-based 
rules for inclusion and integration, and the extension of bureaucratic peacebuilding 
institutions to the local level. Informal rules and social organizations, however, are 
pervasive and equally important for conflict analysis. The chapter justifies the coalitions 
concept and forwards hypotheses related to the potentially significant role of civic groups 
that operate outside of formal organizational structures.  
Chapter two analyzes drivers of ethnic conflict in the case of Kenya, and the 
historical transformation of state responses to the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict. 
In particular, it analyzes how prior modes of state intervention shape current logics of 
conflict among communities in the periphery region, and how state institutions designed 
to prevent inter-ethnic group conflict affect local protection strategies. In areas of limited 
state presence, the qualities of prior state interventions affect armed actors’ strategies as 
well as operating conditions for civic organizations.   
Chapter three presents narratives of five conflicts that escalated in the rural 
periphery of Northern Kenya. Each case accounts for contextual analysis of conditions 
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that contributed to the outbreak of conflict, corresponding responses, and conditions 
contributing to escalation or non-escalation. The cases show how escalation occurs across 
multiple cases in the absence of local organizational structures to monitor threats and 
support pact making based on customary forms of restitution. 
Chapter four compares conditions for limited escalation, or the containment of 
inter-ethnic group conflict. Five episodes portray conditions that contribute to the 
outbreak of conflict, corresponding responses, and outcomes. The cases show the most 
prominent mechanisms through which informal coalitions of local civic groups restrain 
armed groups and limit rapid, asymmetrical violence when inter-group conflict is on the 
brink of escalation. 
Chapter five assesses and compares cases in which local peacebuilding 
organizations failed to contain violence. In these cases, collective peacebuilding efforts 
had prior success in containing conflict yet conflict re-escalated. In this chapter, there is 
further evidence of local associations effectively containing violence. However, 
additional patterns are evident. Coercive state actions and acts of symbolic violence 
trigger escalatory dynamics that are to contain difficult for local civic groups.  
Chapter six draws comparative findings from the study, articulates how the 
findings contribute to the research on non-state violence, and explains why some inter-
ethnic conflicts escalate, whereas others do not. The conclusion summarizes key findings, 
describes limitations of the research, and articulates implications for Kenya, divided 
societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and non-state conflicts, more broadly.
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CHAPTER ONE: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS 
 
The Cold War era global upsurge in ethnic conflicts—from the late 1960s through 
the early 1990s—gave rise to extensive research on the causes of conflict between 
identity-based social groups. As a result, there is a strong foundation for identifying 
potential root drivers of ethnic conflict at multiple levels of analysis (Horowitz 1985; 
Brass 1997; Kaufman 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Varshney 2003).15 Predatory elite 
behavior is the most prominent narrative (Bates 1982; Allen 1999; Herbst 2000; 
Lemarchand 2011; Bates 2008; Boone 2014). State failure and fragility, minority 
exclusion, and horizontal inequalities are also dominant theoretical approaches (Gurr 
2000; Barkan 2012; Bates 2008; Laitin 2007; Stewart 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, and 
Min 2009). State fragility and elite behavior, in particular, clearly help explain why rural 
Northern Kenya is vulnerable to more frequent outbreaks of armed violence than 
Southern Kenya. However, the concepts of state fragility and elite predation are 
misleading.  
                                                
15 For example, Horowitz’s seminal psycho-social theory identifies four necessary conditions for the onset 
of deadly ethnic violence: 1) a history of intergroup hostility that provides a contextual motivation for 
killing; 2) a social sanction or moral justification for killing, usually signaled by support from in-group 
elites; 3) the presence of a precipitating event, such as rumor or small scale violent episode that sparks 
group mobilization, and; 4) the reduction of group inhibitions against killing, or the lowering of constraints 
including the absence of police forces (Horowitz 2001). 
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Conflict analysis, especially across states in Sub-Saharan Africa, leaves the 
impression that ethnic conflict is a normal phenomenon. Empirically, even in the most 
remote and largely ungoverned areas of the world where theories predict the highest 
levels of vulnerability to ethnic conflict, episodes of conflict that escalate to include mass 
collective violence are still quite rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Straus 2012). The 
conditions thought to predict conflict between identity-based groups are more prevalent 
than the outcome. Many small-scale social conflicts are contained before they escalate 
and transform into wars. What are the conditions, therefore, that contain conflict between 
ethnic groups in largely ungoverned regions of the world? Why does collective violence 
not escalate, when conditions are rife for allowing it to escalate?  
  Chapter one has three main sections. The first section defines foundational 
concepts used in the study. The second section reviews sets of literature most relevant to 
the research question—why do some local inter-ethnic group conflicts escalate while 
others do not? The review analyzes plausible factors and mechanisms that may contain 
violence under conditions of sub-state fragility in order to identify gaps and unresolved 
debates in the literature. The third section proposes a theoretical explanation for variation 
in patterns of violence based on the main propositions—the interactive effects between 
state and non-state modes of response to local conflicts. 
 
 
Conceptual Orientation 
The dependent variable in the study is the escalation of non-state conflict. 
Escalation can occur rapidly or over longer periods of time, but it always includes a shift 
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in distinct aspects of a crisis (Zartman 1989, 9). Escalation is the extent to which the 
nature of conflict changes in intensity and severity of tactics, which initially includes a 
shift from latent conflict to armed violence with increased competition in risk taking 
(Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994; Licklider 2005; Kahn 2009). Other forms of evidence 
associated with escalation include the shift to increasingly violent tactics such as 
targeting women and children, burning homes, or destroying resources that belong to 
particular ethnic groups (Carment and James 1996; Horowitz 2001; Lobell and Mauceri 
2004; Colaresi 2007).  
Resilience, in contrast, refers to the absence of increased competition in risk 
taking. The resilience concept has many critics due to its broad use across multiple 
disciplines including ecology, engineering, and psychology, inter alia. Within peace and 
conflict analysis the concept often lacks of clarity of meaning due to its use in a wide 
range of policy documents from international organizations such as the African 
Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).16 However, in this 
study, the concept simply refers to successful instances in which communities resist 
pressure to resort to violence following the onset of conflict (see also, Carpenter 2014; 
Ryan 2012). As Menkhaus describes, resilience occurs when escalation is a potential 
outcome due to increasing pressures for groups to resort to violence, yet the use of lethal 
force is limited (Menkhaus 2013, 4).  
                                                
16 See, for example, the major OECD peacebuilding policy document titled, “Concepts and Dilemmas of 
State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience,” (2008), at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/41100930.pdf  
 
 20 
Conflicts analyzed in the study occur between non-state groups, and do not 
include pogroms or civil wars. In other words, groups involved have no direct control 
over state military forces and the state is not a direct, active participant in the initial 
conflict. Representatives and agents of the state are potential third parties to the conflict, 
however, especially following initial outbreaks of violence.17 Violence refers to the 
empirical, physical definition, in which groups engaged in conflict choose to use lethal 
force to gain control over a contested resource, which aligns with Galtung’s classic 
definition of visible armed violence—as opposed to cultural violence or structural 
violence (Galtung 1969).  
The significance of ethnicity as a cause of conflict is essentially contested in the 
literature. Alesina and Sambanis, among others, argue ethnic diversity—measured 
through degrees of ethno-linguistic fragmentation—does not affect the likelihood of 
conflict escalation (Reilly 2001; Alesina et al. 2003; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Sambanis 
and Shayo 2013). Therefore, in this study, ethnic identity limits the scope of the 
dependent variable rather than operating as an explanatory factor.  
Conceptually, identity is a social category to which individuals are eligible for 
membership, and ethnic means eligibility for membership is based upon decent-based 
attributes18 that are real or believed (Chandra 2006). Ethnicity is a socially constructed 
sense of collective belonging. It provides a platform to differentiate groups and mobilize 
                                                
17 See UCDP definitions of “non-state” conflict at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Non-
state_conflict   
 
18 Decent based refers attributes that are genetic, cultural, historically inherited, or acquired such as a last 
name or tribal markings (see, Chandra 2006). 
 
 21 
individuals for collective action (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2000). 
Ethnic identity, in other words, becomes a conflict driver when groups feel threatened 
and identity becomes a common rallying point. In sum, conflicts analyzed in the study 
occur between non-state groups with a shared communal identity, and grievances are 
related to ethnic affiliations (Horowitz 2001). 
 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
The following section critiques theoretical arguments relevant to the puzzle of 
why violence escalates in some cases, yet not others. The literature related to this 
problem falls into three general categories: state fragility, civil society associations, and 
informal institutions. The review of extant literature serves as the foundation for the 
analytical framework used for case study assessment and comparative analysis. It 
identifies gaps and unresolved debates in the literature to build a case for the need for 
further inquiry into interactions between modes of state and non-state responses to 
contain inter-ethnic group conflicts. In particular, there is a lack of consensus on the 
conditions under which civic associations and informal institutional arrangements are 
able to effectively contain violence that is related to political and economic transition.  
There is also a lack of consensus across the literature regarding whether or not 
coercive or non-coercive pressures are most necessary for containing inter-ethnic group 
conflicts. In other words, is the threat of the use of deadly force necessary to reduce the 
likelihood of conflict escalation, or are non-coercive pressures capable of preventing 
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violence from spiraling out of control? This problem relates to theories of restraint versus 
constraint.  
Some theories suggest violence stops mostly due to internal pressures that 
restrain armed groups from escalating a conflict. Rational calculation of the cost of 
violence for a particular group, the fear of consequences, or reaching a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,”19 for instance, may reduce the likelihood of escalation (Horowitz 1985; 
Zartman 2001; Collins 2009). In contrast, other theories are based on the fundamental 
assumption that violence stops due to external pressures, or forces that restrict the ability 
of armed groups to use violence, such as pressures from elders and militia patrons, 
peacebuilding associations and civic organizations, or from state institutions. These 
debates are addressed throughout the literature review. 
 
Sub-state Fragility, Ethnic Conflict, and Coping 
A dominant theory in the literature on ethnic conflict is that the modern 
bureaucratic state is the most necessary constraint—without it, conflict is likely to 
escalate. Weak states have ineffective policing systems, which, in Fearon and Laitin’s 
terms, yields low capacity to cauterize small scale conflicts before they turn into wars 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). In other words, state authority and a monopoly over the use of 
violence are necessary for preventing the escalation of violence (Weber 1968). The state 
fragility argument is related to Cohen and Felson’s general theory of collective violence 
                                                
19 According to Zartman, whether or not external third party mediation contains escalation depends upon on 
the interests of conflict parties, not on the neutrality or legitimacy of the mediator, per se. Whether or not 
violence escalates depends upon whether or not both parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate 
(Zartman and Rasmussen 1997). Conflict will continue to escalate, Zartman suggests, until both parties are 
locked in a situation in which they both perceive further stalemate will lead to catastrophe.  
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as a social process that occurs in space and time under three conditions, including the 
presence of motivated actors, the presence of suitable targets, and the absence of capable 
guardians (Cohen and Felson 1979).  
Where the state is not a capable guardian, ethnic security dilemmas may take root 
(Posen 1993; Herbst 2000; Putzel 2005; Kaufman 2006). Militias and warlords often step 
into governance vacuums to provide authority and communal security where the state 
cannot. In the case of Northern Kenya, this is a common phenomenon. Across the 
northern periphery there is very minimal state authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Sub-
state fragility creates conditions conducive to severe poverty and human insecurity 
(Kumssa, Jones, and Williams 2009). Ethnic militias operate in this context as the first 
line of defense for communities. Under conditions of rapid environmental change, 
intensive inter-group competition occurs over increasingly scarce resources (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Butler and Gates 2012; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013; Mine et al. 2013).  
Empirically, however, even with very similar conflict pressures across a broad 
region, the state’s capacity to contain conflict may vary across different sub-state settings 
within areas of limited state presence.20 One approach to this problem is the construction 
of ideal types of stateness, or various forms of governance that emerge under conditions 
of state fragility (Migdal 1988; Desch 1996; Allen 1999; Laitin 2007; Risse 2013). For 
example, Stanislawski makes a case for three types of limited statehood, para-states, 
                                                
20 Defining limited statehood, Risse states, “in those parts of the country in which central authorities 
(governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules or in which the legitimate monopoly over the 
means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily” (Risse 2011: 5). 
 
 
 24 
quasi-states, and criminal enclaves. Each type may vary in terms of state capacity to 
contain local inter-ethnic group conflict (Stanislawski 2008).  
Criminal enclaves, for example, tend to be corrupt, undemocratic, and sustained 
through illicit economies with linkages to international criminal networks. Theoretically, 
this type of sub-state structure may be more prone to violence than others. Violence 
escalates if ethnic out-groups threaten to undermine illicit economic activities or the 
authority of local warlords. Militias operating under these conditions also are more likely 
to use violence against both ethnic competitors and state police forces (Bayart, Ellis, and 
Hibou 1999; Bunker 2012). In short, from this perspective, violence is a tool warlords 
and local powerbrokers use to protect criminal economies (Sullivan and Bunker 2002; 
Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013).  
Prior research on the Kenya context relates to this approach. Early writers called 
Northern Kenya a bandits kingdom (Farson 1953). Contemporary conflict analysis of the 
region suggests not much has changed. Eaton and Bollig et al., for example, argue 
violence escalates most often and most severely in relation to commercialized banditry. 
Politicians, corrupt security actors, and government administrators benefit from local 
conflict through corruption, patronage, and high value bribes. Local militias, therefore, 
may use violence against ethnic out-groups that threaten criminal economies (Osamba 
2000; Eaton 2008b; Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013). The extent to which 
commercialized banditry has taken root across northern Kenya, however, is not clear. 
While there have been reports of political support for criminal activities across Northern 
Kenya, this issue may be over exaggerated (Eaton 2008b). 
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 Brass’s research on sub-state conflict in India takes state fragility as the starting 
point for classifying riot prone versus non-riot prone areas. He argues that some areas are 
more prone to ethnic violence than others due to the direct absence of state security 
forces. The absence of formal policing allows for the rise of a class of actors called riot 
specialists who build and maintain organized social networks of armed actors who keep 
inter-ethnic tensions tense. Riot specialists organize violent attacks at opportunistic 
moments, including during democratic and economic transitions, elections, and in areas 
of states where anonymity is possible (Brass 1997). Theoretically, Brass’s argument 
implies ethnic violence has an urban bias. He suggests it is more difficult to operate as an 
anonymous killer in a rural area than in an urban area, making violence more likely to 
escalate in urban settings. The Kenya context questions this approach. Rural regions of 
Northern Kenya are more prone to recurrent violence escalation than urban areas. This 
implies communal strategies to maintain and protect the anonymity of armed actors may 
play an important role within conflict dynamics.  
Critics of state fragility arguments claim the absence of the state is not the most 
important factor that explains why inter-ethnic group conflict escalates in some areas area 
not others. Rather, the presence of the state and the actions of state representatives may 
be more critical. Horowitz, for example, argues ethnic violence is not random. It is 
usually well organized. Organized, large-scale acts of ethnic violence often require the 
resources of the state (Horowitz 1985). Saideman and Zahar, more recently, build upon 
this insight. They argue governments are the biggest threat to their own citizens. State 
actors may play critical roles in determining whether or not intra-state conflict escalates 
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(Saideman and Zahar 2008). For example, case study evidence from Fjeld’s comparative 
research on sub-state conflict dynamics in Nigeria supports this approach. She finds that 
local violence escalates more often in relation to “sins of commission” at the hands of 
state actors, including patronage politics and abusing political office for amassing 
personal wealth, rather than “sins of omission” in failing to provide security or public 
goods (Fjelde 2009).  
Approaches that highlight state actions identify sets of specific behaviors that can 
implicate the state as a direct or indirect cause of inter-ethnic group violence. Even in 
highly ungoverned periphery regions with very limited state capacity, local inter-group 
conflicts often have links to national level conflict dynamics (Mamdani 1996; Albert 
2001; Kalyvas 2006). For instance, Cedarman et al. argue that state’s use of 
discrimination and favoritism of particular ethnic groups over others can deepen ethnic 
divisions and grievances at the local level, increasing the likelihood of escalation 
(Mamdani 1996; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Redrawing internal district 
borders based on ethnic identity (Donnan 1999; Greiner 2013), prebendalist state elite 
behavior, and identity-based rent-seeking may have a similar effect (Joseph 1983; Lewis 
1996; Le Billon 2003). State responses to sub-state conflicts may deepen inter-group 
grievances and increase pressure for communities to resort to violence. 
More directly, military support for one ethnic community over another within a 
local conflict, often for the purpose of consolidating political support can trigger large-
scale inter-group violence (René Lemarchand 1972; Steeves 1997; Valentino 2013). In 
some cases, the issue may not be direct military support for one community over another, 
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but rather disarmament campaigns in one community and not another. Unequal 
disarmament may increase fear among minority groups of adequate protection and thus 
trigger escalation (de Figueiredo and Weingast 1997). Similarly, Bell et al. argue the 
state’s use of coercive force against citizens, such as disappearances and human rights 
abuses, may increase the likelihood of escalation (Bell et al. 2013).  
Overall, the state fragility literature and its critics reveal that state responses to 
local ethnic conflicts vary significantly across time and space. The state is not a 
homogenous actor. The general concept of state fragility does not capture the empirical 
reality of how state actors respond, on the ground, to prevent escalation across various 
inter-ethnic group conflicts. Lawson and Rothchild’s concept of state coping, therefore, 
serves as a conceptual foundation for the analysis. State actors often adjust strategies 
under conditions of institutional weakness and insecurity—factors common across 
modern African states (Lawson and Rothchild 2005; see also, Jackson 2002; Boone 
2003). State coping, theoretically, generates local-level variation in strategies the state 
employs to try to contain escalation of inter-group conflict. State responses may cause 
violence to escalate in some cases yet prevent it from escalating in others.  
In the study, therefore, state responses to communal conflicts are conceptualized 
as ad hoc, experimental attempts to improve security and prevent inter-group conflicts 
from escalating under harsh and uncertain conditions. It is critical to try to account for 
variation in patterns of state approaches to local conflicts in different settings across the 
rural periphery. In particular, in the Kenya context, shifts in the larger regional political 
economy have increased state interest in local security for the purposes of protecting 
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resource extraction and international investment in some previously marginalized areas, 
but not others. Explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not in the Kenya 
context, therefore, requires accounting for variable patterns of state response to inter-
group conflicts in particular areas of the Northern periphery. 
 
Civic Organizations, Ethnic Conflict, and Coalitions 
A second set of literature related to the study of variation in patterns of local 
conflict focuses on civic organizations and violence prevention efforts. However, there is 
no consensus on the conditions under which civic groups are or are not capable of 
containing escalation. The major gap in the literature is related to the problem of scope 
conditions and intervening factors that cause variation in the capacity of civic 
associations to contain violence more or less so than others. Under conditions of state 
fragility, to what extent can civic groups contain violence? Kalyvas’ seminal study of 
sub-state conflict merely states, “we know little about how [local organizations] operate” 
(Kalyvas 2006, 110). Recent research tries to fill this gap.  
 Across multiple studies and methodological approaches, four mechanisms now 
stand out as the most plausible channels through which civic associations contain 
violence. First, civic groups may incentivize inter-group or “crosscutting” cooperation 
and help overcome collective action dilemmas. Second, they may provide information to 
conflict parties and the state necessary for early warning and effective preventive 
response. Third, they may leverage international support and help increase capacity and 
resources available for conflict prevention efforts. Finally, they may even change norms 
among armed groups. Civic groups may encourage armed groups to adopt non-coercive 
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conflict management tactics that help reduce the likelihood of escalatory dynamics. The 
following section addresses research on civic organizations and violence prevention, 
assessing the range of processes through which civic organizations may succeed or fail to 
contain violence.  
Civil society approaches build from Putnam’s research on civic associations and 
democracy. He theorizes dense associational networks create social capital, or norms of 
inter-group trust that increase the likelihood of collective action (Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1993). In other words, civic groups increase “bridging” among ethnic groups and 
decrease “bonding” within ethnic groups (Colletta et al. 2000). Applied to ethnic conflict, 
the theory implies strong civic associations lead to higher levels of inter-group trust. 
Inter-group trust then serves as the foundation for high-risk collective action necessary 
for effective violence prevention. Civil society organizations that integrate ethnic groups 
may increase willingness among citizens representing different ethnic groups to intervene 
in crisis situations to contain violence in the absence of state security (Kalyvas, Shapiro, 
and Masoud 2008; Druckman and Olekalns 2011).  
Varshney finds evidence to support this theory in urban settings in India. Hindu-
Muslim violence was more intensive in communities lacking crosscutting business 
associations, labor unions, political parties, and voluntary community organizations. In 
areas with crosscutting organizations, during periods of rising tension, pre-existing 
associational frameworks were conducive for rapid collective action. They shared 
information about conflict dynamics with state authorities, quelled the spread of rumors 
and hate speech, and improved informal community policing (Varshney 2002, 9 – 10). 
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Overall, Varshney’s theory implies that in settings where civic groups tend to segregate 
local ethnic groups, conflict is more likely to escalate. 
The ongoing research program on civil society and sub-state violence now 
includes multiple methodological approaches to identify key mechanisms that link civic 
groups to variable conflict outcomes. Most studies use case study methods (Barkan 1994; 
Belloni 2001; Orjuela 2003; Imobighe 2003; Paffenholz 2010), some use mixed methods 
(Kaplan 2013; Murdie 2014), and a few recent studies use large-N data (Nilsson 2012; 
Bailer, Bodenstein, and Heinrich 2013). Within the literature, the range of potential 
mechanisms linking civic groups and conflict outcomes is now far broader than the three 
main processes Varshney identified in the India case. The research program now focuses 
on the specification of what civic associations really do, on the ground, to contain 
violence during inter-ethnic group conflicts.  
Most civil society studies analyze specific types of organizations. Business 
associations, churches and faith-based organizations (FBOs), NGOs, INGOs, 
transnational human rights networks, and political parties, in particular, all may play 
positive roles in containing conflict. Varshney’s research focused on the positive role of 
crosscutting business associations, similar to Jha, who analyzed medieval trading towns 
in India and found that ethnic groups engaged in trade tended to form business 
associations that helped prevent inter-group conflict (Jha 2008). Similarly, in the case of 
Colombia, when civil war broke out, a local peasant workers’ association served as a 
platform for communities to negotiate with armed actors. The institution improved 
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monitoring of the behavior of armed actors and improved the transparency and credibility 
of information about local crises, effectively limiting acts of violence (Kaplan 2013).  
Religious organizations, some argue, dampen violence by changing social norms 
around the use of violence. For example, Fein argues that during the holocaust where 
local churches were engaged in regular, active opposition to Jewish persecution, violence 
was less common than in areas without church presence (Fein 1979). Similarly, in the 
Rwanda case, Longman suggests Christian churches failed to condemn violence at the 
state level, creating a window for mass collective violence (Longman 2009). At the same 
time, in some small pockets of Western Rwanda local churches actively condemned 
violence through peace messaging campaigns. Peace messaging and norm change around 
the use of violence may lead to lower levels of casualties in particular communities (see 
also, Frank 2002; Imobighe 2003; Morton 2008; Sisk 2011).  
NGOs, INGOs, and transnational networks may play a similar role as religious 
organizations and FBOs in changing norms around the use of violence during conflict 
and share information about local conflict dynamics across broad networks of civic 
associations. In some cases, there is case study evidence that they helped communities 
develop capacity to use non-coercive or nonviolent tactics to contain violence. McMahon, 
for example, argues networks of transnational NGOs in Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
helped dampen conflict (McMahon 2007). In areas where violence could have erupted, 
transnational NGO networks were heavily involved in peace messaging, providing direct 
support for nonviolent social movements, and financing inter-ethnic group negotiations. 
Similarly, information sharing may have played a role in stopping genocide in the East 
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Timor case. International journalists gained internal access to the conflict through local 
NGOs and CSOs. This allowed for sharing of information on the conflict that improved 
the effectiveness of peacebuilding responses (Robinson 2009). 
Beyond information sharing, and providing support for local peacebuilding 
efforts, the inclusion of civic organizations in peace negotiations may be a key 
mechanism for violence prevention. Nilsson’s analysis of global data on peace 
agreements, for example, claims violence is less likely to re-escalate if peace processes 
include civic organizations.21 NGOs and INGOs may play lead roles in bargaining 
processes, threat monitoring, and holding spoilers accountable for the use of violence 
within local conflicts (Murdie 2009; Murdie and Davis 2012). Civic associations can 
provide eyes of the ground for identifying culprits of violence, reducing the anonymity of 
armed actors, and raising the cost of engaging in violence (Brass 1997).  
While there is a significant amount of case study evidence that suggests civic 
organizations tend to play positive roles in preventing violence, the role of NGOs and 
INGOs remains highly contested in the literature on peacebuilding. Many scholars argue 
NGOs and INGOs, across multiple cases, have had a very minimal or even negative 
impact on local conflict dynamics. Autesserre, for example, claims the behaviors of 
international peacebuilders commonly deepen cleavages between external actors and 
communities in conflict (Autesserre 2014). In the Nigeria case, she suggests INGOs 
involved in peacebuilding do not help contain violence.  
                                                
21 The relationship between inclusivity and stable peace echoes the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011. 
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Denskus and Eaton find evidence of other mechanisms that prevent INGOs from 
having a positive impact on local conflict. Elite capture of civic groups and communal 
perceptions of corruption, bias, and inequality among INGOs involved in local peace 
processes are dominant explanations of peacebuilding organizations (Denskus 2007; 
Eaton 2008a; Autesserre 2014). Similarly, Smock, Pearlman, and Richmond hypothesize 
that overly bureaucratic solutions to localized conflict often decrease the effectiveness of 
grassroots peace processes (Smock 1997; Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham 
2012; Richmond 2013). The imposition of externally developed solutions for local, inter-
ethnic group conflict may undermine the efforts of more organic, ground-up 
peacebuilding processes (Mamdani 1996). Only domestic processes, many argue, can 
truly contain local conflict. In short, critics suggest civil society organizations regularly 
fail to contain violence. It may be more rare for civic groups to develop capacity to 
prevent complex inter-group conflicts from escalating than much of the literature of civil 
society organizations suggests.  
The civil society literature also includes analysis of political parties as a key type 
of civic associations that plays a role in processes of local ethnic conflict prevention. The 
literature is linked to larger debates around formal state institutions for political 
contestation and inter-ethnic cooperation, also known as the long-running 
consociationalism (Lijphart 1969; Lustick 1979; René Lemarchand 2007; Selway and 
Templeman 2012) versus centripetalism debate (Sisk 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; 
Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Reilly 2001; Large and Sisk 2006). These arguments focus on 
formal, constitutional incentive structures for political parties. Whether or not parties 
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choose to divide ethnic groups by playing the “ethnic card,” or unite ethnic groups in the 
pursuit of political power may impact whether or not ethnic violence is likely to escalate. 
For example, in contrast to Varshney’s argument regarding crosscutting civic 
groups in the India case, Wilkinson argues that political parties and associated elites 
actively protected minority groups from acts of violence only when a larger ethnic group 
depended upon a smaller minority group to maintain a coalition necessary to win an 
election (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972a; Wilkinson 2006). In other words, whether or not 
violence is used against particular groups depends upon electoral dynamics and political 
calculations of the value of minority group support. These theories imply political parties 
have authority to mobilize and command armed actors and determine whether or not 
violence escalates between particular ethnic groups around electoral cycles. When 
political parties and their leaders have little to lose or a lot to gain from violence, 
escalation may be more likely (Laitin 2007; Gagnon 2006).  
This perspective, quite prevalent in the literature on African politics assumes 
ethnic entrepreneurs regularly mobilize ethnic constituencies to engage in collective 
violence (Bates 2008; Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006; Boege, Brown, and 
Clements 2009). With minimal state authority and weak justice systems to hold power 
political actors accountable, political actors have both greater capacity for, and fewer 
disincentives against, organizing ethnic groups and instigating inter-communal conflicts 
using violent tactics for the purpose of gaining political power. Elites competing for 
power may engage in ethnic outbidding, or, in other words, appeal to ethnicity as most 
important issue for the masses (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).  
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In sum, whether or not local violence escalates, from this perspective, depends 
upon the interests of political parties. Parties may manipulate ethnic identity and draw 
upon inter-ethnic grievances in order to gain or maintain access to local political power. 
This explanation is critical for the Kenya context, as some of the most severe episodes of 
violence in Northern Kenya have occurred in the run up to, or just after local elections. 
The process of devolving power to the local level in Kenya, many analysts argue, may 
ethnic conflict to become for intense around contests for local political power in regions 
that historically have not had relevance for national elections.   
Local militias and vigilante groups are the final major type of civic group 
analyzed in the literature on civic organizations and ethnic conflict (Meagher 2007; 
Meagher 2012). Weinstein and Wood analyze various militia organizational structures 
that can vary in terms of using violent or nonviolent action against rival groups 
(Weinstein 2007; Wood 2014). Similar to Olson’s theory of the stationary bandit, 
analyses of militia organizations claim whether or not violence escalates depends upon 
the relationship between the community and local militias (Olson 1971). For example, 
Weinstein argues opportunistic militia groups are more likely to escalate violence against 
local communities. They do not require support from the community to survive, and tend 
to be more fragmented and less capable of preventing militia members from using 
violence against rival communities to extract resources.  
Bunker suggests an alternative theory—armed groups with links to illicit markets 
require support from the local population and are thus more likely to use violence against 
out-groups that challenge their authority (Sullivan and Bunker 2002; Bunker 2012). In 
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sum, theories of militia behavior imply the drivers of escalation or non-escalation relate 
to the internal organizational structures of armed militias. From this perspective, in 
contrast to the larger literature on civic associations, the capacity of a militia to restrain 
its own potentially violent actors is more critical than the capacity of local civic groups to 
mobilize to contain the escalation of violence.   
Overall, the civil society literature provides a broad set of potential explanations 
and mechanisms for explaining why violence escalates in some cases, and not others. 
Local civic organizations may incentivize inter-group cooperation through crosscutting 
social networks, or monitor conflict dynamics and provide information to conflict parties 
and the state to improve policing. They may leverage international support and use 
external resources for preventive diplomacy. They may even alter norms at the local level 
and change the behavior of armed groups. However, there are four gaps in analysis of the 
relationship between civic groups and patterns of ethnic conflict.  
First, by focusing on cases with very specific types of associations, the literature 
does not capture the empirical reality of what civil society often looks like on the ground 
in conflict-affected communities. Even in very remote and largely ungoverned regions in 
conflict-affected countries, multiple civic organizations engage in responses to contain 
violence. Rarely do conflict settings include only one type of organization. There is a 
very high level of institutional multiplicity, even in remote settings such as Northern 
Kenya. This insight serves as a conceptual foundation for the coalitions concept. In areas 
prone to insecurity, informal civic coalitions and other local, informal institutional 
arrangements may form and play significant roles in containing escalation.  
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Conceptually, according to Stevenson et al. coalitions are “deliberately 
constructed, [yet] independent of formal organizational structures” (Stevenson, Pearce, 
and Porter 1985, 256 – 257). Empirically, many civic associations at the local level in the 
Kenya context are informal organizations, as opposed to formal organizational structures 
(Opalo 2011). The coalitions concept allows for assessment of cooperation among 
various civic organizations involved in preventive action in a conflict setting. It also 
provides a conceptual foundation for inquiry into the extent to which cooperation among 
civic associations cuts across ethnic boundaries. The presence or absence of a cohesive 
coalition of local peace actors may affect whether or not local associations are able to 
contain escalation.  
Second, the literature assumes civic associations predominantly use non-coercive 
or nonviolent forms of pressure to contain escalation. The primary mechanisms across the 
literature are non-coercive forms of pressure designed to change the behavior of armed 
actors, including monitoring threats, information sharing, spoiler accountability and 
transparency, or teaching and supporting non-coercive or nonviolent conflict resolution 
strategies. However, evidence from conflict cases across the Kenya context raises a 
question—is it accurate to classify civic organizations as largely non-coercive, nonviolent 
actors?  
In some settings in Northern Kenya, civic associations directly and indirectly 
support local militias and extend their capacity to use or threaten to use deadly force 
against rival groups. For example, in the Nyrio Mountain corridor (see chapter 4), civic 
organizations contain escalation largely through their ability to expand communal support 
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for a broad network of local militias. Civic groups improve access to information about 
threats provide organizational support for militias to respond more rapidly and directly to 
threats and warnings of impending attacks. In this case, the contribution of local civic 
organizations is not in fostering crosscutting, inter-group cooperation as Varshney’s 
theory suggests, but in improving the capacity of local militias to exert coercive force as a 
deterrent.  
Third, the literature on civil society and ethnic conflict presents a paradox. Some 
research on inter-ethnic group violence suggests the experience of conflict itself can 
improve civic capacity to contain future violence. For instance, Bellows and Miguel 
found in Sierra Leone that communities impacted most by violence during the war were 
more likely than communities not impacted “to attend community meetings…join local 
political and community groups, and…vote” (Bellows and Miguel 2009, 1145). The most 
conflict-affected communities had higher levels of civic engagement and thus higher 
potential for collective efficacy, or communal capacity to contain and regulate inter-
group conflict (Sampson and Wikstrom 2008). Communities often bear the highest costs 
of violence, which may create incentives for civilians to develop collective solutions to 
reduce insecurity.  
In short, this approach suggests crisis may help communities overcome collective 
action dilemmas and adopt new strategies for preventing violence. In line with this logic, 
many arguments about the efficacy of civic associations claim prior experience in 
organizing preventive responses increases the likelihood of future success. A primary 
assumption of Varshney’s theory is that prior organizational experience creates social 
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frameworks that then serve as platforms for mitigating conflict between ethnic groups 
before it escalates (Varshney 2002). In other words, under conditions of state fragility, 
civic organizations develop skill sets that, over time, allow for more effective preventive 
action. Local coping and the formation of informal institutions may lead to stronger inter-
community ties, and strategic innovations that can dampen violence. In sum, this 
approach suggests state fragility creates conditions for resilience via the strengthening of 
civic groups and informal institutional arrangements. 
Variation across the Kenya context allows for examination of this claim, 
especially in areas where collective efforts of local organizations were successful in 
containing prior inter-group conflicts in the past, but then violence re-escalated (see, 
chapter 5). For example, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee is cited 
commonly as a case of successful civic-led prevention (Menkhaus 2008; Odendaal 2013). 
However, violence re-escalated in the region in 2012 and 2014. Varshney’s theory does 
not account for factors that can cause well-organized civic coalitions to fail to contain 
violence, even after they have been successful in the past (Meagher 2012).  
The Kenya context indicates even the strongest and most effective civil society 
groups may face critical limitations, which indicates a gap in knowledge related to scope 
conditions for effective violence prevention through non-state organizational structures. 
Civic groups may be able to contain some types of violence yet not others. Civic groups 
also may be prone to threat – response dilemmas similar to state-level policy makers 
(George and Holl 1997). Even with adequate information about possible threats, civic 
groups may not have adequate incentives to take risks necessary to preemptively 
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intervene in local conflicts. Moreover, in some cases, state elites may directly work to 
undermine the capacity of civic associations. Ethiopia’s Charities and Societies 
Proclamation, for instance, does not allow local organizations to share information 
openly about local conflict dynamics, which has implications for peacebuilding efforts 
along the Kenya – Ethiopia border (see, chapter five). In other cases, previously effective 
civic association break down following state-led policing or military interventions that 
use indiscriminant violence against communities.   
Overall, non-state actors and civic associations have a broad range of tools that 
may contain escalation and limit the spread of collective violence in some cases, but fail 
to do so in others. It is not clear what causes such broad variation in the extent to which 
civic associations may or may not prove capable of containing conflict. In any given 
conflict setting, some civic organizations may have more capacity than others to 
coordinate effective interventions to contain escalation. The track record of civic 
organizations is not perfect, and prior success does not ensure future success. The Kenya 
context provides a large range of cases in which to assess the relative efficacy of different 
civic coalitions and preventive interventions, as well as the factors that hinder effective 
preventive responses.  
 
Informal Institutions, Ethnic Conflict, and Communal Adaptation 
A third school of thought in the literature claims the principal conditions that 
affect patterns of inter-ethnic group violence are not related to the state’s ability to police, 
or civic associations’ ability to build peace, but to informal institutional arrangements 
specific to particular conflict settings. Informal institutions are unwritten conventions or 
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codes of behavior that evolve over time (see, North 1990). As Helmke and Levitsky state, 
informal institutions22 are, “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, 727). For example, in some communities in Northern Kenya, following 
deadly clashes elders negotiate communal restitution or “blood payments” to support 
aggrieved communities and reduce the likelihood of violent retribution (Chopra 2009). 
Context-specific institutions at the communal level of analysis may impact whether or not 
violence escalates.  
This theoretical perspective contradicts the bulk of research on ethnic conflict that 
focuses on formal institutional arrangements for containing inter-ethnic group conflict 
(Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005; Laitin 2007). Assessment of formal institutions overlooks 
informal customs, traditions, or adaptive rule systems that may create disincentives for 
violence within inter-ethnic group conflicts. Informal institutional arrangements tend to 
result from communal adaptation to high levels of human insecurity. Menkhaus, for 
instance, states, “local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and 
insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase 
predictability in their dangerous environments” (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and 
Vlassenroot 2008, 75). This is the fundamental assumption of what Meagher coins the 
“strength of weak states premise” (Meagher 2012)— vulnerable communities, in some 
cases, may be as innovative and strategic as armed militias. Communities may adapt 
                                                
22 In Helmke and Levitsky’s conceptual orientation, informal institutions are rooted in “shared 
expectations” rather than “shared values,” which means they may or may not be rooted in culture. Culture 
might “reinforce or undermine particular informal institutions” (727). 
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preventive, informal institutions to maximize protection and reduce the likelihood of 
collective violence (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006).  
The concept of preventive adaptation is most common in research on 
environmental vulnerability (Taylor and Mackenzie 1992; Eriksen, Brown, and Kelly 
2005; Eriksen and Lind 2009). However, the concept has important implications for the 
study of sub-state ethnic conflict. As McAdam states, “lacking [formally] 
institutionalized power, challengers devise techniques that offset their powerlessness” 
(McAdam 1983, 735). Conceptually, adaptation focuses on context specific protection 
strategies and informal rule systems that communities devise for protection under 
conditions of insecurity, the threat of violence from ethnic competitors, and the absence 
of state security (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006).  
There is evidence for communal adaptation in periphery regions in Somalia and 
Somaliland leading to informal institutional arrangements that contain inter-ethnic group 
conflict. In particular, elders and religious authorities collaborated with militia leaders to 
form informal policing units, enact customary modes of conflict resolution, and even 
provide basic public services within conflict-affected communities (Menkhaus 2008). In 
these cases, traditional authorities, including elders and imams, devised new informal 
institutional arrangements to resolve inter-group conflicts. This had a dampening effect 
on inter-group violence even in the absence for formal security and justice institutions. 
Ayittey and Meagher find evidence of similar outcomes in South Sudan and Nigeria—
indigenous institutions serve as the foundation for the emergence of new community 
protection systems that improve resilience to violence (Ayittey 2006; Meagher 2012).  
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The literature on peacebuilding, therefore, generally indicates there is a positive 
relationship between informal institutions and communal resilience (Edwards 1985; 
Malan 1997; Boege 2006). Supporters of the so-called post-liberal peace paradigm argue 
local, informal conflict resolution approaches are more effective than external, formal 
approaches for preventing violence within traditional societies. Richmond, Kumar, and 
Chandler, for instance, claim indigenous conflict prevention practices play critical and 
under-analyzed roles in preventing inter-group violence (Richmond 2010; Kumar 2011; 
Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Chandler 2013). Murithi, MacGinty, and Akinwale present 
case study evidence from local peace processes in Ghana, Nigeria, and South Sudan to 
support this theory (Murithi 2008; MacGinty 2008; Akinwale 2010).  
In the absence of effective and legitimate state institutions in largely ungoverned 
periphery regions, traditional conflict mediation processes may play important roles in 
determining whether or not conflict escalates following initial acts of inter-group 
violence (Hydén 2006). Traditional conflict resolution processes commonly provide 
groups with access to channels for bargaining outside of corrupt, inefficient, and high 
cost justice systems common across Sub-Saharan Africa. Customs and codes of behavior 
embedded in community-level social expectations about compensation, fairness, and 
social support for communities affected by violence may dampen stabilize inter-ethnic 
relations and reduce the likelihood of escalation.  
Conflict resolution scholars argue the unique qualities of traditional conflict 
resolution processes lead to more positive outcomes than mediation processes led by 
external state-based peacebuilding organizations or INGOs. Theoretically, rather than 
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using coercive pressures or threats to get conflict actors to the negotiation table, 
traditional modes of mediation tend to rely upon elders as legitimate local authorities and 
trusted conflict mediators (Rothchild 1995; Zartman 2000; Lederach 2012). Buur and 
Kyed, for example, argue state-led peace processes are often short-term and ad hoc, 
whereas traditional peace processes are long-term and based on consensus building. 
Elder-led peace processes, they suggest, are more effective than state-led processes 
because they use legitimate rules for negotiation and have high levels of communal 
participation and inclusivity. These qualities of traditional peacebuilding may increase 
the stability of local agreements (Buur and Kyed 2007).  
In Lederach’s terms, elders play critical roles in containing inter-ethnic group 
violence because they are able to function as “insider-partial” mediators. Elders tend to 
have personal stakes in conflict outcomes (Wehr and Lederach 1991). The insider partial 
concept aligns with Fearon and Laitin’s theory of interethnic cooperation. Elders and 
traditional conflict mediators may function as powerful information brokers with, 
“specialized knowledge of actors, members, and personality types within the group” 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996, 731). Local information brokers play significant roles in 
reducing uncertainty following conflict triggers, often decreasing the probability of 
escalation.  
Communal adaptation and the emergence of context-specific informal 
institutional arrangements, therefore, are plausible explanations for why conflict escalates 
in some cases, but not others. Ethno-specific peacebuilding institutions or context 
specific preventive adaptations may affect whether or not armed actors choose to escalate 
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conflict. Analysis of the relationship between communal adaptation and patterns of 
conflict escalation, therefore, is a key level of analysis for the study.  
The literature on traditional conflict resolution and informal institutions has 
critics. Similar to civil society theories, the primary unresolved debate is related to scope 
conditions. In particular, to what extent can traditional, informal peace processes, or 
“local infrastructures for peace,” (Lederach 2012) contain modern forms of violence and 
inter-ethnic group conflict? Recent research on conflict dynamics in Kenya, in particular, 
suggests that informal institutions and customary modes of conflict prevention may no 
longer function as effective controls or checks against violence.  
Prior research on conflict dynamics in Kenya challenges the assumptions of the 
strength of weak states premise. In contrast to a broad set of literature on indigenous 
peace processes, Adano and Wittsenberg argue traditional modes of conflict prevention 
often fail to contain modern processes of inter-group conflict in periphery regions. The 
actual contribution of informal conflict prevention processes maybe overstated (Adano et 
al. 2012). For example, Duffield, Boege and Chapman argue traditional conflict 
resolution practices are increasingly ineffective. Heavily armed, highly cohesive youth 
militias no longer follow traditional codes of conduct or respond to traditional forms of 
social authority (Duffield 1997; Mkutu 2001; Turton 2003; Boege 2006; Chapman and 
Kagaha 2009).  
From this perspective, elders once had control over youth militias and consistently 
helped limit the use of indiscriminant violence. Elders shared experience with militias on 
assessing threats, effective scouting, and calculating low-risk opportunities for defensive 
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attacks or acts of banditry. However, the integration and rapid modernization of periphery 
regions, the proliferation of small arms, increasingly severe human insecurity, and the 
emergence of powerful warlords with wealthy patrons living outside of conflict zones 
may, in fact, undermine the effectiveness of informal and traditional modes of conflict 
prevention. 
In short, some analysts claim the experience of elders used to be a check against 
indiscriminant acts of violence. Now, however, young warlords have more wealth and 
power than elders, making militias more likely to use indiscriminant violence against 
rival out-groups to increase power, territorial control, and wealth. Without the control of 
elders, heavily armed youth, with little experience in warfare, may be more likely to use 
deadly force to steal resources from rival ethnic groups, even killing women and children 
in the process. These acts of violence may increase the likelihood of escalation. They are 
less calculated, more deadly, and an affront to traditional cultural norms about how 
violence should be used, and who or who should not be a target. From this perspective, 
the state may be necessary for solving the enforcement dilemma (Brosché and Elfversson 
2012). Without the state acting as a third party and threatening to use violence to enforce 
local pacts, informal institutions may have very little power to affect patterns of 
escalation (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994).  
Many analysts of conflict dynamics in Northern Kenya follow this logic. Mirzeler 
and Young, inter alia, claim pastoralist warfare has become a capitalistic form of 
resource extraction. Rising prices for livestock and land drive groups to use increasing 
severe forms of violence against ethnic out-groups for individual economic benefit 
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(Krätli, Swift, and England 1999; Bates 1999; Mkutu 2001; Mirzeler and Young 2000). 
In other words, leaders of militia groups in the periphery are modern robber barons 
(Collier 2000). Violence escalates when ethnic militias choose to target neighboring 
communities for personal gain, putting their own communities at risk of further violence. 
This theory suggests marginal returns are higher for militia groups with more weapons, 
less aversion to the use of deadly violence, and less attachment to the larger ethnic 
community. Escalating inter-group violence, from this perspective, is the outcome of 
rational maximizing, economic behavior among militias trying to maintain and gain 
wealth in periphery regions (Gelsdorf, Maxwell, and Mazurana 2012).  
The same logic informs a recent wave of small arms research across Northern 
Kenya and other ungoverned areas of fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mkutu 2003; 
Weiss 2004; SRIC 2006; Ndungu 2009; Wepundi 2012). This line of research is based on 
the assumption that the proliferation of small arms is a key explanation for escalation. 
Cameron et al. state, “Since the availability of modern firearms, [informal] processes for 
mitigating escalation have become eroded, causalities have become higher, and cycles of 
revenge, often indiscriminate, have become more common” (Cameron, Weatherbed, and 
Onyiego 2013, 4). Modern forms of pastoralist violence and new forms of weapon 
technology provide ethnic groups with more power to threaten the existence of other 
groups leading to increasingly severe ethnic security dilemmas (Mirzeler and Young 
2000).  
This narrative, however, may not be accurate, especially based on the logic of 
restraint within inter-ethnic group conflicts. The presence of advanced weapons 
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technology in traditional pastoralist societies may limit the deadliness of inter-ethnic 
attacks and reduce the likelihood of escalation. With advanced weapons, youth militias 
become smaller and more risk averse, with knowledge that potential enemy groups are 
also well armed (Eaton 2008a). In other words, even if customary forms of authority are 
not as capable of controlling youth militias, the proliferation of more and more modern 
weapons may restrain ethnic militias from using violent force by increasing fear among 
armed groups of the consequences of escalating violence. This logic aligns closely with 
prior studies of escalation that contend internal calculations of the potential cost of 
violence to armed actors affect whether or not conflict escalates (Zartman 1989; Zartman 
2001; Morgan et al. 2008, 34 – 36). 
Overall, the literature on informal institutions serves as the foundation for analysis 
of how community level adaptations may affect the actions of youth militias following 
violent attacks, and thus affect patterns of conflict escalation. In many conflict settings 
formal institutions have very little influence upon the daily lives of citizens, leaving 
informal institutional arrangements as the most important rule systems shaping inter-
group interactions (Chirot and McCauley 2010). Informal institutions remain critical for 
understanding patterns of conflict.  
Whether or not unique forms of communal adaptation and customary mechanisms 
for conflict prevention contain escalation requires further investigation (MacGinty 2008). 
In particular, local adaptation may include forms of tactical innovation to increase the 
capacity of local militias to use or threaten to use deadly force as the primary foundation 
or communal resilience, rather than non-coercive strategies, such as traditional conflict 
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resolution processes, preventive bargaining and informal pacts, or informal codes of 
restitution.   
 
Assessing State, Civic, and Communal Responses to Local Conflicts 
  Across the three sets of literature, the key unresolved problems are all related to 
scope conditions. When do state actions accelerate or contain local, inter-ethnic group 
conflict? To what extent do informal communal protection strategies accelerate or 
contain conflict? In particular, there is a lack of clarity on the conditions under which 
civic may or may not have the capacity to contain forms of inter-group violence that 
presently affect communities in ungoverned periphery regions.  
  Explaining why some conflicts escalate and others requires addressing state 
actions, civic coalitions, and informal communal adaptation. These three concepts justify 
a levels-of-analysis approach to study patterns of escalation across various conflict 
settings. The approach also aligns with Carment and James’ insight that, “ethnic conflicts 
are multifaceted and dynamic phenomena. The analysis of ethnic conflict should focus on 
the development of models based on theories of multiple causation” (Carment and James 
1996, 1). Similarly, Straus proposes that the study of ethnic violence should clearly 
articulate the ways in which processes of, “escalation and restraint can be seen to work in 
tandem” (Straus 2012, 345). Conditions that restrain escalation, and the factors that 
breakdown and undermine restraints are as critical for understanding process of inter-
ethnic violence as the core drivers.  
  As the conceptual basis for structured, focused comparison, in each case, after the 
initial outbreak of conflict, patterns of response related to state actors, civic 
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organizations, and communal adaptations are addressed, and then linked to conflict 
outcomes. Based upon the conceptual framework outlined, the following questions are 
the foundation for empirical inquiry across the cases: 
1. Following an initial outbreak of violence, how did local civic associations 
respond to the incident? What were the effects, if any, on the subsequent 
process of conflict escalation or restraint?  
• What, if anything, happened after the initial conflict between the groups?  
• Is there evidence that local, civic, and/or state responses restrained conflict 
actors from engaging in further attacks, or resolving the initial conflict 
trigger? Or, is there evidence that responses contributed, in meaningful 
ways, to the continuation of conflict and further acts of violence?  
• Is there evidence that particular types of responses were more or less 
effective than others in resolving the crisis following the initial outbreak 
of conflict?  
 More specifically, the proposed causal mechanisms, key conditions, and 
interactive effects mapped out in the section above for explaining escalation or non-
escalation are analyzed within each episode, using questions that reflect the most critical 
set of factors and interactions.  
2. How did conflict actors react to preventive responses? What were 
particular courses of action that followed? Why did the conflict escalate, 
or not escalate? 
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• What actions did local associations in the area undertake in response to the 
initial outbreak of conflict? To what extent did civic associations 
cooperate while engaging in preventive responses?  
• Was the coalition of local peacebuilding organizations able to maintain 
cohesiveness and stability following the outbreak of violence? Was the 
coalition of actors able to maintain cohesiveness and stability following 
state intervention? 
• Was the coalition able to support community actors in using non-coercive 
strategies to respond to violence? What types of bargaining processes were 
initiated, and to what effect?  
• Did the state deploy security forces in response to communal violence, or 
not? Did state actors elect to cooperate with particular civic groups within 
the local peace coalition, or not?  
• Is there evidence of militias adopting new strategies in relation to 
particular state actions? Did state actions undermine or compliment local 
approaches to the conflict? 
 Regarding the problem of how to compare a broad range of strategies for 
containing local inter-group conflict, Rothchild proposes a typology distinguishing 
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coercive from non-coercive modes of state response (Rothchild 1995).23 The two 
categories, with minor amendments, provide a framework for analysis of the state, civic, 
and communal responses to violence. After conflict occurs, actors typically respond with 
coercive or non-coercive measures to attempt to contain escalation.  
 Conceptually, structural prevention strategies are employed prior to the outbreak 
of crisis to try to deal with root drivers of conflict. Categories of structural preventive 
strategies include early warning, preventive diplomacy, sanctions, inducements, and 
military force. Operational prevention strategies are employed following a crisis. The 
main types of operational preventive action include mediation, messaging, and assistance 
(Carnegie Commission 1998). The following typology of preventive actions derived from 
the literature on conflict prevention in general and conflict prevention in Africa, 
specifically, serves as a tool for identification and comparative analysis of various types 
of strategies used by different actors to contain violence across cases in Northern Kenya.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Rothchild conceptualizes bargaining as the opposite of violence. Violence eliminates all opportunities for 
group bargaining and imposes the will of one group for control over another. From this perspective, 
limiting escalation requires securing opportunities for inter-ethnic group bargaining and negotiation. The 
key causal mechanism Rothchild identifies that contains violence is the “moral norm of reciprocity.” Where 
groups share this norm, it operates as the foundation for inter-group bargains and conflict reduction, but 
without this shared norm, extreme fear emerges increasing the likelihood of violence (Rothchild 1995). 
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Table 2: Types of Preventive Action 
 
Level of 
Analysis 
Coercive Non-coercive Outcomes 
State • Sanctions 
• Inducements 
• Police/Military 
Force 
 
• Messaging 
• Mediation 
• Assistance 
 
• Escalate 
• Contain 
• Re-escalate 
 
Civic 
 
• Sanctions 
• Inducements 
• Militia Support 
 
• Messaging 
• Mediation 
• Assistance 
 
• Escalate 
• Contain 
• Re-escalate 
Local 
 
 
• Sanctions 
• Inducements 
• Militia Force 
• Messaging 
• Mediation 
• Assistance 
• Escalate 
• Contain 
• Re-escalate 
 
 
 
 
Coalitions and Conflict Trajectories 
While there are multiple theories relating a broad spectrum of potential causes of 
escalation or restraint within communal conflicts, the study proposes a narrow set of 
specific factors and scope conditions to explain why violence escalates in some cases but 
not others. The following section proposes a theory to explain variation across conflict 
cases that share a high risk of escalating under conditions of sub-state fragility.  
 
Logic of Escalation in Fragile Settings  
The core features of conflicts within periphery settings that make violence likely 
to escalate between groups are as follows. Following a deadly attack, a targeted group 
faces a critical decision juncture: to use coercive or non-coercive means to respond to 
acts of aggression. Not responding at all puts the group at risk of further threats, and high 
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levels of poverty undermine the capacity of group to absorb the loss of property.24 Non-
coercive response, or, more specifically, initiating a process of bargaining and conflict 
mediation with an assumed culprit, requires sending emissaries to acquire adequate 
information about the identity of culprits, their location, and motivations.25 
In remote periphery regions with limited state presence, the risks associated with 
initiating mediation processes are significant. Emissaries sent to negotiate may be 
targeted by attackers or other armed groups operating in the region, or even threatened or 
targeted by civilian actors within the out-group community committed to protecting the 
identity of armed actors (see also, Eaton 2008b).  
Indirect means of attaining information following an attack are also high risk. 
Attaining information through personal relationships risks causing a contact to risk in-
group trust, or, at worse, face the threat of violence for sharing information with an out-
group. In areas where ethnic communities are highly skilled in protecting the individual 
identity of armed assailants following acts of aggression, violence is increasingly likely 
to escalate between ethnic groups. Uncertainty surrounding the identity of individual 
culprits increases the likelihood of indiscriminate violence against an entire group.  
Considering the high risk associated with pursuing and gathering accurate 
information necessary to initiate a bargaining process following a deadly attack, 
indiscriminant violence against proximate members of the rival ethnic group becomes a 
lower risk option for deterring further acts of aggression. Absent channels for bargaining 
                                                
24 Asfaw Kumsaa, UNCRD, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 18, 2014. 
 
25 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
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with ethnic militias and their intermediaries, aggrieved groups are more likely to engage 
in acts of organized violence against members of the opposition identity group who were 
not directly involved in the initial act of violence.  
 
Cohesive Coalitions 
Cohesive civic associations may support preventive actions that alter this logic, 
and thus reduce the likelihood of escalation. Providing secure spaces and opportunities 
for groups to negotiate informal rules for compensation and restitution is a key 
mechanism for containing and preventing escalatory dynamics. Local coalitions may 
increase access to conflict information, increase access to platforms for inter-group 
bargaining, and provide support for non-coercive communal protection strategies at the 
village-level. Cohesion, building from Pearlman’s conceptual framework, includes two 
observable characteristics, including unified local civic leaders, and the presence of 
institutions, formal or informal, with clearly articulated and accepted rules for conflict 
prevention (Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012).  
Effective coordination of preventive action does not have to be institutionalized, 
such as in formal District Peace Committee systems, but can be highly informal and 
action based. Unity among diverse civic associations and effective preventive action may 
occur where groups organize and mobilize around shared interests. Prevention capacity, 
therefore, depends upon alignment among multiple civic associations around a particular 
cause, or upon alignment with resisting the threat of attack from a particular violent actor. 
Where informal coalitions of civic organization improve threat monitoring, provide 
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platforms for inter-group bargaining and pact making, and enforce informal codes of 
restitution, violence may be less likely to escalate.  
Hypotheses 
• Escalation is less likely when a cohesive coalition of civic groups is 
present. 
• Escalation is more likely when a coalition of civic groups is not present. 
• Escalation is more likely when a coalition of civic groups breaks down. 
 Informal coalitions of local civic groups, including CBOs, FBOs, LPCs, elders’ 
networks, and youth militia leaders, inter alia, can, in some cases, prevent escalation. 
Coalitions restrain violence escalation by engagement in coordination of preventive 
actions including monitoring, threat response, routinized negotiation, immediate crisis 
response, and limiting interference and meddling by external actors interested in 
exacerbating conflict for economic or political gain. When coalitions break down and 
become fragmented, monitoring is limited, crisis response is not rapid or adequate to 
restrain mobilization for retribution, and external meddling is more likely.  
 Coalitions provide local actors working to protect communities with more complex 
institutional platforms for inter-ethnic group bargaining. Different types of civic 
associations engage in different types of bargaining processes, such as faith-based 
reconciliation strategies, or local peace institutions and inter-group dialogues. While 
approaches may vary in strategies for conflict prevention, in the absence of crosscutting 
civil society organizations, these processes, at least, increase opportunities for bargaining 
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and informal pact making between armed groups. Cohesive coalitions allow for the 
proliferation of platforms for inter-group bargaining, which can limit escalation.  
 
Scope Conditions 
In areas of limited statehood, local, informal coalitions help to routinize 
monitoring and bargaining processes. However, as mentioned above, even under 
conditions of state fragility the actions of representatives of the state can impact coalition 
cohesion and stability. In line with the logic described above, state responses to outbreaks 
of communal violence may either undermine or compliment coalition cohesion. Proposed 
scope conditions include the use of indiscriminant force by police and military forces and 
symbolic acts of violence. These two conditions may undermine preventive efforts of 
civic organizations and create windows for conflict escalation.  
Hypotheses 
• Escalation is more likely when coercive state responses cause local 
peacebuilding coalitions to collapse. 
• Escalation is less likely when state responses strengthen and compliment 
local coalitions.  
Political and economic interests condition state responses to local violence. The 
value of an area for particular state development strategies, political support and 
mobilization, and national security interests shape state responses to outbreaks of 
communal violence in any given locality. These interests impact not only whether or not 
the state will respond, but also how it will respond to initial outbreaks of inter-ethnic 
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group conflict. Whether or not the state uses coercive or non-coercive tactics to contain 
local violence, I argue, is shaped by the following logic. Investment in, and the 
deployment of, well-trained security actors in remote periphery areas is very high cost. 
Choosing to work through local voluntary institutions and informal coalitions already 
established at the local level is very low cost, even if potentially sub-optimal in terms of 
ensuring a monopoly over violence. Security outcomes may not fully improve by 
channeling state support and resources to local civic organizations, but state actors may 
choose sub-optimal behaviors during processes of coping with high levels of uncertainty 
and insecurity.    
 
Conclusion 
  Within literature related to containing local ethnic violence, the majority of 
theories situate agency for whether or not collective violence occurs at the level of the 
state, with political elites, or with militias. These approaches operate under the 
assumption that armed actors are most innovative and important actors to determine when 
outbreaks of mass armed violence will or will not occur within an ethnic conflict. 
However, dynamics of restraint may counteract state actions, elite actions, or the actions 
of armed militias are not well accounted for. In some cases, civic associations may be as 
well organized as armed actors in developing strategies to contain acts of violence. 
Prior studies have identified a range of potential contributions of civilian actors 
and organizations to process of violence restraint. However, this study advances the 
literature on civil society and ethnic violence by articulating key conditions that can both 
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support or undermine communal peace actions. In short, prior research over-exaggerates 
state fragility, under-exaggerates the capacity of communities to adapt and develop 
unique informal organizational arrangements to contain conflict, and largely overlooks 
critical interactive effects between state actions, informal coalitions, and local adaptation 
in shaping conflict trajectories.
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CHAPTER TWO: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND INSECURITY IN MODERNIZING 
KENYA  
 
To contextualize the conflicts under assessment in chapters three, four, and five, 
the following chapter analyzes the dynamics of ethnic conflict and conflict prevention 
strategies employed throughout different periods of Kenya’s history. The broader context 
of Kenya as a developmental state is related to the informal organizational structures in 
place to contain local violence. Historically, marginalization of the northern periphery 
region was, in part, a measure to contain conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist 
ethnic groups. Long-term marginalization, however, created conditions conducive to sub-
state fragility, high levels of human insecurity, and relatively high levels of armed 
violence across a broad region with limited state presence. In the post-independence 
period, the erosion of state legitimacy led to the mobilization of ethnic militias for 
communal protection, and the emergence of a broad array of civic organizations that 
function as primary providers of security and basic public goods across Northern Kenya.  
Over the past seven years, changes in the regional political economy have led to a 
policy reversal, with the state investing in and supporting the formation of more 
formalized peacebuilding institutions across Northern Kenya. However, even though 
there is a new set of formal institutions in place, communities continue to rely upon 
diverse configurations of non-state organizations, community leaders, elders, and 
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informal security actors who are not constitutionally mandated to provide local security. 
As James N’dungu describes, “there are a lot of new rules on the books for conflict 
prevention, but when you really look at how communities interact with the state to 
govern local conflicts, the rules are quite different.”26 Contextual dynamics, specific to 
Northern Kenya, affect both conflict dynamics and the efficacy of local peacebuilding 
efforts.  
 
State Formation and Sub-state Fragility 
Ethnic fragmentation remains a persistent feature of Kenya’s post-colonial 
political economy. Political and economic change generated conditions conducive for 
inter-ethnic group conflicts. Political elites used monetary handouts, land allocation, and 
even infrastructure, education, and health projects to secure support from particular 
ethnic groups for the formation of dominant ethnic coalitions (Barkan 2012). There is 
corresponding evidence that political elites, in order to maintain control of the state 
apparatus, directly coordinated attacks against ethnic groups aligned with opposition 
political coalitions (Branch 2011).  
Identity-based cleavages persist in Kenya due to a long history of political 
violence and prebendalism.27 Ethnic-based state resource allocation sustains social 
cleavages even during larger processes of rapid modernization and democratization. In 
Ruth Aluoch’s terms, “the success of any given community, economically, is tied to its 
                                                
26 James N’dungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 8, 2014. 
 
27 Prebendalism is Richard Joseph’s term. The concept describes political regimes in which state 
representatives use government resources to benefit co-ethnic supporters (Joseph 1983). 
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level of access to political power.”28 The following section maps the most persistent 
social cleavages across Kenya, along with the policies various regimes employed to 
contain inter-group conflicts that erupted under pressures related to state formation and 
economic integration.  
 
Colonial Strategies for Containing Local Violence 
State formation in Kenya has a long history with roots in the Berlin Conference 
and the Scramble for Africa in 1885. As early as 1895, the East Africa Company 
constructed railroads to open the territory for economic development, which led to a mass 
influx of European settlers starting in 1907 and the establishment of plantations and 
ranches for large-scale agricultural production (Lonsdale 1977). During the first stage of 
colonization over 350,000 Europeans, mostly from Great Britain, immigrated to Kenya. 
A large majority of the population settled in the Central Highlands, the primary territory 
of the Kikuyu (see map below). With European settlement concentrated in the Central 
Highlands, government institutions also concentrated in the area. The first colonial 
government called the Legislative Council maintained links between London and 
Nairobi, and constructed bureaucratic structures to provide basic public goods, including 
jails, schools, and livestock and agricultural management boards (Anderson 1986).  
In contrast, in Northern Kenya, then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD), 
the government established scattered military and administrative posts. The territory was 
officially set apart as a “closed district.” Bureaucratic structures remained weak with little 
authority, capacity, and legitimacy, especially among highly mobile pastoralist ethnic 
                                                
28 Ruth Aluoch, NSC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 24, 2013. 
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groups. Without formal boundaries to determine the limits of state control, authority was 
based on the extension of colonial military capacity (Herbst 2000). Within the regional 
political context, the NFD was a buffer zone to prevent the expansion of the Ethiopian 
empire under Menelik II (Zartman 1989, 114 – 118). British military posts across the 
North functioned as an informal border defense to protect Kenya from Italian interests in 
expanding the territory of Ethiopia southward (Fratkin and Roth 2006, 40).  
Under these conditions, early writers called Northern Kenya a bandits kingdom 
(Farson 1953). During this period, colonial authorities employed coercive, and in 
Berman’s terms, terror-like tactics against civilian populations to project authority and 
prevent inter-group conflict and violent clashes (Lonsdale 1977; Lonsdale and Berman 
1979; Berman 1992). The British military imposed order through the use of coercive 
force, or what the military called punitive expeditions. State-sanctioned violence against 
pastoralist ethnic groups was a component of the early state formation processes. The 
military threatened pastoralist groups, took livestock as a form of taxation, punished and 
shamed of local leaders accused of involvement in attacks, and assassinated local leaders 
who resisted colonial authorities (Berman and Lonsdale 1992).  
Not all colonial governance strategies used coercive measures as the basis for 
control, however. For groups such as the Turkana, Somali, Borana, Gabra, Rendille, and 
Samburu there was a high level of encouragement of nomadic movement. In many areas 
of Northern Kenya, the government established group ranches to separate conflicting 
pastoralist groups. As long as pastoralist groups paid taxes, engaged in minimal inter-
group conflict, and remained within the borders of designated grazing areas, the colonial 
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government did not intervene (Fratkin and Roth 2006). In some cases, arrests and public 
hearings were used to try suspected criminals. For example, as early as 1909, building 
upon traditional rules of conflict resolution, the Collective Punishment Ordinance 
required groups, as a whole, to pay for crimes of individuals from that group (Anderson 
1986). This institution persists today within multiple local peace agreements and 
customary codes of restitution. 
Historical records describe colonial leaders’ interest in protecting the traditional 
pastoralist lifestyle (Kochore 2013). This indicates an early motivation to protect 
indigenous cultures and pastoralist livelihoods that were under threat from nascent 
modernization and industrialization. This motive, however, contradicts early records of 
administrators’ views toward the region. In archived letters from the period, 
administrators posted to the NFD complained they were assigned positions as “museum 
curators” rather than “civilized administrators” (Kochore 2013). In some cases, colonial 
administrators were sent to government outposts such as, North Horr, Marsabit, Archer’s 
Post, and Loiyangalani on Lake Turkana as a form of political exile. The areas had very 
harsh living and working conditions compared to urbanizing town centers in the central 
highlands.  
 An economic logic also shaped the colonial governance strategy for the region. The 
projection of military authority protected the agricultural center from pastoralist groups. 
The North was not viable for large-scale agricultural production, and thus not worth the 
cost of investing in the development of bureaucratic structures needed to extract 
economic resources (see also, Boone 2003). To maximize agricultural resource 
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extraction, pastoralist groups were cordoned off within the closed frontier district to 
protect more fertile land. The closed district designation prevented pastoralists from 
migrating southward to more arable lands where European settlers had large-scale 
agricultural schemes, especially in the fertile Mt. Kenya central highlands. As Rothchild 
describes, a structure of European settler privilege shaped the deep and persistent core-
periphery cleavage in Kenya (Rothchild 1973). The early state structure served the 
interests of European settlers, and prioritized the interests of a particular, foreign ethnic 
group over the interests of indigenous groups.  
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Figure 2: Kenya Ethnicity and Dialect Map29 
 
 
 
Source: New World Encyclopedia 2015 
 
 
                                                
29 Source: New World Encyclopedia, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/File:Kenya_Dialect_map.jpg  
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 Overall, the structure of the early colonial state, and the nature of patron-client 
relationships between colonists and indigenous groups set up conditions for inter-ethnic 
group inequality. With the central highlands as the most productive region of the country, 
following independence, European settlers allocated the most valuable land and 
productive resources to the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu community, therefore, had 
greater initial access to state resources, educational opportunities, and capital not 
available to other ethnic groups, especially compared to pastoralist groups of the northern 
periphery.  
 These initial conditions created overlapping class and ethnic-based social divisions 
across the country, or, in Stewart’s terms, deep horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000; 
Stewart 2008). The Kikuyu, over time, comprised the dominant elite based on access to 
the most fertile land, early government capacity, and political control over the allocation 
of both land and state resources. Targeting of Kikuyus across Kenya in 2007-2008 was 
rooted within long-standing grievances among ethnic groups related to early colonial 
structures. 
 Overall, colonial policies set up conditions for persistent inter-ethnic group 
divisions and conflict over access to political power. At the same time, they set up the 
pastoralist periphery as the most underdeveloped and marginalized area of the country. 
With few roads, schools, and local government services human security30 is persistently 
under great threat for the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Rendille, Gabra, Borana, Garre, 
Murule, and Degodia communities of Northern Kenya. Under these conditions of sub-
                                                
30 For assessment of the relationship been human insecurity and inter-group conflict, see: (Kumssa, Jones, 
and Williams 2009). 
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state fragility, ethnic militias have proliferated to secure highly mobile, highly valuable 
communal resources under harsh environmental conditions. 
 
 
Opening a Closed District 
The transition to independence in Kenya was less violent than many other 
decolonization processes across Sub-Saharan Africa and other colonial states (Horowitz 
1985, 4 – 6). Even though decolonization did not directly trigger mass ethnic violence, 
the transition was intertwined with the Mau, Mau rebellion from 1952 – 1956 and the 
Shifta War, from 1963 – 1967 (see, Branch 2009). In 1952, the Mau Mau, a Kikuyu 
insurgent group, attacked British settlers in control of the largest and most fertile farming 
areas around Mt. Kenya and Meru. During the same time period, Jomo Kenyatta was a 
key leader of the Kenya African Union (KAU), a nonviolent independence movement. 
Initially, colonial authorities presumed Jomo Kenyatta was a supporter of the Mau Mau 
movement and thus imprisoned. He was later released in 1961.  
In response to the Mau Mau insurgency, British authorities coordinated a military 
campaign with over 15,000 troops (Barkan 2012). There is disagreement among 
historians around the severity of the Mau Mau conflict and the number of fatalities. 
Official documents from the colonial government indicate that there were 11,503 
fatalities. David Andersen suggests 20,000 fatalities is a more accurate number 
(Anderson 1986). Elkin’s archival work to get beyond official narratives and include 
washed evidence finds that 70,000 or more people died during the conflict (Elkins 2005). 
Eventually, the government defeated the Mau Mau in 1956 using extensive violence 
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against civilians including mass detention camps and acts of torture to try to identify and 
attain information about armed militias (see, Elkins 2005; Branch 2009).  
Comparative research on the Mau Mau movement points toward a relationship 
between local governance strategies and the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict. 
Mungeam’s research, for example, addresses the following puzzle: why did the Kikuyu 
use violence against white colonial settlers, yet not the Maasai, who were a larger 
majority group and well known for their warrior culture and military capacity (Mungeam 
1970). He builds a case that the Kikuyu, as an agriculturalist ethnic group, had a different 
standing relative to the projection of colonial authority than the Maasai, a pastoralist 
ethnic group. The colonial government’s interest in the extraction of agricultural 
resources caused the state to use more coercive and more violent state intervention in 
agricultural areas, compared to pastoralist regions. Even though Maasai were better 
organized for war than the Kikuyu, grievances against the colonial state were less severe 
in the pastoralist periphery than in agricultural regions. In short, the violent Mau Mau 
movement formed among the agriculturalist Kikuyu ethnic group due to deeper 
grievances against the extractive and coercive colonial government structure. 
After Jomo Kenyatta was released from prison in 1961, he became the first 
president of the newly independent state in 1963. The process of independence in Kenya 
triggered reformulation of state strategies for containing conflict in the northern 
periphery. In 1962, one year prior to independence, the state established a new institution 
called, the Northern Frontier District Commission. The Commission focused specifically 
on the management of ethnic grievances and conflicts in the periphery during the political 
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transition toward constitutional democracy. The primary challenge facing the commission 
was a secessionist movement among Somali31 ethnic groups (Whittaker 2014). Public 
sentiment among Somali ethnic groups across the NFD was in favor of territorial 
secession from Kenya. Kenyan Somalis wanted the NFD to join greater Somalia. 
However, in response to secessionist demands, in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta reportedly said, 
quite harshly, “Let them pack their camels and go back to Somalia” (Kochore 2013).  
The government did not grant Kenyan Somalis an opportunity for a popular 
consultation on the issue of secession. The denial of autonomy triggered the escalation of 
violence across the NFD. Starting in 1963, Somali shiftas attacked government posts. The 
government response to shifta attacks included enforced sedentarization of pastoralist 
communities and group detainment, the confinement livestock by the military, and 
widespread civilian abuses to identify, track, and detain militants. The Shifta war lasted 
from 1963 until 1967, when Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, led a team of 
mediators that reached the Arusha Agreement (Thompson 2015). 
Historians who analyzed the effects of state actions during the Shifta War found 
that the conflict had a very deep and lasting impact on pastoralist communities across the 
region. Communities in Northern Kenya still refer to the Shifta War as the “time of stop” 
(Whittaker 2008). In an already fragile and marginalized environment, military 
intervention destroyed all wealth in the area. The Shifta War exacerbated the process of 
pastoralist sedentarization, and further undermined the livelihoods of pastoralist ethnic 
groups (Fratkin and Roth 2006). There has not been another secessionist movement in 
                                                
31 Multiple Somali ethnic groups have resided for centuries within the current territory of the Kenyan state. 
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Northern Kenya since the Shifta war. However, the war itself deepened the core-
periphery cleavage between the North and South and further undermined the legitimacy 
of the GoK across the region.  
Archival documents reveal Kenyan leaders referring to local political leaders from 
Northern Kenya as “those secessionists.” The term shifta still operates as a slanderous 
term against ethnic Kenyan Somali communities (Whittaker 2014). In terms of general 
identity-based stereotypes, the North, to this day, remains, “the other Kenya,” and the 
South, “the real Kenya” for most residents of the rural periphery. Ethnic groups in the 
North have not formed an attachment to the larger Kenyan identity (Kisiangani 2014). 
This condition is most severe in Northeastern Kenya, along the Somalia border. Somali 
Kenyan youth were part of a major al-Shabaab attack against a University in Garissa, 
Kenya in March 2015 (Sperber 2015). The rising rate of radicalism among pastoralist 
youth, in general, and Kenyan Somali youth, in particular, is linked to the long history of 
marginalization of Northern Kenya. Persistent grievances against both the state and 
neighboring ethnic groups created pools of willing recruits for local ethnic militias, and, 
more recently, for al-Shabaab. 
 Over the fifteen-year tenure of the Kenyatta regime, Kenya experienced rapid 
economic growth. In general, most post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa promoted 
protectionism and socialist economic strategies. In contrast, the Kenyatta regime 
maintained a high degree of economic openness and promoted a more liberal orientation 
toward integration into the global economy. Liberal economic policy triggered rapid 
economic growth, yet development concentrated in the Central Highlands and within 
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urban centers. Critically, rapid economic development and urbanization did not reduce 
ethnic fragmentation, as modernization theories predicted. Mazrui’s study of post-
independence Kenya, for example, found that urbanization caused a decline in the 
practice of unique ethnic rituals and customs, but “in the scramble for limited 
opportunities and resources in cities and towns, the pull of ethnic loyalty has remained 
strong. Ethnic behavior may have declined, but ethnic loyalty has remained strong” 
(Mazrui 1998, 128).  
For the Kenyatta regime, Northern Kenya had little to contribute to rapid 
economic development. As a result, the area received minimal state investment and 
public goods provision. This outcome aligns with Rothchild’s theory of ethnic bargaining 
in developmental states. Outward looking national development policy tends to align with 
the political marginalization of groups and regions with little capacity to contribute to 
development of a modern market economy (Rothchild 1973). The direct categorization of 
the Northern periphery as a “low potential area”32 correlated with a process of state 
retreat (Kurimoto 1998). Government posts established under the colonial state were 
abandoned and neglected during the Kenyatta regime, leaving the northern periphery with 
even less contact with the center than during the colonial regime.  
Under these conditions, leaders from principally agricultural regions had little 
interest in allocating scarce government resources to rebuild defunct government 
institutions and protect and support pastoralist livelihoods. Political elites from the 
                                                
32 Low potential area is an official term within the, “Sessional paper No. 10 of 1965, African Socialism and 
Its Application to Planning in Kenya,” which divided the country into “low” and “high potential” areas 
(Kochore 2013). See, Government of Kenya (1965). Sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 African Socialism and 
its Application to Planning in Kenya. Republic of Kenya, Nairobi. 
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Central Highlands dominated the state system. Kikuyu elites under the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) controlled the first post-independence government. Technically, 
Kenya was a democratic regime, but in practice, the regime was neopatrimonial 
(Eisenstadt 1973; Erdmann and Engel 2007). In other words, political power consolidated 
among a set of male political elites from the Kikuyu ethnic group, and state resources 
were allocated to areas of the country where Kikuyu represented a majority of population 
(Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). State support for education in the Kikuyu highlands, in 
particular, set up conditions for Kikuyu dominance (Barkan 2012). 
Directly after independence in 1963, the NFD remained an official no-go zone for 
the government and outsiders. The government abolished the closed district policy in 
1969. The end of the closed district policy impacted conflict dynamics across the region. 
In many locations local elites and warlords controlled territory, while other pockets were 
fully anarchic with no clear center of local authority. In particular, Kratli et al. describe 
how the Northern periphery experienced rising levels of armed violence following the 
end of the closed district policy. The state had authority over urban centers, but no 
control over vast northern frontier (Herbst 2000). The introduction of outside interests, 
cross-border dynamics, and large inflows of illegal arms increased tension and armed 
violence between pastoralist groups in the region (Krätli, Swift, and England 1999).  
With rising insecurity, the state had to develop a solution to prevent violence 
among pastoralist groups from affecting and destabilizing the center (Stanislawski 2008). 
New leaders of the state, therefore, faced a dilemma—how to govern an increasingly 
insecure periphery with a lack of political legitimacy. The most severe inter-ethnic 
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clashes occurred due to inter-ethnic group power imbalances. In situations where one 
community with more weapons could overpower another community, violence escalated 
rapidly. In response, the initial state solution was to restore and create an ethnic balance 
of power among pastoralist ethnic groups through the allocation of arms to the Kenya 
Police Reserves (KPR), also known as home guards.33 This informal policing strategy, 
however, had unintended consequences. Arming citizens with no accountability to formal 
policing institutions increased the availability of weapons across the area, and changed 
the context of inter-ethnic conflict (Ndungu 2009). In sum, independence, the opening of 
the North, and rising insecurity across a region with a high level of sub-state fragility 
opened the door for, in Wulf’s terms, “outsourcing” peace and security functions to non-
state actors (Wulf 2005). 
 
 
Ethnic Federalism and Local Violence 
Following the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi assumed the 
presidency. Regional conflict dynamics during the early years of Moi regime increased 
pressures for inter-ethnic group conflict among pastoralist communities in Northern 
Kenya. From 1978 – 1979, Idi Amin led Uganda into a short territorial war with 
Tanzania. During the campaign, Amin received direct military support from Muamar 
Qadahafi in Libya. Jackson and Rotberg, inter alia, argue the war was designed to divert 
attention away from the increasing instability of Amin’s autocratic regime (Jackson and 
                                                
33 Following security reforms in 2010, the institution was renamed the National Police Reserves (NPR). 
However, actors in Northern Kenya still refer to local informal police as KPR. For consistency, KPR is 
used throughout the study. 
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Rotberg 1982). The regime collapsed very shortly after the failed war. In 1979, as 
soldiers loyal to Amin fled from Uganda, they sold arms to pastoralist militias operating 
along the Uganda—Kenya border. The collapse of the Amin regime, therefore, triggered 
the first major wave of weapons proliferation across Northern Uganda and Northern 
Kenya. The proliferation of weapons increased the intensity and deadliness of inter-ethnic 
group clashes across what became known as the “Karamoja Conflict Cluster” (Mirzeler 
and Young 2000). 
Addressing the spike in inter-ethnic group conflict across the country, Moi 
described ethnicity, “as the cancer that threatens to eat away the very fabric of our 
nation” (Goffard 2012). During his tenure, however, inter-ethnic group tension and state 
corruption were rife. The regime allocated state resources to particular ethnic groups to 
consolidate political support and manipulated long standing inter-group grievances to 
maintain access to power.  
As Rothchild’s research suggests, ethnic bargaining remained the primary tool for 
the maintenance of Moi’s hegemonic exchange regime—an authoritarian regime type 
where the foundation of authority is based on elite-level ethnic pacts. This regime type 
persisted across multiple African states even with the introduction of multi-party 
democracy (Rothchild 1995). For example, Moi employed a political strategy to unify 
previously disparate ethnic groups living in Western Kenya. Political elites emphasized 
shared cultural attributes among the Keiyo, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Pokot, Sabaot 
 76 
and Tugen to construct a large Kalenjin ethno-political identity (Lynch 2011; Branch 
2011).34  
The Kalenjin alliance flourished under the Moi presidency. State resources flowed 
less to Kikuyu areas and more toward Kalenjin areas. Moi used the single-party state and 
coercive tactics around electoral process to undermine and repress Luo and Kikuyu 
opposition groups from contesting the regime (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 371). In some 
cases, the state relocated entire Kalenjin groups to undeveloped areas in order to both 
gain support and contain local, inter-ethnic group clashes. The Nandi, for example, were 
relocated away from Luo dominated areas around Lake Victoria to more fertile areas 
along the Rift Valley. Relocation decreased violence between Nandi and Luo 
communities in the short-term, but set up conditions for more intensive inter-ethnic group 
grievances over land ownership (Boone 2014).  
After three years in the presidency, in 1981, Moi amended the constitution to 
prevent the emergence of multi-party democracy. Under the majority of Moi’s tenure, the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the foundation for a single-party state. In 
the late 1980s, facing increasing pressure from civil society groups and increasing 
international pressure, Moi set up the Commission for Constitutional Reform of Kenya. 
Chairman Prof. Yash Pal Ghai led the process of constitutional reform. The outcome of 
the constitutional reform process was the repeal of single party state provision in the 
                                                
34 See, for further detail, Karega Munene, “Production of Ethnic Identity in Kenya,” in Kimani Njogu and 
Kabiri Ngeta eds., Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. (Taweza 
Communications, 2010): 41-53. 
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constitution and the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992 (Murunga and 
Nasong’o 2007).  
Multi-party politics had implications for local conflict dynamics in the northern 
periphery. As Tablino argues, elections were the “only unifying national ritual” that cut 
across the very deep center-periphery division (Tablino 1999, 137). Even though the area 
was disconnected from the Kenyan economy and the larger national identity, ethnic 
groups in Northern Kenya became involved in the national political system through 
electoral processes. 
Even with new constitutional rules allowing for inclusion and contestation among 
multiple political parties, Moi won elections in both 1992 and 1997. Historians compare 
Moi’s political strategies to colonial divide and rule practices that were used across 
multiple African societies across Sub-Saharan Africa (see, Throup and Hornsby 1998). 
For example, Moi introduced a policy in the early 1990s called majimboism, or 
regionalism, that introduced a major national policy debate and intensified inter-ethnic 
group conflict.  
The policy was, in effect, a form of ethnic federalism (Branch 2011). It was based 
on the idea that indigenes would maintain exclusive rights in local administrative areas 
and control over communal resources, including land and property. The creation of home 
areas for particular ethnic groups increased pressure for conflict across Northern Kenya 
(Fox 1996). Population mobility among pastoralist communities clashed with the basic 
premise of ethnic federalism. Starting under the Moi regime, majimboism35 triggered 
                                                
35 There is an unsettled debate in the literature on decentralization and ethnic federalism around whether the 
institutional structure helps manage ethnic conflict, or foments ethnic conflict. Decentralization of power to 
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conflict between ethnic groups, with violence directed against ethnic out-groups in local 
political districts.  
Historians of the Moi period argue that the introduction of multi-party politics 
correlated with rising ethno-centrism and ethnic fragmentation in Kenya. Multi-party 
politics created an overlap between land competition, political competition, as well as 
competition for control over ethnic militias and crime syndicates that could be mobilized 
during electoral cycles to use violence for political purposes. Contestation over land, 
political positions, and militia allegiance played out in terms of ethnic divisions, which 
deepened inter-ethnic group fragmentation. In parallel, research from the Moi period 
focuses on predatory elites, the criminal state, and ethnic electoral competition as the 
most significant drivers of conflict escalation (Steeves 1997; Klopp 2001; Anderson and 
Lochery 2008; Mueller 2011). As Umaro Adano describes, “the state was the only visible 
route to wealth, fame and glory. As such, fighting over access to state resources along 
tribal lines was considered an entirely rational and legitimate pursuit” (Adano 2014, 3). 
One of the largest acts of state-sanctioned violence in Northern Kenya also 
occurred during the Moi era—the Wagalla Massacre. Human rights groups have accused 
the government of massacring upwards of 5,000 Degodia on the Wagalla Airstrip on 
February 10th, 1984. Some local accounts suggest the government carried out multiple 
acts of torture and human rights abuses. Official reports indicate that the GoK mission 
was a disarmament campaign to control Degodia militias engaged in clashes with Garre 
                                                                                                                                            
smaller ethnic blocs is designed to better organize local governance and meet local demands for greater 
autonomy. The process is designed to reduce inter-ethnic conflict. However, in some cases, ethnic 
federalism increases ethnic competition. The construction small administrative units can create conditions 
under which majority ethnic groups engage in ethnic cleansing to ensure full control group over the area. 
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and Merule communities in the Northeastern Province. The state reports only 57 fatalities 
during the operation (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2014).  
The case is still under investigation. If reports on the event are accurate, the 
Wagalla Massacre is the largest act of state-sanctioned violence against an ethnic group 
in the history of Kenya. Like the Shifta War, the Wagalla Massacre had long-lasting 
effects upon state-society relations in Northern Kenya. In particular, during the tenure of 
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) following ethnic violence in 
2007-2008, debates surrounding the Wagalla Massacre led to withdrawal of the TJRC 
commissioner, Bethuel Kiplagat. Kiplagat withdrew from the chairman position 
following accusations that he was complicit in the massacre as a leading politician under 
the Moi regime. The opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by 
Raila Odinga, used the Wagalla massacre to undermine credibility of the Kenyatta regime 
and to build support for ODM in the Northeastern district during the lead up to elections 
in 2013 (Gitari 2014). 
 
The Development Frontier 
The Moi era ended with new constitutional restrictions in place to prevent him 
from running for a third term. In 2002, Mwai Kibaki won the national election with 
backing from the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Increasing polarization between 
Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin ethnic groups occurred under Kibaki regime. In particular, a 
failed constitutional referendum in 2005 designed to limit the powers of the presidency, 
also known as the Wako Draft, created a deep amount of mistrust and suspicion between 
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007). After the failed 
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referendum, Odinga organized a strong opposition movement among the Luo community, 
deepening the division between Luo and Kikuyu communities in the lead up to the 2007 
election. 
The Kenyatta and Moi regimes directly excluded Northern Kenya from larger 
national development planning. However, a major national policy shift took place during 
Kibaki’s tenure that impacted inter-ethnic group conflict dynamics across the region. 
With the expectation of a very close national election in 2007, ethnic constituencies in 
Northern Kenya became relevant to national election outcomes. In particular, to garner 
support from pastoralist communities, in 2007, the Kibaki regime established the 
Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (MDNKOAL). 
The ministry focused on improving local security in Northern Kenya and supporting 
livelihoods among pastoralist communities. Through the MDNKOAL, in the lead up to 
the 2007 – 2008 election, the government allocated Northern Kenya more development 
support than it had ever received. 
In 2007, Raila Odinga ran against Kibaki’s incumbent regime. The election had 
disastrous consequences. Mass post-election violence broke out during December 2007 – 
January 2008. According to best estimates, post-election violence caused over 1,300 
fatalities and 650,000 IDPs, including major massacres, church burnings, severe property 
destruction, and human rights atrocities (UCDP 2015). Mungiki attacks directly targeted 
Luo communities using severe forms of violence, including mass rape and executions.  
 81 
The major political parties in Kenya, including the Jubilee Coalition Alliance,36 
ODM, and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) are not explicitly ethnic 
parties. This does not, however, limit ethnic identity from playing a major role within 
processes of party formation and electoral competition. Even though national parties are 
not explicitly ethnic, local political contestation is ethnic. In the absence of sufficient 
state support for electoral campaigns, candidates running for office rely on their own 
ethnic groups for resources to run campaigns. Local political contestants hold harambees 
to collect donations and build local support networks. Political entrepreneurs working to 
position themselves with political party structures gain the support of an entire ethnic 
group, and then use that power base as leverage to form coalitions with other political 
actors. Political parties in Kenya, therefore, function as ethnic coalitions that are 
constructed through local processes of ethnic-based political mobilization (Lynch 2006; 
Branch, Cheeseman, and Gardner 2010) 
Two proximate factors, therefore, triggered the outbreak of mass violence in 
Kenya in 2007 - 2008. Allegations and rumors that the Kibaki regime rigged the election 
and the long period of time it took the electoral commission to announce the results 
created uncertainty (Mueller 2008; Cheeseman 2008; Kanyinga 2009). At the same time, 
long-term institutional decay and a lack of state control over local security actors created 
a window for the rapid and severe escalation of post-electoral ethnic violence (Mueller 
2008; 2011). Violence played out between the largest ethnic groups in the country, 
                                                
36 Jubilee is an alliance of four parties, the National Alliance, NARC, and the United Republican Party, and 
the Republican Congress party. The coalition backed Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in the 2013 
presidential election. 
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including the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin. The core-periphery cleavage in Kenya served 
as a buffer for minority, pastoralist groups in the North against the 2007 outbreak of 
election-related violence. Respondents described, “we were sitting at our TVs wondering 
– what is happening in Kenya?”37  
The first stage of response at the state level was the organization of an informal 
group of national peace actors, led by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. The group 
coordinated the initial response, drawing upon personal networks and experiences in 
peace negotiations across Africa.38 Shortly following, the African Union (AU) set up a 
formal Panel of Eminent African Leaders, led by Kofi Annan, to lead a national peace 
process (see also, Lindenmayer and Kaye 2015). To coordinate the international 
response, a new institution was established—the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR) Commission. Negotiations among elites and external mediators 
led to the formation of an peacebuilding agenda with four points of action for the 
restoration of peace in Kenya, including immediate police deployment to contain 
violence, addressing humanitarian crises, resolving the political crisis through 
powersharing, and addressing inter-group grievances related to land, employment, and 
impunity.  
The escalation of ethnic violence in 2007-2008 left a deep imprint on social 
divisions across Kenya. The major post-conflict policy document known as the Waki 
Report, drawing on peacebuilding policies used during post-genocide experience of 
                                                
37 Hassan Kochore, National Archives, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 8, 2014. 
 
38 Bethuel Kiplagat, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
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Rwanda, recommended local tribunals in conflict-affected communities. The 
recommendation to set up structures to build peace from the ground-up, however, was not 
adopted. Instead, the ICC took up the case. The ICC eventually indicted six political 
elites for crimes against humanity in March of 2011, including Uhuru Kenyatta, Henry 
Kosgey, William Ruto, Francis Muthaura, Joshua Arap Sang, and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali.39 Evidence gathered for the ICC trial indicated political elites directly supported and 
mobilized local youth militias that engaged in attacks against rival ethnic groups.  
  In response to the outbreak of post-election violence, in March 2008, the GoK 
passed the National Reconciliation Accord Act. The Act included provisions for 
powersharing. It restructured executive institutions to allow for a Prime Minster and two 
Deputy Prime Ministers under a coalition cabinet called the Government of National 
Unity. Under the powersharing government, in June of 2008, Kibaki launched Vision 
2030. The goal of the strategy is for Kenya to attain middle-income status by 2030. 
Targets are linked to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
development strategy has wide ranging implications for inter-ethnic group conflict and 
peacebuilding efforts across Northern Kenya. Shortly thereafter, in 2009, the GoK passed 
constitutional reforms designed to address conditions that led to violence in the prior 
electoral cycle, and in 2010, a new constitution was passed through a national referendum 
with 67% support. The Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee (COIC) was 
set up, increasing momentum for process of devolution and broad reform of institutions 
across the country.  
                                                
39 After a long process of negotiation, evasion, and reports of disappearances of key witnesses, the ICC case 
against President Uhuru Kenyatta was dropped on December 5, 2014.  
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In the final years of Kibaki’s tenure, due to new electoral rules enacted in 2010, 
Northern Kenya again was relevant for national political campaigns. In the lead up to the 
2013 election, political elites campaigned across the North more than in any other prior 
electoral cycle. In line with increasing political relevance of the periphery, the GoK 
articulated new state policies around reversing long-held policies of marginalization and 
exclusion of Northern Kenya. Policy papers provide direct evidence of the recent 
reversal. For example, Sessional paper no. 10 of 2012, states:   
“The defining feature of Northern Kenya is its separation from the rest of the 
country, which manifests itself in both physical and psychological ways. The 
primary challenge is how to close this gap and achieve national integration in 
terms that benefit the people of the region and the country as a whole” (GOK 
2011, 12). 
Critically, under Kibaki’s tenure, the remote hinterlands were no longer seen as 
being of little importance to Kenya’s development strategy. The GoK set established new 
policies and institutions to integrate the area into the Kenyan political economy.40 The 
increasing political relevance of Northern Kenya is directly related to changes within the 
larger, regional political economy (Shamaro 2014). Over the past seven years, Turkana 
and Isiolo Counties, in particular, have become hubs for regional economic activity. Oil 
exploration and production in Turkana, wind power production in Marsabit, and livestock 
market expansion in Marsabit, Isiolo, and Mandera drive rapid economic transition.  
Economic transition in Northern Kenya is linked to changes within the East 
African economic context, including increasing cross-border trade, infrastructure 
                                                
40 See, Government of Kenya (2012). Sessional paper No. 10 of 2012 On Kenya Vision 2030. Office of the 
Prime Minister. Ministry of state for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030. See also, 
Government of Kenya (2011). Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid 
Lands. GOK Printer: Nairobi. 
 
 85 
construction, and major development projects, including Vision 2030, which is part of the 
Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor project (LAPSSET). Mwai Kibaki, 
Salva Kiir, and Meles Zenawi commissioned the LAPSSET project in 2012. Kenya 
allocated 2.5 Trillion Kenya Shillings (KES) to the project, or roughly 30 billion dollars. 
The project was designed to develop a transportation corridor linking South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to the Indian Ocean for the purpose of exporting oil 
supplies from across Eastern Africa. Principally, the LAPSSET project is designed to 
construct a pipeline across the region to provide landlocked South Sudan an outlet for its 
oil supply that does not run through Northern Sudan. With oil as a driver of long-running 
civil conflict in Sudan, the LAPSSET pipeline would allow South Sudan to avoid 
engagement with the authoritarian regime of Omar Bashir. 
All four countries, however, have incentives for the successful implementation of 
the LAPSSET project. Following its secession from North Sudan in 2011, landlocked 
South Sudan needed an alternative, sustainable outlet for its oil production. Kenya 
remains a key ally for South Sudan. Similarly, with the secession of Eritrea in 1991, 
Ethiopia is also landlocked. Ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea undermines 
the likelihood of cooperation around trade, leaving the state with a need for an alternative 
link to the Indian Ocean for exporting goods. At the moment, Ethiopia maintains a strong 
relationship with Kenya largely due to increasing regional cooperation under the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),41 and new agreements in place for 
                                                
41 IGAD is a regional trading bloc comprised of eight member states including, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. 
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Kenya to purchase power from Ethiopia. The Gibe III dam project,42 in particular, 
includes large-scale hydropower development projects across Western Ethiopia to 
support the LAPSSET project. 
Kenya’s interest in the LAPPSET project is linked to its larger developmental 
goal to become the gateway for the region. Regional aspirations drive inter-state 
collaboration and cooperation. Exporting oil from Turkana, Uganda, and South Sudan 
would generate positive externalities for the larger Kenyan economy. However, the 
LAPSSET project has broader ambitions to redress severe poverty in the North. 
Considering that Northern Kenya is the most underdeveloped region of the state, 
LAPSSET aims to redress this problem through complementary business opportunities, 
such as pipeline construction, long-term infrastructure maintenance, and transportation 
industries. Railroads, paved roads, and an international port in Lamu will accompany the 
construction of the pipeline and provide new opportunities for economic growth.  
Growing economic interest in the Northern periphery, and increasing potential for 
economic gains, drive a shift in how the North is viewed by the center. The state is now 
far more concerned with development in the region. It is also concerned with efforts to 
redress local grievances and prevent outbreaks of violence among pastoralist ethnic 
groups. New strategies are in place to try to integrate previously marginalized minority 
groups into the larger nation. In the view of analysts from the region, “strategies are 
                                                
42 Gibe III is generating international cooperation between Kenya and Ethiopia, but also internal conflict 
around Lake Turkana. The agreement is viewed in Turkana as a lack of support by the Kenyan state for 
local groups whose livelihoods are linked to water levels in Lake Turkana. A strong civic response to the 
dam project, called Friends of Lake Turkana and led by Ikal Angelei, advocates for a shift in Kenya’s 
energy development policy as the key for conflict mitigation around Lake Turkana. 
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designed, mostly so pastoralist groups do not stand in the way of development.”43 From 
this perspective, the state’s effort to integrate previously marginalized groups into the 
larger nation is a pacification strategy. Under the Kibaki regime, the GoK started to view 
the North not just as an ungoverned bandits kingdom, but also as a potential, in Kibaki’s 
terms, “bridge for opportunity” (Kantai 2012). Political will to engage in local 
peacebuilding efforts across the region has increased with potential implications for 
conflict patterns across Northern Kenya. 
 
 
National Reform and Local Conflict  
In January of 2015, following the collapse of the court case against Uhuru 
Kenyatta, Fatou Bensouda, chief prosecutor of the ICC, released a summary of charges. 
The case indicated that there was sufficient evidence that Pres. Kenyatta was personally 
involved supporting the Mungiki militia in 2007 to carry out attacks against civilians. 
However, throughout the pre-trial process Kenyatta denied his involvement in inciting 
ethnic violence, and the ICC did not ban Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto from running 
for the presidency even while facing trial for crimes against humanity.  
Analysts argue the Kikuyu - Kalenjin Jubilee coalition is held together due to a 
shared interest in protecting both groups from allegations of crimes against humanity 
(ICG 2014). Political elites from the two most prominent ethnic groups had a shared 
interest in gaining and maintaining access to political power in order to avert the ICC 
indictment for crimes related to the 2007-2008 electoral process. The Jubilee coalition 
                                                
43 Hassan Kochore, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 8, 2014. 
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also uses the ICC trial as tool to mobilize its own support base, accusing ODM of 
supporting a foreign process to unjustly try to take back power (Kisiangani 2014).  
After the Kenyatta and Rutto’s Jubilee party won the national election in 2013, 
the ICC case also affected state development policies that have increased pressure for 
inter-group conflict in Northern Kenya. In particular, as Ali Gorai describes, “the ICC 
trial led to a decisive turn east.”44 The trial process influenced the Kenyatta regime’s 
interest in collaborating with states less concerned with the ICC case and human rights 
protections. China invests heavily in Kenya, especially in infrastructural development 
projects across the northern periphery.  
The “turn East” is shrinking space for civil society groups to hold the GoK 
accountable, narrowing space for civil society organizations involved in local 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts. Organizations working to gather human 
rights data, track abuses related to political elites, and monitor the actions of police and 
military forces are particularly under threat. The Kenya Information and Communication 
Act of 2013, for example, directly reduced media independence. In 2014, the parliament 
debated a new bill designed to prevent NGOs and CSOs from access to external funding. 
Much like Ethiopia, the GoK is actively working to constrain civil society groups and 
prevent opposition to and criticism of the Jubilee coalition.  
From a historical perspective, the episode of 2007-2008 was not unique. Ethnic 
violence escalated during multiple electoral cycles in Kenya, including in 1992, 1997, 
and 2005. In all of the cases, elites were, if not directly, at least indirectly involved in 
                                                
44 Stephen Ali Gorai, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 11, 2014. 
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mobilizing support for youth militias. Therefore, a key finding of the Waki Report in 
2008 was that containing ethnic violence in Kenya requires upholding the rule of law for 
elites involved in criminal activities (Mueller 2011). The ICC case is the first experience 
using an external justice mechanism in Kenya to regulate impunity and election crimes. 
The logic of the process is that it will create a strong institutional disincentive for elites to 
use youth militias to manipulate elections, and reduce the future likelihood of election-
related violence. 
A wave of institutional innovation occurred after the outbreak of violence in 
2008. Broad constitutional reform set up a new set of formal national institutions 
designed to improve the capacity of the state to prevent outbreaks of inter-ethnic group 
violence. The so-called Agenda Four served as the foundation for constitutional proposals 
that were approved by referendum and enshrined in the new Kenyan Constitution in 
2010. New institutions and reform processes play key roles in shaping state approaches to 
inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes across the country. In particular, Agenda Four Reforms 
fall in multiple categories of formal institutions thought necessary to contain outbreaks of 
ethnic violence.  
The first priority focuses on improving the effectiveness of policing in Kenya, 
long identified as one of the most corrupt institutions in all of Africa (Anderson 2002). A 
new independent oversight committee for national police is now in place titled the 
Independent Police Conduct Authority and administration police are in the process of 
integration with the Kenya Police Service. The National Land Commission is working to 
pass the Land Acts to address long-standing land-related grievances, as are reforms to 
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address youth unemployment and devolve power to the county level. Devolution is 
designed to reduce the intensity of competition around presidential elections.  
Institutional changes aim to control and limit elite impunity for supporting ethnic 
militias and engaging in violence for political purposes. However, there is still a very 
high risk of inter-ethnic clashes across Kenya due to the fact that elites have framed all of 
the core issues within ongoing reform process in terms of political and ethnic affiliation. 
All of the political issues of post-conflict reform and their corresponding public debates 
take on ethnic dimensions.  
For example, the issue of corruption is addressed through processes of ethnic 
balancing, which questions the long-term Kikuyu dominance of the public service. 
Similarly, incumbent versus opposition ethnic politics between a Kikuyu-Kalenjin 
alliance and a largely Luo opposition, drive contestation around police and judicial 
reform. The land question revolves around the history of political elites, and their 
families gaining ownership of very large swaths of land through illegal land grabbing. 
Land contestation also takes on an ethnic dimension (Boone 2014). Surveys indicate the 
public reform efforts as slow and of little benefit, indicating a high level of mistrust in 
public institutions due to persistent corruption in the political system (SRIC 2013). The 
expansion of formal institutions and oversight bodies intends to limit ethnic violence. At 
the moment, however, formal institutional changes have not redressed deeply entrenched 
practices of corruption and impunity – especially in the rural periphery, and especially 
around issues of local security.45  
                                                
45 Focus Group with National Peacebuilding Actors, Dialogue with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 
2014. 
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Localizing Ethnic Politics 
 The construction of a new national peace architecture and the devolution of power 
occurred at the same time. The two processes, however, are working at cross-purposes. In 
2010, constitutional reforms decentralized state power. Constitution changes were 
enacted in 2013, creating 47 counties with access to state funds and new jobs and posts at 
county level, including governors, senators, and members of the county assembly 
(MCAs). The intended outcomes of devolution were to allow state resources to reach the 
most marginalized areas, to support groups with very little power and control within the 
national government, and to improve governance of the periphery. Devolution, in sum, 
was designed to reduce grievances among the marginalized groups within Kenya, and 
thus reduce insecurity. 
The early stages of devolution, however, have reproduced and intensified inter-
group conflict and ethnic politics at the local level.46 The process has had unintended 
effects due to the fact that the nature of funding allocation from the national government 
generates a rentier state problem at the county-level (see also, Aslaksen and Torvik 2006; 
Torvik 2009; Basedau and Lay 2009; Ross 2013). At the county-level, taxation of the 
local population is the not the primary source of resources for public goods. Rather with 
funding from the national government, local leaders can allocate resources to particular 
groups to gain support, which intensifies intergroup competition for access to county-
level political positions.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
46 Daniel Kiptugen, Oxfam, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
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In Mandera, Moyale, Isiolo, and Turkana, devolution exacerbated competition 
over territorial control and, in some cases, escalated inter-ethnic group violence. Local 
populations view devolution as the institutionalization of ethnic territories. Devolution 
imposed an ethnic template upon contested territories, and created a situation where 
county government posts come with more power. Abdi Mohammed describes how 
devolution, “creates new minorities among minorities,” deepening the assumed link 
between ethnicity and territorial control (IRIN News 2014). As Carrier and Kochore 
report, new narratives across Northern Kenya of: “go back to your county,” “you do not 
belong,” “and expelling the other” have become more common (see, Carrier and Kochore 
2014). Ethnic groups operate under the assumption devolution is a form of ethnic 
federalism, much like the system in Ethiopia, which is increasing suspicion and fear of 
organized political exclusion among ethnic groups at the county level.  
Devolution also created localized financial shocks (Kimenyi 2013). All six of the 
counties under comparative assessment, due to their very high levels of poverty, have 
access to extra funding from the GoK through the Equalization Fund.47 With the new 
county budget formula, MCAs have larger budgets than MPs, especially because the 
MCA has a smaller constituency to serve. In Bryan Kahumbura’s terms, “County leaders 
are sitting pretty. With devolution, the Northern counties now receive more state 
resources per year than they have in total in the past 50 years.”48 According to GoK 
                                                
47 For further detail see the Kenya Law Reform Commission at: 
http://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/147-chapter-twelve-public-finance/part-1-
principles-and-framework-of-public-finance/373-204-equalisation-fund  
 
48 Bryan Kahumbura, ICG, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 12, 2014. 
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reports, county governments in Northern Kenya now receive between $33 – 81 million 
dollars per year. In 2013, for example, the Mandera County Government in 2013 was 
allocated $73 million dollars through the Equalization Fund. Inter-ethnic group conflict 
over political power to control the allocation of funds led to a situation where, as of 
December of 2014, none of the county budget was utilized (IRIN 2014). This is a new 
pattern across the periphery. Inter-ethnic group conflict around local political 
competitions has become increasingly severe, even in remote periphery settings.  
 
Kenya’s Peace Committee System  
The expansion of the District Peace Committee (DPC) system and its rapid spread 
is a unique contextual feature of the Kenya context. Insecurity can trigger social 
organization and the formation of organizational structures to manage rising uncertainty, 
reduce the risk of violence, and prevent escalation after violence breaks out. For example, 
conflict escalation sparked collective peacebuilding action in Wajir, Kenya in 1993. A 
local women’s market association formed a local peace committee and intervened in a 
deadly conflict between the Degodia and Ajurran. The group coordinated local 
peacebuilding processes through multiple local associations to contain violence.  
In particular, the coalition of civic associations in Wajir enforced and sustained a 
long-term negotiation process between elites from the Degodia and Ajurran communities 
and collaborated with the government to enforce bargains and monitor the movement of 
local youth militias. These actions had an observable impact on violence reduction. The 
unexpected success of the Wajir Development and Peace Committee caused the model to 
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become an archetype for the formation of peace committees across Kenya. The United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), in cooperation with multiple national level 
CSOs, including Peacenet Kenya and the Uwiano Platform, provided financial and 
technical support for establishing country-wide peace committee institutions (van 
Tongeren 2005; van Tongeren 2013; Odendaal 2013).  
In 2001, the Ministry of Security in the Office of the President established the 
National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC) to 
oversee DPCs, and, in 2008, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 
provided further support. At present, major efforts of the NSC include advocacy for a bill 
on National Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (National Policy on Peacebuilding 
2011, 9). During the field research period, the bill was stalled in parliament due to 
uncertainty about where the mandate for peacebuilding rests within the state structure. 
Devolution triggered national debate over whether peacebuilding should be controlled at 
the county or national level.  
Not all DPCs have had the same success as the Wajir DPC, and the process of 
devolution is creating increasing complex operating conditions for formal, focal-level 
peacebuilding institutions. In fact, the national peace architecture is not functioning as a 
cohesive system. Mads Frilander, Country Director for Danish Demining Group, states, 
“DPCs have lost credibility and momentum. It is unclear what they will look like with 
devolution. They have become semi-political institutions. They are not strong and they 
are not easily mobilized.” 49 Where DPCs have been successful, prior analysis suggests it 
                                                
49 Mads Frilander, Danish Deming Group, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 18, 2014. 
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is largely due to charismatic leaders with strong skills in reconciliation and integration 
(see also, Menkhaus 2015). Frilander further states, “Leadership matters with local DPCs, 
even down to personalities and the need for local champions that are trusted and seen as 
real peacebuilding leaders. Not everyone has the skills necessary for engaging in complex 
political negotiations in ethnically diverse environments.”50  
Within the process of devolution, political tension and competition around the 
locus of control over local peacebuilding and security efforts have caused the DPC 
system to unravel in many locations. The locus of authority and control over local 
peacebuilding efforts still remains a contentious debate in Kenya. There is no consensus 
over whether the state or counties should have authority over local security interventions. 
As such, county-level governments are working to develop new institutions to try to fill 
in the gaps and improve coordination among the broad array of civic groups involved in 
peacebuilding efforts. In Marsabit, for example, the governor developed the 
“Commission for Cohesion, Peace, and the Coordination of Non-state actors” in an effort 
to try to improve peacebuilding interventions at the county-level.51 Supporting the 
initiative, local politicians made the argument that state-sanctioned security forces “do 
not know the terrain of Northern Kenya. We need our own actors in the police, to ensure 
our own security” (KTN 2014).  
Deep ethnic fragmentation and a lack of trust in state-based policing create 
complex conditions for local peacebuilding efforts. Tension over the locus of authority 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
 
51 Elema Dibo, Chairman of County Security Committee, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, 
September 11, 2014. 
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for local security, whether it rests with actors in the new county system, or actors in older 
Provincial Administration system, means local civic groups remain the most critical 
peacebuilding actors. DPCs are set up across the periphery, but their organizational 
capacity is very limited compared to churches, NGOs, local CSOs, and even ethnic 
militias.  
Conclusion 
Ethnic groups living in the periphery have little attachment to the larger, national 
identity of Kenya. The high level of mobility of nomadic groups engaged in pastoralist 
livelihoods caused them to ignore national boundaries, moving fluidly across the borders 
of Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. Throughout the post-independence period, 
without capacity to tax pastoralist groups, the GoK viewed the area as inherently 
ungovernable. Successive regimes left Northern Kenya alone. The area experienced no 
development of modern state functions and a deep core-periphery cleavage as the center 
experienced rapid economic growth and political development.  
State strategies for governing the North changed little over the post-colonial 
period, leaving the region of the state as an area of limited statehood at risk of conflict 
due to the absence of state security (Stanislawski 2008; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and 
Vlassenroot 2008). In other words, as long as inter-group violence did not escalate 
severely, the state allowed local communities to control and maintain their own 
protection tactics, only working behind the scenes to try to ensure that all groups have 
relatively equal access to arms to, at the very least, deter opportunistic attacks against less 
powerful ethnic groups. Pastoralists were left to navigate complex inter-ethnic group 
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relations using informal conflict management practices to negotiate terms of resource 
sharing and restitution following deadly attacks.  
Adding another layer of complexity to the context, state interests in the periphery 
changed with the discovery of oil and the prospect of major development projects related 
to the LAPSSET pipeline, which has important implications for local conflict patterns. 
The state is advancing in areas of the North where access to resources is at stake, but not 
in others, creating new forms of inequality and new inter-ethnic group cleavages. 
Employing Rothchild’s logic, with new opportunities for economic growth in the North, 
the cost of continued marginalization of ethnic groups in area is rising. The major costs 
include the risk of violent mobilization against the state and subsequent loss of 
international support and investment (Rothchild 1973; Rothchild 1995). As a result, the 
state is investing in the set up of formal security operations and state bureaucracies in 
high potential areas such as Isiolo and Turkana. At the same time, rising interest of the 
state in consolidating power in the rural periphery creates more direct linkages between 
national ethnic politics and local-level ethnic politics.  
Neo-patrimonial systems of governance with high levels of patronage and 
clientelism remain highly susceptible to identity-based violence (Lemarchand 1972). 
Within the larger political system, ethnicity functions as the basis for the consolidation of 
power. With Northern increasingly relevant for the national development agenda and for 
national political contests, conditions are in place for increasing fragmentation along 
ethnic lines. National politicians rely on ethnic-based voting as the basis for electoral 
competition. The threat of violence against would-be ethnic competitors helps maintain 
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stability of regimes working to maintain order and construct state institutions. The 
process of devolution is shifting this form of political behavior to the rural periphery. The 
combination of devolution and national ethnic politics causes contentious ethnic conflict 
around struggles for land, political power, and control over state resources. In some 
cases, including Mandera, Moyale, and Isiolo, these conflicts have turned deadly.  
  The transformation of governance approaches in the ASALs impacts the logic of 
violence among ethnic groups. Formal institutional change is increasing dissonance 
between local peace and security institutions and emerging state institutions. Formal and 
informal rules of the game often conflict. Access to formal security systems in the 
ASALs still has a very high cost for pastoralist groups due to extensive corruption across 
the security system. The high cost of engagement with state security system causes many 
communities to avoid engagement with police, military, and even formal peacebuilding 
institutions such as DPCs. Wealthier actors who can afford high cost bribes may engage 
with the formal security system, providing them with access to information, protection, 
and immunity from prosecution for violent actions that poorer actors and communities 
cannot afford.  
  Due to institutional dissonance, ethnic militias, who rely on donations and support 
from their own ethnic communities, commonly use violent revenge attacks as a primary 
form of deterrence and communal protection. This is because they do not have access to 
information about threats that is accurate, and they cannot directly identify and try 
individual criminals considering the weakness of formal state judicial institutions. Under 
these conditions, asymmetrical and indiscriminant identity-based attacks are likely to 
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occur following acts of aggression, making escalation an increasingly likely phenomenon 
in the region. 
Kenya’s efforts to manage and govern communal conflict in the periphery 
included formal bureaucratic approaches that have had a very mixed impact on local 
conflict dynamics. Formal policing structures have had little success and formal peace 
building institutions have a very mixed record. Disarmament campaigns have done very 
little to limit violence and may have had unintended effects. Overall, considering local 
peace systems are often ad hoc and not institutionalized, there is a very high level of 
variation in both the presence and quality of local peacebuilding institutions. Further 
inquiry into local cases, and processes of escalation and non-escalation is thus critical for 
improving understanding of the factors and processes that make escalation less common 
in some areas over others, especially under the harsh and increasingly uncertain 
conditions on Kenya’s periphery.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICT ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA 
 
Most inter-group conflicts are resolved without violence in Northern Kenya. 
However, some conflicts escalate to include mass collective violence between ethnic 
groups. The set of cases presented in this chapter share the same dependent variable: the 
escalation of non-state conflict. In these cases, the state is not a direct, active participant 
in the initial conflict. In all of the cases, however, state agents are third parties to the 
conflict following initial acts of violence. As previous micro-level studies of civil war 
suggest, it is common for different episodes of sub-state violence to have competing 
logics (Kalyvas 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kalyvas 2012). Analytic narratives for 
five inter-group conflicts in which local civic groups engaged in minimal preventive 
action provide a platform for identifying common factors that lead to escalation. Before 
assessing conditions that contain escalation in the next two chapters, the following cases 
serve as a platform for analysis of common triggers and logics of escalation in Northern 
Kenya. 
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Table 3: Escalation Cases  
 
 
Samburu, Turkana, and Marsabit 
 
1. Turkana: Turkana – Samburu Range War (December 1996 – 1997) 
2. Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (November 2012) 
3. Samburu: The Maralal Conflict (October 2013) 
4. Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (May 2011)  
5. Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2012 – 2013) 
 
 
 
Samburu: Turkana – Samburu Range War (1996 – 1997) 
Turkana and Samburu communities living along the Nyiro Mountain – Suguta 
Valley conflict corridor, such as Waso Rongai, Kawap, Tuum, Parikati, Sarima, and 
Loongerin, are as close as possible to the complete absence of the state. Administrative 
and police posts are absent or abandoned, there are no paved roads, and no cell phone 
coverage.52 The area has no international borders, no oil deposits, and minimal state 
interest in economic development.53 Within a very fragile, semi-arid desert ecology, 
populations support local youth militias, or moran, who are well-organized, increasingly 
well-trained in military tactics,54 and heavily armed to protect valuable and highly 
vulnerable communal resources. Semi-nomadic groups in the area, including the 
Samburu, Turkana, and Pokot uphold strong social incentives for raiding and the use of 
                                                
52 A cell tower was under construction in Tuum in July of 2014. 
 
53 Granted, there are rumors of mineral deposits in parts of Samburu County, but at present they are not 
being pursued actively. One major development effort, The Turkana Windpower Project, is now under 
construction in the area. To date it has caused only minimal conflict between ethnic groups in the area. 
 
54 Retirees of the police or Kenyan military from pastoralist groups have returned to the area to train young 
warriors in both offensive and defensive military strategies.  
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force against rival ethnic out-groups.55 These social features are common to pastoralist 
ethnic groups that live across Northern Kenya. 
 
Context of Conflict 
 
Conflict between the Samburu and Turkana escalated in 1996, initiating a 
protracted range war along the Nyiro – Suguta Valley conflict corridor that cuts across 
Turkana, Samburu and Southern Marsabit County.56 The UCDP database identifies the 
Samburu – Turkana case as a non-state conflict, estimating the initial wave of escalation 
led to 51 fatalities in 1996. Local informants claim the death toll was over 100 with 
between 10,000 - 20,000 stolen livestock over the course of three months of attacks and 
counter-attacks between Turkana and Samburu militias (UCDP 2014; see also, Pkalya, 
Adan, and Masinde 2003).   
Prior to the outbreak of armed violence, a regional drought caused pastoralist 
groups from Marsabit to relocate to more fertile grazing areas in the Nyiro Valley. 
Samburu leaders negotiated informal land and resource sharing arrangements with Gabra, 
Rendille, and Somali groups prior to the initial migration.57 Negotiations among elders 
and sub-district chiefs led to temporary, informal land-sharing arrangements, allowing for 
the accommodation of ethnic out-groups within Samburu County.  
                                                
55 Detailed anthropologies account for rituals related to violence among pastoralist groups. This set of work 
highlights heroism and raiding, age set social status and rewards, rituals of animal sacrifice following 
deadly attacks, scarification, tattooing, ritualistic violence and rites of passage.  
 
56 Conflicts in the area certainly have a longer history, but multiple key informants set the start date of the 
range war between the Samburu and Turkana as 1996. In the study I employ local narratives as primary 
points of departure. 
 
57 Research Participants 107, 111, 121, Interviews with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 16 – 20, 2014. 
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Samburu accommodation, however, increased fear and suspicion among Turkana 
clans with semi-permanent settlements along Western border of Samburu County.58 
Fearing potential aggression due to the formation of alliances between Samburu, Gabra, 
and Rendille militias and the loss of access to land in the Nyiro Valley that functioned as 
reserve pasture for Turkana livestock, Turkana militia leaders organized 600 moran and 
recruited reinforcements from Pokot militias. In December of 1996, the large joint militia 
raided the Nyiro Valley. The joint militia attacked multiple Samburu and Rendille 
settlements across the region. Smaller and widely dispersed Samburu, Rendille, and 
Somali militias failed to repel the large-scale attack.  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
After the initial attack in December 1996, the Government of Kenya deployed 
police, military, and political leaders by helicopter to track and recover stolen animals 
and arrest Turkana militia leaders. During the state-led operation, the Turkana-Pokot 
militia threatened and attacked police posts, and shot down a government helicopter with 
a rocket-propelled grenade. The helicopter carried a well-known Samburu leader, District 
Commissioner Henry Nyandoro, as well as, “ten other senior security personnel who 
were trying to monitor [militia] movements, killing all of them on the spot” (Daily 
Nation, December 28, 1996). The loss of a dominant group leader made the attack 
symbolic and especially egregious for the Samburu. 
Local churches in cooperation with Catholic and the Presbyterian mission stations 
provided support for families that lost members, and assisted in relocating Turkana 
                                                
58 Respondents referred to these groups as “Samburu – Turkana,” as opposed to the “Turkana – Turkana.” 
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minority groups to more secure towns along the Nyiro Mountain range, including South 
Horr and Baragoi.59 Prior to the conflict, Turkana and Samburu had semi-permanent, 
integrated settlements along the main trade route, including Waso Rongai, Tuum, and 
Loongerin. Fear of attacks against Turkana civilians caused area chiefs and councilors to 
donate personal resources to relocate Turkana away from predominantly Samburu 
settlements. Local government and mission station vehicles transported Turkana to 
homogenous settlements to prevent indiscriminant revenge attacks against Turkana 
civilians.  
Samburu elders pooled communal resources and donations of livestock to 
purchase more sophisticated weapons through preexisting livestock trade networks.60 A 
Samburu informant describes the situation: “we began then [1996] to deal in illegal arms 
with our other enemies [Gabra and Borana] because we could not access arms as easily as 
the Turkana. We have no international border.”61 The Samburu also formed an alliance 
with the Pokot to coordinate a counter attack. In January and February of 1997, a 
Samburu – Pokot militia attacked Turkana settlements in the Suguta Valley. Informants 
suggest Samburu elders leveraged relationships and radio communication across church 
mission stations to gain information about Turkana settlements prior to engaging in the 
                                                
59 Research Participant 121, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
60 Covert trade networks may establish inter-ethnic group bonds that can then help to strengthen informant 
networks (also covert). Types of weapons in the region include: rifles, AK-47, SKS, G-3, M-16. Cost 
varies. Informants indicate it costs roughly three bulls for one semi-automatic weapon (60,000 KSH). 
Ammunition is also expensive – 150 – 200 per round. Ammunition is purchased through informal networks 
from Somalia, Ethiopia, Pokot, or KPR. Research Participants 105, 106, 108, (Samson Leriano) Interviews 
with the author, South Horr, Kenya, August 14 - 21, 2014. 
 
61 Research Participant 110 (Namugie Leokoe), Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 16, 
2014. 
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counter-attack: “we had to find ways to get more information about the Turkana and the 
Pokot before those attacks—the church bases helped us do that.”62 Estimates indicate the 
Samburu – Pokot militia killed 60 Turkana in multiple revenge attacks (Pkalya et al. 
2004).  
 
Outcomes 
 
Respondents indicate that after 1997, “women and children started to die. That did 
not happen before. It was not allowed among the Samburu or Turkana moran.”63 Conflict 
between the two groups escalated in relation to direct failure of the state to ensure 
security and the use of increasingly severe tactics by both groups in the conflict dyad. 
Following the wave of violence, Suguta Valley, along the southwestern edge of the Nyiro 
Valley, became known as the “valley of death” (AllAfrica April 28, 2006). It became a 
strategic location for organization, mobilization, and refuge for armed bandit groups from 
various ethnic backgrounds. Opportunistic militias used the remote and very harsh desert 
environment as a base for the organization of attacks in the area. The 1996-1997 wave of 
escalation made the region a no-go zone for state police and even Kenya Defense Forces 
(KDF). After being targeted, the state was even less likely to intervene to prevent 
mobilization of militia groups engaged in large-scale cattle theft. Conflict escalation 
further eroded the state’s capacity to stem the increasing militarization and organization 
of youth militias, increasing the likelihood of violence in the area.  
                                                
62 Research Participant 117 (Anonymous), Dialogue with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
63 Godfrey Godana, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 10, 2014. 
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The case provides an example of the logic of escalation in pastoralist conflict 
settings. Resource scarcity was a conditioning variable causing population movement and 
inter-group conflict. The primary motive of the initial Turkana attack, however, was not 
to acquire resources, but to dislocate Rendille, Gabra, and Somali groups, and prevent 
Samburu militias from accommodating and forming alliances with ethnic out-groups. The 
expansion of militia alliances would have put the Turkana at greater risk of predatory 
attacks or dislocation from more fertile territories.64 A patron of a local Turkana militia 
described this logic of deterrence, as follows: 
We raid, not because we are poor and need more animals, but because we know 
that if we look weak, they [Samburu] will raid us at any opportunity. We have to 
make them fear us and fear that we are watching them from behind every rock. If 
not, they will slowly move into our territory, pretend like they are our friends, but 
then attack us first. If they do not fear us, they will want to live near us to take our 
water and pastures and kill our people. We will not survive if we do not improve 
our skills in raiding and war.65  
 
An informant from a Samburu militia in the conflict corridor confirms the logic of using 
banditry as a form of deterrence, as follows:  
War is a more profitable activity than anything else that happens here, but stealing 
animals from the Turkana is not for getting rich. It is for getting more powerful. 
Animals are used to buy more weapons, more ammunition, and to pay bribes to 
prevent the police from chasing us.66  
 
Predation reinforces local militia capacity at the expense of other ethnic out-
groups.67 The use of raiding and deadly force against rival ethnic groups follows a 
                                                
64 Jonathan Losokon Lokinei, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
65 Research Participant 117, Dialogue with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
66 Focus Group 122, Dialogue with the author, Kawap, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
 
67 Raphael Lesas, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, August 21, 2014. 
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defensive logic—to cause other potentially aggressive ethnic groups to fear living in 
close proximity. In the 1996 event, after the initial attack, for Samburu militias, there 
were two strategic goals for escalating violence against Turkana communities. The first 
goal was to create fear among the Turkana, as deterrent. The second was to restore a 
sense of reciprocity: “whey they draw blood, we draw blood.”68 This led to spiraling 
violence and the break down of former informal codes of behavior, such as traditional 
moran codes against killing women and children during warfare (see also, Spencer 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Samburu elders convened negotiations with rival ethnic group leaders during the 
initial relocation period. However, Turkana militias viewed new inter-ethnic group 
allegiances as a threat. In the absence of early warning and preventive intervention, 
violence escalated. The police intervention failed to apprehend leaders of the Turkana – 
Pokot militia and the Samburu lost a key leader, making the attack again a government 
helicopter a highly symbolic act of violence. These conditions triggered rapid 
mobilization of militias, the pooling of communal resources, arms acquisition through 
inter-group trade networks, alliance formation, and subsequently, violent revenge attacks 
against Turkana communities.  
The critical tipping point toward escalation in this case was evidence that the state 
was not immune from targeting. This created a new context for amassing weapons, 
increasing militant skills among the warrior class, and developing increasingly 
sophisticated strategies for communal protection. Samburu elders continue to reference 
                                                
68 Research Participant 117, Dialogue with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
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the event as a justification for illegal arms acquisition, training and support for youth 
militias, and spy networks across the region.69  
 
 
Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (August – November 2012)  
The Baragoi Massacre is an episode of non-state conflict escalation between 
Turkana and Samburu communities in Samburu County. The attacks leading up to the 
massacre are not accounted for in the UCDP non-state conflict database, but the large-
scale event is listed (UCDP 2015). According to local informants the initiating event 
occurred in early August of 2012. A Samburu militia stole 600 animals and killed 11 
Turkana moran in Narokwe.70 In response, Turkana militias conducted two major raids. 
They stole 600 animals from the Samburu near Baragoi, then stole 450 cattle two days 
later in a raid near Lotikal. The Turkana militia killed 10 Samburu moran during the 
raids. Three months later, in November of 2012, a Turkana militia massacred 42 security 
personnel, predominantly Samburu KPR or “home guards,”71 during an ad hoc policing 
mission to recover the stolen livestock.  
 
 
 
                                                
69 Fred Langaltei, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, August 14, 2014. 
 
70 Stephen Lobert, Interview with the author, Waso Rongai, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
 
71 KPR policing actors are former ethnic militia members. They are provided access to G-3 rifles from the 
Kenyan Police. They operate in areas with no formal police stations, and, due to high levels of corruption, 
often purchase their weapons from the police. They have very minimal oversight and accountability to 
formal policing institutions. For a good assessment of the KPR system and its related shortcomings, see: 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR16-Kenya-ES-EN.pdf  
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Context of Conflict 
After the Turkana raids at Baragoi and Lotikal in August of 2012, Samburu elders 
organized a protest in Baragoi. The group demanded a response from the local 
government for failing to protect the community from major acts of Turkana aggression 
(Standard Media 2012). In response, the Ministry of Internal Security coordinated a team 
of 107 local security actors. A BBC Media reports claims the group was composed of, 
“the regular police, reservists, and paramilitary officers” (BBC Nov. 14, 2012). The ad 
hoc group included different types of security personnel, but Samburu KPR or informal 
“home guards” were the major participants. A Samburu informant described the 
composition of the police force as follows: “even though some members of the General 
Service Unit (GSU) were involved, they [the Turkana] assumed we [the Samburu] were 
going for a counter-attack and revenge, rather than a peace mission.”72  
The composition of the group indicated to the Turkana that a Samburu militia had 
backing from the government. As a Turkana informant described, “the government was 
with the Samburu, our enemies; we thought they were going to clear us.”73 With dense 
informant networks across the area, the composition, organization, and route of the police 
group was well known: “with informers on both sides, the Turkana knew the exact date 
and time of movement of the group coming after them.”74 Some informants presumed 
Turkana political elites alerted local militias of the policing mission and justified the use 
                                                
72 Namugie Leokoe, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 16, 2014. 
 
73 Research Participant 115, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
74 Fred Langaltei, Interview with the author, South Horr, Kenya, August 14, 2014.  
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of extreme force.75 For example, a security analyst involved in the operation provides a 
plausible explanation of the role of Turkana politicians:  
Turkana politicians gave a message to all their moran beforehand: telling them, 
‘there is an operation coming to kill you.’ This made them fearful and they 
prepared for all out war. The evidence for this is clear – the Turkana were so well 
prepared, and their most skilled sharpshooters were there. They knew exactly 
what the Samburu were doing and had support from their politicians for the attack 
well in advance. No way they would have been so ready to kill without that 
support. Security is always the main concern of our people, so politicians are very 
aware of threats to their people, all of the time.76  
 
There are mixed reports on how the attack evolved, and a high level of 
speculation due to the fact that only a few KPR survived the attack to provide first-hand 
reports. The following excerpt is based on interviews with informants who were in 
Baragoi during the episode: 
The [Samburu] KPRs went through the valley, following the escape path that the 
local moran identified after the Turkana stole their animals. The KPR were ahead 
of the police who did not know the area as well as the Samburu. Then Turkana 
snipers from the hills attacked them. After the shooting began, the Samburu KPRs 
tried to counter attack around the hill, but they lost 8 people right away trying to 
climb the hill. Then, the police, who were behind, came into the attack too – but 
the Turkana were just so ready and so well positioned, that everyone was killed 
completely.77  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 This claim cannot be verified, but is broadly shared among multiple actors across the district. The insight 
aligns with Horowitz’ argument that ethnic violence rarely occur without “disinhibition,” or actions that 
reduce internal restraints among armed actors for engaging in high-risk collective violence. It is plausible 
that elite justification occurred in this case (Horowitz 1985). 
 
76 Philip Ongunje, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 2013. 
 
 
77 Research Participants 105, 106, 110, Interviews with the author, South Horr, Kenya, August 14 - 16, 
2014. 
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Patterns of Response 
 
A KDF military operation tracked the militia after the massacre. The military 
operation did not lead to any arrests. Intelligence reports suggest the Turkana militia split 
into two smaller groups that dissolved into predominantly Turkana communities around 
Marti in Samburu County and Parikati in Turkana County.78 The nature the attack 
indicated that the Turkana militia had prior information of the timing and movement of 
the group. The militia was pre-positioned in a strategic position, had knowledge of the 
mountainous terrain of the Suguta Valley, and a pre-planned retreat strategy to evade 
capture. Weapons caches of the Turkana militia were highly sophisticated, including 
sniper rifles, AK-47, RPGs, grenades. This indicates that the militia had, at least, strong 
informal trade networks for acquiring illegal weapons beyond the capacity of most local 
militias. Some analysts interpret these facts as evidence of direct political elite support for 
the militia.  
After the massacre, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) in 
Baragoi and the Samburu North DPC canceled long-running inter-group dialogue 
programming and shifted activities toward peace messaging to stabilize conditions and 
prevent acts of post-massacre revenge.79 Turkana villages near Baragoi dissipated and 
engaged in mass flight. The Turkana community abandoned the town of Lemerok—the 
village nearest the site of massacre and the most likely location for Samburu militias to 
target for revenge attacks.  
                                                
78 Citizen TV Report, “So, What Really Happened in Baragoi,” November 14, 2012. 
 
79 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
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With sufficient foreknowledge of the mission, the Turkana could have engaged in 
negotiation rather than violence, especially through the Catholic Church and the DPC. 
However, the nature of prior policing missions affected the decision to use deadly force. 
Prior policing missions in the area involved excessive force against civilians who were 
accused of harboring militia members. Philip Ongunje argues, “In the absence of a 
political settlement to ensure the hybrid local police force would deal with them [the 
Turkana] justly, the militia choose extreme violence as the mode of resistance.”80 The 
depth of uncertainty around the operation created conditions conducive for one of the 
most severe acts of violence within the long-running range war between the Samburu and 
Turkana.  
 
Outcomes 
 
The KDF failed to apprehend the Turkana militia, and perceptions of inequality, 
corruption, and direct marginalization deepened among the Samburu. The most common 
narrative of the Baragoi massacre among Samburu respondents was not that the state 
failed to provide security, but that the state sided with the Turkana. Rumors spread 
among the Samburu that Turkana contributed money to hire lawyers and prevent an 
investigation into the attack. The local government charged two Turkana MPs, but the 
case was dropped. Other informants claimed a Turkana MP cut the Turkana militia 
members a deal, offering immunity for mobilizing support for ODM in the 2013 
                                                
80 Philip Ongunje, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 2013. 
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election.81 Turkana leaders, such as Ekuru Okot, of the Turkana Professionals 
Association, claimed the Samburu police force was planning to drive Turkana from the 
county in order for the Samburu to have an electoral advantage in the lead up to the 2013 
election.82 Following the massacre, the national political cleavage between ODM and 
Jubilee became part of the conflict narrative.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The Baragoi incident highlights that state support, or even the perception of state 
support for a particular ethnic group can increase the sense of shared communal threat 
and trigger escalatory dynamics. In this case, the local government armed and backed 
informal Samburu police reservists in the absence of a clear agreement between the 
Samburu and Turkana regarding the formation of neutral policing forces. The Turkana 
community supported local militias to engage in mass organized violence to eliminate a 
potential threat to the larger Turkana community support network. Uncertainty 
surrounding the policing operation, as well as a history of violent policing operations in 
the past, triggered a violent response. The Turkana attack was related to intra-community 
defense, as well as retaliation for prior acts of state-sanctioned violence against the 
Turkana community.  
The Turkana militia also took all of the weapons from the bodies of the Samburu 
KPRs who died in the massacre, which increased the expectation among the Samburu of 
                                                
81 Johnstone Kibor and Jennifer Katusya, SRIC, Interviews with the authors, Nairobi, Kenya, August 12, 
2014. 
 
82 Citizen TV Report, “The Baragoi Massacre Dilemma Thickens,” November 14, 2012. 
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more aggressive attacks against Samburu settlements. An informant stated, “The problem 
now is the Turkana took 57 guns from the officers they killed, but only 3 have been 
recovered. We know those guns have circulated among the Turkana, because we’ve heard 
the voice of the G-3 in other raids.”83 The perception of an imbalance in weapons 
stockpiles set up conditions conducive for further escalation, including attacks in in 
Maralal, and raids in Waso Rongai and Tuum (described below).  
 
 
The Maralal Clashes (October 2013) 
Less than one year after the Baragoi Massacre, on October 30th, 2013, ethnic riots 
broke out between the Samburu and Turkana in the town of Maralal. The event is not 
recorded in the UCDP database since it did not cause more than 25 confirmed fatalities. 
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) records one fatality 
related to the Maralal clashes (Raleigh et al. 2010). Local informants, however, reported 
8 total fatalities occurred over the course of the process of escalation.84 Narratives 
gathered from first-hand conflict participants and witnesses allows for analysis of a 
process of escalation that unfolded within a very short timespan.  
 
Context of Conflict 
 
One week prior to the outbreak of violence in Maralal, a Turkana militia attacked 
a Samburu community on the outskirts of Baragoi. The militia stole 200 cattle and killed 
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two Samburu moran.85 Informants indicate the Turkana militia used G-3 rifles acquired 
during the Baragoi Massacre during the attacks. On October 28th, a week after the raid, 
Samburu living in Morijo village identified the stolen animals in two trucks en route to 
Maralal: “all Samburu clans know the marks of Samburu animals. They noticed our 
marks.”86 Samburu elders in Maralal received the report and organized a large group to 
blockade the road and watch for the trucks. When the lorries arrived in Maralal, the group 
stopped them and escorted the vehicles to the police station. The trucks and livestock 
were then impounded in the police compound.87  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
After two days, Samburu in Maralal, “started thinking the animals would go back 
to the Turkana, so they organized a demonstration at the police station.”88 A well-known 
student from Laikipia University organized a group of 500 Samburu youth. Early in the 
morning of October 30th, they walked through Maralal town to the police station with 
posters, destroyed the padlock to the police station gate, and let the cattle off the trucks. 
To disperse the group, a police officer shot into the air, but then shot at the crowd killing 
a 14-year-old boy. 
A Samburu university student, one of the lead organizers of the protest, took 
photos of the shooting and showed the images to the Officer Commanding the Station 
                                                
85 This analytical narrative is derived from interviews with informants who were present in Maralal on the 
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(OCS). The protest dispersed, and the police took back the cattle and locked them in the 
trucks at the station. Then, the station commander pursued and apprehended the student 
who took the photos and ordered an officer to shoot the student. The officer refused. The 
commander took a rifle from the officer and publically assassinated the student in front of 
the group of Samburu protestors.89 Then, informants describe,  
We all ran, but reorganized and came back to the police station. The police shot at 
us before we were close, and injured two more. We went away, but then went 
back again. Everyone was refusing to let the police take the body. The group then 
made a line and yelled at the police, ‘shoot us, too!’ for almost three hours. They 
kept shooting, but, by then, killing was everywhere. Moran in Maralal went 
through Turkana neighborhoods to chase all of them out, even beyond Maralal. 
Many Turkana living in Samburu villages around Maralal were killed. We know 
at least seven Turkana died and many houses were burned.90  
 
After the deadly riots, informants describe,  
“the MP and the Governor of Samburu flew to Maralal from Nairobi. They called 
a forum and told us: hold his body until we tell you what to do. The MP cried, and 
they took the boy’s body. They put the OCS in jail in Maralal, at first, but then he 
was relocated. No one knows where he has gone. They kept it a secret to protect 
him.”91  
The Catholic Church in Maralal convened peace dialogues and conducted peace 
messaging, but the town dis-integrated in the wake of the clash.92 Discrimination and 
threats against Turkana increased. Samburu business owners stopped working with 
Turkana actors, and a large majority of the Turkana community relocated away from 
Maralal. Even though the Samburu were aggressors, the event deepened perceptions of 
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inequality, victimhood, and suspicion among the Samburu community. The police 
released the cattle and lorries to the Turkana one week after the riots, causing local 
leaders to make claims that: “the police are part of this syndicate of Turkana cattle 
rustling.”93  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although state actors were not directly involved in the initial conflict, the 
perception of state inequality interacted with the nature of violent actions in the process 
of escalation. Police protection for Turkana, and the public assassination of a young, 
well-known university student triggered rapid escalation. The initial act of violence broke 
a social norm, and local police became a third party to the conflict. These two factors led 
to threats and violent attacks against Turkana civilians in Maralal and surrounding 
villages. Violence escalated rapidly with minimal space for intervention, and rapid dis-
integration of the town undermined opportunities for negotiation.  
 
 
Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (2011 - 2013) 
The Todonyang massacre is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group conflict that 
escalated to include mass collective violence between Turkana and Dassanetch 
communities. Todonyang is a small fishing village in the Northeast corner of Turkana 
County near the border of Ethiopia. A catholic mission station is the only external 
organization based in the village. Local CSOs based in Lodwar, SAPCONE and the 
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Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, provide intermittent support for local 
peacebuilding work in the Todonyang area. The conflict is not included in the UCDP 
non-state conflict database, but it is listed in the ACLED database. ACLED data captures 
three deadly conflict events within the escalation process, totaling 48 fatalities (Raleigh et 
al. 2010).  
The Turkana and the Dassanetch94 have a long conflict history. Historically, the 
Dassanetch were the only group with semi-permanent settlements across the marshlands 
of Northern Lake Turkana in Southwestern Ethiopia. Turkana shifted livelihoods over 
time due to climate change, unstable rain patterns, and insecurity due to persistent 
raiding. At the same time, the water level in Lake Turkana fell and the marshlands 
retreated southward beyond Kenya’s boundary. Under these conditions, to the Turkana, 
the Dassanetch are illegal immigrants in Kenya; to the Dassanetch, the Turkana 
community infringes upon fishing resources—the Dassanetch community’s traditional 
source of livelihood.95  Informants trace conditions for increasing hostility between the 
two groups trace to September 2002 when tension increased due to conflict over 
marshland access and killings related to Dassanetch initiation rites.96  
 
 
                                                
94 The Dassanetch are also known as the Merille. 
 
95 Peter Echele and Purity Akok, SAPCONE, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 31, 2014. 
 
96 One informant stated, “they kill us during August.” When male Dassanetch youth are on break from 
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have killed a Turkana and become a man. August is the most dangerous month. Everyone knows it. This is 
when they go for circumcision. The Turkana see their footprints in the area, and get very afraid” (Research 
Participant 84). 
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Patterns of Response 
 
In response, elders from both communities, with the support of the local Catholic 
Church and the MP for Turkana North, Japheth Ekidor, mediated an informal peace pact 
to set rules for resource sharing in the marshlands. Both groups signed the pact on 
September 11th, 2002. On September 13th, only two days after the local peace agreement 
was signed, a Dassanetch militia attacked a village near Todonyang killing ten Turkana 
civilians. A second attack on September 17th, 2002 caused six fatalities (Raleigh et al. 
2010). Ekidor continued to convene peace negotiations, but on October 14, 2002, as the 
Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) reports, “Ekidor’s vehicle was sprayed 
with bullets while he was in route to Nairobi ahead of Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) Presidential nominations” (SRIC 2006).  
Following the assassination of Ekidor, from 2002 – 2011, best estimates indicate 
cyclical clashes between the two groups caused between 15 – 20 fatalities per year (SRIC 
2006).97 Turkana militias adopted more aggressive tactics, conducting terrorist-like raids 
on Dassanetch civilians and attacking Ethiopian police. During this period, the conflict 
developed a cross-border dimension with linkages to the LAPSSET project (see chapter 2 
for overview).  
Increasing demand for energy necessary for oil pipeline construction led the GoK 
to sign an agreement to purchase energy from Ethiopia. The primary source of power for 
LAPSSET projects will come from the Gibe III Dam on the Omo River. The dam, when 
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complete, will block the Omo River and further reduce the marshlands of Northern Lake 
Turkana, and push the Dassanetch closer to Turkana communities. The agreement 
undermined the neutrality of the Kenyan government to mediate in the conflict, as 
Turkana in Todonyang believe the GoK sided with Ethiopia, and by proxy, the 
Dassanetch. It also increased fear among the Turkana that their interests were not 
protected by the state.  
On May 2, 2011, the most severe episode of violence within the long-running 
conflict occurred, with direct acts of ethnic cleansing and cyclical revenge attacks. After 
a dispute over access to the lake, a band of armed Dassanetch youth attacked a small 
fishing settlement near Todonyang, killing one Turkana elder and injuring another. 
Turkana citizens rapidly mobilized and conducted revenge attacks, initially killing 4 
Dassanetch living in Todonyang (see, Maina, Friends of Lake Turkana, 2011).  
After the major attack in Todonyang, leaders of the Catholic parish mobilized to 
warn Turkana to evacuate from Dassanetch villages. Excerpts from Fr. Steven Ochieng’s 
situation report indicate elders from the Catholic Church attempted to intervene, but did 
not mobilize fast enough to prevent the massacre. Ochieng states:  
“We were very worried and wanted to save the situation from more 
casualties…News reached the village of Sies before us and we were in shock to 
see the aftermath of one of the cruelest atrocities we have ever witnessed in the 
area; 23 bodies of women, children and men…This was a massacre” (Ochieng, 
May 28, 2011).  
Before the informal response team could warn Turkana to relocate, the Dassanetch militia 
killed 23 Turkana civilians who were en route to a market in the Dassanetch village of 
Sies.  
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KPR in Todonyang were not equipped contain violence, especially attacks by 
heavily armed Dassanetch militia members with backing from the Ethiopian police. 
Turkana informants claim, “The police arm the Merille to protect the marshes. Each 
month, each person gets restocked with bullets.”98 In the absence of significant police 
capacity, local civic associations including elders and the catholic mission functioned as 
the primary crisis response team. The church coordinated a full evacuation of the village 
of Todonyang, facilitating the movement of 1,200 people south to Lowarengak. 
Informants report that the IDP settlement at Lowarengak was attacked multiple times 
following the relocation. On August 15th, 2013, the Dassanetch attacked Todonyang, 
again, killing 13 Turkana. Police from Ethiopia intervened to contain attacks, but the 
Turkana militia killed 15 police. 
 
Outcomes 
 
An informal coalition of civic actors in Todonyang, including the area MP, local 
religious leaders and elders convened negotiations that led to an informal pact. The pact 
was very quickly broken, reducing the likelihood of future negotiation. Variation in civil 
society space between Kenya and Ethiopia undermined the effectiveness of local peace 
actors working to resolve the long-running conflict. Local peacebuilding associations, 
including SAPCONE and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, cite this issue as a 
major restraint for effective preventive action. Lucas Echuchuka describes this condition: 
“The major problem in Todonyang is that there is no civil society in Ethiopia to negotiate 
with. When we want to plan cross-border dialogues, and try to reach agreements to help 
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the situation, they say where is the government? They won’t negotiate with CSOs.”99 
Ethiopian government officials did not cooperate with civil society groups from Kenya 
due the CSO Proclamation—a set of restrictive regulations against civic associations 
engaged in issues linked to human rights promotion.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The Todonyang case presents a combination of pressures conducive for 
escalation, including the deliberate and rapid breaking of a local peace pact, ritual 
violence and inter-group fear, and the symbolic assassination of a local leader. The case 
also illustrates pressures limiting effective preventive intervention. SAPCONE and CJPC 
attempted to mediate the conflict, but were not able to convene negotiations due to formal 
institutional restrictions on civil society associations operating in Ethiopia. State 
representatives also faced restraints for engaging in the conflict as neutral third party 
mediators. The perception that the government was not protecting the interests of the 
Turkana community limited the ability of government actors to mediate. Under these 
conditions, the Dassanetch and Turkana both engaged in increasingly severe, and 
terrorist-like acts of violence. As the conflict escalated, both groups targeted state 
security actors, police posts, border crossing posts, and even peacebuilding actors, 
triggering further escalation.  
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Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2011 – 2013) 
Inter-ethnic group violence escalated in two major waves in Moyale between 
2011 and 2013. The events are listed in the UCDP database, which estimates a total of 
174 causalities during inter-ethnic group clashes among Borana, Gabra, Burji and Garre 
communities. Moyale is small trading town on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia in 
Northern Marsabit County. The Borana and Gabra have a long history of conflict outside 
of Moyale—it is only recently that violence between the two groups escalated in Moyale. 
The case presents a logic for conflict escalation between pastoralist ethnic groups 
competing over increasingly scarce resources, with a border dimension. There is some 
evidence of local preventive action containing the spread of violence beyond the urban 
center. 
 
Conflict Context 
 
The Burji and Garre are minority groups in Moyale, yet they make up a large 
portion of the business elite. Control over trade networks makes Burji and Garre powerful 
minority actors in a border town where illegal weapons and human trafficking are major 
economic activities. Borana and Gabra are also settled around Moyale. Both communities 
maintain largely livestock-based subsistence livelihoods. In early 2011, within the initial 
process of devolution and county government reform in Kenya (see chapter 2), Burji and 
Garre actors gained political influence within the Moyale electoral constituency. Under 
shifting political conditions, the following events intensified conflict between ethnic 
groups in Moyale, leading to two waves mass collective violence.  
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In 2011, facing pressure to relocate from settlements in Somalia and Mandera due 
to rising in resource scarcity and insecurity, Garre communities established new 
settlements in the Moyale area on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia. Garre 
expansionism increased tension and conflict over territory around the border town. In 
July 2011, a Garre militia clashed with a Borana militia north of Moyale. Shortly 
following the Garre attack against Borana settlements, the Gabra formed an alliance with 
the Garre.  
Analysts suggest the alliance, in part, was a coordinated effort for Gabra militias 
to gain access to funding from radical Islamic groups through Garre networks, in order to 
increase funding and military training for Gabra militias.100 With the Garre population 
rapidly growing due to emigration from Somalia to areas along the Kenya – Ethiopia 
border, rumors spread about impending attacks. For instance, actors from the Borana 
community claimed the Gabra-Garre alliance preemptively secured protection from 
Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces through large bribes and payoffs.101  
Informants from Marsabit County indicated the Gabra - Garre strategy was well 
formulated, promoted through online platforms, and very well known among security 
officers, and even key peacebuilding organizations. For example, a statement from David 
Kimaiyo, Inspector General of the Kenya Police, published in the East African Standard 
described threats related to the Garre expansionist narrative:  
Kimaiyo said [the police] are also investigating a website known as Garr online 
for allegedly inciting skirmishes. The website calls for the secession of parts of 
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North Eastern Kenya. According to map, the new region will be called Garreland 
Republic which stretches from Isiolo–Moyale, Wajir and Mandera to parts of 
Ethiopia (AllAfrica, September 3, 2013). 
 
Despite widespread knowledge of the threat of major attacks, violence escalated. 
On January 2nd, 2012, a Gabra militia attacked Mansile, Heilu, and Oda, Borana villages 
on the outskirts of Moyale. The Heilu attack occurred at the same time District 
Commissioner Elias Kithaura was in the village conducting peace talks (AllAfrica 2012). 
Kithaura was able to escape from the attack unharmed with support of Borana KPR 
protecting the convoy of mediators. The attack triggered four days of clashes between 
Gabra and Borana militias around Moyale. Borana civilians fled from the area and 
traveled across border into Ethiopia, and the Gabra militia gained control of all three 
villages after the Borana militia ran out of ammunition (BBC News, “20,000 Flee Moyale 
Clashes,” July 28, 2012).  
The KDF and border patrols based in Moyale secured the border to prevent an 
influx of armed actors from Ethiopia. Borana and Gabra reinforcements tried to cross the 
border, but most reinforcements retreated after clashing with KDF border patrols. In 
Moyale town, riots broke out. Borana youth attacked the District Commissioner’s office, 
claiming he was supporting Gabra in the clashes. However, no fatalities occurred in 
Moyale town during the initial attacks, only in the surrounding villages. Reports estimate 
25 actors from both sides were killed during the four days of clashes.102  
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Patterns of Response 
 
After direct violence ended, Gabra retained control of the three villages outside of 
Moyale. National-level mediators from the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (NCIC) secured a ceasefire agreement through negotiations with local 
political leaders from the Gabra, Garre, Borana, and Burji communities (AllAfrica 2013). 
The KDF border patrol unit promised to enforcement the ceasefire, and President 
Kenyatta threatened local political leaders with suspension of the government should the 
ceasefire not hold. However, both groups interpreted the threat as a political move rather 
than a sincere effort to contain the conflict. Borana and Gabra communities in Moyale 
assumed Kenyatta aimed to use the conflict to undermine the new County Governor, 
Ukur Yatani Kanacho, who was aligned with CORD rather than Jubilee (Menkhaus 2015, 
121). 
 Two months after the first wave of violence, in March of 2012, Borana civilians 
who had fled to Ethiopia returned to Kenya. Then, in April, Gabra civilians from Ethiopia 
moved into grazing areas on Kenyan side of the border 30 kilometers form Moyale town, 
and set up two nomadic settlements called Funan Nyata and Antuta. The Borana viewed 
this as an act of aggression related to the Gabra’s expansionist strategy. The new 
settlements caused the Borana community to mobilize and recruit more youth militia 
members from intra-ethnic networks in Ethiopia, under the assumption that new 
settlements were evidence that the Gabra intended to take control of the area.103 They 
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assumed nomadic settlements were potential forward bases for Borana militias working 
to gain access to the area. 
With ongoing threats of attacks, from May – August 2013, the ceasefire held. 
There were ongoing reports of small and sporadic acts of theft between Boran and Gabra 
militias, but most of the attacks were in the form of banditry aimed toward vehicles on 
the roads between Marsabit and Moyale. During this period, a clash in Ethiopia threated 
to undermine the ceasefire. On July 25, 2012, a clash between Garre and Borana militias 
on the Ethiopia side of the border lasted for three days. The UN and the Red Cross 
reported 20 fatalities and over 20,000 IDPs in Ethiopia (Al Jazeera July 28th, 2012). The 
clash did not spillover directly into Kenya. Borana in Kenya, however, interpreted the 
conflict as another sign of increasing intensity of Garre acts of aggression and active 
territorial expansion. 
During August of 2012, campaigning picked in Moyale within the national 
electoral cycle. Politicians used the conflict as a platform for consolidating support, 
which further intensified tension between the Borana and Gabra (Scott-Villiers et al. 
2014). Outcomes of the county elections were not favorable to the Borana, again 
deepening the sense of threat. The REGABU alliance, comprised of the Rendille, Gabra, 
Burji – the three minority groups in the area, won almost all major political posts 
including the new104 governor, senator, and women’s representative roles.  
A brief history of REGABU is critical for understanding the conflict dynamics in 
the case. REGABU formed due to Gabra frustration toward Borana domination. 
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Historically, prior to devolution, the Borana dominated mid-level political positions in 
the county government. In particular, Gabra were persistently under-represented in the 
teachers union, one of the largest labor groups in the area. Initially, in order to shift the 
balance of power away from the Borana, the Gabra used the REGABU strategy to win 
elections within the Kenya National Union of Teachers and Marsabit Teachers’ 
SACCO.105 Within teachers’ union elections, the strategy worked effectively to “sideline” 
Borana representatives. The reversal in control of the teachers union, then, created a 
situation where the majority ethnic group was underrepresented in the union. Borana 
interpreted this as, as a “Gabra conspiracy to lock us out of power.”106 The same strategy 
used in teachers union elections, was then applied as foundation for county elections in 
2013, fueling the same sense of grievance among the Borana. 
Electoral outcomes increased fear among the Borana of political exclusion within 
the newly devolved system of county government.107 In response, the Borana accused the 
REGABU alliance of “stealing our seats” (Daily Nation 2012). In the words of an 
informant, “election outcomes left Borana feeling ‘sidelined,’ and the Gabra feeling 
victorious over their historical subjugators.”108 The electoral processes increased fear of 
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marginalization by an alliance of minority groups, which intensified animosity and 
tension in in Moyale. 
Between April and August of 2012, conditions remained relatively peaceful in 
Moyale. However, over the course of four months, the Borana reported increasing threats 
of attack and displacement from Gabra militias and elites. In response, the Borana 
activists organized a protest in Moyale, demanding a statement from the government 
about how they were planning to deal with increasing threats against Borana from Gabra 
militias. Protesters also demanded the arrest of a prominent local Gabra chief that they 
accused coordinating a deadly raid (Star News, August 12, 2013). The KDF was 
deployed to control crowds, but, as tension escalated, a KDF officer shot and killed a 
Borana human rights activist, Hassan Ali Guyo. The incident deepened suspicion among 
the Borana that the Gabra bribed Kenyan government officials and security actors to 
support Gabra expansionism.  
Two weeks after Guyo’s death, on August 26, 2013, a second wave of major 
violence began. Gabra militias attacked Heilu, Odda, and Antuta on the outskirts of 
Moyale town. During the second outbreak, the KDF was not able to effectively control 
the border. Borana and Gabra reinforcements crossed into Kenya, causing clashes to 
spiral for three days. The Kenyan military intervened using helicopter gunships, and 
stepped up policing of the area.  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
In the wake of the clashes, the GoK posted a new District Commissioner to 
Moyale, Kamunyan Chedotun. Chetodun had a specific mandate to lead a local peace 
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process. Reports emerged of tension between Chetodun and local police. Boran and 
Gabra leaders perceived a divided government, and rejected negotiations (Star Report, 
August 28th, 2013). On December 3, 2013 clashes resumed. The Gabra/Burji alliance 
again engaged in clashes with the Borana for four days, with, according to government 
reports, 27 fatalities (20 Borana fatalities and 7 Gabra/Burji fatalities), and over 70,000 
IDPs fleeing from Moyale. On day four, the KDF intervened using helicopter gunships 
and infantry to drive militias from the town and reclaim the area.  
Two days after direct conflict ended, reports spread of government alignment with 
the Gabra.109 Reports suggested the KDP gave uniforms to Gabra militias during the 
conflict and helped to burn Borana civilian homes. Borana elites took the issue to 
parliament in Nairobi, calling for statements on the reasons for government support for 
the Gabra during the clashes. The GoK responded, claiming that the Ethiopian military 
was involved, and justified its support for the Gabra militia as a joint effort between the 
Kenyan and Ethiopian militaries to root out OLF members hiding among the Borana 
militia in Moyale (Borana News 2014).  
Without established DPCs in Marsabit County, the GoK formed an ad hoc 
county-level peacebuilding committee to mediate the conflict. A committee of eminent 
personalities called the Kaparo-Haji joint committee facilitated negotiations. Ole Kaparo, 
former speaker of National Assembly, and Yusef Haji, Garissa county senator, and 
former Defense Minster led the ad hoc peace committee. The Kaparo-Haji committee 
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achieved a negotiated settlement and stayed in place to oversee reconstruction, relocation 
of IDPs, and allocation of resources to support affected families.110  
The recommendation at the center of the peace strategy was to ensure the: 
“equitable distribution of resources of the government, both financial and human” 
(Marsabit County Review, June 2014). The committee imposed new rules of engagement. 
Ole Kaparo set up a mandate that the government would fine communities five million 
KES for breaking the ceasefire pact. On February 15th, 2014, an elite compromise was 
reached. President Kenyatta increased pressure through an ultimatum:  
Kenyatta issued an ultimatum to the local political leaders to reach an agreement. 
Under pressure from the president, leaders from different communities in 
Marsabit agreed to form an oversight committee to ensure continued efforts for 
peace. If negotiations fail, Kenyatta stated, all measures will be taken to see peace 
restored (Capital FM, February 15th, 2014).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Inter-ethnic group conflict escalated in Moyale in two major waves: one in 2012, 
and the other in 2013. In 2013, clashes broke out following local elections. Initially, local 
peace actors engaged in the conflict with little success in attaining a truce. The GoK 
coordinated a peace restoration committee with external political actors as lead 
negotiators. The process of devolution introduced more resources into the conflict 
system, creating a type of localized financial shock and increased inter-ethnic group 
competition. With political positions linked to exclusive control over the allocation of 
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new county resources, the long history of identity-based allocation of state resources 
raised the stakes of local elections.111  
As Roba Shamaro describes,  
“what really makes democracy dangerous in the North is that every leader has 
their own ethnic militia. This creates very unstable conditions around contests for 
local power. Politicians directly mobilized their own militias to burn houses and 
displace rival groups in the lead up to elections.”112  
Devolution, therefore, deepened inter-ethnic enmity as local elites competed for access to 
new positions in the county government. Political entrepreneurs exploited ethnic identity. 
Historical grievances related to prior acts of violence were brought to the surface, 
establishing conditions highly conducive for a symbolic event, such as the killing of a 
nonviolent activist, to spark even more widespread violence.  
In the Moyale case, border dynamics intensified the process of escalation. Gabra 
and Borana in Kenya both have ties with kinship groups in Ethiopia. This factor affected 
the escalation process. During the lead up to attacks in Moyale, Borana and Gabra 
militants trained new militias members across the border. Borana from Northern Marsabit 
had links with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Borana in Kenya supplied and aided 
former Oromo militia members in the process of evading the Ethiopian military, making 
Gabra increasingly fearful of highly coordinated and aggressive attacks with support 
from and cooperation with the OLF fighters.113 Increasing rumors of mobilization, 
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armament, and bribery of security forces on the other side of the border increased 
suspicion and fear between both groups.  
At same time, both groups could draw upon ethnic ties across the border for 
accessing arms, fleeing across border into Ethiopia, and calling for reinforcements. 
Cross-border ethnic networks and linkages to conflict in Ethiopia made the conflict 
increasingly complex on the Kenya side of the border. During the Moyale episode, for 
example, the Borana were accused of calling in members of the OLF militia to assist in 
attacks. Borana denied the allegations, claiming that they were victims of aggression 
from both Kenyan and Ethiopian militaries, who were falsely accusing them of harboring 
OLF rebels, merely based on their shared identity (see also, Menkhaus 2015, 47 – 48).  
OLF militants from Ethiopia offered assistance for organization and militarization 
of Borana youth in Marsabit introducing more actors with previous wartime experience 
into the conflict system.114 The Ethiopian military and intelligence officers constantly 
look for Borana OLF sympathizers in Kenya. Thus, the Gabra are highly likely to spoil 
zones of protection for OLF rebels evading the Ethiopian military. OLF supporters 
cannot trust Gabra to keep secrets of identity, whereabouts, as well as businesses 
transactions related to human trafficking, poaching, or arms trafficking. The process of 
securing Kenyan ID Cards for Borana from Ethiopia wanting to relocate to Kenya has 
become a big business, with illegal trafficking operating under umbrella of livestock 
                                                                                                                                            
OLF members across border in Kenya in areas around Sololo and Moyale, for example. Moreover, there 
are reports that Borana chiefs who have not been loyal in supporting the OLF have been assassinated. The 
OLF has used aggression and violent tactics against elites within Borana community, which may help 
secure protection and harboring of rebel leaders within the remotest areas of Northern Kenya.  
 
114 Ibrahim Sora, CIFA, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 12, 2014. 
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trade.115 Therefore, cleansing Gabra from contested border areas is a way for the Borana 
to protect illegal, intra-group activities as well as protect actors supporting the OLF from 
Ethiopian spies and military actors. Border dynamics play a significant role in the 
conflict. 
In the Moyale case, the Borana conducted highly organized attacks against the 
Gabra. The level of organization required for clandestine activities intensified identity-
based divisions. Local peace actions occurred prior to the escalation of violence in 
Moyale but did not contain escalation. There is some evidence of local peace action 
preventing the spillover of conflict from Moyale to surrounding villages through the 
coordinated actions of elders networks formed through negotiation processes over local 
declarations following the Turbi massacre (see chapter five for further analysis). 
 
 
Logics of Escalation  
In these cases, the following conditions stand out as common features of 
escalation processes in areas with limited state presence. First, the initial trigger of 
escalation was related to the quality of particular acts of violence. Inter-group conflict 
intensified in relation to the downing of a helicopter with a prominent Samburu leader, 
the killing of a well known student activist, the targeting church elders, and the killing of 
youth militia members, as respondents described, “in their sleep.” All of these acts of 
violence were symbolic and fell outside of more expected acts of killing that occurred 
                                                
115 Hassan Kochore, Interview with the author, Nairobi, September 8, 2014. 
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more regularly between male youth involved in militias. These acts broke the social norm 
of reciprocity regarding informal codes of targeting within range wars, and increased the 
likelihood of escalation (Rothchild 1973).  
The second common pattern is that different combinations of civic associations 
responded to initial crises to mediate informal peace pacts. In the Turkana - Samburu 
case, local government officials, church mission station leaders, and group elders 
intervened and led negotiation processes. Operational preventive actions predominantly 
included peace messaging, and assistance for relocation. In the Todonyang case, a 
prominent MP, the Catholic Church and local CSOs mediated. The rapid breaking of 
locally negotiated informal peace pacts, however, played a role in the escalation process 
in multiple cases. Informal peace pacts were signed, but quickly broke due to small-scale 
acts of violence.  
The state used ad hoc helicopter missions to respond to the most remote clashes, 
but sent a team of eminent personalities to Moyale to broker a cease-fire agreement. The 
use of elite, immanent figures is a common state-led approach to govern conflict in the 
periphery. At the state level of analysis, two actions influenced the process of escalation. 
In four of the cases, conflict intensified after militias targeted and killed state police 
agents. Targeting of the police led increased communal support for local militias. Patrons 
of local militias formed cross-ethnic alliances, and extended trade networks to gain 
access to more sophisticated arms using pooled communal resources. Similarly, when 
conflict actors perceived that the state used force unevenly, conflict escalated. In four of 
the five cases, when the targeted group assumed state agents aligned with the aggressor, 
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conflict escalated. The perception of state discrimination is a common factor that plays 
into local conflict escalation dynamics.
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Table 4: Features of Escalation Cases 
 
Explanatory 
Factors  
1. Turkana 
Nyrio Clashes 
(1996 – 1997) 
 
2. Samburu 
Baragoi 
(2012) 
3. Samburu 
Maralal 
(2013) 
4. Turkana 
Todonyang 
(2011) 
5. Marsabit 
Moyale 
(2012 - 2013) 
Groups Samburu, Turkana, 
Pokot, Somali 
Samburu, Turkana Samburu, Turkana Turkana, Dassanetch Gabra, Borana 
1. Symbolic 
 
Y 
Political Leader 
N 
Fear: Revenge 
Y 
Student Killed 
Y 
Political Leader 
Y 
Activist Killed 
2. Border 
/Dev/Periphery 
Periphery Periphery Periphery Border/Development
al 
Border 
3. State 
Response 
 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
(state targeted) 
 
Coercive: Hybrid 
Police Force 
(state targeted) 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
(unequal force) 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
(state targeted) 
Coercive: Military 
Force 
Sanctions 
(unequal force) 
Non: Mediation 
4. Cohesive 
Coalition 
Elite Unity 
Informal 
Institutions 
Militia Trust 
N N Y* 
(Rapid Riot)  
N  
Fragmented: 
CSO Restraint in 
Ethiopia 
 
N  
Fragmented: 
DPC Collapse 
 
5. Local 
Adaptation 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Mediation 
(Elder) 
 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Messaging 
(Elder) 
Outcomes 
1) Escalation 
2) Non-
escalation 
3) Re-escalation 
1 
Escalation 
 
1 
Escalation 
 
1 
Escalation 
 
1 
Escalation 
 
(*2 – catholic church 
protection) 
1 
Escalation 
 
 (*2 – no urban to 
rural spread) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LIMITED ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA 
 
The set of cases analyzed in chapter four share the same dependent variable: 
limited escalation or resilience. Inter-group conflict intensified and actors had the 
opportunity use violence against a rival group, but they did not. In contrast to the set of 
cases in chapters 3, episodes in this chapter provide evidence of coalitions of local civic 
associations playing roles in processes of preventive intervention and warning response 
to contain inter-group conflict.  
In all of the cases, there is evidence of local peace actors operating outside of 
formal organizational affiliations to respond to threats and dampen violence. Each case 
considers plausible conditions for constraint, or factors related to external actors and 
preventive intervention, and restraint, or factors internal to armed groups, contributing to 
non-escalation. Across the cases, informal coalitions of civic organizations prevent 
conflict escalation following acts of violence through three key mechanisms: threat-
monitoring networks, providing platforms for inter-group negotiation of informal peace 
pacts, and enforcing traditional codes of restitution. 
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Table 5: Limited Escalation Cases 
 
 
Samburu, Marsabit, Turkana, and Isiolo 
 
1. Samburu: Nyiro Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014) 
2. Marsabit: Sarimo Settlement: Gabra – Turkana (2010 – 2014) 
3. West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (2014)  
4. Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014) 
5. Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014) 
 
 
 
Samburu: Nyiro Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014) 
Conflict between Samburu and Turkana militias along the Nyiro Mountain 
conflict corridor from 2012 –2014 is a case in which inter-group hostility was very high, 
but escalation did not occur. Following a series of three Turkana attacks against Samburu 
villages and resources, local militias did not use violence against Turkana settlements 
along the border of Samburu County. Why did inter-group violence not escalate during a 
period of increasing hostility and threats of revenge attacks? The series of conflict events 
is included in the ACLED database, but not in the UCDP database since total fatalities 
did not reach the threshold (Raleigh et al. 2010). The Nyiro mountain case is an example 
of local civic associations playing a key role in containing escalation.  
 
Conflict Context 
 
Overlapping conditions increase the potential for escalation and collective 
violence within the conflict between the Samburu and Turkana along the Nyiro Mountain 
– Suguta Valley corridor. Small arms density is high. Saferworld and SRIC survey 
indicate a 100% ownership rate among adults for the area (SRIC 2006). Turkana 
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settlements within the boundaries of Samburu County have rising populations, and 
Samburu politicians regularly express fear of Turkana resettlement schemes. The area 
chief, Dominic Lepulelei stated, “Their home area, Suguta Valley, is a terrible place. 
They keep moving into our territory. They have it in their minds take over our grazing 
areas.”116 Drawing upon this suspicion, Samburu political leaders regularly threaten, “to 
push the ‘Samburu-Turkana’ back towards ‘Turkana-Turkana.’”117 Samburu politicians 
consistently threaten to remove Turkana settlements due to fear of a long-term Turkana 
expansionist strategy.118 Rising competition over increasingly scarce resources, political 
incitement, and a history of inter-group banditry and violent clashes suggests there is a 
high risk for conflict escalation.  
Between 2012 – 2014, a series of conflict events increased hostility between the 
Samburu and Turkana along the Suguta Valley – Nyiro Mountain conflict corridor. Less 
than a year after the Baragoi massacre in 2012 (see chapter 3), on the morning of October 
17th, 2013, a Turkana militia attacked the village of Waso Rongai. The militia killed four 
Samburu moran, injured three, and stole 600 cattle. One day prior to the attack, Turkana 
abandoned the village of Kawap, a semi-permanent settlement 8 kilometers west of Waso 
Rongai along the Turkana militia’s escape route—evidence of direct collaboration 
between the Kawap community and the militia.  
                                                
116 Dominic Lepulelei, Chief, Interview with the author, South Horr, August 15, 2014. 
 
117 Ibid. 
 
118 Research Participants 105 and 106, Interviews with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, August 13 - 14, 2014. 
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Following the attack, the Samburu North DPC and the Catholic Church in 
Baragoi convened a peace dialogue between Samburu and Turkana ward representatives. 
The dialogue led to a new informal boundary agreement, and a new rule of engagement 
for Turkana and Samburu militias: “shoot on sight.”119 Elders from both groups informed 
leaders of remote Samburu and Turkana militias of the new boundary rules.  
Shortly after the dialogue, on October 27th, 2013, a Turkana militia broke the 
agreement. A militia attacked Tuum, injuring one Samburu moran and stealing 120 
cattle. Families who lost animals in Tuum demanded a direct response from local 
Samburu militias, increasing the potential for a revenge attack against Turkana 
settlements. Even though only one injury occurred, a local elder stated, “[the Tuum 
attack] was not at all acceptable for the Samburu—it was cowardly, shameful, and 
happened right beside the police barracks.”120 During the attack, only one warrior 
monitored a large herd of cattle belonging to 17 families, and fog covered the valley.  
Informants indicated the animals belonged to the poorest families in the 
community, stating, “There is no way we can stand still when the poorest among us lost 
so much.”121 The proximity of the attack to the most recent peace dialogue, “made the 
Tuum raid so bitter.”122 Respondents expressed the Turkana were, “speaking peace with 
                                                
119 Research Participant 125, Interview with the author, Kawap, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
 
120 Focus Group 120, Catholic Peacebuilding Team, Interviews with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 
2014. 
 
121 Ibid. 
 
122 Raphael Leparkiras, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
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one mouth, and organizing violence against us with the other.”123 In the words of a key 
moran leader, “a Turkana must die, and the cows must be brought back, due to the way 
they took the Tuum cows.”124  
 
 
 
 
Patterns of Response 
 
 Despite increased hostility and direct demands from the Tuum community for 
moran to coordinate revenge attacks, revenge attacks did not occur. On the brink of 
escalation, what factors prevented Samburu militias in the Nyiro Valley from engaging in 
revenge attacks against Turkana settlements? In July of 2014, drought was the most 
common explanation. In the words of one informant: “when it rains, there will be 
trouble.”125 Without access to water and resources away from the mountain range, moran 
could not travel inconspicuously to conduct a counter-raid operation. With clear evidence 
of increased tension, Turkana militias stationed scouts across the rangeland, especially 
close to well-known water points and raiding routes. Militia vigilance increased the risk 
of Samburu mobilization, especially under drought conditions. With the Samburu 
community demanding a revenge attack, a plausible explanation for restraint is that 
environmental conditions increased the cost and risk of conducting a counter-raid, 
containing escalation (see also, Witsenburg and Adano 2009).  
                                                
123 Ibid. 
 
124 Samson Leriano and Lchagi Amin, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014. 
 
125 Samuel Lekinet, Interview with the author, South Horr, Kenya, August 16, 2014. 
 
 143 
 
 In other cases of escalation, such as the Baragoi conflict and Turbi massacre, 
militias elected to engage in asymmetrical revenge attacks against proximate out-group 
communities. Turkana civilian populations in close proximity to Tuum, including Parikati 
and Sarima and Kurungu were not immediately targeted. What factors prevented revenge 
attacks against proximate Turkana settlements? The following narrative employs insights 
from interviews and focus group conversations on threat response strategies employed in 
the area. Local interpretations from Tuum, Loongerin, Parikati and Sarima, the most 
plausible sites of attacks, suggest informal out-group coping mechanisms, and intra-group 
civic associations play key roles in containing violence. Local civic associations, in 
particular, contributed significantly to non-escalation.  
 
 
Parikati – Tuum Communal Protection Strategies  
 
Parikati, Kenya is a Turkana village on the edge of the Suguta Valley, between 
Turkana and Samburu Counties, 15 kilometers from Tuum. There is very little trust 
between the two groups and a persistent threat of attack. Samburu do not allow Turkana 
from Parikati direct access to markets in Tuum out of fear of spying, and access to 
information related to militia locations and resources. Livestock trade between Parikati 
and Tuum occurs through heavily policed sokko, or “peace markets,” organized by the 
Catholic Church, or through intermediaries who conduct exchanges in remote locations 
between the two villages. Samburu militia members assume the Turkana community in 
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Parikati is likely to collaborate with highly mobile Turkana or Pokot militias to raid 
Samburu livestock.126  
Turkana living in Parikati articulated a range of strategies to reduce the likelihood 
of Samburu targeting the village following deadly raids. Local elder Jonathan Losokon 
stated, “Parikati is a very dangerous place, but we trained ourselves to survive in this 
area.”127 A small network of Turkana leaders in Parikati share threat information with 
patrons of Samburu militias in Tuum. In the absence of communication technology, 
Turkana source information on potential threats through intra-clan trade networks.128 This 
is a high-risk strategy, as Turkana militias have assassinated actors caught spying for 
Samburu militias.129 The covert informant network limits the likelihood of rapid 
escalation. As a local Samburu militia leader stated, “We still do not trust them at all. We 
would attack them if we knew they were working with other enemies, but as long as they 
share information with us, we cannot attack them.”130 Clandestine informant networks 
establish a minimal form of cross-ethnic group connection to reduce the likelihood that 
Samburu will target out-group villages.  
                                                
126 Research Participants 122, Dialogue with the Author, Tuum, Kenya, August 19, 2014.  
 
127 Jonathan Losokon Lokinei, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
128 Research Participant 117, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
129 Ibid. 
 
130 Focus Group 122, Dialogue with the author, Kawap, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
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At the same time, informal, intra-group policing131 strategies compliment covert 
inter-group information networks. The tenuous relationship would break down if 
Samburu suspected Turkana of forming an outside alliance to allow an external Turkana 
or Pokot militia to use the village as a forward base for conducting raids. As Joseph 
Lokinei describes:  
We do not let other Turkana or Pokot pass through Parikati, even just to trade. 
There are spies for the Turkana in Parikati and in Tuum and spies for the Samburu 
in Parikati and Tuum. All of the spies want peace and to protect their own 
animals. They tell each other if the other group is coming through their territory to 
attack. We do not want those who kill to be part of our community, so we keep 
them out.132  
 
The GoK promotes informal community policing among pastoralist communities in the 
area via the nyumba kumi (“ten houses”) initiative. Replicating communal policing 
structures in Rwanda, the GoK encourages villages to develop informal community 
watch systems to control movement of potential spoilers in and out of settlements in the 
most insecure areas.  
Livestock management strategies compliment informant networks and intra-group 
policing. For example, the Turkana community in Parikati established livestock 
identification and tracking systems for each clan, and enforced a shared communal rule to 
not purchase animals from unknown Turkana or Pokot markets or traders. They do not 
purchase livestock if they do not know and trust the source to reduce suspicion among 
                                                
131 Fearon and Laitin, 2006. 
 
132 Research Participant 117 (Turkana moran, anonymous), Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, 
August 18, 2014. 
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Samburu militias: “even if they think we are thieves, there will not be peace.”133 Turkana 
in Parikati over-accumulate livestock. A prominent elder stated, “We do not sell animals, 
even if we need the money for schools fees. Sometimes, we really struggle for food, but 
if raided, at least we can forgive and not organize for revenge.”134 Respondents claim 
these tactics prevent Samburu from attacking Turkana living in Tuum following Turkana 
militia attacks on Samburu resources: “In these ways, we suffer to keep peace.”135 
 
Sarima – Loonjerin Communal Protection Strategies  
 
Similar to Parikati, Sarima, Kenya is a Turkana settlement at high risk for revenge 
attacks. Loonjerin and Sarima are, “two villages in the danger zone. When the Turkana 
attack Samburu, they must first attack Loonjerin. It is just at the base of the mountains 
and easy to scout for animals and warriors. When the Samburu attack, they first attack 
Sarima.”136 Due to the severity of past attacks that have occurred in these two locations at 
the intersection of major raiding routes, there is a very high level of distrust and inter-
group suspicion. For example, a Samburu elder state: “Those of Sarima also give us fake 
names of raiders when we go to them after the attack to see what happened. They use 
diversion and lies to try to keep the peace and protect their own people.”137   
                                                
133 Ibid. 
 
134 Research Participant 112, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
135 Ibid. 
 
136 Steven Lepaul Lemadada, Interview with the author, Loongerin, Kenya, August 16, 2014. 
 
137 Focus Group 139, Loonjerin Elders Dialogue, Dialogue with the author, Loongerin, Kenya, August 26, 
2014. 
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Despite severe suspicion and mistrust between the Samburu and Turkana, similar 
to Parikati, both groups have in place covert informant networks. Samburu informants 
described,  
“They [Turkana of Sarima] are still our enemies, but they let us know if Turkana, 
Pokot, or Gabra militias are on the other side. This is a dangerous strategy. 
Sometimes bandits from other groups make tracks leading to Sarima to make us 
think [the Turkana] were involved when they were not.”138  
An ex-militia leader,139 and now key elder of the Turkana clan describes the strategic 
dilemma for the settlement: 
We live at a very dangerous point along the road between Maralal and 
Loiyangalani. Many people pass through here, so we have to be welcoming to 
everyone for our businesses. This makes the Samburu suspicious of us. They 
think we are always working with others to coordinate attacks on them. That is 
why we have to make sure they know this is not the case. We have to be a town of 
peace. If we are not, the Samburu will clear us.140 
 
Due to high levels of suspicion, and shared knowledge of the various ways the 
other group can avert blame and mislead local policing missions with tracking or 
misinformation about impending raids, informant networks are complex and layered. As 
one respondent stated, “we have spies to spy on our spies.”141 The main Turkana elder 
based in Sarima is infamous. Respondents from the area said, “that guy was a real 
warlord” and accounted stories of his leadership and behavior during deadly clashes. He 
now chairs the local peace committee of Sarima. As a major local power broker, the local 
                                                
138 Samson Leriano and Lchagi Amin, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014. 
 
139 N.B.: Actor is also the chairman of the local peace committee. 
 
140 Naisei Erupe Esunyen, Interview with the author, Sarima, Kenya, August 22, 2014. 
 
141 Samson Leriano and Lchagi Amin, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014. 
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leader of the Sarima settlement works in close collaboration with Samburu elders, 
informants, and militia leaders, and has become a central figure for information sharing 
and monitoring. Critically, his dominant status as a former militia leader protects him 
from threats from other Turkana militias. 
Respondents from Sarima village claimed they disarmed the village to make it 
less prone to attacks, stating: “home guards (KPR) have weapons to protect us, so we do 
not need weapons.”142 Further investigation indicated that this is not the case: “Turkana 
in Sarima have a lot of weapons. Everyone does. But it is true that they do not try to get 
more. If they did, we would know and they would have to leave.”143 Samburu elders 
maintain linkages with actors involved in weapons trade that provide them with 
information about who is purchasing or transporting weapons into the area, which plays 
into calculations related to potential threats. 
 
Civic Associations and Warning Response in the Nyiro Valley 
 
A rapid deployment unit (RDU) with an anti-stock theft police force is based on 
the outskirts of Tuum. Police actors, however, do not have access to day-to-day 
interactions and exchanges between the Samburu and Turkana regarding potential threats. 
Samburu and Turkana are suspicious of the policing force comprised of soldiers from 
“down country.” Samburu militia leaders in Tuum do not provide information to the 
formal security unit due to the high cost of corruption, and that fact that militia actors 
                                                
142 Naisei Erupe Esunyen, Interview with the author, Sarima, Kenya, August 22, 2014. 
 
143 Research Participant 138, Interview with the author, South Horr, Kenya, August 23, 2014. 
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assumed their illegal weapons would be confiscated. A group of young boys in Tuum, too 
young to be initiated into moran protection groups, frequented the military camp and, in 
exchange for food, provided some information to the military. State actors in Tuum 
functioned well outside of the primary group of actors responsible for the day-to-day 
management of threat warnings and organized scouting missions.  
Local civic associations with insider linkages to leaders of youth militias station 
in remote outposts involved in day-to-day scouting and warning response in the Tuum 
area reveals a strong, informal coalition of local civic groups that includes five Samburu 
associations. The Protestant Church in Tuum is as a major hub for communication with 
leaders, elders, and, indirectly, leaders of armed communal protection units. The mission 
station in Tuum had the only Thuraya (satellite) phone in village. Early warning 
messages are sent to that phone in the hands of a local missionary. Vehicles from the 
mission regularly deployed for tracking, animal recovery, and scouting missions. 
Elders groups played a key role. Elders are the main patrons for young moran 
entrenched in the day-to-day process of livestock protection, information gathering, and 
positioning of resources. This is very different from the past social structure.144 
Increasing insecurity in the area has triggered change within the Samburu age-set 
hierarchy. Traditionally, Samburu moran operated independently. Elders collaborate 
closely with moran to provide support and protection while in mobile cattle camps. For 
                                                
144 Traditional social order is based on what anthropologists call, “a hierarchical, segmentary descent 
system” (Evans Prichard 1940; Spencer 1973; Fratkin 1991; Naito 2005). The social system is organized by 
ethnic group, clan, sub-clan, and patrimonial lineage. Clan functions are key organizing feature of life in 
Samburu – as it impacts nature of marriage, and inter-clan collaboration. However, segmentation between 
age sets is now changing, with more collaboration between elders and youth in day-to-day actions of 
communal protection. In other word, “bonding social capital” among Samburu age sets is quite strong. 
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example, as an informant described, “last year we failed in a raid and lost one warrior. 
Elders came in to support us and help organize the next one we could learn quickly from 
the mistakes.”145 Elders also play multiple roles within various community organizations, 
increasing their capacity to acquire broad and detailed information about conflicts and 
negotiation processes to provide to warriors. Warrior bands living in remote, clan-based 
cattle camps use information provided through informal networks to make day-to-day 
decisions on herd movement, scouting locations, or mobilization for offensive theft or 
attack if low-risk opportunities are identified.  
The Catholic Church of Tuum is another major hub for improving and enhancing 
local protection strategies. The Church constructed signage around the valley with the 
message, “Tuum – Land of Peace.” It was involved in peace messaging, and coordinating 
peace dialogues designed for long-term norm change and a discursive shift (Cameron, 
Weatherbed, and Onyiego 2013). In other words, dialogues pursed the goal of convincing 
all groups living in the area to identify smaller bandit groups as thieves and murderers, 
not as, “legitimate members of the larger collective.”146 Most importantly, the Catholic 
Church organized peace markets, helping to reestablish open exchange between Turkana 
and Samburu, and increase opportunities for information sharing among clandestine 
informant networks.  
                                                
145 Focus Group 122, Dialogue with the author, Kawap, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
 
146 Focus Group 120, Catholic Peacebuilding Team, Dialogue with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 
2014. 
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The teachers’ union played a role, as well. On a day-to-day basis teachers engage 
with Samburu youth, many of whom choose, “to stay in town rather than in the 
camps.”147 Samburu students maintain direct relationships with age mates stationed in 
remote protection militias, allowing teachers the opportunity access and relay information 
related to rumors, conflict dynamics, and potential threats.  
The District Peace Committee for Samburu North played a minimal role in 
responding to the Samburu – Turkana conflict. With an increasing threat of violence, the 
chairman of the DPC for Samburu North, Moses Lenaroishi, traveled to Tuum to conduct 
a peace dialogue. After suggesting the Samburu were culpable for prior attacks, 
informants indicate that the community did not allow him to convene a dialogue. Leaders 
of Samburu militias communicated to the DPC that,  “there is no way must a Turkana not 
die and the cows be brought back.”148  The threat initiated dialogue among leaders of the 
DPC and local political representatives about the government paying restitution for the 
crimes to reduce the risk of escalation, the first time a proposal was considered.149  
 
Outcomes 
 
Historically, clashes occurred between Turkana and Samburu in Loongerin and 
Sarima. Recently, however, clashes have not occurred between Samburu and Turkana 
communities for six years. Coping strategies restrain the mobilization and movement of 
                                                
147 Boniface Lekenit, Dialogue with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 19, 2014.  
 
148 Samson Leriano, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014. 
 
149 As of April 2015, no payment had been made, and violence had not reoccurred. 
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large armed militias in the area, making it difficult for armed groups to move freely and 
inconspicuously across the territory. Small groups still operate in the area, often in very 
small bands of moran that break away from the larger militia to engage in banditry. 
Dense covert informant networks prevent mobilization and planning required to engage 
in large-scale raids and attacks, increasing risk for large bands of armed actors to operate 
in the area. Dense informant networks restrain the mobilization of large groups, but they 
cannot fully contain all mobile ethnic militia groups that are small, strategic, and well 
armed.  
Covert trans-ethnic informant networks are strong, even if this is a high-risk 
strategy. The absence of an international border forces Samburu militias to purchase arms 
and ammunition through outsider ethnic groups, rather than through intra-group 
networks. Thus, the formation of illicit arms networks that cut across identity boundaries 
strengthens informant networks that help in creating trans-ethnic alliances for threat 
monitoring, and policing of inter-group boundary areas within Samburu County. Due to 
the fact the Samburu have historically faced threats from almost every group in the 
region, militias have developed skills in forming opportunistic alliances. As conflict 
dynamics change, the Samburu have the capacity to use threat of the use of force as a 
deterrent and to work through civic organizations to monitor potential threats and 
convene inter-group negotiations.  
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Conclusions 
 
The case indicates local associations extend informal threat-monitoring networks. 
Covert informant networks contain inter-group violence, but at high risk to informants. 
Clandestine information sharing provides communities on both sides of the conflict dyad 
with greater access to information. They also increase time to address and respond to 
potential threats or reinforce local protection strategies. Cooperation between militias and 
local civic associations, improves scouting and threat response capacity for local militias. 
An informal coalition of local civic associations in Tuum improved intra-group 
communication and extended the threat response capacity of Samburu militias.  
Reports of suspicious armed groups moving in the area – reach armed actors in 
remote manyattas set up at locations with broad visibility. The rapid spread of 
information through civic organizations triggered deployment of armed scouts to areas 
with suspicious activity. Scouts then gained more accurate information about movement 
of potentially threatening actors in the area, in order to shift placement of protection units 
and deploy additional scouting units to strategic locations. Vehicles from local 
associations helped local militias respond to potential threats and police broader territory, 
allowing actors within monitoring networks to attain even more information about of 
potential threats.  
The informal protection system in Tuum resisted interference of outside actors. 
Local associations prevented external actors and civic groups from operating in the area. 
Respondents identified multiple external CSOs and church groups interested in ad hoc 
peace work or missionary work in the area that were not allowed access. Samburu elders 
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stated, “NGOs and other missionaries do not support our moran. They tell them to disarm 
and go to school, but without the moran, no one can live here.”150 Since the state cannot 
ensure security in the area, local associations, even those involved in peacebuilding 
programming, collaborate with and support armed militias to ensure local militias have 
capacity to respond quickly to information about potential threats.  
In this case, local militias leverage the resources of civic associations to extend 
policing and threat-response capacity. The collaborative relationship between local 
militias and the coalition of civic organizations allows for armed groups to Tuum to 
engage in more strategic, and controlled interactions and negotiations with Turkana 
militias, reducing the likelihood of rapid, asymmetrical revenge attacks against proximate 
Turkana communities and thus limiting the escalation of violence. 
 
 
Marsabit: Sarimo: Turkana – Gabra (2010 – 2014) 
Outside of town centers such as Marsabit and Loiyangalani, across the remote, 
Northwestern region of Marsabit County, the majority of semi-permanent settlements are 
ethnically homogenous. Sarimo, however, is a unique Turkana – Gabra settlement in 
Northwestern Marsabit County. Similar to the nature of inter-group relations between 
Samburu and Turkana settlements in the Nyiro Valley, Sarimo is an example of non-
escalation. Local civic associations and informal institutional arrangements play key roles 
in containing conflict between local communities from two rival groups. Guyo Tuke 
describes the setting:  
                                                
150 Research Participant 121, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
 155 
 
“Sarimo is a unique case of peace in Marsabit County. The Turkana and Gabra 
decided to settle together even after major clashes in 2008 and 2009, and even 
stayed together in peace after a major drought in 2011. Many thought there would 
be problems in Sarimo, but Turkana are now grazing over 100 kilometers into 
Gabra territory, with no problems.”151 
 
Context of Conflict 
 
Gabra and Turkana militias engaged in deadly clashes outside of Loiyangalani152 
in the village of Moite in May of 2007. The conflict escalated with major attacks in April 
and July of 2008. ACLED data indicates clashes between the Gabra and Turkana caused 
31 total fatalities in 2008 (Raleigh et al. 2010). In 2009, during a major drought, Gabra 
and Turkana elders negotiated an informal peace agreement, called the Sarimo 
Declaration. A local civic association called the Pastoralist Integrated Support Program 
(PISP) was the lead coordinating organization, collaborating with elders from both 
groups and the District Peace Committee in Loiyangalani.  
After the signing of the pre-movement pact, the two groups formed a new 
settlement in Sarimo. The village remains divided, with no inter-group marriage, and 
persistent intergroup suspicion. Gabra and Borana militias still engage in attacks against 
Turkana clans outside of Loiyangalani. The Gabra view Turkana groups on the eastern 
side of the lake, as “living outside of their home area.”153 However, even following 
attacks between Gabra and Turkana militias in neighboring areas, the joint settlement did 
                                                
151 Guyo Tuke, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 20, 2014. 
 
152 Most residents of Loiyangalani have, over time, fled violence in home villages to settle in informal 
cluster settlements around the town (see, Goldsmith 2000). 
 
153 Philip Molu, PISP Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 10, 2014. 
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not dis-integrate. Sarimo is a case in which conflict was of the brink of escalation, but 
violence did not escalate. 
 
Patterns of Response 
 
Peacebuilding actors in Marsabit claimed the work of PISP, a local NGO with 
special focus on supporting the pastoralist groups across Marsabit County played a 
critical role in strengthening communal protection strategies. Prior to the establishment of 
the village of Sarimo in 2006, PISP conducted a peacebuilding program that included 
pre-movement negotiations, pact making, and a training program for local KPR.154 
Informants from Sarimo, however, did not support the narrative of successful external 
intervention.  
During the focus group, a respondent stated,  
“The [peacebuilders] set up new rules and agreements about land and animals for 
all of us to follow, but in our scattered nomadic societies, rules are difficult to 
follow. Our people are scattered everywhere, so their programs always 
breakdown. We have to build new rules with our neighbors everywhere we go.”155  
Leaders in Sarima cited the following criticism of preventive efforts conducted in the 
village, stating,  
“Peace programs are small, short-term, and one-time meetings. The NGOs sit up 
there, and nothing reaches us. No one sits with us to see how we keep peace. We 
use our own leaders and processes to resolved our own conflicts. They sit up there 
and take credit, while our people keep peace.”156  
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The most plausible factors that help contain violence between the Turkana and 
Gabra and prevent dis-integration of the unique settlement are as follows. The Turkana 
community living in Sarimo fled an even more insecure area to the South of Loiyangalani 
under severe threat from Samburu, Borana, and Gabra militias. Gabra actors settled in 
Sarimo relocated from an insecure area north of North Horr. Both groups settled in the 
remote village due to flight from more severe violence. The location remains at threat of 
attack from Dassanetch militias to the North; however, Sarimo is a strategic location for 
protection from Dassanetch aggression. Sibiloi National Park is a buffer. Sibiloi is 
remote, largely ungoverned territory, but ranger patrols make it difficult for Dassanetch 
militias to cross the area.  
In short, the Turkana and the Gabra face a common aggressor, increasing the 
likelihood of cooperation and negotiation following inter-group conflict events. Leaders 
in Sarimo described the strategic dilemma for both groups:  
After so many battle deaths in our communities, we all agreed that this death is 
useless. We came to an agreement to share the land. We chose a very distant, very 
harsh location, even with less water. Our women and children suffer most. But we 
had to come here, so we would not have a border with the Dassanetch. Sometimes 
the Dassanetch try to come this far; so we must work together to survive here. We 
see the benefit of peace and of staying together to be protected from the 
Dassanetch.157  
 
 Respondents from Sarimo also identified disarmament and day-to-day practices of 
resource management as key conditions for inter-group peace. Integrated livestock 
management and tracking functions to increase security. Everyone in the settlement helps 
protect livestock. Women and children herd livestock by day, but, at night, men monitor 
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the area, circling borders to look for footprints and scout for bands of raiders. If there is 
suspicion of theft, the KPR lead recovery missions as both groups have disarmed. 
Turkana respondents described the situation: “We accepted not having arms only because 
we would not be allowed to live in Gabra areas. As long as we have the KPR and as long 
we know whether or not the Dassanetch are coming, we think everything will be OK.”158  
The enforcement of an informal peace pact cements the higher level of inter-
group cooperation in Sarimo, as well.159 Clashes occurred between Turkana and Gabra 
youth militias over grazing blocs and water points south of Sarimo broke out in 2009 near 
Loiyangalani shortly following the peace agreement. One Turkana died in the clashes. In 
contrast to other cases where informal peace pacts failed to contain further escalation of 
violence (see chapter 5), the Sarimo pact held. Why did the Gabra community choose to 
pay the high cost of restitution following the clash? PISP intervened, along with elders, 
and representatives of the district peace committee in Loiyangalani.  
The local coalition assisted in coordination and enforcement of the informal 
restitution payment stipulated in the Sarimo Declaration, and supported both groups in 
the process of navigating the county justice system. PISP played a key role in supporting 
the informal process of restitution. The enforcement of the informal institutional 
arrangement governing the settlement was highly symbolic for both groups: “after the 
Gabra made the payment, we knew we could stay in peace for a long time.” Elders stated, 
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159 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
 
 159 
 
“We knew we had to follow the rules to stay here in peace. We pressured the community 
to ensure the payment was made.”160 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Sarimo settlement, similar to Parikati and Sarima, is a case where a minority 
group, the Turkana adopted context specific informal institutional arrangements to live in 
close proximity to a primary aggressor and reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation. In 
2014, negotiations through the elders system and with Gabra clans led to the expansion of 
informal agreements between the Gabra and Turkana, and Turkana gained access to 
grazing rights in Gabra territory with rising resource scarcity.161 In this case, civic 
associations complimented local protection strategies to prevent disintegration in Sarimo 
following clashes between Gabra and Turkana militias in Loiyangalani. The experience 
of enforcement of the informal peace agreement played a key role in preventing Gabra 
and Turkana clashes from escalating.  
 
 
West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (July 2014) 
Turkwel Gorge is a micro-level case in which a coalition of local peacebuilding 
organizations played a role in dampening violence between the Pokot and Turkana along 
a highly volatile border area. The case is linked to the larger inter-group conflict 
discussed in chapter 5, in which many preventive efforts did not limit escalation. 
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However, in this micro-case, it is plausible that rapid threat response of elders, “reformed 
warriors,” and Catholic Church leaders along the border contained a conflict that could 
have continued to escalate. The coalition provided a platform for informal inter-group 
negotiation, threat monitoring, and support for non-coercive communal protection 
strategies.  
Following an initial attack and a highly asymmetrical counter-attack, violence 
stopped. ACLED data includes the key events within the conflict, starting on July 18th, 
2014 (Raleigh et al. 2010). Participant observation and interviews with conflict actors 
provide the foundation for the following conflict narrative. Intervention forestalled 
further cyclical violence under conditions of severe volatility.  
  
Context of Conflict 
 
Historically, banditry was the most common conflict driver of inter-group conflict 
along the border between West Pokot and Turkana. Groups in the area, including the 
Pokot, Turkana, and Karamajong,162 have long engaged in highly cyclical raids. 
Traditionally, stolen animals tended to stay within the herds of each group, remaining as 
the foundation for wealth accumulation and social status. Animals were rarely sold, even 
for school fees for children. Cyclical theft occurred in relationship to cycles of animal 
replacement, and tit-for-tat retribution following initial acts of inter-group violence. 
Many anthropologists argue elders organized raids, and attacks were opportunistic and 
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highly risk-averse, which caused very low levels of fatalities. Parenti and other analysts 
describe the traditional form of banditry as a game of social exchange. This approach 
assumes that inter-group resource conflict functions to increase and develop the status 
and household wealth of young warriors (Meier et al. 2007; Sterzel et al. 2012).  
Armed actors, however, have become increasing militarized over time, and many 
groups abandoned relatively peaceful games of social exchange. Well-organized Pokot 
militias now engage in violent theft and banditry as an accumulation strategy, rather than 
more traditional and symbolic forms of raiding (Griner 2013; Triche 2015). In West 
Pokot, very violent forms of predatory resource extraction have emerged that are quite 
different and more intensive than in other areas of Northern Kenya. 
 In contrast to relatively peaceful forms of traditional theft, banditry began to be 
used not only for the purpose of the accumulation or exchange of wealth, but to 
undermine the power of other ethnic groups operating within the predatory system. As 
raids became increasingly militarized, armed groups changed tactics, and inter-group 
violence escalated in relationship to the nature of attacks. Violence became more 
indiscriminant with women and children becoming targets during raids, and villages 
being looted and burned. Banditry became a tool for ethnic cleansing, across the larger 
conflict system (Triche 2014). This form of inter-group violence concentrates around 
Turkwel Gorge.  
Turkwel Gorge, in West Pokot County near the Uganda border, is a site of major 
contestation and frequent clashes between the Turkana and Pokot communities. Turkwel 
River is a key water resource for both groups, flowing from Mt. Elgon, across West 
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Pokot County through the Southern Plains of Turkana County, and across the Loturerei 
Desert to Lake Turkana. Development assistance from France supported the construction 
of a hydro-power plant along the river between 1986 – 1991 (Adams 1989). The reservoir 
increased settlement of Turkana clans within West Pokot County. Turkana settled in the 
area to access jobs during dam construction, the new stable water supply, electricity, and 
opportunities for fishing. Over time, Lorogon village formed as a Turkana settlement near 
the reservoir.  
The project created high expectations among the Pokot.163 The GoK promised 
compensation to the Pokot community through land, job opportunities, and overall 
development gains. A local informant described, “today there have been no gains for us. 
No jobs were given to the Pokot; they were given to the other communities, so we felt 
cheated from land and jobs in our own county.”164 Actors from the Pokot community 
claim Turkana encroachment is the primary cause of conflict in Turkwel Gorge. 
Respondents state, “this was not their original land; they do not belong here.”165 Pokot 
assume that the government of Kenya protects the Turkana in Lorogon, but tries to, 
“chase the Pokot from Turkwel Gorge.”166 Similarly, the dominant narrative among the 
Turkana is related to a Pokot conspiracy to drive the group away from water resources 
and claim Turkana territory. A local Turkana respondent stated: 
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When the dam was built there was a secret between the government [Moi regime] 
and the Pokot to drive the Turkana away from the Turkwel River. They all drew a 
secret map, and land around Turkwel Gorge was sold to the Pokot. We didn’t 
know this until recently, but they changed the map of Turkana when they built the 
dam. Lorogon was our land before.167  
 
From the view of the Turkana, even though the settlement is within the borders of 
West Pokot County, the community assumes it has a legitimate claim to the land around 
the dam, claiming it used to be part of Turkana County. Both groups claim the land and 
both groups assume the GoK supports and protects the other group. For example, Pokot 
respondents indicate that unequal application of disarmament campaigns has exacerbated 
the conflict, stating: 
This conflict has become worse because of efforts to disarm all Pokot instead of 
those guilty of crimes. When you criminalize the whole community, this leads to 
mobilization of the whole community. There has been a strong government bias 
against the Pokot. They help to recover cattle stolen for the Turkana, but they do 
not help recover cattle the Turkana steal from us.168  
 
The dam deepened conflict between the Pokot and Turkana over territorial 
demarcation, ownership and access to Turkwel River, as well as access to irrigation 
schemes linked to the new reservoir at Lorogon. Administrative control over Lorogon 
remains contested. The village is within the boundaries of North Pokot District of West 
Pokot County, but the chief of Lorogon represents the Turkana community and reports to 
the Turkana County Administration (West FM, Sep. 16, 2014). Under these conditions, 
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Pokot and Turkana militias engage in aggressive tactics and the minority Turkana 
population living at Lorogon remains highly vulnerable to outbreaks of violence.169 
On July 18th, 2014, Pokot warriors rode into Lorogon on motorbikes, killed four 
Turkana men and took 20 animals. Two days later, on the 20th of July, Turkana engaged 
in a nearly immediate revenge attack against a Pokot settlement near Turkwel. The 
revenge attack was asymmetrical—the Turkana militia killed two Pokot men, one 
woman, and eight elders and children.170 However, the conflict stopped short of further 
escalation.  
Why did the Turkana kill Pokot civilians, indiscriminately, after the attack? An 
informant described, “after the incident on 18 July, we asked for them to hand over those 
who were responsible for the attack, but they [the Pokot] did not produce them. This was 
why we killed 11 Pokot.”171 Vigilante justice was used to try create a sense of equality of 
loss. As a conflict actor described, “if we can’t get the right person, we have to get 
someone from that group to make them feel the same pain.”172  
The reported logic of violence indicates the trigger for highly asymmetrical 
violence was the absence of equality of loss between both groups. As a conflict actor 
described, “if we can’t get the right person, we have to get someone from that group to 
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make them feel the same pain.”173 The expectation of tit-for-tat justice between both 
groups is a strong and deeply embedded customary institution that shapes the trajectory 
of conflict between the groups. Why did violence not continue to escalate, after the 
highly asymmetrical Turkana attack directed toward women and children? 
 
Patterns of Response 
 
In response to the clashes, the state deployed political elites on a fact-finding 
mission. The government mission coordinated a peace rally in Lorogon and promised 
deployment of security personnel including a rural border patrol, rapid deployment unit, 
and anti-stock theft unit for the area (see, Daily Nation, “More officers planned for 
Pokot-Turkana border,” June 2, 2014). Historically, multiple organizations, including the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), POKATUSA, and Riam-Riam, 
supported local peace processes in Turkwel Gorge. Peacebuilding actors targeted 
resource-sharing issues,174 focusing on dialogues with Pokot and Turkana political 
leaders (see also, Reliefweb, “Turkana-Pokot Peace Meeting,” March 05, 2014).  In this 
particular case, however, the Catholic Diocese of Kitale was the lead responder to the 
conflict.  
The diocese mobilized reformed warriors from Lorogon to assemble militia 
leaders, and bring conflict actors together on neutral territory for negotiations.175 The 
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Committees, NCCK, POKATUSA, World Vision Mapotu, Riam-Riam, and the District Peace Committees. 
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Church convened a dialogue in Kitale on July 23rd, 2014. Mediators communicated to 
both groups to send delegations of, “real warriors, not town people.”176 A well-known 
mediator, Bishop Cornelius Korir,177 led the dialogue. Priests led intra-group dialogues, 
and inter-group dialogues followed.  
A final joint dialogue set forth three basic agreements to avert escalation: inter-
group compensation and restitution, upholding the shared norm of non-targeting of 
women, elders, and children, and limiting community mobility until tension eased. The 
Bishop stated, “now that we have agreed, call your boys and tell them not to cross the 
border with guns, because everyone is ready for war.”178 Pokot militia leaders agreed to 
prevent reinforcements from traveling into the region from across the Ugandan border. 
Militia patrons present at the dialogue informed local politicians of the outcomes of the 
negotiation.179  
Participants in the dialogue had extensive experience dealing with scripts of 
formal peace negotiations due to the high level of prior intervention. After the program 
ended, ongoing negotiations and inter-group dialogue took place outside of the peace 
meeting in a more informal setting. Both groups voiced grievances related to composition 
and group representation – Turkana claimed their negotiation team included, “real 
warriors but the Pokot only brought town warriors,” and conflicts emerged over demands 
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from Finn Church Aid (FCA) for payments and sitting fees. Participants claimed: “all the 
other groups have paid us to come to these things!”180  
In terms of the impact of the dialogue on conflict dynamics, discussing the 
process with participants, they argued, “these meetings help a little.”181 Rather, 
respondents highlighted the importance of the “reformed warriors” as key local peace 
actors in ongoing work to contain violence in the area. As John Lodinyo, founder of 
POKATUSA and supporter of reformed warriors programs, describes:  
“Reformed warriors from both sides react to every problem. Things are bad now, 
but they could be so much worse. Their bravery allows us to all work together to 
make decisions about how to protect the community. When the peace actors live 
out there, the situation changes. They demand peace.”182  
Local reformed warriors groups, comprised of Turkana and Pokot men that have 
been part of the conflict system in the past, formed over time through the longer-term 
peacebuilding work of church networks and other CSOs. These groups have a very high 
level of legitimacy and, as evident in the July 23rd dialogue, are able to convene actors 
directly involved in clashes. Pokot participants, for example, stated, “we are only here to 
talk, because (anonymous) is a reformed warrior, and he wanted us to be here.”183 
Outside of intermittent dialogues supported through external organizations, peacebuilding 
actors working along the Pokot – Turkana border claim village level peace groups 
coordinate routinized inter-group dialogues to contain conflict.  
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Outcomes 
 
Under conditions of severe insecurity community protection strategies have a 
taken on new forms. Three main village based groups coordinate local dialogue 
processes, including elders’ councils, reformed warriors, and local women’s groups. 
After local dialogues occur, elders and women leaders report receiving more information 
about impending attacks, and being able to coordinate dialogues, warn other groups, and 
alert patrons of local militias to persuade youth militias to stand down from planned 
attacks.184 Local peace actors along the border claim village-level associations prevent 
severe clashes and dislocation, even though the larger conflict is not resolved.  
During periods of heightened insecurity, external organizations cannot access the 
most insecure and vulnerable communities along the Pokot – Turkana border due to 
threats from militias with experience resisting state police and military forces. In day-to-
day settings, reformed warriors groups play a key role in threat monitoring and 
coordination of local dialogue processes. In the words of a national-level conflict 
specialist, “along the West Pokot border, there is significant reverse engineering of 
peacebuilding technology.”185  
 
Conclusions 
 
Following the church-led intervention, two months followed without major 
attacks; however, violence re-escalated in Lorogon in early September, leading to over 15 
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fatalities.186 Reformed warriors and the dialogue platforms of the Catholic Church had a 
momentary dampening impact. Rapid response and mobilization of local peace actors, 
convening rapid preventive negotiations, and symbolic compensation for fatalities were 
key mechanisms that restrained the immediate mobilization of armed groups for further 
attacks. The larger conflict remained unresolved, however, especially in light of rising 
conflict pressures within the larger conflict dyad between the Turkana and Pokot (see 
chapter five). In this case, faith-based groups with linkages to local peacebuilding actors 
with direct relationships with leaders of militia groups filled in gaps in preventive 
intervention when other organizations withdrew due to increased insecurity.187  
An informal coalition among the Catholic Church, Finn Church Aid, and local 
groups of Reformed Warriors responded rapidly to violence to convene negotiations. The 
coalition created opportunities for information exchange, and a platform for ongoing 
inter-group negotiation directly following clashes. The formal dialogue process was 
scripted and bureaucratic, but it provided an opportunity informal dialogue and 
negotiation that would not have occurred otherwise. Due to the highly asymmetrical 
nature of revenge killings against women and children, severe collective violence could 
have occurred. The intervention did not transform the conflict, but contained it at a 
critical juncture at which spiraling violence was likely. Deep perceptions of inequality in 
state responses to the conflict continued to drive mobilization of armed groups, making 
the conflict prone to recurrent violence. 
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Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014) 
Turkana County is a site of major economic transition. The discovery of oil in 
Turkana, the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport project (LAPSSET), Vision 
2030, the construction of new roads, increasing cross-border trade of livestock and goods, 
and increasing land speculation, all point toward significant development gains in the 
region. The potential for rapid economic growth in an area of severe poverty influences 
the dynamics of inter-group conflict. In 2013, riots broke out across oil drilling sites in 
Turkana County. The conflict had ethnic dimensions. Turkana communities rioted 
against, in the words of informants, “Kenyan outsiders.”188 In this case, ethnic identity 
overlaps with the core-periphery division in the Kenya context. Turkana protesters 
claimed Tullow Oil had unjust hiring practices, favoring non-locals. The case is non-state 
conflict in which Turkana used coercive force against predominantly Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin oil workers. The conflict did not escalate to include deadly violence. Following 
the riots, local peacebuilding groups played a complementary role in containing 
escalation.  
 
Context of Conflict 
 
Kenya, historically, has not experienced conflict pressures related to the so-called 
resource curse. This is no longer the case. Turkana County has key risk factors for an 
impending oil curse. Pre-existing inter-ethnic grievances around land rights and political 
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representation are increasing between rival groups across Turkana County (Johannes, 
Zulu, and Kalipeni 2014). Comparing conditions in Turkana with conflict dynamics in 
DR Congo, South Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria, analysts now predict communal violence 
will escalate in Turkana due to historical marginalization and severe poverty, highly 
militarized ethnic militias, and the introduction of lootable resources. Cummings predicts 
Turkana is the location of “Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency” (“Predicting Africa’s Next Oil 
Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana County” 2014).  
In 2012, Tullow Oil, an Irish exploration and production company, discovered oil 
in the South Lokichar Basin in Turkana County. Tullow drilled the first exploratory well 
at the site Ngamia-1 in 2011, and confirmed discoveries at two locations in 2012: 
Ngamia-1 and Twiga South. In 2013 three additional sites were viable: Etuko-1, Ekales-
1, and Agete-1. In early 2014, the GoK signed off on a multiple field exploration 
approach, accelerating exploration and the development of additional well sites across 
Turkana County. As of January 2015, the South Lokichar basin had the potential to 
produce 1 billion barrels of oil (“Kenya Exploration and Appraisal Update” 2015).   
In 2012, following the discovery of oil at Ngamia 1, politicians running in 
national elections picked up on the emerging sense of fear of marginalization among 
Turkana communities related to oil exploration.189 Campaign strategies appealed to this 
sentiment. CORD, in particular, developed a platform targeting Turkana voters, claiming 
the party would ensure that the Turkana community would benefit from oil extraction. 
CORD gained broad support across Turkana County. CORD candidates won multiple 
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county-level posts in the 2013 election, but the party did not win the national election 
(see, IEBC Election Results 2013). National electoral outcomes increased fear among the 
Turkana that the Jubilee coalition would not protect Turkana interests related to oil 
extraction on communal land (Vasquez 2013).  
In October 2013, James Lomenen, MP for Turkana South, and Nicholas Gikor, 
MP for Turkana East organized and mobilized Turkana groups to protest outside Ngamia-
1 and Twiga-1. Initially peaceful protests escalated into large-scale riots. Protesters 
hurled stones at vehicles, threatened security guards, broke into two compounds, looted 
camps, and damaged property. Tullow Oil evacuated staff from the region, and Turkana 
militias blockaded roads to prevent access to the compounds for two weeks (Akumu 
2013). On October 26th, 2013, Tullow Oil halted drilling operations.190  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
In response to riots, Tullow Oil agreed to double the amount of funding allocated 
for local development projects and to hire more Turkana workers, especially for higher 
wage positions. The company re-articulated its work to build a social contract with the 
community, in cooperation with Turkana leaders and politicians. Tullow stepped up 
private security around convoys and drilling operations, and the GoK agreed to increase 
policing around oil sites (Akumu 2014). A negotiated settlement led to the restoration of 
operations two weeks following the riots.  
                                                
190 NTV Kenya, “Tullow Oil Suspends Operations on Two Exploration Blocks,” Oct. 27, 2013. 
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Prior to engaging in oil exploration in the region, Tullow Oil conducted risk 
assessments and concluded setting up a major operation in Turkana County, an area with 
extreme poverty and high levels of animosity toward outside ethnic groups, would 
require careful communal diplomacy to avoid triggering conflict.191 Tullow established a 
formal strategy to address grievances around local employment preemptively, with clear 
strategies in place for conflict prevention. The firm’s strategies for communal conflict 
prevention were based on a logic of appeasement, including local content and social 
spending, was well as appeasement of national political elites through dialogues around 
levels of taxation.  
As of 2014, Tullow Oil Co. invested over $70 million in Kenya through $21.7 
million paid in taxes to the national government, $47.9 million in local content 
procedures, and $1 million in the form of social investment (Tullow Report 2014). Social 
investments were directed to scholarships for Turkana students, and school and hospital 
construction across Turkana County. The company hired local labor for a broad range of 
positions across the operation. Seventy percent of Tullow Oil’s 2000 staff are Kenyan 
nationals, and nine out of ten subcontracting companies are based in Kenya, as of 
December 2014 (Internews 2014). 
Early efforts to include a large majority of Turkana staff and control the narrative 
around hiring practices, however, were not sufficient to prevent the emergence of local 
grievances and riots (Hatcher 2014). Riots were directly related to the dilemma of 
ensuring inequality in hiring within an unskilled labor pool. Tullow’s overall proportion 
                                                
191 Research Participant 61, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 26, 2014. 
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of national (Kenyan) staff is 90%, and local contractors involved in supplying the wells 
and exploratory bases report 60% of their staff are Turkana. However, only 25% of those 
hired have high wage positions (Kavanagh 2014). Despite careful hiring practices, the 
Turkana community perceived resources from the oil boom benefited Kenyans from 
“down country,” over Turkana communities.  
Tullow’s efforts have not changed perceptions of inequality, marginalization, and 
the potential for state abuse. Informants, from a broad spectrum of Turkana society, share 
a common view that, “gains from the oil will go to corrupt politicians; not to us.”192 Even 
though there are numerous local employees, political elites benefit most from supply 
chains and local sourcing efforts. Turkana political elites, in particular, and the only 
actors with access to enough capital to purchase vehicles and start companies to provide 
goods to the rapidly increasing number of drilling sites across Turkana County.193 
To adapt to the increasing threat of communal conflict, Tullow employs informal 
strategies to manage and prevent conflicts during day-to-day operations. At the local-
level, to manage inter-group grievances and suppress outbreaks of violence, the company 
maintains tight control over conflict narratives. Tullow employees are not allowed to 
directly speak to local media outlets, reporters, or researchers working on the issue.194 
They are not allowed to engage communities directly during convoys. An anonymous 
respondent, for instance, described that when the company’s vehicles encounter 
                                                
192 Patricia Ekadele, County HR Manager, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 29, 2014. 
 
193 Research Participants 61, 68, 70, Interviews with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 26 – 29, 2014. 
 
194 Research Participant 68, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 28, 2014. 
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roadblocks set up by local Turkana youth militias, they are not allow to exit vehicles. 
They must return to base and take a community relations liaison to the site to manage the 
grievance and control information about the conflict. Specific personnel manage public 
grievances and information related to conflict issues.195  
Tullow makes regular public statements at key peacebuilding events, especially 
related to projects they are funding in the region. The company is open and transparent 
about its social efforts, but efforts have not reversed social expectations that gains from 
oil will benefit outsiders (Vasquez 2013). The community at large is aware of the 
massive financial gains at stake related to the oil. The company engages in clandestine 
talks with the national government about resource sharing, which contributes to the 
communal perception that outsiders, “are coming to drink our oil.”196 Accountability, 
transparency, and limited cooperation with local labor associations are reported 
weaknesses of the firm’s approach to violence prevention.197  
Respondents from local peacebuilding organizations claimed the company did not 
collaborate with or support local peacebuilding processes. However, in light of deepening 
grievances and rising local conflicts related to the process of oil extraction, as the County 
Peace Secretariat described, peacebuilding organizations fill in information gaps: “even 
though we have little support from the company, local organizations voluntarily extend 
                                                
195 Research Participants 61, 68, 70, Interviews with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 26 – 29, 2014. 
 
196 Elias Ekiyeyes, DPC Chairman, Turkana South, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1, 
2014. 
 
197 Joseph Areng, Turkana County Peace Secretariat, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 
2014. 
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Tullow’s efforts. The oil issue is now part of every dialogue and project we do.”198 Local 
peace actors in the area are highly skilled in engaging in high-risk preventive intervention 
with very few resources due long-running interventions in the larger Karamoja Cluster. 
With changing conflict dynamics actors within the broad peace coalition shifted efforts 
toward dampening conflict around oil-related issues—a plausible constraint against 
further riots.  
Conclusions 
 
Tension remained high between local Turkana communities and Kenyan 
employees working for Tullow operations, but no major riots or acts of violence occurred 
for two years. Why is this the case? Two primary factors stand out in the case. Turkana 
political elites and business owners, the primary patrons of local Turkana militias, benefit 
from start up businesses to provide locally sourced services and resources for Tullow Oil 
well sites. In short, local powerbrokers, the dominant patrons and supporters of Turkana 
militias have new economic interests that reduce the likelihood of violence between 
Turkana communities and external workers.  
At the same time, due to rising insecurity in the area, Tullow employs members of 
Turkana militias, and former KPR officers as private security officers to protect assets 
and compounds across the area. In short, key actors most likely to use riots and violence 
to destabilize operations and capture resources, at present, benefit from the process of 
rapid economic expansion. The most likely spoilers benefit from resource extraction 
(Brass 1997). Actors with the most power to incite violence have interests related to the 
                                                
198 Ibid. 
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protection of peace and open trade routes. Local militias and their patrons benefit from 
the oil industry, making escalation less likely.  
Secondly, Turkana County has a very large and broad coalition of civic 
associations involved in local peacebuilding interventions. The area experienced the rapid 
expansion of civic associations to manage the massive influx of international donor 
support to address insecurity along the Western border with Uganda. This process led to 
the emergence of a strong, coalition of peace actors in the area with broad experience 
working with multiple CSOs and NGOs on complex peacebuilding programs. For 
instance, the Catholic Church, with more resources, staff, and logistical capacity than the 
County government, stands at the center of a very broad set of peace organizations 
operating across the area.  
Even though key peacebuilding organizations broke down in the face of rising 
political pressure in Turkana County (see chapter five for further analysis), actors from 
prior associations reformulated new organizations to extend a broad range of preventive 
actions to contain conflicts related to rapid economic expansion. A broad coalition of 
local peace organizations works to increase levels of information sharing around Tullow 
efforts, improve local conflict monitoring, and engage in rapid response mediation when 
conflicts occur. These two factors contribute to containing conflict in this case, and 
preventing the outbreak of further riots against Tullow operations and employees. 
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Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014) 
The Isiolo case is an example of successful preventive intervention through an 
informal coalition of local civic actors operating outside of official roles in formal 
organizational structures. The Isiolo conflict corridor experienced a pre-election period of 
escalation (see, chapter five). However, it did not experience post-election violence as 
analysts predicted (Menkhaus 2015). Conflict escalated between Borana and Gabra 
communities in Moyale, and Garre and Degodia communities in Mandera following high 
stakes elections in 2013. Violence, however, did not occur in Isiolo under similar 
conditions (Carrier and Kochore 2014).  
The Borana-Somali alliance won the most coveted positions in the devolved 
county system—the governor, Godana Doyo, a Borana; the Deputy Governor, a Somali; 
and the Senator Mohammed Kuti, from Sakuye. A Turkana representative won one of the 
MP positions, but a Borana representative, Tiyyah Galgalo, won the new Women’s 
Representative position. Electoral outcomes were skewed in favor of the Borana – Somali 
coalition, yet did not trigger violence following the election. What explains this outcome 
within the longer conflict trajectory? The case study analyzes non-escalation. The 
narrative draws from interviews with politicians and local peace actors from Isiolo to 
analyze actions of state actors, civic associations, and communities related to the high 
threat of post-election violence.  
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Patterns of Response 
 
Respondents built a case that state support for local peace action prior to the 
election had a positive effect, preventing outbreaks of violence following the 2013 
election.199 Due to higher levels of state interest in peace and stability in Isiolo as a 
necessary condition for resource extraction and international investment, in the lead up to 
the election the GoK provided additional support to local peace actors and the District 
Peace Committee. The Isiolo County government conduced multiple peace forums in 
cooperation with DPCs (Elder, Stigant, and Claes 2014).  
The state provided financial support for the DPC system through national 
peacebuilding organizations including the NSC, NCIC, and the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA), the three biggest state-based organizations with 
political authority to engage in and support local peace efforts. The Isiolo Inter-agency 
Forum was set up to help improve collaboration of multiple peace actors in the area. The 
Governor of Isiolo County, Godana Doyo, expressed support for the forum and its work 
to deploy peace actors to prevent conflict around the election (Daily Nation, Nov. 11, 
2014).  
Respondents from Isiolo, however, argue state-led peace forums conducted 
through the DPC system had a minimal impact (Elder, Stigant, and Claes 2014). In 
particular, citizens were deeply suspicious of government motives related to the formal 
peace forums. Media reports following state-led peace forums did not report local 
grievances related to the failures of state security interventions and the DPC system. In 
                                                
199 Focus Group 4, Dialogue with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
 
 180 
 
the words of one respondent, “After peace forums, politicians still go and report that 
conflict in Isiolo is due to the fact that we are wild, violent, traditional people; when, 
really what we are telling them in these forums is that they are failing to protect us.”200  
During state-led peace forums, respondents describe how national-level 
politicians used social cohesion narratives and Vision 2030, the national development 
agenda, to try to unify rival groups. Kochore interpreted the use of a national social 
cohesion agenda as a strategic effort to try to integrate historically marginalized groups 
into the larger national identity in order to neutralize potential secessionist sentiments201 
among the population in Isiolo (Kochore 2013). The promotion of national cohesion and 
development agendas did not reduce inter-group suspicion. Local actors remain very 
skeptical of the new narratives, especially in light of how the state tried to exert power in 
the past. In the words of a local Borana leader, “the government can’t even stop the 
Samburu from attacking us, but now they care about ‘development,’ ‘social cohesion,’ 
and ‘peace’? All we are seeing is outsiders rushing in to grab our land and take our 
money.”202  
 
Outcomes 
 
Even with very little trust in formal peacebuilding interventions in the area and a 
high level of inter-group fear around the election, a local movement with broad support 
                                                
200 Focus Group 29, Isiolo Peace Actors, Dialogue with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, July 25, 2013. 
 
201 Historically, Isiolo has also served as the home of secessionist movements in the region. It was the 
primary site of mobilization for Shifta war (see chapter 2).  
 
202 Focus Group 29, Isiolo Peace Actors, Dialogue with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, July 25, 2013. 
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from multiple civic associations conducted a pre-election pact making campaign. Pastoral 
Women of Isiolo, as the lead local association, in cooperation with youth groups, and 
DPC leaders operating outside of their official roles conducted informal dialogues with 
all candidates. The coalition managed to get every candidate to sign a pact to not engage 
in or support acts of violence around the election, or following the election.203 Initially, 
the effort was locally driven. Donor organizations learned of the pre-election pact making 
campaign, creating a multiplier effect. Saferworld and CJPC provided logistical support 
for the organization of pre-election dialogues in December of 2012, which provided local 
peace actors even broader access to political entrepreneurs and an opportunity for all 
candidates to display support for the pact (Saferworld 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The collaborative, ground-up effort ensured that all candidates signed pre-election 
pacts against the use of violence, creating a new informal institution of accountability 
between civil society actors and political actors. In the words of Abdia Mohammud, 
“political aspirants and community representatives all have to all be on the same page to 
prevent conflict.”204 In this case, an informal coalition of local associations retained 
capacity to engage in preventive efforts that the DPC could not. The DPC faced pressures 
related to ethnic political mobilization, undermining its potential to mediate between 
groups in Isiolo. 
                                                
203 Shoba Ali, Pastoralist Women, Interview with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, August 18, 2014. 
 
204 Abdia Mohammud, Chairwoman, Isiolo Peacelink, Interview with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, August 20, 
2014. 
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In the Isiolo case, there is evidence that an informal coalition of actors working 
outside of their official roles in institutions neutralized the threat of post-election 
violence. Due to the high risk of institutional capture during electoral contests, informal 
civic associations can play roles in conflict mitigation that more formal institutions 
cannot. In this case, a coalition of local peace actors coordinated a successful process of 
pre-election pact making that reduced uncertainty around electoral outcomes, and 
contributed to the prevention of conflict following tense elections.  
 
 
Coalitions and Constraint 
The five cases of limited escalation in this chapter share common features. Civic 
organizations contained violence within inter-group conflicts through three main 
mechanisms. Building from local knowledge related to risk factors within particular 
conflict settings, civic associations collaborated to establish threat monitoring systems 
and informal community policing systems along the Nyiro Valley conflict corridor and in 
Sarimo. In the Sarimo, Isiolo, and Nyiro cases, informal coalitions supported processes of 
pre-movement, and pre-election pact making that played key roles in preventing the 
escalation of violence following initial acts of aggression.  
In the Turkwel Gorge case, local civic associations supported and collaborated 
with reformed armed actors who played key roles in increasing the likelihood that armed 
actors would negotiate following the outbreak of violence. Coalitions of different forms, 
including elders groups, faith-based groups, reformed warrior groups, local peacebuilding 
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committees, and women’s associations, engaged in collective efforts in all of these cases 
to contain the escalation of inter-group violence.  
The Parikati, Sarima, and Sarimo cases reveal that adaptive, localized protection 
strategies, specific to minority groups residing within larger inter-ethnic conflict systems 
can function to reduce the likelihood of indiscriminant, asymmetrical targeting in 
response to both theft and inter-ethnic clashes—two potential triggers of escalation. In 
the Parikati and Sarimo cases, covert information sharing, in-group policing, and 
informal pact making were key mechanisms to contain escalation following deadly 
attacks between local militias. In the Turkwel Gorge case, villages along the volatile 
border used mediation skills learned through long-running peacebuilding programming, 
or reverse engineering of peacebuilding processes, even in the absence of external 
organizations to coordinate opportunities for preventive bargaining. In these cases there is 
evidence that preventive adaptations among minority out-group communities living along 
volatile borders decrease the likelihood of rapid escalation following acts of violence or 
predation.  
At the same time, village level protection tactics, alone, may not be sufficient to 
fully contain violence. Due to sparse population distribution and the highly mobile nature 
of ethnic militias in the area, covert informant networks or other village-level adaptations 
could break down very quickly. A powerful rumor, or even a hint of suspicion of 
collaboration with a militant group can lead to asymmetrical targeting and escalatory 
dynamics. The Turkana and Samburu still have a very high among of fear, distrust and 
inter-group hatred due to a very long history of protracted of inter-group clashes. With 
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very high levels of suspicion and distrust between neighboring groups, informal 
coalitions with the capacity to gather broad information through covert informant 
networks can contain escalation. Strong coalitions restrain mobilization of large groups of 
armed actors, and delay rapid and direct mobilization in response to attacks by providing 
multiple platforms for negotiation.
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Table 6: Features of Limited Escalation Cases 
 
Explanatory 
Factors 
6. Samburu 
Nyrio Corridor 
(2012 – 2014) 
7. Marsabit 
Sarimo 
(2010 – 2014) 
 
8. Turkana 
Turkwel 
(2014) 
9. Turkana 
Oil Riots 
(2012 – 2014) 
10. Isiolo 
Post-election 
(2013 – 2014) 
Groups Samburu, Turkana, 
Pokot, Somali 
Samburu, Turkana Samburu, Turkana Turkana – Samburu; 
Borana - Somali 
Gabra, Borana 
1. Symbolic  
 
Y 
Theft of Poor; Prior 
Symbolic 
N 
Fear: Revenge 
N 
Grievance: 
Inequality/Revenge 
N 
Grievance: 
Inequality 
Y 
Death of 
activist 
2. Border 
/Dev/Periphery 
Periphery Periphery Border Developmental Developmental 
3. State 
Response 
 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
Sanctions 
Non: Mediation 
Coercive: No 
Non: Mediation 
Coercive: 
Inducements 
Non: Messaging 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
Non: Messaging 
Coercive: 
Police Force 
Non: 
Messaging 
4. Cohesive 
Coalition 
Elite Unity 
Informal 
Institutions 
Militia Trust 
Y 
(intra-group) 
(informal pact) 
(militia trust) 
 
 
cohere: resist 
common threat 
Y 
(inter-group) 
(informal pact; pre-
emptive) 
(militia trust – 
integrated KPR) 
cohere: resist 
common threat 
Y 
(inter-group) 
(informal pact) 
(militia trust – 
reformed warriors) 
 
cohere: long-term 
peace agenda 
Y 
(intra-group) 
(militias – 
benefiting) 
 
 
cohere: long-term 
peace agenda 
Y 
(inter-group) 
(informal pact; 
pre-emptive) 
 
 
cohere: resist 
common threat 
5. Local 
Adaptation 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Messaging 
 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Message 
Assistance 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Mediation 
Coercive: Militia 
Privatized 
 
Coercive: 
Militia Force 
Non: Mediation 
Outcomes 
1) Escalation 
2) Non-
escalation 
3) Re-escalation 
2 
Non-escalation 
 
2 
Non-escalation 
 
2 
Non-escalation 
 
2 
Non-escalation 
 
2 
Non-escalation 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECURRING ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA 
 
Cases in chapter four analyzed the extent to which coalitions of civic associations 
dampened violence across various conflict settings in Northern Kenya. In chapter five, 
the question is reversed. What factors limit the effectiveness of local coalitions to engage 
in successful interventions to contain escalation? The cases represent settings in which 
threat monitoring networks, local peace processes and informal pacts, and informal 
communal protection strategies failed to contain the re-escalation of ethnic violence.  
Narratives for five conflicts in which local peacebuilding actors engaged in 
preventive intervention yet violence still escalated provide a platform for comparison of 
factors that may undermine preventive measures. In cases where civic organizations had 
prior success in containing conflict, symbolic acts of violence or the use of indiscriminant 
force by state actors undermined trust between local associations and militia patrons, 
increasing the likelihood of escalation. The relationship between modes of state and non-
state response to local inter-ethnic violence affect patterns of escalation in this set of 
cases. 
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Table 7: Recurring Escalation Cases 
 
 
West Pokot, Isiolo, and Mandera 
 
1. Marsabit: Turbi Massacre (2002 – 2005) 
2. West Pokot: Pokot – Turkana Range War (2013 – 2014) 
3. Isiolo: The Isiolo Triangle (2008 – 2012) 
4. Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008) 
5. Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014) 
 
 
 
The Turbi Massacre (2005) 
The Turbi Massacre is a case of non-state conflict in which responses to threats 
ultimately did not prevent mass collective violence. Prior to the massacre, multiple civic 
associations coordinated negotiations using customary rules for conflict management, 
established informal threat-monitoring networks, and supported local communal 
protection strategies. Notwithstanding, violence escalated in July of 2005. A group of 
1,000 Borana crossed the border from Ethiopia and attacked the village of Turbi, a small 
trading post in Northern Marsabit County.205  
During the raid, the Borana militia directly targeted Turbi Primary School. The 
group wielded machetes, shot students, and killed an infant with a rock, making it one of 
the most severe acts of ethnic violence in Kenya’s history (Mwangi 2006). Casualty 
reports vary.206 The NSC conducted an official government inquiry, reporting 50 
fatalities and 25 injuries during the initial attack at Turbi, with 50 additional fatalities 
                                                
205 Turbi is a small village with a population of 1,300 people. It sits on the border between Gabra and 
Borana dominated territories in Northern Marsabit County. 
 
206 The UCDP non-state conflict database estimates between 68 – 95 fatalities. 
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over the course of three days of violence that spread to other towns including Maikona, 
Kalacha, and Marsabit (NSC 2005).  
 
Conflict Context 
 
Dr. Bonaye Godana, a prominent Gabra politician from North Horr rose to 
national political prominence in the late 1980s, increasing political tension between the 
Gabra and Borana. Borana, historically, dominated political positions in Marsabit 
County. Godana’s appointment as Kenya’s Foreign Minister in 1998 was a threat to the 
status quo. Menkhaus elaborates: “Godana presided over Kenyan foreign policy during a 
time when Kenya agreed to work with Ethiopia to combat the OLF, which the Ethiopian 
government considered a terrorist organization but many Boran Oromo viewed as a 
legitimate liberation movement (Menkhaus 2015, 120). Notwithstanding, inter-group 
relations remained stable. Militias from both groups formed alliances to protect integrated 
settlements from Rendille, Samburu, and Dassanetch aggression.207  
Informants trace the conflict in Turbi back to a localized incident in August of 
2002, in which a minor inter-group dispute over an outstanding debt turned deadly, with 
one Borana fatality.208 In response, the Gabra conducted a revenge raid and stole 800 
livestock. With rising threat of attacks, elders convened an informal negotiation to 
                                                
207 Ibrahim Sora, CIFA, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 12, 2014. Both the Gabra 
and Borana have ethnic ties the cut across the border with Ethiopia. Both groups speak the same variant of 
Cushitic language, with an Oromo variation. Due to language similarity, there has been a very high level of 
intermarriage between Gabra and Borana, historically. Historically, the two groups engaged in a strong 
militia alliance, called the “Worr Liban alliance” during clashes against Maasai to take control of Marsabit 
area during the 1950s and 60s (see also, Schlee 1985).  
 
208 Jeremiah Omar, Former DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
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prevent further incitement. One week later, on September 15th, 2002, the Marsabit DPC 
coordinated a follow up dialogue. Mediators used the Garissa Declaration as a foundation 
for dialogue around restitution. Both groups rejected high rate of compensation: 100 
cattle for murder, and a repayment scheme of 3:1 for stolen livestock.209  
After failed negotiations, informal resource-sharing agreements broke down 
around Turbi. Gabra and Borana communities began to claim exclusive control over 
water points. Due to rising tension, local civic organizations intervened. Two local civic 
associations based in Marsabit, PISP (Gabra) and CIFA (Borana), in cooperation with the 
Marsabit District Peace Committee convened a cross-border peace meeting in Yabello, 
Ethiopia in November 2003. With backing from the DPC, the Marsabit County 
Government promised to enforce the peace agreement. Elders, in response, signed the 
Yabello pact, which held over the course of 2003. However, settlements did not re-
integrate. Borana did not resettle in Turbi, out of fear of potential revenge attacks. In 
February 2004, Gabra elders from the Moyale DPC organized peace meetings in Turbi 
and Marsabit, but when the external mediation team arrived in Turbi, the meeting 
collapsed after a small-scale riot. The long series of local peace processes stabilized 
conditions, but did not resolve the conflict between the Gabra and Borana. 
In April of 2005, in the lead up to national elections in 2006, the District 
Commissioner (DC) disbanded DPCs in Moyale and Marsabit. Formally, the District 
Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) provided oversight for DPCs. In practice, 
they were informal organizations with backing from donor organizations. OXFAM-GB 
                                                
209 Tumal Orto, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 13, 2014. 
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and ITDG provided the bulk of support for the Marsabit DPC. The District Commissioner 
appointed religious leaders as chairmen, who then relied on personal and church-based 
networks to form and maintain informal early warning systems, coordinate rapid 
responses to clashes, and support local peace processes. Prior leaders of the Marsabit 
DPC system claim it was a strong, independent organizational framework with a record 
of successful conflict prevention across Marsabit County.   
From the perspective of former DPC leaders, politicians dissolved the system 
because, “it was too strong—politicians wanted to get us out of the way to be able to use 
the conflict to win the next election.”210 The DC claimed he disbanded the DPCs because, 
“they stepped outside of their mandate—the organization became too involved in security 
issues that County Government should control not the DPC” (National Steering 
Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 2005, 12). Multiple respondents 
supported the view that political elites disbanded the DPC because it was one of the only 
neutral institutions in Marsabit with the potential capacity to undermine Borana political 
strategies.  
Notwithstanding, even after the DPC collapsed, on May 23rd, 2005, PISP, CIFA, 
and mediators from the Diocese of Marsabit convened a dialogue in Maikona to take 
forward the local peace process. Both groups agreed on a shared compensation rate for 
the 2002 Turbi raids: stolen livestock returned a rate of 1:1, and communal compensation 
for murder based on the Borana tradition of 40 cattle or the monetary equivalent. Both 
                                                
210 Jeremiah Omar, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 11, 2014. 
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groups paid restitution for the 2002 events on June 30, 2005 in Maikona.211 The local 
truce, however, was broken, rapidly. On June 5th, 2005 a Gabra militia attacked and killed 
five Borana near Moyale. The attack triggered a series of increasingly severe revenge 
attacks. Gabra raided Hurri Hills, killed a Borana chief, and one Borana KPR. The killing 
of the Borana Chief triggered acts of revenge in Marsabit town, with two fatalities and 
five homes burned.  
The following week, police deployed additional KPR to the area. Borana 
politicians led a peace mission, collaborating with local peace actors to try to secure 
another truce. In the midst of a flurry of preventive intervention, the key trigger to very 
rapid escalation and major cleansing occurred on July 1st, 2005. A Gabra militia attacked 
and killed six Borana youth in the village of Forole. In the words of a respondent, “it was 
in no way acceptable for the Borana—killing those boys in their sleep.”212 In response, 
Borana living in Ethiopia mobilized a large group of actors to conduct a major attack at 
Turbi.  
Informants indicate information about plans for the Turbi attack traveled broadly, 
up to two weeks prior to the massacre.213 There was basic early information warning of 
the group mobilizing. For example, reports from the NSC fact-finding mission indicate 
Gabra children withdrew from school in Turbi during the week prior to the attack (NSC 
2005). Even with rumors of the movement of the large band of attackers spreading 
                                                
211 Tumal Orto, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 13, 2014. 
 
212 Ibid. 
 
213 Stephen Gorai, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 11, 2014. 
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broadly, there was no preventive response. The Borana militia attacked Turbi on July 12, 
2005. The nature of violence was symbolic. The main target of the attack was the center 
of social life in the village—the primary school. As news of the attack spread, violence 
escalated. Attacks occurred across multiple rural villages: “in Bubisa 10 passengers were 
dragged out of a mission vehicle and murdered in the trading center. The victims were 
Gabra, Catholic evangelists from Sololo” (NSC 2005,10). In Maikona, Gabra killed one 
Borana and burned 10 homes burned, and in Kalacha, most Borana fled rapidly, but 
Gabra burned 20 Borana homes.214 
 
Outcomes 
 
Accusations of political involvement followed the massacre. Tension increased 
between the two dominant Borana MPs from Marsabit, Abdi Tari Sasura and Guracha 
Galgallo, and the Gabra MP, Dr. Bonaya Godana.215 Gabra politicians aggressively 
contested Borana dominance (Schlee 2008). One year after the Turbi massacre, on April 
10, 2006, Godana died in a plane crash in Marsabit, along with 10 other passengers; three 
of the 14 survived.216  
                                                
214 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
 
215 Carrier and Kochore describe, “Dr. Godana was seen as the chief architect of a distinct Gabra political 
and cultural identity that countered the Borana hegemony” (Carrier and Kochore 2014, 141; see also, 
Schlee and Shongolo 2012). Godana was an active proponent for the Gabra in a political system dominated 
by the Borana, and a predominant national figure, rising to the position of deputy leader of KANU. 
 
216 Other prominent politicians died in the crash, including, internal security assistant minister Mirugi 
Kariuki, and MPs Abdi Sasura (Saku), Titus Ngoyoni (Laisamis), Guracha Galgalo (Moyale) and 
Abdullahi Aden (East Africa Legislative Assembly MP). 
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The flight was in route to Moyale for peace talks to address ongoing inter-
communal clashes between the Borana and Gabra along the border with Ethiopia. The 
official report indicated the plane crashed into the side of Marsabit Mountain due to an 
unexpected weather change. However, Gabra claim Borana politicians organized the 
crash to prevent the Gabra from gaining political power following the Turbi Massacre. In 
the words of a local activist, “Godana was eliminated because he was about to take the 
government to court over Turbi, he had documents on the case, and Borana in the 
government organized to take him out. They paid the pilots to take their own lives.”217 In 
the wake of the massacre, anthropologists who study the area marked distinctive shifts in 
inter-ethnic group differentiation in terms of identity and traditional religious practice 
(Watson 2010).  
The severity of violence used in the Turbi massacre in 2005 and the following 
events ossified a deep division between the Boran and Gabra. The event also triggered 
extensive cooperation among organizations working to restore peace in the area, which 
had a side effect of forming and extending a broad local peacebuilding constituency 
along the border. Tumal Orto argues the post-Turbi reconciliation processes led to the 
formation of extensive threat-monitoring networks among elders at the village level. 
After the DPC collapsed, an informal coalition of peace actors assembled Borana and 
Gabra elders to implement a long-term peace process to address deep grievances from the 
Turbi Massacre. Tumal Orto states: 
                                                
217 Stephen Gorai, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 11, 2014. 
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A lot of NGOs were trying to bring peace after Turbi, but nothing was working. 
In 2006 and 2007 we were all involved in all types of dialogues that did not help – 
nothing was working; nobody was agreeing to anything. So we started our own 
peace process between the Borana and Gabra. Our strategy was to forget about 
NGOs and the government and to go directly to the elders. We took yaa and 
gadda members and their appointees and held meetings with them, under trees, in 
every village along the border, engaging local elders leaders from both 
countries.218 
 
After three years of informal negotiations, Borana and Gabra elders agreed to a 
peace declaration, signed in Maikona. Gabra and Borana elders signed the 
Maikona/Walda declaration on July 29th, 2009. The declaration articulated rules for 
compensation for killing, and the roles of traditional elders in enforcement of 
compensation. Livestock markets re-integrated after almost three years of full separation 
and ongoing violence after the 2009.  
Although violence escalated rapidly within Moyale town in 2012 and 2013, 
respondents claim, the post-Turbi peacebuilding process constructed an informal, rural 
coalition of conflict monitors with a shared interest in preventing political conflict from 
undermining a hard-fought peace agreement. In particular, after reports of violence in 
Moyale spread, elders within the network report rapidly engaging in local peace 
messaging with three primary persuasive tactics, including interpreting the episode as an 
urban problem rather than an ethnic conflict in order to limit its spread, reinforcing and 
traditional restitution rules established in the Maikona Walda Declaration and articulating 
                                                
218 Tumal Orto Galdibe, Interview with the author. Marsabit, Kenya, September 13, 2014. 
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the high communal cost or organizing attacks, and deploying local protection units to 
increase monitoring and scouting across rural areas surrounding Moyale.219  
Informants also claimed that that the nature of prior state actions in the area, 
including shaming of local leaders caused elders to avoid engagement with the politics of 
Moyale violence, and rely on local protection processes to contain escalation.220 It 
remains plausible that informal grassroots efforts played a role in containing the spread of 
violence beyond the town of Moyale in 2013 (see chapter three).  
 
Conclusions 
 
The Turbi case presents a set of compounding factors that led to the escalation of 
mass collective violence, even with a broad coalition of local peace groups engaged in 
significant preventive action. Prior to the massacre, the Borana and Gabra cooperated 
extensively and shared many common social characteristics. A complex set of pressures 
related to spillovers from the OLF movement in Ethiopia systematically increased tension 
between the two groups. A highly local conflict event triggered a dispute that local peace 
organizations struggled to resolve through series of broken peace pacts. Broken pacts 
increased inter-group suspicion, settlements disintegrated, and contestation over land and 
grazing rights increased. Political tension between group elites deepened the conflict, 
creating a window for mass collective violence targeting an unprotected village.  
                                                
219 Guyo Tuke, Interview with the author. Nairobi, Kenya, September 20, 2014. 
 
220 Peter Gakunyi, Interview with the author. Marsabit, Kenya, September 10, 2014. 
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Escalation and restraint work in tandem. Following the massacre, local peace 
processes helped form and expand the number of civic organizations engaged in local 
peacebuilding efforts across the area, which, some informants claim played a key role in 
containing violence in the Moyale case of 2012 – 2013. In the Turbi incident violence 
between Gabra and Borana spread across multiple villages, but in 2012, violence between 
Borana and Gabra in Moyale concentrated in a single town. 
 
 
West Pokot: Turkana – Pokot Range War (2013 – 2014)  
The Turkana – Pokot border conflict is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group 
conflict. The conflict is included in the UCDP database, which shows that after a five-
year period without major clashes between 2008 – 2013, violence escalated in 2013 
leading to over 70 fatalities. Cross-border dynamics play a role in the case. Uganda 
military intervention contained inter-group conflict on the Uganda side of the border.221 
On the Kenya side of the border, in West Pokot,222 conflict between the Pokot223 and 
                                                
221 Uganda approached the escalation of violence in the Karamoja Cluster and aggression by Pokot militias 
differently than Kenya. Uganda invested in a long-term “boots on the ground” campaign to forcibly disarm 
local militias involved in raiding, as has effectively closed the border.  
 
222 West Pokot County, in Northwestern Kenya, borders Uganda to the West and Turkana County to the 
North. It is classified as an arid and semi- arid region but, geographically, has a highland-lowland split. The 
Southern part of West Pokot is at higher elevation, along the Rift Valley escarpment. The region is very 
mountainous and has poor infrastructure the Northern part of the County is very flat, semi-arid desert, more 
similar to geological conditions in Turkana County. Impassable, but seasonal rivers cut through the area, 
creating many pockets that bandits use for protection. The topography and geography of the area make it a 
very good location for evading formal security actors (Bollig 2010). 
 
223 The Pokot ethnic group has roughly 220,000 Pokot members spread out across West Pokot and Baringo 
counties. The Pokot identify as a sub-group of larger “Kalenjin” identity group that was constructed under 
the rise of the Moi regime to counter the national political dominance of the Kikuyu (see Kipkorir, the 
Marakwet of Kenya, 1982). 
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Turkana escalated between 2013 – 2014, even under the watch of a large coalition of 
peacebuilding organizations operating in the area (UN-OCHA 2015). 
 
Context of Conflict 
 
On September 4th of 2013, a Turkana militia killed two Pokot warriors in a raid 
near Kainuk. In direct response a Pokot militia invaded the village of Lorogon, killing 
three Turkana men and injuring one woman and two children (Sabahi News 2013). The 
militia used trees to block the roads into and out of the village prior to the attack, and 
held the village for one week. The militia blocked the road between Kainuk and Turkwel 
Gorge, and shot at vehicles traveling along the main road between Kitale and Lodwar to 
prevent access to the village. The area MP and CSOs traveling to the area to conduct 
peace talks were not allowed access to the village. At the same time, the Pokot held three 
police camps under siege with reports identifying two police fatalities. 
The siege of Lorogon triggered a cycle of clashes between Turkana and Pokot 
militias along the border between West Pokot and Turkana leading to over 20 fatalities 
between September and December of 2013 all along the 200-kilometer border, including 
Lorogon, Kainuk, Nakwamoru, and Kapedo.224 The conflict continued through 2014 
when another major clash occurred outside the village of Kapedo. On November 1st  
2014, a Pokot militia ambushed and attacked a police convoy. They killed over 24 
Turkana KPR and administrative police in route to address reports of increased militia 
                                                
224 Dominic Kimengitch, Bishop, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, August 1, 2014. 
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activity in Kapedo. The militia stole a GSU vehicle from one of the police camps 
(Francas 2014).  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
In response to conflict escalation between the Pokot and Turkana, the GoK 
deployed teams of security actors and political elites to intervene. In this case, due to the 
relationship between development gains and conflict dynamics, the state deployed high-
level members of the Senate Security Committee, including Yusuf Haji, to mediate. To 
date, an agreement has not been reached. Local, clan-based peace committees, called 
Adakar225 Peace and Development Committees, are in place across the border area. They 
formed during a long-running CEWARN program on conflict monitoring in the 
Karamoja Cluster that ended in 2010.226 Local leaders of the adakar committees 
collaborate with the Turkana District Peace and Development Committee in processes of 
conflict monitoring and early warning. Local DPC chairpersons work voluntarily, 
reporting very little success in dampening violence due to the increased risk of threat 
from local Pokot militias, and the lack of external support.227  
An extensive network of civic associations specifically committed to 
peacebuilding activities in Turkana County, over 30 CSOs in total,228 is in place due to 
                                                
225 “Adakar” is like a clan in Turkana—a group of families living under leadership of a dominant elder. 
 
226 Joseph Areng, County Peace Secretariat, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 2014. 
 
227 Elias Ekiyeyes, DPC Chairman, Turkana South, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, August 1, 
2014. 
 
228 For example, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), a very powerful and well organized 
inter-denominational organization with a long history of peacebuilding work in Kenya, first engaged in 
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extensive international donor support related to conflicts in the Karamoja Cluster and 
increasing support from the GoK for local peacebuilding efforts. Even with very clear 
understanding of current conflict drivers, and resources for intervening along the conflict 
border, civic associations have very little capacity to contain violence along the border 
between Turkana and West Pokot. Respondents indicate that capacity of local civic 
organizations to contain conflict in this case is limited due to dilemmas of coordination, 
and unique conditions that cause Pokot militias to use violence against peacebuilding 
actors.  
Uganda addressed insecurity in the Karamoja Cluster through military 
intervention, which had unintended effects for local peace processes between the Pokot 
and Turkana. In particular, forceful disarmament campaigns in Uganda heightened 
suspicion and fear among the Pokot and Turkana that the state would engage in similar 
disarmament tactics in Kenya. Daniel Edaan describes, “Disarmament in Uganda caused 
Pokot militias to stop engaging with us in peace negotiations. They are very suspicious of 
anyone they think will take their weapons, or report the situation to the government.”229 
Militia groups and the communities supporting them are less willing to engage with civic 
groups involved in peacebuilding work in the area. The nature of aggressive disarmament 
in Uganda increased suspicion of outside actors involved in peace work.  
                                                                                                                                            
peace work in Turkana in 1992, with a program titled, the “Community Peace Building and Development 
Project.” The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission has been active in the area and has worked in close 
cooperation with local CSOs, such as POKATUSA on local peace issues. Other key actors in the field of 
peace building in Turkana County include: the CAPE Unit of AU/IBAR, the MAPOTU Peace Initiative 
with support from World Vision-Kenya, and VSF Belgium. 
 
229 Daniel Edaan, ASALs Resilience, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 25, 2014. 
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Pokot militias use force to repel NGOs, CSOs, and peace operations. Attacks have 
occurred during peace meetings, or right after causing high-ranking staff among NGOs 
and larger organizations to avoid taking the risks of engaging in the conflict zone. In 
response, local organizations withdrew staff from remote field stations, limiting on-the-
ground presence of external organizations that could monitor militia movement. With the 
conflict intensifying, there is a significant amount of financial support available for 
peacebuilding along the Turkana – Pokot border area, but CSOs are not physically 
present along the border. NGOs working on the issue have urban bases and outsource 
high-risk peace work to voluntary local peace committees.  
POKATUSA, for example, one of the most locally oriented CSOs, coordinates 
negotiations in areas away from the border because negotiators are not willing to travel to 
and conduct dialogues in the area. Militias and patrons send intermediaries to travel to 
dialogues who have no control over militia behaviors, making mediation, “a game of 
repeated and broken agreements between actors who have no power to control violence 
border.”230  
The lead organization in Turkana that had prior success in containing violence 
between Turkana and Pokot militia collapsed due to corruption, also undermining the 
legitimacy of peacebuilding organizations in the area. In response to insecurity in the 
Karamoja cluster, a grassroots peace association called the Turkana District Peace and 
Development Committee formed, and later shifted its name to the Riam-Riam Peace 
Network. Former youth militia leaders built the organization and were successful in 
                                                
230 Neven Knezevic, UNICEF HARP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 12, 2014. 
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improving crisis response in the larger Karamoja cluster region. Riam-Riam formed a 
broad network of informants across the county from multiple local associations, ethnic 
groups, and clans.  
Following attacks, Riam Riam assembled teams of first responders of actors with 
direct clan connections in the reported location. Response teams traveled directly to 
conflict sites to coordinate targeted peacebuilding responses. The group was very 
effective in preventing escalation and coordinating rapid negotiations and informal 
restitution payments. New of the success of the local association traveled widely, and the 
organization received donor support from Oxfam. However, leaders of Riam, Riam 
gained political support for improving local security, which caused leaders within the 
organization to shift into politics. In the words of Daniel Kiroket, “peace and politics do 
not mix.”231 The high cost of engaging in politics incentivized theft of organizational 
resources, and leaders of the organization embezzled donor funds to run a political 
campaign. The collapse of the peace network shortly followed.232   
 
Outcomes 
 
In this case, the discovery of oil triggered the perception among the Pokot of 
increasing wealth, weapons, and power among the Turkana. It also increased expectations 
of state support for the Turkana to prevent Turkana mobilization against Tullow Oil sites 
(see, chapter four). The Pokot presume the GoK will use force against local militias 
                                                
231 Daniel Kiroket, MCC, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 2014. 
 
232 Joseph Areng, County Peace Secretariat, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 2014. 
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protect the Turkana and maintain access to oil. It also intensified land claims. Pokot 
militia actors stated, “Lokichar was our land before the Turkana pushed us from there 
with guns.”233 With these two expectations, Pokot militias now employ increasingly 
aggressive attacks to undermine an expected rise in both power and state protection for 
the Turkana. This has detrimental effects for local peacebuilding organizations—they are 
also targeted.  
The nature of Pokot aggression suggests direct intent to capture and control 
territory with Turkana County—a more intensive form of aggression than in prior conflict 
events between the two groups. Prior conflicts between the Turkana and Pokot had little 
to do with the problem of inequality. Both groups were equally poor and marginalized. 
This condition changed with the discovery of significant oil reserves in Turkana County. 
Patrons of Pokot militias now support efforts of Pokot militias to gain access to areas 
with oil resources, with targeting focused on the locations of as Orwo, Marich, or Alale 
that have minority Pokot settlements, but are located within Turkana County. Pokot 
militias rely on informants from these locations for support and information. In the most 
recent incident at Kapedo, for example, most violence was directed toward state actors 
who were attempting to control and limit boundary expansion of the Pokot, rather than 
against Turkana civilians.  
Pokot militias use violence to directly target Turkana groups, threaten the state, 
and establish settlements in areas most likely to benefit from oil and expansion of 
markets and services. With the discovery of oil, violence has a new functional value for 
                                                
233 Dan Nganga, Interview with the author. Kitale, Kenya, July 20, 2014. 
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accessing territory and oil wealth. Civic associations have little capacity to contain the 
violent rent seeking behavior of Pokot militias.  
Civic actors face high risk in mediating the conflict and have little legitimacy due 
to disarmament campaigns in Uganda, was well as prior organizational failures. Rather 
than engaging in high-risk interventions, peace organizations operate from urban centers, 
using resources to conduct ad hoc peace negotiations with intermediaries who do not 
have power to control militia behavior. Even in the presence of a broad coalition of local 
peace organizations supporting threat-monitoring networks and platforms for negotiating 
and enforcing informal rules, preventive actions have failed to contain escalation in this 
case.  
 
The Isiolo Triangle (2009 – 2012) 
Isiolo is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group conflict that occurred even the 
presence of a broad coalition of peacebuilding organizations. Preventive intervention in 
this case failed to contain escalation. From late 1996 – 2002, violence escalated across 
the Isiolo Triangle. Assessment reports from the time period estimate 1,200 fatalities 
occurred due to inter-ethnic group clashes, with up to 300,000 animals stolen in raids and 
counter raids (CEWARN 2004). Local militia strategies changed to include village 
burnings and targeting of women and children (Goldsmith 1997). In 2002, coordinated 
efforts of local civic associations and the District Peace Committee restored peace 
(UNDP 2006). Local peace actors contained violence following a series of major clashes. 
However, even with a relatively robust coalition of local peacebuilding organizations 
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established in Isiolo, violence re-escalated in 2009 and 2012. Preventive responses did 
not contain collective violence in this case. 
 
Context of Conflict 
 
 In 1997, the year of the second national multi-party election, Borana militias 
raided Degodia settlements in Eastern Isiolo. The attacks triggered a cycle of raids and 
counter-raids that led to over 140 fatalities and the loss 17,500 cattle (Goldsmith 1997). 
The large-scale nature of theft and the deadliness of attacks left a deep sense of grievance 
between the Borana and Degodia.234 Prior to the initial attacks, reports claim Borana 
political elites used clandestine intra-ethnic networks to provide militias with weapons 
and information about large and vulnerable livestock populations belonging to Degodia 
groups immigrating into Western Isiolo.235 Analysts indicate incumbent politicians armed 
Borana militias to displace Somali populations aligned with opposition political parties, 
rather than KANU (Brown 2003). Political elites engaged in intensive competition over 
land and political representation directly incited attacks (Menkhaus 2005, 15). Elites used 
resource conflict as a platform to cloak political violence (Kimenyi and Njuguna 2005).  
 After the outbreak of violence in 1997, state intervention failed to control clashes. 
The GoK fired local politicians accused of supporting Borana militias, including MP for 
Isiolo North, Charfano Mokko. Dismissals triggered local demonstrations against the 
government for victimizing the Borana (Daily Nation, “Root Causes of Somali-Borana 
                                                
234 Focus Group 4, Dialogue with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
 
235 James Ndungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 2014. 
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Conflict,” May 14, 2000). Grassroots organizations, eventually, stabilized communal 
relations (Oxfam 2003; Menkhaus 2005; UNDP 2010). The Isiolo District Peace 
Committee played a critical role for stabilization as a hub for conflict monitoring and 
early warning. The District Peace Committee provided civic associations with detailed 
information related to threats of impending attacks, and local chiefs with direct access to 
militia intelligence. Local militia patrons cooperated with DPC leaders who then shared 
dynamics of potential threats across the region.236 The extension of threat-monitoring 
networks, at least, stabilized the conflict.  
 After the first major wave of violence, respondents report that elders played a key 
role in dampening conflict around following elections in 2002 through the practice of 
“negotiated democracy.”237 Elders from all major ethnic communities in the region 
engaged in processes of negotiation over candidate selection in the lead up to elections. 
Candidates for each post were selected for each position, “receiving the anointing of the 
elders.”238 Informal negotiations limited the need for political candidates to engage in 
process of population manipulation to ensure they would be well positioned to become 
candidates. Respondents suggest the practice of negotiated democracy and the 
development of stronger monitoring and early warning systems stabilized inter-group 
relations and reduced clashes for a period of six years.239  
                                                
236 Focus Group 4, Dialogue with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
 
237 Hussein Mursale, Isiolo DPC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 14, 2014. 
 
238 Focus Group 29, Isiolo Peace Actors, Dialogue with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, July 25, 2013. 
 
239 Ibid. 
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 Following a long period of peace after 2002, in 2007, electoral dynamics sparked 
another wave of escalation. The Borana are the majority ethnic group in Isiolo North and 
Isiolo South, the two electoral constituencies in Isiolo County. The Borana have a long 
history of political dominance in both districts. In 2007, Joseph Samaal, a Turkana 
candidate, ran for the MP seat in Isiolo North and nearly won the election. Mohamed 
Kuti, a Sakuye candidate with a strong alliance with the Borana, only narrowly won the 
seat. The narrow victory threatened Borana political dominance in Isiolo North.  
 In response to the near loss, fearing the Borana constituency was too divided 
among clans, Borana leaders reorganized internally to re-unite the group. The unification 
strategy involved coordinated efforts to increase pressure on Turkana and Samburu 
settlements in Northern Isiolo County.240 The Borana organized around a shared goal of 
preventing Turkana and Somali groups from establishing settlements in Isiolo County. 
These efforts led to more frequent attacks on minority group villages.  
 Intra-Borana unification efforts also had a secondary effect—the formation of 
new political alliances. In response to increasing intra-Borana organization and 
aggression, Samburu and Turkana communities formed a minority alliance. The Borana 
and Degodia, also prior enemies from major attacks in 1998, formed a majority alliance. 
Local respondents called the Borana-Somali alliance the Cushitic bloc.241 The alliances 
formed along lines of, in Shamaro’s terms, cultural affinities. The Samburu and Turkana 
shared a larger Nilotic, pastoralist identity, and the Borana and Somali shared a larger 
                                                
240 Hussein Mursale, Isiolo DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 14, 2014. 
 
241 Ibid. 
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Islamic identity, as well as a common language. Cultural affinity functioned as a 
framework, in both cases, for forming alliances among conflicting ethnic groups. Rising 
risk of armed aggression based on ethnic identifies re-shaped the conflict trajectory 
(Shamaro 2014). Cross-ethnic alliances increased the offensive and defensive capacity of 
local militias, and expanded indigenous intelligence gathering capacity.  
 The outcomes of the 2007 county elections set up a path toward increasingly 
deadly attacks between the Samburu – Borana. Political leaders from the Samburu-
Turkana alliance publically articulated a clear goal to unseat the Borana in Isiolo North. 
The Borana - Somali alliance articulated a similar goal, “to clear the area of Samburu and 
Turkana” (Shamaro 2014, 7). Political alliances shaped violent behavior. Seemingly 
traditional pastoralist acts of raiding cloaked politically motivated violence designed to 
undermine Borana power, dominance, and territorial control.242  
 The effects are visible in a steady increase in raiding behavior and attacks that 
played out along the political cleavage. Between 2009 – 2013, estimates indicate inter-
group clashes caused between 165 – 300 fatalities in Isiolo County (Saferworld Report 
2009; Alternet 2011, East Africa Standard 2013, ACLED 2013). Most acts of aggression 
during the time period targeted the dominant ethnic group—the Borana. Samburu and 
Turkana militias collaborated through clandestine networks, sharing information related 
to opportunities to attack Borana militias and settlements. In this period, the Samburu243 
                                                
242 Hassan Kochore, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 8, 2014. 
 
243 Samburu moran who live and raise cattle in Isiolo County have very strong and well-organized standing 
youth militia. Turkana, also have a well organized youth protection system, as do the Rendille, with a 
similar level of militia organization. However, there is an imbalance of militia capacity in the Isiolo case. 
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initiated the majority of offensive raids, with the Borana organizing very deadly, 
asymmetrical counter-attacks.  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
 State efforts to contain conflict in Isiolo had unintended consequences. The state 
established new police institutions across the Isiolo triangle, including anti-stock theft 
units. Under the oversight of Commander Nelson Okioga, police trained security forces 
to counter livestock raids, and were based in joint camps with rapid deployment units 
(RDU). The police conducted disarmament operations. For example, in Western Isiolo, 
during the initial wave of escalation in 2007, Samburu militias agreed to voluntary 
disarmament, but only after the GoK promised to improving security, including the 
allocation of more police and rapid defense forces, more development projects including 
water points, schools, improvements in roads, and equality in disarmament among 
neighboring communities (UNDP 2010). Less than one month after the campaign, 
Borana raiders attacked. The event raised suspicion toward the government and led to 
rapid re-armament across the Samburu community.  
 After failed voluntary disarmament, in 2009, KDF intervened in clashes between 
the Samburu and Borana in Western Isiolo with the intent of disarming Samburu militias. 
During the operation, Samburu killed four KDF soldiers. Samburu claimed that they 
                                                                                                                                            
Borana are seen as weaker targets to the Samburu than the Turkana or Pokot. Local Borana and Somali 
groups do not have same level of organization and number of armed actors. They do not have moran 
systems, so they depend on different methods for communal and resource protection. The KPR, self-
arming, elders carrying arms or hiring private mercenaries, and the maintenance of links to OLF militants 
function to provide the Borana with for skills, training, weapons to counter the force of other armed 
militias. Hired mercenaries is also common in the area, especially in urban centers. 
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attacked because the military aligned with the Borana, while the Borana claimed 
Samburu militias had been alerted of pending military strikes through insider networks 
that allowed them time to design an effective defense strategy against the military. Failed 
disarmament campaigns in the area undermined communal willingness to disarm, and 
raised suspicions that state actors directly arm ethnic groups when it is in their interest to 
do so.244 Respondents indicate that armed militias view disarmament campaigns as 
moments of weakness. After disarmament campaigns, opportunistic militias commonly 
attack disarmed groups.245 
 In 2009, over 5,000 IDPs fled to Isiolo due to rising violence. In response, in July 
of 2009, the GoK secretively allocated 300 weapons to the Borana KPR as a response to 
rising aggression by Samburu and Rendille militias. Reports of MPs and politicians 
unloading trucks with arms and ammunition at night to the Borana leaked to Samburu 
and Turkana militias. The logic of allocating arms to Borana was based on a long-held 
assumption that the state could generate an informal balance of power to reduce Samburu 
and Turkana aggression.246 However, it had the opposite effect.  
 Arms allocation through the KPR system increased suspicion of state support to 
undermine the Turkana and Samburu alliance, and introduced new grievances around 
inequality in the provision of weapons. Inequality in state distribution of arms led to fear 
of Borana domination causing the Samburu to organize to ensure all moran in the area 
                                                
244 James Ndungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 2014. 
 
245 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
 
246 Ndungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 2014. 
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were better armed than the Borana. Samburu and Turkana militias organized local 
protection groups to defend against an increased threat of Borana attacks, and engaged in 
more offensive raids against Borana communities along the borders to undermine the 
capacity of the Borana to mobilize against the Samburu (Saferworld 2009; UNDP 2010).   
 Allocation of weapons in the pursuit of an ethnic balance of power also 
intensified the political dynamics of the conflict. Local political entrepreneurs began 
using KPR arms allocation to campaign: “Politicians told their groups, ‘I will secure you, 
and get you more weapons for our people, if I am in power.’”247 Samburu politicians 
claimed that,  
“the PNU [Party of National Unity] side of government [Borana – Somali 
alliance], with lobbying from the Isiolo North MP and Minister for Livestock 
Development, have resorted to arming supporters in order to punish the ODM 
sympathizers [Turkana – Samburu alliance]” (UNDP 2010, 10). 
Informal armament of KPR actors increased inter-group tension and depended 
perceptions of state inequality.   
 Political elites used the conflict between the Samburu and Borana to consolidate 
support for national political parties. For example, in 2009, the government, with Mwai 
Kibaki as head of the PNU party, sent the KDF to engage in a disarmament campaign 
against Samburu in Samburu East. Raila Odinga, Prime Minister, but in the opposition 
ODM party traveled to the area after the disarmament campaign and accused the 
government of human rights as a means to secure political support for ODM from the 
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Samburu. The Samburu –Turkana alliance aligned with ODM; whereas, the Somali – 
Borana alliance aligned with PNU.248  
 State responses in rising insecurity in the area provided the Borana with evidence 
of how ethnic alliances influence state security interventions, and impact whether or not 
dominant national political parties choose to support local militias, engage in 
disarmament campaigns, or even prevent disarmament campaigns in particular areas. If 
an ethnic group has access to national power through alliances with the dominant party, 
disarmament campaigns can be prevented.  
 This dynamic raised the stakes of 2013 elections, and played into the process of 
escalation in Isiolo. Accessing political control became directly associated with control 
over which groups would be disarmed. Both groups saw the state as a potential enemy, 
triggering militia mobilization and self-protection unit formation, as well as very 
aggressive approaches to ensure access to local political power.249 As conflict escalated 
between the two inter-ethnic group alliances, political interests led to the capture of the 
District Peace Committee, which functioned as a central hub for the coordination of 
preventive action.250  
 As Hussein Mursal describes, “DPCs were formed by the community, but 
hijacked by politicians. DCs captured donor resources directed to the DPCs, and lost their 
                                                
248 Mohamed Guleid, Isiolo Dept. Governor, Interview with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, July 25, 2013. 
 
249 Hussein Mursale, Isiolo DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 14, 2014. 
 
250 Focus Group 4, Dialogue with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
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original purpose and spirit of voluntarism.”251 Similar to the Marsabit case, the Isiolo 
DPC lost capacity to operate as a neutral organization. The success of DPC leaders 
during the period of peace made them valuable information sources for political 
candidates. DPC leaders were gatekeepers of information needed for candidates to 
develop strategies for campaigns. MPs and political entrepreneurs from the area looked to 
DPC leaders for information about threats, mobilization processes, and peace processes.  
 During negotiations with political candidates, DPC leaders were offered 
incentives for information they needed for positioning and campaigning, such as the 
dynamics of local peace negotiations, political positions of local elders and area chiefs, 
party alignment and degrees of support, territorial control, and the severity of threats in 
particular areas. When actors from both sides of the conflict realized DPC leaders were 
not neutral and shared information with political elites, the larger coalition of local peace 
actors broke down and the Isiolo DPC system ceased to function as a key hub for the 
coordination of peace activities.252  
Outcomes 
 
 The process of devolution and local government reform led communities in the 
area to make increasingly aggressive claims over territorial control and position youth 
militias in disputed border areas. Small-scale demographic shifts triggered the 
assumption among the Borana that Turkana and Samburu settlements would help provide 
routes for armed raiders from outside of the area, such as the Pokot, to raid Borana 
                                                
251 Hussein Mursale, Isiolo DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 14, 2014. 
 
252 Daniel Kiptugen, Oxfam, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013. 
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settlements. Reported communal goals of attacks were twofold: to maximize harm and 
damage on enemy groups, and to reduce the likelihood of direct and rapid revenge. 
Escalation led to the expansion of covert information gathering networks across the area, 
and youth militias developed increasingly sophisticated forms of tracking and cloaking 
techniques.  
 With the presence of dense informant networks, the difficulty of entering an area 
without being noticed, even for a small-armed group to conduct an attack, required a high 
level of intra-group cooperation as well as inter-group cooperation across trans-ethnic 
alliances.253 To reduce risk of direct retaliation, groups adopted increasingly sophisticated 
cloaking strategies such as entering an area through the territory of an enemy (or non-
allied) ethnic group to redirect a potential revenge response. Informants claimed: “if you 
can’t trust your neighbors not to collaborate with armed militia from outside of the area, 
you can’t trust your neighbors, at all. Raiders do so much to hide their identity, that most 
times no one know who is attacking.”254 These tactics greatly increase the likelihood of 
revenge attacks, and subsequent escalation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
253 Even though Isiolo does not border Ethiopia directly, the Borana share kinship ties with Borana in 
Ethiopia, and thus are often accused of having links with the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front). These 
linkages are always contested and controversial. In general, networks are largely informal and impact 
conflict dynamics through intra-group linkages for purchase of illegal weapons, or through support from a 
few OLF members for training, or for hire for private protection. The Borana sense of victimization, as a 
target of constant aggression and raiding by better-organized militias, may cause the group to pay high cost 
associated with organizing private militias comprised of former OLF fighters in Ethiopia.  
 
254 Focus Group 29, Isiolo Peace Actors, Dialogue with the author, Isiolo, Kenya, July 25, 2013. 
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Conclusions 
 
 Ethnic violence escalated, in the Isiolo case, in relationship to perceptions of the 
potential for future gain or future loss of power and wealth through access to control over 
the County Government. With political power as the primary channel for access to not 
only massive expected economic resources, but also control over state security 
operations, the expectation of possible loss among the Borana, and possible gain among 
the Samburu – Turkana triggered forcible dislocation, and acts of ethnic cleansing. 
 National-level politics reinforced local ethnic divisions. National politics raised 
the stakes of elections, increased local political tension, and deepened the division 
between identity-based alliances. While dominant interpretations of violence in the Isiolo 
Triangle blame resource scarcity and traditional acts of banditry and violence, in this 
case, political motivations exacerbated seemingly traditional acts of violence. Political 
capture and the collapse of a previously effective local peace structure created windows 
for escalation in Isiolo County.  
 
Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008) 
Conflict between the Garre255 and Murule256 between 2005 – 2008 is a case of 
non-state, inter-ethnic group violence in which preventive intervention failed to contain 
                                                
255 The Garre identify as a Kenyan Somali ethnic group, but are a sub-clan of the larger the Digil group, one 
of largest clans in Somalia, that represents of twenty percent of the population in Somalia. Estimates 
indicate a Garre population of 50,000 in Kenya. Anthropologists classify the Garre within the language 
group, called Oromiyya. There are only minor language differences between Kenya and Somalia 
populations or Garre. The linkages between the Garre in Somalia and Kenya are critical in terms of the 
process of militia formation and the strength and level of coordination of Garre militias. 
 
256 The Murule identify as part of the large group of Kenyan Somalis, and part of larger Somali clan 
Hawiye. The Murule identity is, therefore, a sub-clan, and has been geographically concentrated in 
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escalation. The case is recorded in the UCDP database, estimating between 63 – 105 
fatalities in 2005 and 31 in 2008. The establishment of sub-county political districts was a 
key trigger for conflict between the Garre and Murule.257 Historically, the Garre held the 
only MP seat in Mandera County. In 1983, a Merule representative won the seat. In 
response to the rising threat of political violence, the GoK divided the constituency into 
two districts—Mandera East with a Murule majority, and Mandera West with a Garre 
majority. Elections in 1988 allowed both groups the opportunity for political 
representation.  
At the same time, the new boundary cut through communal grazing land. Elders 
used informal inter-group negotiations to determine water and resource sharing patterns 
in the area. Redistricting, however, caused contestation over the Alango water point. Both 
groups claimed ownership of the area and armed groups from each clan increased patrols 
along the new border. Garre and Murule drew upon cross-border clan networks for 
support, leading to accusations of using foreign actors to bolster local protection 
militias.258  
Fear of external support justified further mobilization, training, and arming of 
youth militias. Both groups amassed weapons and expanded cross-border networks and 
                                                                                                                                            
Mandera County in Northeastern Kenya for over 120 years. Murule populations also reside across the 
border in Somalia, in particular in Gedo and Jubba (See, UCDP Encyclopedia).  
 
257 See Azarya for a longer history (Azarya 1996). He argues Somali ethnic identities in Mandera, in the 
past, were far more fluid than they are today. See also, Donnan (1999) – anthropological approaches 
support this argument, claiming colonial borders and disrupted ethnic alliances created a new ethnic order 
with far less flexible and negotiable ethnic identities (Donnan 1999). 
 
258 Abdul Aziz, COPA, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 17, 2013. 
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alliances.259 In particular, Garre developed linkages with the Rahanweyn Resistance 
Army (RRA) in Somalia. By 2002, the RRA controlled a large region of Somalia called, 
the South-West State of Somalia. After securing territorial control in Somalia, Garre 
militias in Somalia extended additional support for Garre militias in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya (Menkhaus 2005).  
 
Conflict Context 
 
Even with the formation of militia alliances through the late 1980s and early 
1990s, clashes did not occur between the Garre and Murule in Kenya until December of 
2004 when Garre movement into contested grazing territory increased inter-group 
tension. The key trigger of escalation was the murder of a prominent Garre aid worker. 
Armed Murule attacked a relief convoy at the junction of the Fino-El Wak roads, killing a 
well-known actor from the Garre community (Hussein 2012).  
The initial Garre revenge mission was thwarted. Murule caught the Garre militia 
trespassing in Mandera East. The militia fled, but attacked and killed 20 Murule civilians 
during the retreat (IRIN 2005). In response, Murule attacked at El-Wak leading to 
population displacement of 1,500 Garre (IRIN, “Conflict over resources in border areas,” 
August 1st, 2002). 
                                                
259 Collapse of the Somali state in 1991 only further exacerbated the problem. Intra-ethnic networks among 
the Garre and Murule create channel for the import of illegal weapons. In particular, Hargesia and Burao, 
Garre controlled areas in Somalia have flourishing arms markets, from which illegal weapons are 
purchased and imported into Kenya, increasing the ease of access to very deadly weapons for use in war 
efforts (see, Menkhaus 2005). 
 
 217 
 
Actors from the Wajir Peace Network, including elders, local peace committees, 
and women’s groups, engaged to try to restore peace and convene negotiations between 
the two groups. Leaders of local peace committees and the DPCs organized and hosted a 
peace rally for President Mwai Kibaki, who called on elders from the area to lead 
mediation efforts to secure a ceasefire. Elders led a local peace process, proposing a 
communal fine of 100 camels per fatality, based on the traditional rule of blood payment 
within Heer system. Both groups agreed to the rule. Shortly after the local truce, 
however, violence broke out again after a Murule boy was killed in Fino-El Wak. Murule 
blamed it on the Garre, and on March 16th, 2005, mobilized a large-scale attack at the El 
Golicha, killing 22 Garre civilians, including 15 women, an imam, and five children 
(Hussein 2012).  
After the very deadly attack in El Golicha, the GoK engaged with the DPC system 
to coordinate a large-scale peacebuilding intervention across Mandera County. Local 
peace committees took the lead in arranging and coordinating dialogues, with 
overarching support from DPCs and an association of Muslim leaders called the Supreme 
Council of Muslims in Kenya (SUPKEM). DPCs also coordinated the formation of ad 
hoc inter-clan arbitration committee made up of clan elders, civil society leaders, political 
parties, and religious groups.260 The DPC appointed Sheikh Umal of Jamia Mosque in 
Mandera as a key leader of the peace operation. The process included village-level 
dialogues across the region, and eventually the signing of a peace accord, named in honor 
of Sheikh Umal.  
                                                
260 Abdi Haji, SUPKEM, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 17, 2013. 
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The Umal Accord reinforced traditional blood payment codes set at 100 camels 
for each man and 50 camels for woman or child, pasture sharing agreements, open 
movement across political districts, and restitution for homes burned. The agreement also 
included a stipulation for both groups to participate voluntary disarmament campaigns 
(see, AllAfrica, “Blood Money Pact Opens Gender Debate,” March 26, 2005). Analysts 
claim the key to success of the local truce between the Garre and Murule was that the 
Kenyan government stepped into to fill a key void in enforcement (Menkhaus 2005). 
The Umal Accord was informal and based on traditional customs that clashed 
with constitutional mandates. Notwithstanding, government officials promised to enforce 
the informal pact, and threatened military action against spoilers (see, Elfversson, 2013). 
However, on the ground, the GoK did not have capacity to enforce the agreement.261 
Military action across the remote periphery area would have been very costly with 
limited impact due to the ease militia evasion across state borders. In practice, 
government representatives relied upon NGOs with broader presence in the area for 
conflict monitoring and information gathering to produce reports on the status of 
implementation for conflict parties (see, Hussein 2009). In this case, state – CSO 
cooperation improved monitoring, information sharing, and helped stabilize the peace 
accord. The Umal Accord, therefore, held for nearly three years. 
Between 2005 – 2008, communities reported problems related to the 
implementation of the Accord. The state committed to enforcing the declaration and 
NGOs aided in monitoring. On the ground, however, DPCs were the main institutions 
                                                
261 Ibid. 
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involved in enforcement. DPC chairmen, however, had no capacity to force Garre and 
Murule communities to pay reparations for violence crimes. Both groups shirked 
payments for killings and paid bribes to conflict monitors to prevent reports from going 
out that reparations were not paid.262 DPCs had few resources to effectively monitor 
whether or not resource-sharing agreements around remote water points were upheld.  
Therefore, during the period of peace, rather than relocating to former integrated 
villages, Garre and Murule populations moved away from contested areas and 
boundaries. Both groups formed more homogenous settlements seeking protection 
through intra-clan networks and alliances. In 2006, insecurity increased in the area in 
relation to the activities of criminal gangs associated with Garre and Murule militias. 
Both groups had linkages to conflict dynamics in Somalia, which remained rife with 
reports and rumors of kidnappings and assassinations of leaders from within cross-border 
ethnic alliances.  
An event in May of 2007 nearly triggered re-escalation of the conflict:  
“in May 2007 Murule elders traveling to attend a peace meeting were ambushed 
by a Garre militia. Two elders were killed and the rest were injured. The Murule 
claimed that the Garre were never remorseful and instead dismissed the incident 
as the work of unruly Murule youth” (UNDP 2010).  
Peace held for one year following the attack. However, with rising tension due to ongoing 
conflict events in Somalia, as well as problems associated with enforcement and 
monitoring of the local peace pact, violence re-escalated in July of 2008.  
                                                
262 Kassim Kerrow, Mandera East DPC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 29, 2014. 
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The Umal Accord established Alango as a buffer zone between Garre and Murule 
communities. However, the government drilled a new borehole well in Alango in 2008, 
causing a dispute over ownership and access to the buffer zone. On September 5th, 2008, 
clashes broke out over control of Alango, with 13 fatalities. After the initial clash, 
revenge attacks escalated over the course of three months across multiple villages along 
the border leading to 30 fatalities through the end of October 2008, and 30,000 IDPs.  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
In October of 2008, the Kenyan police conducted a four-day sweep across the 
region in an effort to disarm Garre and Murule militias. Over 600 security actors, 
including police, administrative police, and KDF conducted a joint operation. GoK 
reports on the operation indicate the police arrested 150 Somali and Ethiopia militia 
actors without legal residency (Hussein 2012). Human Rights Watch, however, criticized 
the campaign for abuses, including allegations of rape and beatings. Reports gathered 
indicated joint forces caused up to 1,200 injuries through beatings one fatality (Human 
Rights Watch 2008).263 Kenyan police denied allegations of civilian abuse.  
 Even with increased policing in the area, respondents involved in the response 
argue increased policing did not contain conflict. In particular, “security personnel in the 
area, from ‘down country,’ were vulnerable to attack, and new to the desert conditions, 
terrain and topography. Fear of attack by militias from Somalia caused security personnel 
                                                
263 The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights also conducted follow up research in the area on the 
actions of the state related to the conflict, and later published Report of the Fact Finding Commission of the 
Security Operation in Mandera (Nairobi: KNC HR, 2008). 
 
 221 
 
to conduct very few preventative monitoring campaigns.”264 In the absence of effective 
policing, local communities turned to politicians, local militias, and cross-border ethnic 
networks for protection.265 After 2008, the Garre, in particular, turned to ethnic kinship 
networks in Ethiopia for support for small arms and training for local militias. In the early 
2000s, the Ethiopian military supported Garre militias from Kenya to engage in a proxy 
war against the OLF, drawing the Garre into conflict dynamics in Ethiopia, and providing 
youth militias with battle experience.  
The GoK also organized a joint peace team and called elders and politicians for 
dialogues in Nairobi. In 2008, an ad hoc arbitration committee, called the Joint Nairobi 
Community Peace and Resolution Committee formed under the National Ministry for 
Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands. The committee organized 50 village and clan 
elders from all sub-districts in the county, and conducted peace dialogues through 
separate, intra-clan dialogues, before convening joint dialogues.  
After the broad-based dialogue, delegates elected a ten-member team to mediate 
at the village level. The team received vehicles and resources to travel across the county 
and engage in village-level peace dialogues, especially along the district borders. A broad 
collation of organizations supported the peace operation, including local political actors, 
                                                
264 James Ndungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, September 24, 2014. 
 
265 National politicians play a very active role in supporting local ethnic militias in Mandera. Even though it 
remains very difficult to find direct evidence of this support, key informants indicate that it is very well 
known that politicians often make some of the largest contributions for the support of local militias. 
Considering that politicians are the wealthiest members of pastoralist society, they tend to have very large 
herds of animals that the state cannot protect. Politicians and other wealthy actors from the group from 
these areas also support the system of armed actors to protect their own economic resources, providing 
arms, ammunition, and food supplies as handouts, through highly secretive, intra-ethnic networks of 
suppliers.  
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representatives of the UNDP Country Office, and the NSC. Following the local peace 
campaign, the GoK and UNDP reported successful voluntary disarmament along the 
disputed border (see, UNDP 2008). Respondents, however, indicate that disarmament 
was highly symbolic. In most locations, “local leaders brought out older weapons for 
photo opportunities, but still had very large, hidden stockpiles.”266  
District peace committees, prior to the 2005 outbreak, were in place in all four 
constituencies including, Mandera East, Central, West, and North. DPCs were in place in 
all four locations starting in the year 2000. In 2005, the District Commissioner at the time 
was head of the DPC, and both the Garre and Murule viewed him as a neutral actor, 
granting legitimacy to the ad hoc arbitration committee (Adan and Pkalaya 2006). The 
neutrality of mediators involved in the peace process improved the possibility of inter-
group cooperation across all of the local peace forums conducted across Mandera 
County. The DPCs in 2005 functioned as the primary institution to organize, convene, 
and conduct peace negotiations among religious, business, and political elites. In 2005, 
they were a key part of the successful negotiation of the Umal peace accord, and the state 
supported them during the process, improving their capacity to respond and engage in 
multiple negotiations with various sets of conflict actors. 
Some analysts report elders groups were key actors within the peace process. 
Respondents, however, indicate the traditional elders system is no longer a strong 
institution.267 Young Somali business elites challenge the authority of local elders. The 
                                                
266 Hassan Kochore, Interview with the author, Nairobi, September 8, 2014. 
 
267 Ibid. 
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growth of informal trade networks for the transport of goods across the Kenyan border 
into Somali and Ethiopia led to the emergence of wealthy youth business owners who 
have higher social standing than elders. Business networks provide youth with social 
authority and control over local militias due to their financial support for militias through 
clientelistic networks.268 As a result, local councils of elders are not always comprised of 
older men from the community, as in the past, but now include young men with access to 
business networks, transportation networks, and cross-border monetary exchange.  
 
Outcomes 
 
In the Mandera case, LPCs received financing through the local government, 
allowing informal coalitions of peace groups to expand monitoring capacity, to build 
stronger, more routinized processes of preventive negotiation (Weiss 2004; Menkhaus 
2005). Notwithstanding, violence escalated in two major periods. Why did informal 
institutions and local peace systems not contain conflict between the Garre and Murule? 
Evidence suggests state actions undermined previously effective informal institutional 
systems, and that border dynamics allowed for the introduction of external militants.  
After 2005, the conflict broadened to involve clans from Somalia and Ethiopia, 
who crossed the Kenya border to provide support for militia groups in Mandera. Due to 
the failure of disarmament campaigns and the rise of strong cross-border networks, 
militias from Garre and Murule remained heavily armed and prepared for violent 
                                                                                                                                            
 
268 Maalim Aftin, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, August 8, 2014. 
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clashes.269 With youth militias well connected and interlinked with political elites, they 
had direct access to information about when and where the state was planning 
disarmament campaigns, and when the DPC was planning peace negotiations, providing 
militias time to relocate and evade both security interventions. Key informants involved 
in local peace processes in Mandera described how leaders of DPCs and LPCs interacted 
with communities and “played the peace game only on the surface.” 270 At the same time, 
they maintained deep ties to their ethnic community and worked to assist militia members 
with access to accurate information about peace activities, and the behavior and interests 
of other groups operating in the area.  
Traditional blood payment rules were not a sufficient disincentive, and proved 
easy to shirk. As a key informant described, “elders directly support local militias, and 
step into assume the cost of negotiating the informal justice system on behalf of youth 
militants in the event of causalities during a clash.”271 In other words, the fact that the 
entire community would absorb the cost of the blood payment did not create a strong 
enough disincentive for individuals in militias to refrain from using violent force to 
protect communal resources, or to engage in a revenge attack to protect the status of the 
group.  
State actions in the area undermined trust of civic actors, and undermined 
capacity for local peace mobilization among a previously robust set of actors. As the 
                                                
269 Hussein Abubakar, Mandera DPC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 28, 2014. 
 
270 Maalim Aftin, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
 
271 Ibid. 
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Mandera Education Minister described: “With very little information, police choose to do 
untargeted and indiscriminate ‘sweeps’ that offend the people and undermined the 
legitimacy of local security institutions” (Mandera Education Commissioner, NCT 
Interview, August 10, 2014). Indiscriminate police sweeps increase tension and 
undermine trust in not only the police, but also local organizations thought to be 
collaborating with the police. This not only constrained the ability of local peace 
associations to extract information needed to convene negotiations, but it also made 
representatives of peacebuilding organizations potential targets of violence. Alignment, 
even perceived alignment, with the GoK reduced the efficacy of local peace actors.  
Civic associations in Mandera ended up with little leverage to prevent well-
organized armed actors with prior battle experience from using increasingly severe forms 
of violence against civilians. External actors involved in the conflict system have very 
low levels of aversion to killing civilians due to prior experience in militias in Somalia 
and Ethiopia. The local peace architecture in Mandera could not reduce uncertainty about 
impending attacks or threats from militias that were very well organized due to nature of 
severe insecurity in Somalia. The rapid influx of heavily armed, ethnic kinsmen from 
Ethiopia and Somalia quickly triggered escalation, with more severe violence than in 
prior conflicts.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Analysis of patterns of violence and responses to violence in Mandera between 
the Garre and Murule indicates the level of internal organization and skill of armed actors 
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to conduct attacks and evade both security interventions and peace actions played a major 
role in this case. After an extensive local peace process, the introduction of external 
actors the conflict created conditions for the re-escalation of violence. The nature and 
qualities of armed actors who are well trained due to linkages with more complex 
conflicts in bordering countries is critical for understanding why violence is more severe 
in Mandera than in other conflicts across the ASALs.  
The Garre – Murule case reveals that in the wake of 2005 escalation, a very large 
joint peace coalition emerged among a very broad coalition of CSOs, including elders 
groups, religious groups, women’s groups, political parties, and international donors, was 
able to support an effective stabilization process that created a three year period of peace. 
However, keeping a peace coalition in place proved difficult under conditions of severe 
dis-integration of inter-ethnic ties and high levels of cross-border movement. Along the 
border with Somalia, armed militias benefit from illegal trade and extra-legal activities, 
and have significant resources as well as local social support to be able to evade and 
resist attempts among local peace groups to contain the use of violence. At the sub-state 
level, governance of local violence and conflict dynamics ends up in the hands of actors 
not necessarily well equipped with authority, or coercive power to be able to contain 
armed groups.  
 
 
Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014) 
Conflict between the Garre and Degodia is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group 
violence in which preventive intervention failed to contain escalation. The most recent 
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wave of escalation was deadlier than prior clashes with direct targeting of children and 
women, forced dislocation, as well as direct targeting of humanitarian and peacebuilding 
organizations.272 Estimates indicate conflict between the Garre and Degodia between 
2013 – 2014 resulted in over 1000 homes burned, 52,000 IDPs, and 200 fatalities (OCHA 
Mandera Report 2014).  
Reduction of ethnic violence in Wajir in the late 1990s is cited as evidence for 
effective local peace institutions in violence prevention (Odendaal 2013). Originating 
within a local women’s group called the Wajir Women for Peace Group, over time, a 
coalition of local associations formed. The Wajir Peace Group convened negotiations 
with armed groups and political elites, and effectively contained clashes between the 
Degodia and Ajurran273 along the border between Kenya and Somalia (Ibrahim and 
Jenner 1996; van Tongeren 2005; Menkhaus 2008).  
Over time, Degodia involved in the Wajir Peace Group set up and expanded local 
peace networks and associations across Wajir and Mandera. Conflict dynamics in the 
area spill across county and state boundaries, and include the same ethnic groups and 
similar conflict drivers (Menkhaus 2015). Garre are the majority group in Mandera, and 
the Degodia are the Majority group in Wajir. The key puzzle for this case, therefore, is 
why local peace organizations with past success were not unable to contain escalation 
between the Garre and Degodia between 2012 and 2013. 
                                                
272 Red Cross was the main humanitarian organization working in Madera County, but the rising severity of 
violence between clans and increasing attacks by al-Shabaab caused them to suspend operations in the area 
in early 2014. 
 
273 The two groups have not clashed in armed conflicts since 1994.  
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Context of Conflict 
 
 Respondents refer to 1984 as the beginning of conflict between the Garre and 
Degodia.274 In that year, drought sparked clashes over territorial control. Redistricting 
and ethnic based allocation of territory as a means to garner and consolidate political 
support played a major role, as well. Historically, political parties created sub-districts to 
gain ethnic-based support in Mandera. KANU political entrepreneurs, in particular, used 
this strategy broadly the 1990s and 2000s. Based on ethnic bloc voting patterns, political 
elites increased the number of electoral constituencies in Mandera and Wajir275 to 
increase certainty around electoral outcomes. This strategy, originally designed to prevent 
ethnic conflict, had unintended consequences. With a high level of population mobility, 
district boundaries did not ensure all ethnic groups had equal representation in the county 
government. Regularly shifting boundaries increased uncertainty, and, created linkages 
between access to political posts and power to allocate scarce land resources. 
Historically, the Garre276 and Degodia clans were the only two ethnic groups with 
so-called “resident status” in Mandera County. All other groups were considered 
minority, migrants, or “corner tribes.” The breaking of a long-standing informal 
powersharing rule among the Garre and Degodia during the 2007 – 2008 election was the 
                                                
274 Joseph Ngondi, Climate Change Network, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
 
275 Mandera now has six districts: Mandera East, Central, North, West, Banisa and Lafey, and three 
Parliamentary Constituencies (districts from which one MP is elected): Mandera East, Central and West. 
 
276The Garre maintain a communal belief that Mandera is their homeland. The historical narrative is that 
they relocated to Mandera during the 19th century, effectively winning it from the Borana, and pushing 
them back to Moyale. This narrative shapes the idea that Degodia, Murule and other minority groups are 
“outsiders” to the area, and that the settlement of other groups is the area is only due to successful 
negotiations and granting of permission by the Garre (see also, UNDP 2010).  
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key event that set up conditions for escalation in 2013 – 2014. An informal rule of ethnic 
powersharing maintained stability: the Garre held two MP seats, and the Degodia held 
one MP seat. This distribution aligned with the demographic composition of the area 
(Peace Direct 2014).  
In the 2008 elections, the long-term ethnic balance shifted, breaking the informal 
powersharing rule. In Mandera Central, the incumbent MP, Billow Kerrow, a Garre from 
the majority clan, lost the election to Abdikadir Mohamed from the minority Degodia 
clan. Mohamed’s victory shifted the MP seat to control by the minority Degodia group, 
breaking the long period of Garre control. Grievances related to the political shift were 
not resolved. Garre believed the 2008 election as rigged, raising the stakes of the 2013 
election.277 Conditions surrounding the 2013 election also raised the stakes for both 
groups. In particular, due to the ongoing process of devolution, county-level political 
posts were associated with access to more power and more resources due to a sharp spike 
in state resources allocated to Mandera County.278  
National political dynamics raised the stakes of local elections. Constitutional 
reform, passed in 2010, required securing both 50% of national vote and at least 25% of 
the vote in fifty percent of Kenya’s 47 counties279 for a party to secure the presidency. 
William Ruto, the Jubilee vice presidential candidate, and Raila Odinga, the ODM 
                                                
277 Abdi Haji, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 17, 2013. 
 
278 IEBC reforms in 2010 instituted after PEV in 2008 added three additional MP seats for Mandera 
County. 
 
279 The institutional design logic is based on the concept of centripetalism. The electoral rule, in theory, 
incentivizes candidates to pursue a geographic, and thus ethnic, balance of political support during 
campaigns. 
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presidential candidate both spent a significant amount of time campaigning in the rural 
periphery, especially Mandera. This was a new campaign strategy for top national party 
elites. With more at stake in the elections, political entrepreneurs conducted ethno-centric 
campaigns, rife with hate speech and accusations of communal violence being used to 
displace voters. 280  
On March 4th, 2013, the outcome of the elections deepened tension between the 
Garre and the Degodia communities. Garre representatives dominated all political posts. 
The Garre won the MP seat in Mandera Central back from Degodia, as well as the 
County Governor and Senator positions. The Garre also won the MP seat in the newly 
defined district of Mandera North—an area with a majority Degodia population. The 
Degodia assumed it would be impossible, based on demographics, for the Garre to win 
the MP seat in Mandera North without manipulating the population or tampering with the 
election itself (Carrier and Kochore 2014) 
Two months after the election, on March 10th, 2013: “a campaign vehicle 
belonging to the prior Senate candidate Billow Kerrow, who is from the Garre clan, 
struck and killed a businessman from the Degodia clan in Rhamu.”281 The Degodia 
community claimed the accident was intentional and politically motivated, making the 
event highly symbolic of Garre aggression (Sabahi, June 26, 2013). On June 21st, 2013, 
Degodia attacked Garre driving lorries near the village of Eldas as an act of retribution 
                                                
280 Hassan Kochore, National Archives, Interview with the author, Nairobi, September 8, 2014. 
 
281 Prior to the hit and run, Rhamu was a location where Degodia claim they were forcefully displaced by 
Garre militias, and Garre groups from outside of the district were resettled to secure the election for the 
Garre. 
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for the hit and run. Four Garre were killed. After the attack, the same Degodia militia 
attacked a GSU camp near Eldas.  
In response, on June 23rd, 2013, the Garre attacked the Degodia at Jariko village 
in Banisa district, a largely Degodia IDP camp. The Garre militia used grenade launchers, 
targeted and burned homes and lorries among a largely civilian IDP population. The 
Jariko attack led to 14 fatalities and 17 injuries among the Degodia community. Police 
were also attacked: one officer was killed and four were injured. During the conflict, 
violence spilled over into Wajir County with incidents reported at Burmayo, Orgulae, 
Saman, and Dunto, and in Ethiopia near Malkamari. Police and other first-responders 
were attacked as militias tried to restrict the spread of information related to the events.282 
A response team from the Wajir County Government, including the Governor, a Senator, 
and a Women’s Representative, was attacked on the road to Mandera in Burmayo village 
on June 30th, 2014, turning back the rapid response convoy (OCHA Mandera Report 
2013).  
On July 4th, 2013, Garre and Degodia elites signed an agreement in Mandera town 
to accept electoral outcomes, just prior to Ramadan. The GoK sent more police to area to 
try to maintain security, and canceled a disarmament campaign to allow time for 
voluntary disarmament (Mandera Times, July 4th, 2013). Analysts indicate that the threat 
of disarmament and holding local chiefs accountable for violence were key pressures that 
led leaders from both communities to sign the Ramadan agreement (Hiraan, “Mandera 
                                                
282 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014.  
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County warring communities sign peace accord,” July 6, 2013). Ali Ibrahim Roba, 
Mandera County Governor stated,  
“the deal reached by the two communities was a culmination of weeks of multi-
sector peace talks facilitated by the national and county governments with the 
support from the local leadership and national cohesion and integration 
commission” (Hiraan, “Mandera County warring communities sign peace 
accord,” July 6, 2013). 
The Ramadan Accord held only for nine months. On May 13th, 2014 a Garre 
militia attacked three Degodia along the Burmayo-Fincharo road. The Degodia were 
working on a road-clearing project—a development scheme both groups agreed to in the 
Ramadan peace negotiations. The attack created a deep grievance among the Degodia, 
especially since it was against civilian actors involved in a peacebuilding project 
(Standard News, “Politics, Border Disputes, Garre Degodia clan clashes,” June 29th, 
2014). With rising threat of revenge attacks, spillover dynamics from the KDF military 
operation in Somalia complicated the situation and restricted local peace actors. 
A set of attacks by al-Shabaab in Mandera followed directly on the heels of the 
small act of communal violence. On May 14th, Al Shabaab conducted three attacks on 
police stations in Mandera town, and attacked the deputy governor’s home with a grenade 
launcher. Severe disorder in the area prevented local peace actors from engaging in rapid 
response actions.283 One week after the major outbreak of violence, on May 21st, 2014, 
                                                
283 Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab in Somalia increases the likelihood of escalation of inter-ethnic conflict 
in Mandera due to blowback. The KDF is in active campaign against Al-Shabaab in Somalia (AMISOM 
operation), which increases suspicion and fear among ethnic groups in the region, especially as related to 
claims of harboring militants or sharing secret information about the process of recruitment and support for 
militants.  
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actors from local peace groups mobilize teams of elders to try to negotiate a ceasefire. 
However, al-Shaabab gunmen attacked the peace team: 
Al-Shabaab ambushed a security team heading to the reconciliation meeting 
between the Degodia and Garre clans in El Wak town. Al-Shabaab spokesman Ali 
Mohamud Rage warned that more attacks against Kenyan citizens would follow, 
stating, ‘The only ones who should be blamed for your insecurity are none but 
your government, which has invaded Somalia in an attempt to fight war on behalf 
of the West,’ he said. ‘We tell the Kenyan people to not even dream of peace as 
long as your sons are occupying Somalia’ (Boniface, May 21, 2014 in Sabahi). 
 
In late May, Garre and Degodia leaders met President Kenyatta in Mandera and 
agreed to a ceasefire. Elite-centric negotiations, again, failed to stop attacks for more than 
a few weeks. Another major attack occurred in Banisa on June 23rd, 2014, with over 16 
fatalities. On June 25th, both Degodia and Garre leaders met directly with President 
Kenyatta, who issued a proclamation stating that a major security operation would be 
conducted in the area if both groups could not control violence. Again, negotiations and 
state-led mediation failed. On July 1st, over one hundred armed Garre attacked civilians at 
Gunana village in a mission to attack a Degodia militia based along the border of Wajir 
and Mandera. During the attack, the Garre targeted the administrative police camp in 
order to repel police and prevent security actors from intervening (Finn Church Aid 
Report 2014: 8).  
 
Patterns of Response 
 
State military forces responded to the conflict between the Garre and Degodia, 
especially after reports emerged that both groups hired al-Shabaab gunmen284 to carry out 
                                                
284 One of the primary reasons that inter-clan attacks between the Garre and Degodia have become far 
deadlier than they have been in the past is because both groups have hired al-Shabaab actors as 
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attacks. Due to linkages between local communal conflict dynamics in Mandera and 
Kenya’s larger national security intervention in Somalia, the state responded aggressively 
to contain communal conflict in Mandera (see also, Anderson and McKnight 2015). The 
GoK reinforced existing police units and established new joint security operations, 
including Anti-terrorism Police Units (ATPUs).  
ATPUs received allegations of conducting extra-judicial killings (Al Jazeera 
2015; Chimp Reports 2015). The GoK instituted reforms of local policing structures, 
including the removal of Garre and Degodia Police officers from Mandera in an effort to 
remove potential bias within police forces. The GoK also passed new, controversial 
legislation in December 2014 called the Security Laws Amendment Act to extend the 
formal security sector. The legislation increases policing of cross border movement and 
focuses on monitoring the movement of Somali refugees lacking formal documentation 
of residence (Goitom 2014). 
Severity of insecurity and the high level of interest in cross-border stability 
trigged collaboration between the state, local peace committees, and NGOs operating in 
the area including the Kenya Red Cross Society, the National Drought Management 
Authority, Save the Children, Islamic Relief, and the Wajir Peace Committee. In other 
areas of Northern Kenya, peace committees are left to function on their own with a very 
low level of state support and interaction. DPCs in other locations operate as hybrid 
institutions seeking the aid of NGOs and other outside donor groups. In contrast, in the 
                                                                                                                                            
mercenaries. These actors have very sophisticated military capacity, and have been able to conduct very 
deadly attacks, using more deadly weaponry and terrorist tactics, such as the use of IEDs in public spaces. 
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Mandera case, DPCs received significant support and were called upon directly during 
the security operations.285  
In particular, state officials engaged with DPCs in each district for gathering 
intelligence on conflict drivers, investigations related to evidence of political incitement 
and the involvement of local elites, and communicating threats of disarmament. The DPC 
set up state-level dialogues. The GoK and DPCs also collaborated to conduct diplomatic 
talks among political leaders from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia over the problem of 
insecurity in the periphery of all three states.286  
 
Outcomes 
 
Respondents from the Mandera DPC argued the nature of the relationship 
between the state security operation, the DPC, and local peace associations had 
unintended consequences for local peacebuilding interventions. The Mandera Peace 
Committee chairman stated,  
Somalis are being systematically discriminated by Kenyan police and security 
actors. If you don’t feel Kenyan, you don’t feel safe in Kenya. Police see Somalis 
as ‘ATMs’ because they are highly likely not to have documents even if their 
family has always lived in Kenya; they know they can get very high bribes from 
targeting them (NCT Interview, August 10, 2014).  
 
Following collaboration with the state during the policing campaign, local peacebuilding 
organizations receive threats from local militias, and lost capacity to convene 
negotiations. Reports accuse Kenyan security forces that responded to contain violence 
                                                
285 Roba Shamaro, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 6, 2014. 
 
286 Kassim Kerrow, Mandera East DPC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 29, 2014. 
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between the Garre and Degodia of shooting suspects without due process, indiscriminant 
detainment of suspects, and deadly disarmament campaigns.287 Human rights 
organizations accused police for abuse of local government officials for failing to 
maintain security.288 Trust in local peace actors eroded due to heavy handed policing 
tactics, the use of local peace organizations to gather intelligence, and the indiscriminant 
targeting of Somalis by police across Kenya.289  
 
Conclusion 
 
A combination of factors generated conditions for escalation that a relatively 
strong coalition of peacebuilding organizations was not able to control. As the new 
minority group, the Degodia have a very strong suspicion that they will continue to face 
organized political exclusion in Mandera at the hands of the Garre. Under this condition, 
competition over the two most valuable resources in the area—land and political posts—
is the most powerful trigger of violence. 
After the outbreak of clashes, militias sought recruits through intra-clan networks 
in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Garre and Degodia leveraged networks with armed actors 
in Somalia and Ethiopia to bolster local protection militias, including resource pooling 
for hiring mercenaries to bolster protection units. They captured exclusive control over 
                                                
287 For example, the state engaged in disarmament in Rhamu in July 2013, where violence between the 
Garre and Degodia was most severe, but not in the village of Banisa, where conflict was less severe, but 
where the Garre were known to also have stored large stockpiles of weapons. The GoK has not been able to 
ensure equality in weapons reduction, which undermines the potential for negotiation. 
 
288 Maalim Aftin, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
 
289 Roba Shamaro, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 6, 2014. 
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intelligence services, police, and local peace associations in order control all institutions 
related to local security. The Ramadan Accord included an agreement to ensure police 
were external actors from non-Somali groups. This stipulation was not upheld. Both 
groups rejected external police actors to ensure information networks were controlled and 
not leaking information to rival groups.290  
All of these shifts occurred in parallel with the process of devolution and the 
pursuit of exclusive control over political processes to gain control over new 
administration posts. Prior to devolution both the Garre and Degodia had equally limited 
access to state resources. However, with devolution, majority groups have the capacity to 
lock out minority groups from access to state resources at the county level. One of the 
primary tactics for locking out a competing group, therefore, becomes, the use of 
traditional modes of inter-group violence, such as raiding, but on a larger, and deadlier 
scale. These strategic shifts transformed and intensified conflict in Mandera County. The 
informal peace architecture could not withstand the very rapid process of dis-integration, 
institutional capture, and inter-group fear.291 The dis-integration process undermined both 
elite and armed actor interest in cooperating with local peace actors.  
 
Coalitions, Fragmentation, and Conflict Recurrence 
Why were peacebuilding organizations with prior success in limiting violence not 
able to stem escalation in these cases? Analysis of conflict escalation and corresponding 
                                                
290 Joseph Ngondi, Climate Change Network, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
 
291 Abdi Haji, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 17, 2013. 
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patterns of intervention at the hands of state, civil society, and local peace actors indicate 
there are five common patterns that undermine the capacity of local peace coalitions to 
manage violence and prevent severe escalation of ethnic violence across the cases.  
The first condition is the logic of violence itself. In the Isiolo case, for example, 
resource conflict took on both economic and political purposes. It shifted from a logic of 
economic predation to political violence conducted along cleavages based on ethno-
political alliances. The second condition that triggered escalation, even in the presence of 
a very strong coalition of peace actors was the nature of attacks. As attacks became more 
severe, more direct, and targeted toward specific villages, the likelihood of highly 
asymmetrical acts of violence increased.  
Both the nature and logic of violence created conflict conditions civic associations 
and non-coercive preventive strategies could not contain. Multiple, pre-conflict peace 
declarations broke down. Informal peace declarations, agreements, and compensation 
schemes were not sufficient disincentives to stem attacks from escalating. The covert 
involvement of elites in instigating violence, arming local militias, and guiding strategic 
targeting decisions became very difficult for local civic groups to counteract. Elites 
avoided engagement with local peace associations. With a high level of impunity, 
peacebuilding organizations faced challenges in stemming elite-led violence.  
The increasing complexity of the local political economy also played a role. The 
twin pressures of developmental change, and political change, created a more complex 
political economy with a increasing number of interest groups and actors involved in the 
conflict system. The rising diversity in the composition of the polity in Isiolo undermined 
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cohesiveness among local peacebuilding groups. With rising violence and rising fear, 
inter-ethnic communication and informal protection networks broke down, undermining 
the ability of groups to reach pacts among elites from ethnic groups, all seeking to protect 
or access political power. At the same time, the increasing sophistication of organization 
among armed actors undermined local coping and protection strategies.  
 Local civic groups had some success at certain points with each conflict trajectory. 
In some instances, informal coalitions limited escalation. However, in the early stages of 
political change, under the conditions of shifting ethnic alliances, threats to status quo 
and majority control, and the rising possibility of future financial gain from development 
interventions, even relatively strong coalition of peace actors could not fully contain 
violence incited by political elites.  
 Large coalitions of civic organizations involved in preventive efforts collapse under 
political and economic pressures in West Pokot, Mandera, and Marsabit. For example, 
the DPCs in Marsabit and Moyale collapsed in the in the lead up to the Turbi Massacre, 
Riam-Riam and POKATUSA collapsed after leaders developed political aspirations and 
used organizational resources to fund personal campaigns, and in the run up to elections, 
the Isiolo DPC was captured by political interests. In these cases, the fragmentation of 
previously effective peacebuilding coalitions was part of the process of conflict 
escalation. Some forms of inter-group conflict, including more complex political 
violence, may be outside of the scope of civic organizations. Conflicts with political 
motivations that occur along international borders prove difficult for informal 
organizational structures to contain.
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Table 8: Features of Recurring Escalation Cases 
 
Explanatory 
Factors 
11. Marsabit 
Turbi Massacre 
(2002 – 2005) 
 
12. West Pokot 
Turkana Border 
(2013 – 2014) 
 
13. Isiolo 
Triangle 
(2008 – 2012) 
14. Mandera 
Garre – Murule 
(2005 – 2008) 
15. Mandera 
Garre – Degodia 
(2013 – 2014) 
Groups Gabra, Borana Samburu, Turkana Samburu, Turkana, 
Gabra, Somali 
Garre, Murule Garre, Degodia 
1. Symbolic  
 
Y 
Act of Weakness 
Youth killed 
N 
Grievance: 
Inequality 
Y 
Targeting: Norm 
shift 
Y 
Death of 
humanitarian 
worker 
Y 
Death of 
humanitarian 
worker 
2. Border/ 
Dev/Periphery 
Border Developmental Developmental Border Border 
3. State Response 
 
Coercive: Sanctions 
 
Coercive: Military 
Force 
(disarm – Uganda; 
police targeted) 
Coercive: Police 
Force 
(disarm) 
Non: Mediation 
 
Coercive: Military 
Force 
(civilian abuse) 
Non: Mediation 
Messaging 
Coercive: Military 
Force 
(civilian abuse) 
Non: Mediation 
 
4. Cohesive 
Coalition 
Elite Unity 
Informal 
Institutions 
Militia Trust 
N 
DPC Disbanded 
Fragmented 
Broken Pact 
 
N 
Riam, Riam 
Collapse 
POKATUSA 
Collapse 
Targeting 
N 
DPC Capture 
No trust 
N 
DPC capture 
CSOs Targeted 
No Trust 
 
N 
State intelligence = 
Fragmentation 
No Trust 
5. Local 
Adaptation 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Non: Mediation 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Coercive: Militia 
Force 
Outcomes 
1) Escalation 
2) Non-escalation 
3) Re-escalation 
3 
Re-escalation 
 
3 
Re-escalation 
 
3 
Re-escalation 
 
3 
Re-escalation 
 
3 
Re-escalation 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONTAINING VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED 
COMMUNITIES 
 
The previous three chapters presented empirical evidence related to processes of 
escalation in fifteen inter-ethnic group conflicts across six counties in Northern Kenya. 
Three categories of episodes were matched based on most similar outcomes: escalation, 
limited escalation, and cases where civic organizations had prior success in containing 
escalation but violence re-escalated. Each case analyzed conflict triggers, patterns of 
state, civic, and community response, and subsequent outcomes. Analysis focused on the 
extent to which civic groups responded collectively to dampen threats of violent conflict 
and effectively prevented further escalation. The following chapter draws from 
comparative case study analysis, explaining why escalation occurred in some cases, but 
not in others. Across the cases, the study finds that within areas of limited state presence, 
local resilience to inter-ethnic group violence is a function of the interactions between 
cohesive civic coalitions, patterns of state response, and communal adaptation.  
State responses to local, inter-ethnic conflicts in Northern Kenya create a political 
economy in which ethnically homogenous settlements face a persistent threat of violent 
predation. Corruption among formal security organizations, the use of force against 
civilians to extract information about local militias, the involvement of political elites in 
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arming ethnic militias and coordinating disarmament campaigns directed against some 
groups and not others, as Joseph Akoule describes, “make the state an enemy.”292  
Under these conditions, civic associations have some capacity to contain 
escalatory dynamics. Threat monitoring, rapid response, and informal bargaining 
processes make it more difficult for large militias to form and mobilize rapid retaliation 
attacks. In some cases, patrons of militias leverage civic associations to expand and 
improve the capacity of militias to monitor insecure areas and respond to threats. In 
others, civic associations unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas, supporting 
preventive negotiations and informal codes of restitution that improved communal 
resilience. These mechanisms contain escalation and make large scale, well-organized 
acts of mass killing, such as the Turbi, Todonyang, and Baragoi massacres, rare. Informal 
institutional arrangements help avert vengeance and contain the escalation of inter-ethnic 
group violence following initial acts of aggression. 
However, civic coalitions and communal adaption do not necessarily transform or 
resolve deeply protracted inter-ethnic group conflicts under conditions of sub-state 
fragility. In particular, following the state’s of use of indiscriminant violence against 
civilians, communities continue to support, mobilize, and expand the capacity of local 
militias to use the threat of deadly force as a primary deterrent. During perfect storms of 
compounding conflict pressures, informal organizational structures and communal 
                                                
292 Joseph Areng, Turkana County Peace Secretariat, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 
2014. 
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protection strategies can quickly disintegrate. In particular, symbolic killings commonly 
trigger escalatory dynamics that are difficult for civic groups to contain. 
 
State Responses across Local Contexts 
State approaches to prevent the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict were not 
consistent across the cases. This finding confirms the state coping concept initially 
proposed by Lawson and Rothchild (2005). Theories of ethnic conflict must account for 
variable patterns of state action within particular sub-state conflict contexts. Findings 
from the study indicate that across Northern Kenya there are three relatively consistent 
patterns of state response to inter-ethnic group conflict. State responses to local, inter-
ethnic group conflict varied in relation to political and economic interests specific to 
periphery areas, developmental areas, and border areas.  
 
State Action in Periphery Conflicts 
In response to clashes in the most remote and least economically viable areas of 
Northern Kenya, including Samburu, Marsabit, and Turkana, the state deployed elite 
security teams for short-term peacebuilding missions. Preventive interventions were 
largely ad hoc and designed for information gathering, media interactions, and 
interactions with local chiefs and political representatives. During helicopter missions 
state elites accused local politicians of being involved or benefiting from conflict. 
Political elites regularly shamed local leaders for failing to control “their people.”293 
                                                
293 Roba Shamaro, UNDP, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 6, 2014. 
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Following more extreme episodes, such as the Bargoi Massacre and the Moyale clashes, 
the state charged local political leaders with incitement. This occurred even with little 
evidence of culpability. Public peacebuilding barazas were held in urban centers in 
which political elites and eminent figures from police institutions issued ultimatums in 
the presence of media outlets.  
Informants indicated that these approaches had very little effect upon conflict 
dynamics. In the words of an area chief from Marsabit County,  
Helicopter missions do not accomplish anything for us. It makes us not respect 
them, and not want to work with them on anything. When Kimaiyo flies here, he 
warns everyone to stop fighting or there will be consequences. He accuses us of 
being involved, and says that if we are involved in organizing or funding armed 
groups, the problems will be serious. Then, he flies away, and nothing happens.294  
 
State-sanctioned threats undermined cooperation between pastoralist communities and 
state security actors, increasing the likelihood that groups would evade government 
security interventions. In the Nyiro Valley conflict, for instance, there was very minimal 
communal cooperation with RDU and anti-stock theft policing units. Local militias and 
their patrons did not report information on potential threats to the police, largely due to 
the high cost of corruption required to get security actors to respond to threats. Police 
used crisis moments as opportunities to extract resources from the community, which 
further undermined their ability to prevent inter-group conflict. Policing units based in 
the periphery had very low prevention and protection capacity.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
294 Jacob Lengaur, Former Chief, Interview with the author, Tuum, Kenya, August 19, 2014. 
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Following more severe forms of violence in periphery areas, the state deployed 
additional security personnel. GSU camps, administration police, and joint military and 
police camps with rapid deployment units and anti-stock theft agents were established in 
highly conflict prone corridors including Suguta Valley, Loima, and Turkwel Gorge. 
Notwithstanding, the KPR remained the primary security actors involved in day-to-day 
policing and threat monitoring. The operating assumption behind the KPR system is that 
arming local community policing representatives from rival ethnic groups will create, as 
James N’dungu describes, “an informal ethnic balance of power to stabilize inter-group 
relations.”295  
Communities, however, did not perceive the KPR system as an inclusive policing 
institution. Particular ethnic groups with political connections could secure access to 
weapons for their own KPR units. It is widely known that pastoralist politicians arm 
ethnic militias, whether directly or indirectly through the KPR system.296 The depth of 
corruption within police institutions across Northern Kenya creates a situation in which 
communities pay bribes to gain access to weapons for local KPR agents (see also, Mkutu 
and Wandera 2013). Inequality and inconsistency within state policing strategies led 
ethnic groups to maintain large illegal weapons stockpiles and active linkages to cross-
border arms markets. State actions and the availability of arms through co-ethnic, cross 
border trade networks undermined the logic of the KPR system.  
                                                
295 James Ndungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 2014. 
 
296 Ibid. 
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In Samburu, Marsabit, West Pokot and Mandera, to try to control and limit 
escalation the state conducted ad hoc disarmament campaigns. Disarmament processes, 
however, had unintended consequences. The politicization of disarmament campaigns 
contributed to escalatory dynamics. Disarmament was conducted in some communities 
but not others, reinforcing the notion of inter-group inequality. It caused groups to re-arm 
due to the increased threat of opportunistic attacks from neighboring militias that were 
not dis-armed. In the words of an informant from Marsabit County, “the government is 
against us, leaving us vulnerable if we do not have weapons. When they take our 
weapons, we know the government wants to clear us.”297 Communities viewed 
disarmament as a political action. In the Isiolo case, for example, political parties used 
grievances related to disarmament to foster political support.  
During disarmament campaigns, police and military agents used violence and 
intimidation against communities. In West Pokot and Mandera, for example, after the 
state used coercive force to disarm pastoralist communities, militias targeted state police, 
paramilitary actors, and even peacebuilding convoys. The political dynamics behind 
disarmament processes increased the likelihood of violence escalating to include direct 
attacks against government security forces and civic organizations involved in 
peacebuilding missions. For example, in the cases of the Baragoi massacre and the 
Lorogon standoff, ethnic militias engaged in violent clashes with military and police 
personnel who responded to try to contain violence. The perception of inequality within 
                                                
297 Focus Group 139, Elders Dialogue, Dialogue with the author, Loongerin, Kenya, August 26, 2014. 
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state policing and peacebuilding interventions caused many conflicts to escalate to 
include targeting of peacebuilders.  
Suspicion and persistent fear of state meddling within local conflicts drove 
communities to support, expand, and train local ethnic militias. Government interventions 
were seen as a threat to communal security. In response, local militias became, over time, 
more powerful than the KPR, policing units, and even formal military units. Informants 
described state security forces as “outsiders,” “strangers,” and, in some cases, 
“enemies.”298 Where police were not trusted, the state was not trusted.299 Where civic 
groups were thought to be agents of the state, they lost the trust of local militias, as well. 
This caused deep and persistent inter-ethnic group mistrust, suspicion, and fear. In the 
most remote villages of the rural periphery, ethnic groups must not only work to evade 
threats from other ethnic groups but also threats from state security actors. 
 
State Action in Developmental Conflicts 
In comparative perspective, the discovery of oil in the Turkana region and state 
investment in new large-scale development projects in Isiolo presented unique challenges 
for civic organizations involved in local conflict prevention, and variation in state 
responses to local conflict. Turkana and Isiolo recently shifted from being economically 
unviable, to being potential sources of wealth for the country at large. Political and 
                                                
298 Mannaseh Wepundi, Former UNDP Consultant, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 
2014.  
 
299 Philip Ongunje, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 2014. 
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economic transition intensified competition between ethnic groups in the Turkana and 
Isiolo cases.  
In line with resource curse theories (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2014; 
Cummings 2015), rising interest in development gains exacerbated identity-based rent 
seeking in Turkana and Isiolo. In the Turkana-Pokot conflict, Pokot elites at the state 
level directly supported and incited violence against Turkana militias along the border to 
dislocate populations in territories that are likely to contain oil deposits (see chapter four). 
In the Isiolo case, rapid economic development correlated with the escalation of inter-
group violence due to the increasing value of communal territory and local political 
positions. Rapid development gains in both Turkana and Isiolo led elites to organize and 
support local militias to aggressively dislocate other ethnic groups. In these cases, 
resource-related conflict and traditional modes of raiding escalated and transformed into 
political violence.  
Under these conditions, regional experiences and lessons learned from Eritrea and 
South Sudan about the relationship between identity politics, extractive industries, and 
rapid economic growth drove variation in state responses to local conflicts in Isiolo and 
Turkana (Kochore 2013). In areas where the state has interest in the extraction of 
economic resources, local violence becomes more disruptive and higher cost to the state. 
Rather than relying only upon ad hoc, short-term, and principally coercive modes of 
response to local conflict, as in periphery regions with minimal economic potential, the 
GoK invested in a broader range of both coercive and non-coercive preventive strategies 
to try to contain inter-group violence and improve local security. 
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In Isiolo and Turkana, the state supported and collaborated closely with District 
Peace Committees, NGOs, CSOs, and other local civic groups during dialogues and 
informal pact making processes. In contrast to other regions where local peacebuilding 
organizations received little to no support from the state, with economic gains at stake, 
the state provided more resources for the formation and institutionalization of local 
peacebuilding organizations. In particular, the state supported the efforts of the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission to build inter-group unity through a narrative of 
“unity in diversity”300 within areas of higher potential for rapid economic growth. At the 
same time, DPCs in Lodwar and in Isiolo received considerable state support and 
backing, more so than other DPCs in more remote, low potential areas.301  
In Turkana and Isiolo, civic peacebuilding efforts became intertwined with the 
state’s interest in resource extraction within previously marginalized areas. Due to the 
lack of legitimacy and trust in external security actors, the responsibility for local 
peacebuilding falls upon civil society associations and private companies (Raeymaekers, 
Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot 2008). Peacebuilding efforts complimented the state’s 
interest in pacification and integration of periphery areas. Providing support for civic 
groups is much lower cost than the establishment and extension of formal security 
systems. State support for non-coercive strategies was designed to limit the possibility of 
                                                
300 Sellah Kingoro, NCIC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
 
301 Joseph Areng, Turkana County Peace Secretariat, Interview with the author, Lodwar, Kenya, July 30, 
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secessionist movements forming in areas where long-term marginalization increased the 
likelihood of inter-ethnic group violence.  
In the Turkana case, Tullow’s formal security practices had unintended 
consequences for local conflict dynamics. Private security firms contracted KPR to 
provide security for convoys working with oil companies and contractors, and as security 
guards for wealthy elites with new private residences. This is a similar feature of the 
context of Isiolo, where KPR and armed militia members were hired as private security 
guards for compounds of political elites relocating to the region to benefit from rapid 
economic growth. This had unintended consequences, however. As KPR left posts in 
more remote villages such as Kainuk, Loima, and Todonyang for local security positions 
within the oil industry, more remote villages were left more vulnerable to predatory 
attacks.  
Extractive firms in the Turkana case instituted specific informal strategies 
designed to prevent conflict related to oil exploration and extraction process. Tullow Oil 
used community relations liaisons to avoid direct contact between external workers and 
local communities. The company carefully controlled narratives around hiring practices, 
avoided interaction with local youth militias, and systematically managed rhetoric around 
levels and types of services and development programming the company provided to the 
community. Controlling narratives related to the firm’s practices and creating distance 
between external staff and majority ethnic groups were primary strategies for conflict 
prevention.  
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Overall, increasing state investment in the local peacebuilding infrastructure 
occurred in parallel with direct economic gains for local militias and patrons. Internally, 
violence has not escalated between Turkana communities and external actors within 
Turkana County. However, violence is escalating between Turkana and Pokot 
communities along the Southern border of Turkana County. State responses have not 
contained predatory rent seeking and the escalation of violence along the contested 
border between Turkana and West Pokot. 
 
State Action in Border Conflicts 
Somalia is the world’s most failed state. This condition has caused long-term 
disorder and inter-ethnic group violence with direct spillover effects in Kenya. In the 
Mandera case, for example, in November and December of 2014, following clashes 
between the Garre and Degodia in Kenya, Al Shabaab used the escalation of local 
violence as an opportunity to conduct two deadly terrorist attacks—one on a bus and the 
other on a quarry operation in Mandera County. The two attacks caused over 75 
casualties in the span of less than three weeks. In April of 2015, as-Shabaab attacked 
Garissa University College killing 148 people. Al Shabaab attributed the attacks to 
Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. In response, police used indiscriminant force 
against local communities to try to apprehend culprits, which had unintended effects for 
local peacebuilding processes addressing Garre – Degodia conflict dynamics. 
Spillovers from conflict in Somalia clearly impact patterns of escalation in Kenya. 
State failure in Somalia, however, is not the only explanatory factor. The large arc of 
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instability spans across conflict corridors running from West Pokot and the Karamoja 
Cluster, to Lodwar and Lokichoggio, Northern Marsabit, across to Mandera, and Wajir. 
Border dynamics, more generally, impact conflict patterns and affect the capacity of local 
peacebuilding organizations to effectively contain inter-ethnic group conflict.  
In areas of the periphery where conflict dynamics spill across international 
borders, state responses differ from developmental and non-border areas. The Moyale, 
Mandera, and West Pokot cases all share similar cross-border dynamics. These areas are 
prone to spillovers from local conflicts triggered in another state, or to conflicts spilling 
over into a neighboring state. Ethnic conflict on one side of the border, may lead to 
mobilization, grievances, political claims, and violent attacks on the other side of the 
border. Conflict may escalate immediately, as in the Mandera case, or in the future due to 
cross-border population displacement, as in the Isiolo and Marsabit cases. With conflict 
dynamics among ethnic groups deeply intertwined and cutting across multiple borders, a 
small scale clash can serve to undermine inter-state relations if one state accuses other of 
failure to provide security in the area.  
Across the inter-group conflicts that occurred along international borders, similar 
to all of the other settings, the state responded through disarmament campaigns, elite 
security teams, and public peace meetings. However, in order to prevent local conflicts 
from becoming national security issue, the state was more likely to intervene militarily 
along the border. Rather than rely on police, KPR, and hybrid policing missions, in 
response to local violence in Mandera, Moyale, and West Pokot, the state was more 
likely to deploy the KDF to respond to communal clashes.  
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Coercive state actions impacted local peacebuilding processes and conflict 
dynamics. Proximity to the border made disarmament campaigns and accurate 
information gathering increasingly difficult for state security officers. As a result, the 
most violent state sanctioned policing and information-gathering missions occurred along 
border areas. For example, in Mandera, the GoK coopted local peacebuilding 
organizations for intelligence gathering missions to try to apprehend militias, and used 
violent tactics against civilians to try to extract information. These actions undermined 
and broke down relationships between ethnic groups and peacebuilding organizations that 
had taken a long time to develop. Informal organizational structures take a long time to 
form—trust building and consensus building between diverse civic groups and local 
militias and their patrons is a long-term process. Coercive state intervention can rapidly 
fragment and undermine local peacebuilding constituencies.  
In the Marsabit case, actors from Oromo rebel movement from Ethiopia sought 
sanctuary among Borana communities in Marsabit County. The presence of OLF rebels 
within the area also increased the use of indiscriminant policing tactics. Kenyan and 
Ethiopian police, for example, both conducted violent “sweeps” through Moyale and 
surrounding areas in order to intimidate OLF members in hiding. These conditions 
increased the likelihood of escalation following smaller scale outbreaks of violence, as in 
the Moyale, Mandera, and Turbi cases.  
The link between the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the OLF 
also increased suspicion and fear between Borana and Gabra communities in Kenya. 
Gabra accused the Borana harboring rebels. Fear of the OLF using force against the 
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community to extract resources for the war effort increased communal capacity to 
protect, support, and rapidly mobilize youth militias along the Northern Marsabit border 
(see also, Weinstein 2007).  
Across the border cases, civic groups had less control over conflict dynamics. For 
example, in the Todonyang case, multiple civic groups failed to convene inter-group 
negotiations due to restraints against civic group mobilization in Ethiopia. Constraints on 
civil society in Ethiopia were designed to prevent dissident groups from organizing 
against the state. However, they had the side effect of undermining peacebuilding 
associations in Kenya working to try to address and limit violence related to Turkana – 
Dassanetch and Borana – Gabra conflicts. Peacebuilders from the Catholic Justice and 
Peace Commission, for example, reported having to pretend to be representatives of the 
GoK in order to coordinate peacebuilding interventions in Ethiopia.302 Ethiopia’s 
restrictive policies against civic associations created difficult operating conditions for 
peacebuilders working to address Gabra – Borana conflicts along the Kenya – Ethiopia 
border.  
Proximity to international borders also made state security efforts less effective in 
containing escalation. Armed actors who can cross borders can more easily evade 
Kenyan security actors by crossing the porous border, and seeking protection through 
intra-ethnic alliances residing in Ethiopia or Somalia. Sharing a border with Uganda, 
Ethiopia, or Somalia provides local militias with low cost access to arms through intra-
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ethnic trade networks, as well as the option of rapid reinforcement. If necessary, militia 
support can be called into a conflict in Kenya.  
Cross-border intra-ethnic networks allow groups without strong militias to 
organize communal resources to pay for Somali or Ethiopian mercenaries. External actors 
linked to clan networks and family lineage groups with military experience in Somali and 
Ethiopia are better organized, well equipped, and have capacity to use violence with more 
accuracy and deadliness than local youth militias. Groups without access to cross-border 
mercenary networks, as in Samburu, Marsabit, and Isiolo do not have access to these 
forms of militia organization.  
Populations living along border areas in Kenya also are less likely to identify with 
the larger national identity, and thus at higher risk of radicalization. Roba Shamaro states, 
“the state has not been very effective in addressing radicalization of youth in the 
North.”303 Mandera and Moyale are areas of Kenya highly marginalized by the state due 
to the Shifta War. With the persistence of Somali irredentism, the primary response of the 
state has been intentional isolation. Alienation of the area has created a large recruiting 
pool of very poor and disenfranchised male youth, who view joining local militias as one 
of the only ways to maintain subsistence. In the Mandera case, for example, weak state 
institutions, porous borders, illegal economic networks, and Somali irredentism 
contribute to the radicalization and mobilization of youth militias. Informal institutional 
arrangements and peace process meet their upper limits in these environments. Radical 
motivations, terrorist-like forms of killing, and the presence of armed actors that are able 
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to evade detection or identification can quickly trigger escalatory dynamics that non-
violent, non-state actors have little capacity to contain.  
Due to the porosity of borders, national security interests, and limited space for 
civil society associations to operate within neighboring states, conflict episodes that 
occurred along state borders had higher levels of political interest in local peacebuilding 
processes. The state interacted and cooperated with local peacebuilding organizations in 
border areas. The state had higher interest in securing international borders, yet at the 
same time the state had little legitimacy due to the prior use of coercive governance 
tactics, as in the Pokot, and Moyale cases. State co-optation of local peace structures 
during process of state-led mediation can undermine the effectiveness of local 
associations. In these cases, the state tended to co-opt local peace organizations as 
frameworks for information gathering, conducting investigations, or coordinating and 
conducting elite dialogues. These behaviors had the effect of undermining cooperative 
relationships between local civic groups, militias, and militia patrons. 
Border dynamics remain largely outside influence of local peacebuilding groups. 
They cannot control recruitment of militias from across borders, or control illegal arms 
flows. In the Mandera case, both groups sought external support from armed militias to 
engage in the conflict. State borders allow groups the opportunity to retreat to safety and 
develop in-group protection strategies. Limited mobility can increase pressure for groups 
to negotiate. Borders provide an easy out for ethnic groups, undermining more difficult 
negotiations and concessions required for more successful peacebuilding processes.  
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Despite major challenges for effective local peacebuilding along international 
border areas, there are examples of successful local associations in addressing cross-
border conflict dynamics. Civic organizations in Wajir, Marsabit, and Moyale had had 
some success in containing violence. However, even if local peacebuilding organizations 
are comprised of genuine and motivated peacebuilding actors, and organizations are able 
to overcome complex organizational challenges, containing violence is difficult along 
border areas.  
Heavily armed militias along international borders tend to have engaged in prior 
deadly clashes with state security actors, have organizational networks that cut across 
international boundaries, and work to protect vulnerable economic systems that are based 
on predation. In these settings, civic organizations face the largest challenges in these 
settings. International border regions are the most complex operating environments for 
civic organizations.  
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Table 9: Preventive Actions across Sub-state Contexts 
 
 
• Periphery 
o Security teams and eminent persons 
o Shaming, threats, and punishment of local leaders 
o Public barazas and peace ultimatums 
o Armament and disarmament 
o Low state support for CSOs and NGOs 
 
• Developmental  
o National unity campaigns (NCIC) 
o Formalization of peacebuilding bureaucracies (Extension of DPC 
system) 
o Outsourcing to firms: private security, social accountability, and 
narrative control 
o High support for CSOs, NGOs, and local peace associations 
 
• Border  
o Military operations and civic group co-optation  
o State-led 3rd party mediation and elite dialogues 
o National negotiations and formal peace agreements 
o Cooptation of CSOs, NGOs, and local peace associations 
 
 
 
 
Cohesive Coalitions: Monitoring, Threat Response, and Brokering  
 Under conditions of sub-state fragility, within certain parameters, informal 
coalitions of civic groups across Northern Kenya play significant roles in containing 
inter-group conflict. Resilience toward violence is related to the cohesiveness of civic 
coalitions. However, comparative analysis reveals that two types of coalitions play roles 
in fostering communal resilience. In the Samburu and Marsabit cases, for example, 
coalitions of civic groups unified around resisting threats from a particular rival ethnic 
out-group. In Isiolo, in contrast, civic organizations unified around long-term 
peacebuilding agendas.  
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 Both types of coalitions helped to contain conflict and prevent the escalation of 
violence. This finding contradicts Varshney’s assumption that formal crosscutting civic 
groups are necessary for effective violence prevention (Varshney 2002). In some settings, 
ethnically homogenous organizational structures contribute to containing escalation by 
extending the capacity of local militias to monitor out-group movement, respond rapidly 
to threats, and use of force as a primary deterrent of opportunistic attacks. 
 The following section describes the capacities of informal coalitions of civic 
group across the cases. Across Northern Kenya, in the absence of state authority and 
legitimacy, civic organizations had better access to information related to conflict threats 
than police and military actors. Civic group coalitions contained escalation in all six 
counties. Informal coalitions formed in the wake of major massacres, such as Turbi, and 
in the wake of persistent aggression and insecurity, such as in the Nyiro Valley and 
Mandera. The mechanisms linking cohesive civic coalitions to local resilience include the 
establishment of threat monitoring and rapid response systems and supporting preventive 
negotiation and pact making processes.  
 Local peacebuilding actors used formal organizational platforms as the basis for 
extending threat monitoring networks that span across large geographical regions, 
maintaining access to resources and logistical systems necessary for coordinating and 
engaging in rapid response missions to address threats or rumors of rising insecurity, and 
providing multiple opportunities for negotiation. Findings from the study reveal that the 
extent to which civic associations contain violence depends upon trust between local 
associations and militia patrons, the severity of violence, and state actions.  
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Inter-group Coalitions and Resilience 
 In four cases, civic coalitions unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas 
specific to particular conflict settings, increasing civic capacity to coordinate effective 
threat response. In the case of Pokot – Turkana conflict, for example, reformed warriors 
groups, catholic churches, and elders groups united around a long-term peacebuilding 
agenda. The coalition comprised of Turkana and Pokot groups remained active even with 
increasingly violent attacks against government security actors, and shifting levels of 
interest and resources from various international donors and partner INGOs. In the 
Lorogon case, the coalition convened preventive negotiations with militia leaders dampen 
tension and contain escalation.  
 In the Isiolo case, a coalition of Borana, Gabra, Somali, and Rendille women’s 
groups, youth, and elders groups proved effective in convening pre-election processes of 
pact making to contain violence around high-risk local elections. Following initial 
evidence of success, support from domestic NGOs such as Saferworld and the NSC 
helped to expand the pact making process. Violence escalated following elections in 
Moyale and Mandera, but not in Isiolo. Similar to the West Pokot case, civic groups 
united around a long-term peacebuilding agenda. Even in the absence of a strong formal 
DPC structure, local civic groups led pre-emptive pact-making processes with very 
minimal external support. Cohesion among local organizations was critical in this case.  
  In Moyale, an informal network of peacebuilding actors unified around a long-
term peacebuilding agenda. Following the Turbi massacre and the collapse of the formal 
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peacebuilding structure, local peacebuilding actors took up the cause of reconciliation 
and for three years convened bargaining processes between Gabra and Borana 
communities that eventually led to the re-integration of settlements. The long-term 
processes, itself, helped to form cross cutting relationships among elders groups that 
prevented severe violence in Moyale from spreading beyond the town center. The long-
term, post-Turbi peacebuilding process constructed an informal coalition of actors that 
improved resilience in Northern Marsabit. 
  In the Turkana – Tullow Oil case, an informal coalition of peacebuilding actors 
that cuts across identity lines also plays a significant, complimentary role in containing 
violence related to tension between Turkana communities and external Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin from “down country.” A large coalition of civic groups including the Catholic 
Church, DPCs, local peace committees, and a broad range of NGOs with long-term 
presence in the area adopted a peacebuilding agenda that compliments the preventive 
approaches of Tullow Oil and the GoK. The high degree of complementarity proved 
effective in containing inter-group conflict within Turkana County. In all of these cases, 
civic groups united around long-term peacebuilding agendas and contributed significantly 
to limiting escalation.  
 
Intra-group Coalitions and Resilience 
 The cases of conflict between Turkana and Samburu communities in the Nyiro 
Valley and between Gabra and Turkana communities in Western Marsabit, however, 
display a different pattern of cohesion among local associations. Civic group coalitions in 
 262 
 
these areas contributed to conflict containment, but they were not crosscutting and 
unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas. Civic groups unified around resisting a 
particular threat. Guyo Elema describes, “the government marginalizes the area so much 
that communities do not share information with the government. They share it with local 
groups that have their best interests in mind. People say, ‘we have to deal with things on 
our own.’ Communities are the only ones who can stop their own people from killing.”  
Critically, CSOs do not have a strong track record for integrating identity groups 
in Samburu and Marsabit. In the case of Marsabit, for example, even the most ostensibly 
neutral civic organizations constantly face accusations of tribalism from the community. 
Very few formal civic associations provide opportunities for routinized inter-group 
interactions—civil society organizations thus are not obviously crosscutting in 
Varshney’s terms. Schools and political parties are ethnically homogenous. Community-
based organizations (CBOs) serve particular communities. Local CSOs, in contrast to 
INGOs, often rely on funding through identify-based support networks and dominant 
politicians who source financial support through international networks. Thus, most 
CSOs serve the interests of particular ethnic groups. Varshney’s theory of formal civic 
associations does not fully explain patterns of conflict in this case (Varshney 2007).  
This, however, does not fully undermine the capacity of civic groups to limit 
escalation. Local peacebuilding actors with shared interests in resisting aggression from 
particular armed groups developed covert relationships and clandestine threat monitoring 
networks. Covert relationships among leaders of civic groups allowed for just enough 
inter-group cooperation to improve day-to-day threat-monitoring necessary to prevent 
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most conflicts from leading to more severe forms of escalation. For example, in the Nyiro 
Mountain case, missionary stations, elders groups, teachers unions, and catholic churches 
provided a broad range of preventive interventions. Militias leveraged civic groups to 
improve threat monitoring and the capacity to use coercive force to deter attacks from 
ethnic out-groups. The broad coalition of Samburu civic groups functioned to limit rapid 
escalation and dampen violence largely through restraining potential spoilers—or 
increasing the threat-monitoring and military capacity of local militias, raising the risk for 
ethnic out-groups to use violence in the area. 
Layers of village-level organizations with links to civic associations serve as the 
foundation for inter-group collaboration for threat-response. Paul Galmagar describes, 
“even though the DPC is not working well, there are informal security institutions that 
keep violence low.”304 Community security practices and local scouting networks are the 
first layer. Then monitoring and reporting internally, within identity groups occurs. 
Information on possible threats is reported to civic organizations and not the police. From 
that point, information is shared across networks of informers that cut across identity 
groups, of actors who work across multiple civic groups in the area. “These are the 
people know every stone, and every pathway. They know what happens under the trees 
and how the militias move. This is why there is peace, because of these people, not 
because of the government.”305  
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 Similarly, in Western Marsabit, elders groups, the KPR, and PISP, a local CSO 
coordinated preventive bargaining processes, pre-movement pact making and helped to 
enforce informal processes of restitution that served as the foundation for relatively 
peaceful inter-group relations between rival ethnic groups. Over time, even though civic 
groups remained divided along identity lines in the town, civic groups were unified in 
response to a shared threat of attack from the Dassanetch. Formal organizational 
structures were not integrated. Notwithstanding, informal informant networks formed that 
provided minimal information sharing that cut across Gabra – Borana, and Dassanetch 
divisions.  
These cases raises a question—is it accurate to classify civic organizations as 
largely non-coercive or nonviolent actors? In some settings in Northern Kenya, civic 
associations directly and indirectly support local militias and extend their capacity to use 
or threaten to use force against rival groups. For example, in the Nyiro Mountain corridor 
civic organizations contain escalation following intergroup clashes largely through their 
ability to expand and extend communal support for a broad network of armed militias. 
Civic groups improved access to information about threats and provided organizational 
support for militias to respond more rapidly and directly to threats and warnings of 
impending attacks.  
In some cases, the contribution of local organizations is not fostering crosscutting, 
inter-group cooperation as Varshney’s theory suggests, but in improving the capacity of 
local militias to employ coercive force as a deterrent. Local civic associations may rely 
upon and indirectly support local militias for protection and access to insecure regions. 
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Militias, in these cases, view peacebuilding activities as way to leverage organizational 
resources to protect the community and its scarce resources.  
 
Coalitions and Threat Monitoring 
Across the cases, including along Nyiro Mountain conflict corridor, Turkana 
County, Marsabit, and West Pokot, effective coalitions were comprised of grassroots 
leaders of civic groups including teachers unions, elders’ councils, local peace 
committees, mid-level managers of domestic and international NGOs, civil servants in 
the local government, and local faith-based organization leaders. As Tumal Orto states, 
“INGOs try to build peace, much more than the government. But they mostly do roadside 
peace work; we are still on our own to prevent revenge in the most difficult places.”306 
Local civic groups had the most direct contact with actors involved in militias, and the 
highest willingness to voluntarily intervene in uncertain and insecure conditions.  
Local civic associations have moral authority necessary for coordinating 
collective action for rapid response and preventive bargaining in volatile conflict settings. 
This quality is essential as the extent to which civic associations are able to contain 
violence depends upon trust between peacebuilders and patrons and leaders of local youth 
militias. To maintain access to and influence over local militias, civic associations must 
be viewed as neutral or on one side. Peace elites with linkages to militia leaders provide 
channels to information about potential political threats to stability, and receive 
information that more formal peacebuilding organizations cannot access. 
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This group of actors, therefore, has the capacity to engage in and support local 
peace processes outside of more formal roles within NGOs and other civic groups. In 
many cases, actors leading local peacebuilding efforts started out in careers with faith-
based organizations, and then shifted into other organizations. Institution hopping 
provided opportunities for local peacebuilders to become involved in multiple, parallel 
peace programs. Engagement in processes of institution building improved peace actors’ 
knowledge of localized conflict dynamics, and, more importantly, expanded access to 
information related to various types of triggers that may increase the likelihood of 
conflict escalation in particular conflict settings. This class of actors displayed most 
capacity to construct and support broad threat monitoring networks, and rapid 
interventions to contain escalation of inter-ethnic violence, as they were less likely to be 
threatened than external actors. 
In multiple cases, faith-based organizations operated as central points of 
coordination among multiple local associations. For example, in Samburu, for example, 
missionary compounds were major hubs for threat monitoring and crisis response. They 
become an integral part of the informal local security system. In Lodwar, the catholic 
diocese had more vehicles than the county government, more money, a larger 
constituency, and a large network of village-level peacebuilding groups spread out across 
the entire county. Faith-based organizational structures, therefore, increase mobilization 
capacity and the amount of local resources available for supporting peacebuilding 
processes.  
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Many coalitions formed around faith-based civic groups. Faith-based actors had a 
high level of local moral authority and were less likely to be targeted for sharing 
information related to conflicts. In many cases local peacebuilding actors were trained as 
pastors prior to becoming dominant peace elites. They were viewed as neutral, 
authoritative actors with a moral mandate for local peacebuilding. In West Pokot, actors 
from local church communities engaged in a long-running intervention to develop a 
group of reformed warriors (see chapter four). In the West Pokot cases, reformed 
warriors played significant roles in maintaining threat monitoring networks and 
convening preventive negotiations following actors of violence, where other 
organizations could not. Actors involved in armed violence in the past became active and 
effective participants in local peace organizations.  
Within informal threat-monitoring systems, elders groups had power to help 
dampen violence because of their knowledge of the direct identity of conflict actors and 
spoilers operating in the area. When elders councils have support from other civic groups, 
such as women’s groups for faith based organizations, who also have direct knowledge of 
conflict actors, it becomes increasingly less likely that external spoilers, even if they are 
co-ethnic kinsmen will not be protected by the larger community. If youth militia leaders 
are aware that they have lost the support of civic groups and face the risk of being handed 
to the state justice system as criminals, they are increasingly likely to avoid engaging in 
acts or violence in those areas. Civic associations, in this way, can raise the cost of 
violence for local militias. 
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In the Samburu, Pokot, and Marsabit cases, civic coalitions mobilized resources 
rapidly to respond to meet basic needs of families and groups who lost animals or family 
members. This occurred even where more formal organizations such as DPCs lacked 
necessary resources. Access to logistical systems is necessary for coordinating rapid 
response missions to address threats or rumors of rising insecurity. They can also pool 
resources to be the first outside observers to enter a conflict setting, which increases 
accuracy of information about the conflict and the identity of actors involved, and can go 
direct to a particular village and engage in negotiations over compensation, providing 
outlets beyond revenge attacks.  
Overall, effective local peacebuilding structures had following characteristics. 
Actors with direct access to the planning of violent events and willing to engage in 
preventive response under high risk of and threat of violence by militias, helped sustain 
long-term peace processes that dampened violence. Teams of direct responders to initial 
clashes tend to be comprised of peace actors that work for local civil society 
organizations and use personal networks to access the conflict environment. Informal 
peace actors then draw upon formal organizational resources and logical capacity to 
coordinate collective peace actions.  
In the absence of state security, local peace actors regularly engage in responses 
to violence voluntarily and at great personal risk. Personal and social attachment to the 
conflict environment increases the willingness of peace elites to engage in high risk, 
direct responses to violent clashes. Cohesive coalitions increase the complexity of 
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strategies to contain violence, and are better able to develop solutions to conflicts within 
environments where state is absent and inefficient.  
Table 10: Coalition Qualities for Effective Preventive Response 
 
 
• Distance 
o Voluntary commitment to high-risk peace action 
o Local contact, insider information, and spoiler access 
o Moral authority and embeddedness  
o Power to convene  
 
• Rapid Response 
o Informal response teams and ethno-specific stabilization 
o Resource pooling for victim support 
o Spoiler identification, returns and restitution 
 
 
 
Coalitions and Informal Pact-making 
 Prior analysis suggests many of the proposed mechanisms of informal 
institutional restraint are not fully effective controls on violence due to the integration of 
periphery, the proliferation of weapons, the rise of warlords and wealthy powerbrokers, 
and change in size and forms of militia organization (Duffield 1997; Mkutu 2001; Turton 
2003; Boege 2006; Chapman and Kagaha 2009). However, in multiple cases local pacts 
based on customary codes of restitution limited escalation in the absence of effective 
state security. Where civic associations provided opportunities for negotiation and around 
traditional rules for restitution escalation was contained. Thus, regarding the debate 
around channels through which local civic coalitions dampen violence, the study 
confirms the importance of informal pact making processes and local resilience (Nilsson 
2012; Kaplan 2013; Murdie 2014).  
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 The logic of peace pacts across Northern Kenya is based on the idea that if 
individuals cannot pay for violent crimes, the entire community must pay. This rule 
incentivizes communities to adopt strategies to control armed actors and prevent them 
from engaging in indiscriminant violence. It raises the cost of violence for the entire 
community. In Fearon and Laitin’s terms, informal communal pacts improve intra-group 
policing (Fearon and Laitin 2002).  
 In contrast to Fearon and Laitin’s approach, however, comparative analysis 
suggests local peace processes have a secondary effect—the construction of inter-group 
civic coalitions. In Marsabit, Samburu, and Moyale informal pact making processes 
strengthened civic coalitions and stabilized institutional arrangements for conflict 
prevention. Long-term processes of negotiating and re-negotiating local peace 
agreements expand opportunities and platforms for inter-group negotiation and 
preventive bargaining and help to construct local peacebuilding constituencies.  
In Northern Marsabit, for example, the process of pact making generated 
knowledge about the inconsistencies in rules or restitution and gaps in enforcement 
capacity across Northern Kenya. This, then, led to the development of cluster-based 
declarations to harmonize rules for restitution (Maina 2011; Modogashe Report 2011). 
Long-term bargaining following the Turbi Massacre unified civic organizations across 
Northern Marsabit, and strengthened threat monitoring and rapid response networks. It 
helped to construct a more robust local peacebuilding constituency that intervened and 
prevented Gabra – Borana violence from spreading beyond the town of Moyale in 2014. 
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In the Mandera case, the Umal Accord brought an end to the Garre – Murule 
conflict in 2005. It was based on traditional codes of restitution. The Accord clashed with 
constitutional mandates, but the GoK supported and helped enforce the agreement. It 
stood for three years. The next wave of escalation was related to increasingly complex 
political and economic conditions that civic organizations could not contain. In 2013, the 
Ramadan Accord helped contain the Garre – Degodia conflict mirrored traditional codes 
of restitution, with the government threatening to impose a large fine upon entire ethnic 
communities in the event of a broken ceasefire. 
In Western Marsabit, prior to relocation, informal pact making between the 
Turkana and Gabra led to the formation of integrated settlements in the Sarimo valley. 
Pre-movement pact making created opportunities for inter-group cooperation around 
local resources and the establishment of new policing institutions. When tension began to 
increase related to militia conflict near Loiyangalani, in the absence of state security 
actors, civic actors helped to enforce the informal Accord. The restitution process was 
based on the terms of the Sarimo declaration, and helped stabilize inter-group relations. 
Respondents reported enforcement of the informal pact was a critical juncture that 
allowed for further negotiations around resource sharing that helped to maintain peaceful 
inter-group relations across Western Marsabit County. 
In the Isiolo case, pre-election pact making reduced uncertainty of electoral 
outcomes, and contributed to the prevention of conflict after elections. Pact making 
provided routinized opportunities for strengthening local peacebuilding coalitions and 
provided a foundation for organizing inter-group negotiations following acts of violence. 
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Coalitions provided multiple platforms for brokering pacts between armed actors, 
communities, and political elites.  
 
 
Limitations of Civic Intervention   
Civic coalitions did not contain escalation in all settings. Varshney suggests prior 
organizational success often serves as a platform for further success in containing inter-
ethnic group conflict (2002). In contrast, the study finds that prior organizational 
experience does not clearly yield future success. CSOs with prior success in containing 
intergroup conflict face common risks that can lead to fragmentation and ineffectiveness. 
In some cases, effective local peacebuilding coalitions had short lifespans. 
Comparative analysis reveals conditions under which civic associations break 
down and lose capacity to contain inter-ethnic group violence. Building effective 
peacebuilding structures is already difficult under conditions of sub-state fragility. It is 
even more difficult, as described above, under developmental pressures and along 
international border regions. Holding together diverse groups of actors during peace 
processes is complex, especially with high expectations of voluntarism, high risk of 
personal insecurity, and inconsistent state responses to initial outbreaks of violence. 
Specifically, three factors commonly undermine the capacity of civic organizations to 
effectively coordinate preventive intervention—the type of violence, coercive state 
actions, and incentives within the local political economy that can lead local peace elites 
to shift into political roles.  
 
 273 
 
Symbolic Violence 
First, in contrast to theories that highlight exogenous pressures such as the 
absence of state authority, poverty and inequality, or elite predation, this finding suggests 
key triggers of escalation are commonly local-level factors (Smock 1997; Johansson 
2011). Inter-group conflict did not escalate for long periods of time under increasing 
exogenous pressures and stress factors across multiple conflict settings. However, 
symbolic acts of violence triggered rapid escalation across cases with both minimal and 
significant preventive intervention. The following acts of violence served as the initial 
trigger for militia mobilization, revenge attacks, and escalatory dynamics, even in the 
presence of civic organizations that had previously proven successful in preventing 
conflict.  
 
Table 11: Symbolic Violence as Escalation Trigger 
 
 
• Acts of weakness, and “shooting people in the back” (Turbi) 
• Assassination of nonviolent activists (Maralal Massacre; Moyale)  
• Assassination of political leader s(Turbi case; Samburu – Turkana Range War) 
• Hit and run by a political leader (Moyale) 
• Murder of aid worker (Moyale) 
• Targeting children, women, elders (Samburu – Pokot; Turkana – Pokot) 
• Theft of animals belonging to the poor, following a murder (“morally 
reprehensible” action – Tuum Episode) 
 
 
Theoretically, micro-level studies of intra-state conflict suggest episodes of 
violence have competing logics (Kalyvas 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kalyvas 2012). 
Across the conflicts under assessment, acts of violence had different logics and 
characteristics that influenced processes of escalation. However, one common feature 
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stands out across the cases. Acts of violence that broke social expectations and norms 
about how and when violence should be used triggered escalation. This was a common 
driver in multiple cases including Turbi, Moyale, Mandera, Tuum, and with the Samburu 
– Turkana and Turkana – Pokot range wars. Violence escalated after the murder of an aid 
worker in Mandera, the killing of a nonviolent activist in Maralal, and killings viewed as 
acts of weakness in Turbi.  
Where particular types of violent action break the norm of reciprocity, violence is 
more likely to escalate. The norm of tit-for-tat justice is based on the assumption of 
reciprocity. Rothchild’s concept remains a very strong insight: in the absence of the 
shared norm of reciprocity, extreme collective fear emerges which then triggers conflict 
and violence (Rothchild 1973). Unexpected forms of aggression are most likely to trigger 
revenge attacks that result in high levels of causalities, as they increase uncertainty in the 
conflict system. Groups assume victims of acts of armed banditry will organize revenge 
attacks, are thus prepared to protect themselves from acts of revenge. A broad spectrum 
of social, political, and economic tactics and communal adaptations are in place at the 
village-level to thwart rapid revenge attacks.  
Escalation tends to occur in relation to acts of violence that break social 
expectations. Acts of aggression that fall outside of the informal rules of the game are 
more likely to intensify conflict. Experiences of violence leave marks on societies and 
generate lasting grievances against perpetrators.307 After acts of symbolic violence, 
bonding tends to occur over bridging. In other words, as Ruth Aluoch states, “people 
                                                
307 Bethuel Kiplagat, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014. 
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revert to their ethnic identities as a source of protection during times of crisis and 
uncertainty.”308 Grievances may remain latent for long periods of time. Symbolic acts of 
violence serve as fodder for escalation in relation to other conflict pressures. When an act 
of violence is a deeply symbolic affront to communal norms or symbolic of an intention 
to undermine the whole community, escalation is more likely to occur.  
 
Coercive State Action 
To what extent do state actions support or undermine the preventive efforts of 
peacebuilding organizations? The state used coercive force in response to multiple local 
conflicts in Northern Kenya to try to contain escalation, but this action had unintended 
consequences for local peace processes. In Asfaw Kumsaa’s terms, “if brute force 
worked, conflict in the North would have stopped long ago.”309 State-led responses to 
local conflicts frequently involved the use of indiscriminant violence against civilians, 
increasing the likelihood that groups would evade peacebuilding interventions involving 
state actors, and seek internal, community-based solutions to rising insecurity.  
Bell et al. argue the state’s use of force against citizens, such as disappearances, 
deepen citizens’ disaffection with the state, which increases the likelihood of violence 
(Bell et al. 2013). This is part of the explanation in the Kenya context. Coercive state 
action can lead to disaffection with state actors and increasing support for local militias. 
However, the study finds evidence for a secondary impact. State-sanctioned violence 
                                                
308 Ruth Aluoch, NSC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 24, 2013. 
 
309 Asfaw Kumsaa, UNCRD, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 18, 2014. 
 
 276 
 
undermines crosscutting civic coalitions. Across the Samburu, West Pokot, Moyale, and 
Mandera cases, where the state used force against communities, local associations broke 
down, creating windows for escalation.  
State sanctioned violence increased citizen disaffection and increased communal 
support for local militias. As Geoffrey Lipale stated, “When the state criminalizes the 
whole community, this leads to mobilization of the whole community.”310 The expansion 
of local military capacity and communal protection of culprits of violence are both 
related to the state’s use of violence against pastoralist communities. Ethnic communities 
protect in-group militia members who conduct acts of violence, and patrons of local 
protection militias often pay bribes to release culprits from prison. Halkano Bukuno 
describes the dilemma for state security actors,  
“There is no real information on perpetrators of violence in the periphery. Police 
ask elders and local politicians to identify criminals in their community, yet they 
always blame violence on other groups in the area. In response, the government 
punishes the whole group often very harshly, and violently.”311  
Second, the state’s use of indiscriminant violence in response to outbreaks of 
inter-group conflict narrows local civil society space. Where the state uses indiscriminant 
force, local peace actors have a more difficult time in engaging with armed militias, 
sustaining local peace processes, and maintaining covert informant networks for threat 
monitoring. Policing intervention undermines trust between local organizations and 
                                                
310 Geoffrey Lipale, POKTUSA, Interview with the author, Makutano, Kenya, July 22, 2014. 
 
311 Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014. 
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militia leaders, and reduces the capacity of local peace associations to coordinate 
preventive interventions.  
For example, in Turkana, West Pokot, and Isiolo, informal organizational 
structures with prior success were less capable of containing escalation following heavy-
handed state policing missions. After police used excessive force against civilians to 
extract information about militia groups, or co-opted local peace associations for 
gathering information about conflict actors, the loss of insider status undermined the 
ability of civic actors to function as neutral mediators and acquire accurate information 
from armed groups. Armed militias avoid engagement with organizations they believe 
may be working with the state to gather information for use in policing missions. In 
Todonyang, Mandera, and West Pokot militias targeted civic groups following the co-
optation of peacebuilding associations for intelligence gathering and disarmament 
campaigns. 
Similar dynamics occurred in Mandera. After state intervention to try to dampen 
inter-group violence, Garre and Degodia pooled communal resource to hire external 
mercenaries from Somalia and Ethiopia. Local political elites engaged in dialogues with 
police and state-level government officials to avoid heavy-handed state security tactics 
and accusations of ethnic incitement. At the same time, however, they remained deeply 
involved in processes of arming and supporting ethnic militias. As the state became more 
involved in peace processes, local militia leaders and their supporters became less willing 
to engage with actors and organizations working on peace interventions. If information 
on illegal arms or prior acts of violence reaches the state, it can be used to launch 
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disarmament campaigns or accusations of political incitement. Militias resisted 
cooperation and information sharing when civic groups aligned with the state.  
 
Local Peacebuilders as Political Entrepreneurs 
In some cases, effective peacebuilding organizations had short lifespans due to 
role shifting among peace elites. Successful leaders of peacebuilding institutions shifted 
into political roles leading to the loss of neutrality and the breakdown of previously 
successful organizational structures. Multiple coalitions collapsed after extended periods 
of success. This pattern occurred in the cases of West Pokot, Turkana, Isiolo, and 
Marsabit.  
It is difficult for local peacebuilding actors to remain neutral during periods of 
heightened insecurity and increasingly contentious ethnic conflict. Politics and 
peacebuilding do not go together. Politics in Kenya is based on ethnic divisions. 
Collective identity is basis for the pursuit of individual power. Peacebuilding aims to 
accomplish the opposite—the construction of trans-ethnic organizations and inter-group 
relationships. Peace elites often develop political aspirations during local peacebuilding 
processes. Civic leaders gain status and prestige through developing skills and networks 
related to peacebuilding interventions.  
The high cost of engaging in politics in the Kenya context, however, incentivizes 
corruption to gain access to resources necessary to compete in the local elections. Within 
the Turkana – Pokot conflict, Riam, Riam and POKATUSA, the two most prominent 
civic organizations in the area broke down after leaders embezzled funds to run political 
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campaigns. In the Isiolo case, the DPC was captured by political actors interested in using 
the organizations to access information on local conflict dynamics for use in campaign 
strategies. In Marsabit, due to increasing insecurity and tension between the Borana and 
Gabra prior to the Turbi Massacre, the DC directly disbanded the most effective 
peacebuilding institutions in Marsabit and Moyale in order to undermine organizations 
most likely to attain and reveal accurate information about planned attacks. In this case, 
political entrepreneurs working to gain power over contested territories directly 
disbanded civic organizations prior to escalating the conflict.  
After inter-ethnic group clashes, politicians and political entrepreneurs become 
involved in conflict dynamics and enter into the negotiation space. This causes, “the 
peacebuilding space to become a forum for ethnic politics.”312 In Galgallo Tuye’s terms, 
“after clashes, politicians do not encourage us to live together, but to perish together as 
fools.”313 The outcome of negotiations impact on how a community judges local political 
actors. Whether or not a local political entrepreneur takes a hardline against a rival group, 
or supports a process of restitution and reconciliation, is a political calculation. Peace 
actors within intentions to make the shift into local politics become less likely to engage 
as neutral mediators.  
Communities assume state mediators use local peace processes to forward the 
interests of a particular ethnic group, or political party. State actors are not viewed as 
                                                
312 Dan Nganga, Interview with the author. Kitale, Kenya, July 20, 2014. 
 
313 Galgallo Tuye, Former MP North Horr, Interview with the author. North Horr, Kenya. September 17, 
2014.  
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neutral third party mediators due to the politicization of security provision. This causes 
actors who, in the past, had power to convene across the conflict divide to become less 
capable of effectively mediating inter-group conflicts. This dilemma is even more 
intensive under the pressure of potential economic growth, as the stakes for winning 
elections increases. With Vision 2030, more investment, and rising land prices, political 
entrepreneurs across Northern Kenya operate under the assumption that county positions 
will come with access to even more rents from businesses and actors seeking access to 
the area. In these areas, it becomes increasing tempting for peace elites with large 
constituencies and broad based legitimacy to make the shift into politics.  
As conflict escalates and peacebuilding actors shift into political roles, civic 
organizations often align with particular ethnic groups. Alignment with a particular ethnic 
group, however, increases the risk of targeting during conflicts, especially when civic 
groups lose the trust of local militias and their patrons. In the most severe cases of 
escalation, including along the West Pokot – Turkana border, Mandera, and Todonyang, 
militias targeted actors involved in local peace processes. Overall, these cases suggest a 
spectrum of processes of organizational capture, ranging from indirect shifting of 
peacebuilding actors into political roles, to direct organizational collapse related to 
dismantling of peacebuilding structures prior to organized ethnic violence.  
 
 
Communal Resilience and Militia Restraint  
Informal communal protection strategies played a minor role in containing 
escalation in some cases under analysis. In some cases, along the Nyiro conflict corridor 
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and in Western Marsabit, the factors that limited escalation were related to nonviolent 
adaptation. Communal protection strategies reduced suspicion of cooperation with 
external militias and made rapid, indiscriminant revenge attacks against particular out-
group communities less likely.  
Bunker argues that communities linked to outsider militias are more likely to be 
targeted (Bunker 2012). Findings from the Nyiro Mountain Corridor, however, indicate 
this is not always the case. Turkana villages, associated with outsider militias developed 
unique, non-violent adaptation strategies, and covert informant networks with local peace 
elites that made them unlikely targets of revenge attacks. In this case, communal 
adaptation reduced the likelihood of particular out-group villages being targeted 
following deadly attacks by out-group militias.  
This finding confirms that information sharing between ethnic groups is a critical 
restraint. In Fearon and Laitin’s terms, “local information brokers” are key actors for 
preventing violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2002; McMahon 2007). What 
differs, however, is the way in which information sharing does not necessarily require 
intergroup trust, or crosscutting civic networks, as Varshney suggests (2002). Information 
sharing still occurs under conditions of severe mistrust, suspicion, and fear, as a coping 
and survival mechanism. Basic threat monitoring reduces the likelihood of violence still 
occurs in the absence of inter-group trust. 
 In some cases, clandestine collective action limits escalation. Where groups, at 
least, come to expect that members of an out-group will share accurate information about 
threats of impending attacks, the in-group becomes more willing to reciprocate threat-
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related information. Civic coalitions improve reciprocal sharing of information related to 
potential threats from armed groups. In cases where violence did not escalate following 
violent attacks, rival groups had complex, informal informant networks involving 
participants from multiple ethnic groups, even groups outside of the primary conflict 
dyad.  
This strategy played a key role in containing escalation along the volatile borders 
between Samburu and Turkana, Turkana and Gabra, and Pokot and Turkana 
communities. Specifically, in the Parikati case, informant networks included actors from 
Samburu, Turkana, as well as Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Pokot actors. Covert threat 
monitoring systems decreased the likelihood of suspicion that minority communities 
settled along the border were involved in processes of forming external alliances and 
granting access to external Turkana or Pokot militias to use village as a forward bases for 
conducting attacks. Providing Samburu militias with accurate information about militia 
support, mobilization, and movement and reduced the likelihood that Turkana villages 
would be targeted in revenge attacks following acts of violence.  
Minority ethnic out-group settlements living along contested and highly 
vulnerable borders, in the words of respondents from Sarima, groups may choose to, 
“suffer to keep peace”—electing to abandon long-held territory, relocate to very harsh 
environments to evade insecure areas, and collaborate with local civic associations to 
negotiate informal institutional arrangements for resource sharing and community 
policing. Fear of escalation can drive increased vigilance and the emergence of informal 
institutional arrangements between groups living in highly insecure conflict zones.  
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In Parikati, Tuum, Sarima, Sarimo, and Moyale, groups conducted trade through 
youth intermediaries in neutral locations to avoid inter-ethnic group interaction and 
suspicion of spying. Based on social norms, youth who have not gone through initiation 
rites are not legitimate targets for militias, decreasing the likelihood of opportunistic 
attacks during inter-group exchanges. Minority out-groups settled along volatile borders 
reported over-accumulating livestock, diversifying livelihoods, dispersing communal 
resources for protection across multiple local militias, and developing informal 
identification and tracking systems. These strategies decreased the likelihood that a single 
family or clan would lose an entire stock to banditry, and thus less likely to mobilize a 
militia to engage in immediate revenge attacks following attacks or acts of predation.  
Where minority groups face severe threats, forms of protection include circular 
encampments, ring fencing, triple ring fencing, or even digging foxholes within all homes 
in encampments. When such strategies prove insufficient for ensuring in-group 
protection, collective evasion and relocation is the most common alternative. In some 
cases such as the Turbi massacre and attacks along the Suguta Valley out-group 
communities relocated prior to attacks, indicative of advanced foreknowledge of the 
rising threat of retaliation. In the Sarimo case, civilian actors fled from more insecure 
areas. With the support of civic organizations, vulnerable out-groups avoided re-
settlement along more vulnerable border areas.  
Following clashes, the compounds of local political leaders and civic 
organizations are often open to civilians fleeing from insecurity, as in the cases of 
Mandera, Marsabit, and Todonyang. Over time, integrated settlements disintegrate with 
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civilians fleeing to urban areas with better government services,314 and militia actors 
establishing settlements in abandoned and more inaccessible terrains. Settlement of 
militias in areas with poor information networks and no infrastructure lowers the cost of 
protecting illegal weapons caches and evading police. Acts of ethno-communal violence 
remain more frequent in areas of state fragility, but escalation is not predetermined. 
Communal adaptation plays an important role in helping constitute secure spaces in 
highly insecure environments.  
Table 12: Non-coercive Adaptation 
 
 
• Clandestine informant networks and threat monitoring 
• Informal resource sharing agreements 
• Social disintegration, flight, and evasion via co-ethnic networks 
• Over-accumulation, resource dispersion, and communal insurance 
• Diversification of livelihoods 
• Emissaries for inter-group trade 
• Local elites and post-conflict resource mobilization 
 
 
 
Coercive Communal Protection  
Prior cases studies of civic organizations and the prevention of inter-ethnic group 
violence found norm change was a key mechanism that reduced the likelihood of 
escalation (Fein 1979; Longman 2009; Cameron et al. 2013). From this perspective, 
where civic groups promote human rights norms or religious norms around nonviolence, 
escalation is less likely due to the fact that militias may adopt non-coercive strategies to 
                                                
314 Ethnic sorting has the potential generate a negative feedback loop under conditions of resource scarcity: 
the emerge of no-go zones, reduction of the size of arable land that groups have access to, which in 
combination with environment change, desertification, over grazing, or drought, can increase pressure upon 
livestock-based livelihoods within arid or semi-arid climates. 
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deal with conflict dynamics. Granted, norm change was a factor in a few cases. Reformed 
warriors in West Pokot and Turkana embraced nonviolent conflict resolution norms, and 
played important roles in the larger peacebuilding constituency. However, comparative 
findings indicate communal adaptation principally contributes to increasing the capacity 
of youth militias to use deadly force.  
In the words of Samson Leriano, a patron a local militia along the Nyiro Valley 
conflict corridor, “we buy arms and we build peace.”315 Due to the long history of state-
sanctioned violence against pastoralist populations, there is minimal evidence of norm 
change toward nonviolent conflict prevention tactics among local militias across the 
larger conflict system. State responses to inter-ethnic group violence increased communal 
adaptation related to militia support and increasing the capacity of local militias. Under 
conditions of sub-state fragility and persistent human insecurity, communities may 
embrace non-coercive conflict prevention strategies, without abandoning support for 
youth militias to threaten to use deadly force against rival ethnic out-groups as the 
primary communal protection strategy.  
Participation in local militias requires living under highly insecure conditions in 
locations that are distant and disconnected from the large community. At the same time, 
militia participation provides an opportunity for youth to attain access to resources 
donated to the militia from the larger ethnic community. In the absence of educational or 
                                                
315 Samson Leriano, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014. 
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other economic opportunities, youth remain willing recruits for local militias.316 
Patronage networks within the community provide ethnic militias with arms, 
ammunition, military equipment, and increased opportunities for military training. They 
are sustained through contributions from the larger ethnic community.  
Donations for militias come from wealthy ethnic elites—often very significant 
amounts of money that allow youth militias to access to more sophisticated military 
equipment and training. Youth militias receive advanced trainings in scouting, tracking, 
and tactical arms use through co-ethnic networks of actors with prior experience in state 
policing, military organizations, or rebel movements, as in the Marsabit and Mandera 
cases. In the wake of conflict escalation in the cases of Samburu, Pokot, Turkana, and 
Mandera, communities financed the purchase of arms through pooling of communal 
resources. Youth militias gained access to increasingly sophisticated arms through 
identity-based trade networks, and elder - youth collaboration increased in order to 
strengthen militia skills. Ethnic groups collectively pool resources for armed actors, and 
prevent the spread of information about militia activities to enemy groups.  
In West Pokot and Turkana, communities formed complex commercialized 
raiding schemes to fund and expand militia capacity. In Mandera, illicit intra-ethnic 
group trade networks fund and support the expansion of militia capacity. Poaching, 
charcoal cartels, and organized crime all fund and support militias. Ports in Somalia are 
                                                
316 Militia recruits often have personal motives for taking up arms, as well. From a young age, young boys 
are very well aware of who their enemies are. Through narrative histories, or very often through personal 
experience of having a father or family member killed by another group, young men in these areas grow up 
with very clear “enemy images,” which enhances their capacity to conduct very deadly forms violence 
against rival groups (Little 1994). 
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used to evade high tariffs on goods imported into Kenya. Cross border arbitrage and tariff 
evasion also provide resources for militias. Turkana communities developed informal 
donation schemes to pay bribes and hire lawyers to protect co-ethnic militia members 
from the formal judicial system. 
The shift from communal livestock ownership among pastoralist groups toward 
private ownership created a new source of resources for local youth militias. Wealthy 
elites residing in Nairobi hire private militias to protect livestock and gain access to 
scarce water, land, and grazing resources. The Mandera case, for example, suggests that 
when the primary patrons of militias do not reside in the area and share risks related to 
instability, the likelihood of escalation is higher. Where militia patrons are distant from 
militias, there are fewer local-level checks against the use of violence. The Samburu case 
is the opposite—where militia patrons are part of the community, and involved across a 
broad network of local civic associations, the likelihood of escalation is lower.  
Political elites play key roles in supporting and sustaining identity-based militias 
as the primary foundation for the protection of communal wealth. Militias not only help 
protect elite business interests livestock and other trade activities, in some cases, 
including Marsabit, Isiolo, and Moyale, political elites cooperated with elders and ethnic 
militias to engineer long-term strategies for territorial expansion and demographic change 
as political strategies. Local-level and national-level political actors contribute to 
increasing the capacity of ethnic militias to use violence or the threat of violence as a 
primary deterrent.  
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Politicians use handouts of arms, ammunition, and food supplies channeled 
through covert intra-ethnic networks to support youth militias. Deadly raids have been 
used to undermine the support base of political rivals. Political actors, in many cases, 
condone terrorist-like acts of raiding and violence designed to undermine potential 
political competitors. In Marsabit, Moyale, West Pokot, and Isiolo politicians directly 
collaborated with youth militias. Seemingly normal resource conflict cloaked elite 
strategies for maintaining political power. Political elites are often a key source of 
funding and supplies for militias, such that the consolidation of ethnic blocs also occurs 
through allocation of resources for communities to acquire weapons and ammunition.  
In some cases, social change occurs in the wake of conflict escalation. Elders are 
deeply engaged with youth militias, more so than in the past. In traditional hierarchical, 
segmented forms of social organization, elders had little day-to-day contact with 
warriors. Traditional rituals and informal codes of conduct divided and separated age-
sets, leaving youth militias with the responsibility of survival and protection of 
communal resources. Now, elders collaborate extensively with leaders of youth militia 
groups to determine when attacks should or should not occur and they collectively 
develop plans to carry out raids and counter-raids. Where youth militias failed in 
missions, elders intervened to provide additional support for organizing attacks and 
restore status and group esteem after failed attacks.  
Overall, under these conditions, large-scale escalation still remains rare due to 
internal militia restraints. A significant amount research focuses on the proliferation of 
weapons across traditional cultures as a core condition for escalation (Mirzeler and 
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Young 2000; Mkutu 2003; Weiss 2004; Ndungu 2009; Wepundi 2012). Findings from 
the study, however, do not support this approach. Militias across are Northern Kenya are 
increasingly armed, better trained, and consistently learning new military tactics. 
Increasing military capacity across traditional pastoralist societies makes it increasingly 
difficult to form very large groups that can move freely across broad swaths of territory. 
These adaptations make it more likely that armed groups will choose to engage in, 
at least, processes of more careful information seeking and thus more calculated attacks 
upon guilty parties rather than asymmetrical revenge killings. Very rapid, uncalculated 
acts of indiscriminant revenge could lead to very disastrous outcomes for pursuers, like 
the Baragoi massacre. Civic groups and threat monitoring networks developed through 
coalitions of civic groups compliment the process or restraint, making it increasingly 
difficult for larger militias to mobilize. These inter-related factors function as key 
restraints for rapid mobilization of large armed groups following conflict triggers. 
 
Table 13: Coercive Adaptations 
 
 
• Outsourcing violence to co-ethnic militants 
• Investment in the expansion of illicit markets to fund militia organization  
• Communal resource pooling for militia support  
• Resource pooling for bribes, legal system evasion, and evasion of state security  
• Militia recruiting, reinforcement, and skills training via co-ethnic networks 
• Elder – youth collaboration and intra-group cohesion 
• Elite support for ethnic militias 
 
 
 
Processes of communal adaptation increase the capacity of youth militias to use 
deadly force, with non-coercive communal protection strategies playing a minor role in 
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containing rapid revenge attacks against minority ethnic out-groups along highly volatile 
borders. Non-coercive tactics reduced the risk of targeting, reduced the risk of in-group 
mobilization, and increased the likelihood of inter-group negotiation. Covert informant 
networks, in particular, make villages along the border less likely targets of revenge, 
which makes it even more difficult for militias to organize attacks against distant and 
unknown locations. In this way, local coping restrains rapid mobilization and escalation. 
However, with all citizens well armed and in support of communal militias, collective 
violence still remains a possibility. It remains the unlikely outcome, but is always a 
possibility with ethnic groups constantly working to expand military capacity of local 
militias. When coalitions of civic groups break down, escalation becomes increasingly 
likely.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In periphery areas of developing states vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict, 
why does violence sometimes stop and armed groups decide to maintain peace? Do 
informal associations have the ability contain violence using non-coercive and informal 
modes of conflict prevention? The findings from this study are guardedly optimistic. 
Where the state is not capable of providing immediate security or effective rapid response 
to threats, coalitions of civic associations can contain violence using informal 
institutional arrangements. Within the most intensive inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya, 
including along the Pokot – Turkana border, Mandera, and Samburu, local associations 
collaborated to take risks to establish and maintain complex, often covert informant 
networks for threat monitoring, to convene negotiations with militia actors responsible 
for organizing deadly attacks, and to enforce customary rules of restitution for violent 
crimes.  
Through comparative cases studies, findings indicate civic associations in various 
configurations limit escalation between warring communities across the rural periphery 
of Northern Kenya. This primary finding, however, is contingent upon key scope 
conditions. Drawing from empirical evidence, the study finds that modes of state and 
non-state response to local inter-ethnic conflicts affect patterns of conflict escalation. In 
particular, the use of indiscriminant force by police and military forces commonly 
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exacerbates conflict. The following chapter summarizes key findings related to the main 
propositions discussed in detail in chapter six, addresses potential limitations and 
challenges related to the research, and closes with implications for peace research in 
Kenya, African divided societies, and non-state conflict.  
 
 
Summary of Findings 
The project addresses the puzzle of why some ethnic conflicts escalate, whereas 
others do not. Even in the presence of multiple pressures that create very high levels of 
conflict vulnerability, violence may escalate, or it may not escalate. In particular, the 
primary questions examined are: Why does conflict not escalate when conditions are rife 
for allowing it to happen? What are the potential conditions at the state, civic, and 
communal level of analysis that help contain escalation of violence within non-state 
conflicts?  
Six county-level cases studies were conducted to select and analyze fifteen 
different inter-ethnic group conflicts along with corresponding responses from local, civil 
society, and state actors to try to contain escalation. Comparative analysis of conflict 
episodes and corresponding responses reveal patterns of behavior across the cases, 
despite the presence of various conflict actors, conflict triggers, and contextual features. 
The study demonstrates how informal coalitions of civic organizations prove crucial for 
explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not. It also demonstrates how 
interactive effects between state actions and local peace processes help explain why some 
conflicts are not contained and re-occur. Conditions that restrain escalation, and the 
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factors that breakdown and undermine potential restraints are as critical for understanding 
process of inter-ethnic violence as the core drivers. 
Across the cases, two factors contained escalation. First, informal coalitions of 
civic associations comprised of actors with direct relationships to patrons and leaders of 
youth militia units built threat-monitoring networks and provided platforms for 
negotiating informal pacts that contained escalation. Second, informal communal 
protection strategies reduced suspicion of cooperation with external militias and made 
rapid indiscriminant revenge attacks against out-group communities less likely.  
Notwithstanding the success of some informal organizational structures, state 
actions made it increasingly difficult for non-state organizations to prevent the re-
escalation of violence. As Christopher Gitari stated, “The story of Northern Kenya cannot 
be told without looking not only at state failure to provide security, but at the very long 
history of state abuse and the direct use violence against its own population.”317 Coercive 
state actions following outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence reduced the capacity of local 
peace associations to contain violence and increased the likelihood of escalation. After 
state police used excessive force, or coordinated with local peace associations for 
gathering information about conflict actors, the loss of insider status reduced the 
likelihood of effective preventive intervention through non-state organizations. In some 
cases, local peacebuilding coalitions had short lifespans. Previously successful peace 
actors shifted into political roles leading to the breakdown and fragmentation of 
previously successful associations. 
                                                
317 Christopher Gitari, ICTJ, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014.  
 
 294 
 
 
Table 14: Factors for Escalation and Restraint in Non-state Conflicts 
 
Factors containing escalation  Factors facilitating escalation 
Constraints 
• Cohesive civic coalition 
o Peace Elite – Militia Trust 
o Threat Monitoring 
o Informal Pact-making  
 
Restraints 
• Communal Adaptation (Coercive and 
Non-coercive) 
 
• Coercive state action 
• Perception of inequality in state 
response 
• Symbolic violence  
• Fragmented civic coalition 
o Breakdown of trust between 
peace elites and militia leaders 
o Breakdown of informal pacts 
and institutions) 
 
 
 
 
Civic Coalitions and the Capacity to Contain 
 
Organizing effective and rapid response to inter-group conflicts is a complex 
organizational challenge. Not all social organizations are up to the task. In some cases, in 
the absence of the state, informal coalitions of local civic associations play critical roles 
in conflict prevention. Local associations, in various forms, improve information sharing 
between groups, and provide platforms for inter-group bargaining, monitoring and 
enforcement of local pacts to contain violence. These actions, at least, reduce the 
likelihood of rapid, asymmetrical and indiscriminate attacks against nearby out-group 
communities.  
Even with the absence of policing in remote regions, the presence of informal 
coalitions among local solidarity groups increases the likelihood that accurate knowledge 
of conflict events will be communicated to armed actors, allowing for more strategic 
responses among armed groups. Interventions coordinated through informal coalitions of 
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local peace actors increase the likelihood that bargaining will be selected over rapid, 
asymmetrical collective violence. Where cohesive solidarity group coalitions form, threat 
monitoring, inter-group bargain platforms, and informal pacts generate resilience to 
escalation.  
Prior research analyzes the relationship between particular types of civic 
associations and ethnic conflict, such as business, religious organizations and political 
parties. Effective prevention, however, rarely hinges upon one particular organizational 
structure. Multiple organizations are involved in responses to localized, inter-ethnic 
group conflict. Local resilience depends upon relationships among multiple civic 
associations that align with a particular cause, as in the  Moyale and Marsabit cases 
where long-term peacebuilding process, improved monitoring, and rapid response to 
threats of escalation. Local resilience also is achieved where civic groups align with 
resisting the threat of attack from particular violent actors, as in the Samburu, Turkana, 
and Pokot cases where local organizations unified and helped form high-risk, clandestine 
monitoring systems. Findings from this study, therefore, indicate that the types of civic 
associations are less important than the relationships among civic organizations, often 
held together by local peacebuilding actors.  
In areas highly vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict, violence is less likely to 
escalate when there is a cohesive coalition of civic associations capable of coordinating 
rapid preventive actions directly related to the logic of violence. In these settings the 
extent to which local civic organizations are able to contain violence is based upon trust 
between armed actors and un-armed interveners. Civic organizations are more or less 
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capable of containing violence in particular locations depending upon the level of trust 
between leaders of civic associations and patrons of local militias. In areas where there is 
a high level of reciprocity between local civic associations and militias, escalation is less 
likely.  
Trust between local peacebuilders, militias, and elites patrons is difficult to 
maintain and always quite fragile. Evidence across the cases suggests that a class of local 
actors, or peace elites, play significant roles in maintaining trust of militia leaders at 
critical moments of potential escalation. Peace elites tend to have been employed, at 
various times, across multiple civic organizations, including churches, schools, CSOs, 
NGOs, political parties, and local government, remain directly connected to local conflict 
settings via family or identity-based relationships, and have large networks with peace 
actors across multiple civic associations.  
In moments of crisis, organizational types and affiliations matter less than 
informal coalitions built by local peace elites. Local peace elites draw upon multiple 
resources personal, communal, and organizational to contain conflict violence. This class 
of actors is thus critical for forming and holding together a coalition of diverse civic 
organizations operating within a given conflict setting. Where this class of local actors is 
able to maintain a strong coalition, the resources, strategies, and platforms available for 
negotiation increases, reducing the likelihood of conflict escalation.  
Formal organizational boundaries between different CSOs matter little when 
conflict occurs. Roles within formal organizations matter less than roles in society. Key 
actors who respond directly and rapidly to threats do so as elders, community members, 
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and family members, rather than as CSO or NGO workers. Responses that dampen 
violence address grievances based on customary rules of restitution draw upon socially 
appropriate compensation schemes and forms of communal protection.  
Local peace elites tend to develop trust and local authority based on associational 
ties that cut across multiple civic associations, and based upon their status within the 
community as relatively neutral actors committed to the cause of peacebuilding. Moral 
authority of peace elites gives them power to coordinate and engage in high-risk 
responses that other actors cannot. For example, peace elites are able to rapidly 
coordinate collective responses to crises, convince communities to donate resources to 
cover the cost of informal compensation and restitution after deaths, report accurate 
information across broad associational networks making it more likely that information 
will cross ethnic boundaries.  
In the periphery, leaders of local solidarity groups quickly become embedded 
within networks of information sharing and rapid response that impact conflict patterns 
and shape what happens at the initial moment of crisis. Mid-level aid workers, NGOs, 
and CBOs as implementing partners, even religious and missionary organizations play 
important roles within informal systems of local conflict governance, that, at times, have 
helped to mange inter-group violence and prevent escalation. In sum, in localities where 
peace elites have formed strong informal relationships that cut across multiple civic 
groups, violence is less likely to escalate. 
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Scope Conditions 
 
Findings from the study indicate that the capacity for informal civic coalitions to 
contain escalation depends upon three conditions. First, it depends upon the quality and 
severity of violence. Symbolic acts of violence spark the rapid disintegration of civic 
organizations and informal threat monitoring networks. Inter-group fear drives actors to 
pursue protection through bonding rather than bridging groups. Unexpected acts of 
violence that break social norms, such as the murder of aid workers, activists, political 
candidates, women and children, or the theft of resources belonging to the poorest 
members of a community can trigger the breakdown of informal coalitions, rapid militia 
mobilization, and asymmetrical acts of violent retribution. Widespread, rather than 
localized violence, then becomes more difficult for informal coalitions to contain.  
While civic coalitions may be able to contain localized inter-ethnic group conflict, 
they may not be able to contain conflict that spans across larger regions and spills across 
borders. As evident in the Turkana – Pokot conflict, the direct targeting of police and 
local peace actors greatly decreased the ability of organizations with a lot of experience 
in conflict resolution from being able to intervene and prevent violence escalation along 
the border, especially with oil discoveries making the conflict far more complex.  
Second, the extent to which civic associations are able to contain violence 
depends upon the nature of state response to the outbreak of local conflict. Violence is 
not pre-determined by state actions. State actions, however, make it more difficult for 
communities and civic organizations to contain violence. In areas highly vulnerable to 
inter-ethnic group conflict, violence is less likely to escalate when state actions do not 
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undermine civic coalitions. Where state agents use indiscriminant force, civic coalitions 
are more to fragment and break down. Where state actors co-opted civic associations for 
intelligence gathering civic coalitions are more likely to fragment and peacebuilding 
actors are more likely to be targeted by armed groups.  
Third, when the potential for development gains increases, the likelihood of the 
fragmentation of peacebuilding coalitions is more likely. Local peace elites confront new 
incentives to shift roles and become political entrepreneurs. Past success in peacebuilding 
can, in some cases, led to the collapse of effective organizations. Some peacebuilding 
coalitions had short lifespans. CSOs were victims of their own success. The availability 
of more resources for peacebuilding activities incentivized corruption. Rising legitimacy 
and extensive communal support for leaders of peacebuilding organizations incentivized 
shifts into ethnic politics. For these reasons, prior organizational experience does not 
clearly predict future success. Success in local peacebuilding efforts can, in some cases, 
lead to the collapse of effective coalitions. As peacebuilders gain social status, build 
broad constituencies, and shift to become political entrepreneurs, coalitions can break 
down and fragment.  
 
Communal Adaptation 
 
 Dominant theories of ethnic conflict tend to assume that communities have few 
options when weak states cannot protect them and armed actors choose to use violence. 
Data gathered indicates that this is not the case. Local communities are not passive 
victims in the face of insecurity and state weakness. Non-coercive strategic innovation 
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can, in some cases, increase communal capacity to respond to various types of conflict 
triggers and shocks, and foster resilience toward violence in the absence of the state.  
Under increasingly complex conflict conditions with rising tension and threats of 
indiscriminant violence, local protection strategies, both coercive and non-coercive are 
adopted. Local communities bear the highest costs of violence, which creates an incentive 
to not only rely upon threat-based strategies for communal protection. In some cases non-
coercive tactics, at least, made particular out-group communities less prone to 
indiscriminant targeting following outbreaks of violence in other locations, creating a 
dampening effect. 
For example, along the Samburu – Turkana border, Turkana out-groups 
developed covert, inter-group threat monitoring systems that functioned to restrain 
violent actors from engaging in rapid asymmetrical attacks. Local adaptation reduces the 
likelihood of escalation through the introduction of diverse tactics for managing common 
conflict triggers. However, acts of violence create conditions of uncertainly which 
triggers communal adaptations, both coercive and non-coercive. Patrons of militias 
acquire more sophisticated weapons and training, and pursue informal negotiations with 
aggressors through elders, or local peace actors such as reformed warriors.  
There is a very high level of coping and improvisation during the process of 
responding to conflict threats under conditions of uncertainty. Armed actors may use 
non-coercive strategies for nefarious purposes, such as sending emissaries to engage in 
peace negotiations or peacebuilding programming for the purpose of information 
gathering on rival groups. For this reason, communal adaptations and survival strategies, 
 301 
 
alone, cannot explain variation in patterns of escalation. Interactive effects must be taken 
into account.  
 
Limitations of the Study  
The study faces limitations related to information sources, reliability, and 
comparability of qualitative data. First, precise data on fatalities in conflicts in periphery 
regions is very difficult to attain. During episodes of violence both armed actors and 
civilians lose lives, making it difficult for outside observers to accurately identify who is 
who, especially when insecurity remains very high. Attacks also always become political 
events with various actors working to control the narrative around violence.  
Conflict reports are prone to errors due to police under-reporting in which high 
numbers would undermine their authority and garner severe reprimands from 
commanding authorities, or over-reporting by groups who use events to make claims of 
government failure, victimhood, or to undermine the legitimacy of incumbents or 
competing political leaders. Corruption also undermines the accuracy of data on local 
conflicts. Under reporting can be purchased. Some actors involved may want to cover up 
a severe act of violence to avoid police intervention or severe retribution by another 
ethnic militia. For these reasons, following the protocol of UCDP, the study relies on best 
estimates within each analytical narrative (UCDP 2015).  
  The study cannot definitively prove that cohesive peace coalitions are necessary 
for limiting escalation. Studies of few cases and multiple variables face the problem of 
multi-colinearity (Fearon 1991, 187). Many other spurious factors outside of the 
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assessment framework may contribute to escalation or non-escalation. However, to deal 
with this problem each case presents evidence of observable preventive action taking 
place that are most likely to have played a role in contributing to the non-occurrence of 
violence (Rubin 2002). Cases provide observable evidence of actors engaging in actions 
intentionally selected to prevent escalation (Rubin 2002). Actors believed the risk of 
escalation was high enough to undertake preventive efforts, overcoming the threat-
response problem (George and Holl 1997).  
  Second, studying ethnic violence runs against the problem of reliability due to 
competing interpretations of its causes and consequences from different actors. High 
levels intervention and multiple NGOs and CSOs engaged in peacebuilding leads to the 
formation of scripts among leaders of organizations who aim to maintain narratives of 
effectiveness even when local peacebuilding efforts fail (see also, Eaton 2008a). To 
overcome this challenge, during the fieldwork component of the study, I collaborated 
with a variety of local institutions, including, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the 
Turkana County Peace Secretariat, Local Elders Networks, District Peace Committees, 
and the Pastoralist Integrated Support Program.  
  In some cases, I was invited by local peace actors to observe peace programs and 
interventions to address active violent conflicts, allowing access to face-to-face 
interviews with conflict actors who were more critical of local peacebuilding 
organizations and programming (see also, Haer and Becher 2011; Mazurana, Jacobsen, 
and Gale 2013). This provided me with an opportunity to employ direct participant 
observation methods, and to assess and compare various organizational responses to 
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conflict episodes that occurred during my fieldwork. Insights derived through participant 
observation have proven particularly useful for analysis of the ways in which informal 
forms of organizational collaboration occur at moments of crisis.  
  In each county, I worked with at least one research assistant with linkages to local 
security actors, peacebuilding organizations, and conflict actors. All research assistants 
had been involved in inter-group negotiations and other peacebuilding processes, and 
were trusted as relatively neutral actors in the community. Government officials and local 
chiefs were contacted first in each location to present my research permit and ensure 
approval. Overall, my research team engaged 327 research participants: 251 in the form 
of semi-structured interviews, 42 in the form of focus group dialogues, and 34 in the form 
of participant observation during inter-group negotiations I was invited to attend during 
the course of the field work.    
  Third, the study aims to compare multiple conflict events. However, there is 
variation in the depth and quality of information attained and variation in the spectrum of 
sources I was able to consult for analyzing particular conflicts, responses, and outcomes. 
For example, due to the lower level of insecurity, I was able to attain more data on local 
adaptation strategies at the village-level in Samburu than I was in Mandera where 
ongoing attacks prevented travel to conflict sites. Also, there is far more published 
material on conflict related to oil extraction in Turkana than fishing access in Todonyang. 
To try to overcome this problem, I draw from a variety of information sources, and 
assume that the relatively large number of episodes included in the data set helps to 
prevent distortions related to information asymmetry across the cases. 
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  Empirically, local peacebuilding efforts have expanded across Northern Kenya. In 
particular, NGOs and CBOs have shown special interest in supporting customary 
institutions for conflict prevention and dispute resolution across multiple conflict settings. 
The cases provide a high level of variation on the dependent variable, escalation, as well 
as the main independent variable, cohesive coalitions.  
  Many local peacebuilding organizations assessed their work and published reports 
on engaging local institutions in the pursuit of peace. Even though information from 
NGO reports is unorganized with mixed findings, at least basic data from very remote 
and hard to reach conflict settings is available. Grey material is available on most of the 
cases and provides a secondary source for the construction of analytic narratives. 
Considering that Kenya remains open for international researchers (unlike Ethiopia, for 
example) and relatively safe, research can be conducted in remote, conflict-affected 
settings without too much concern for personal security. Kenya, therefore, is a good 
setting for analyzing theories of sub-state fragility and patterns of inter-ethnic group 
violence.  
  In the summer of 2014, during the fieldwork, security conditions in Mandera 
eroded due to heavy military intervention to curb al-Shaabab terrorist attacks. Insecurity 
in the area prevented me from traveling directly to Mandera to conduct research. To gain 
insights on the case, I collaborated with the National Steering Committee for 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and District Peace Committee chairmen to 
identify security actors and conflict actors. I also engaged Kenyan scholars working on 
the case, and hired two graduate student research assistants to translate and conduct 
 305 
 
follow up phone interviews with peace and security actors in Mandera. Research 
assistants based in Nairobi also provided help conducting phone interviews with key 
contacts I was not able to meet directly during field trips.  
Including the use of ethnographic methods, such as participant observation, 
embedded research, and working with actors directly involved in initiating and managing 
first responses to outbreaks of communal violence, I acquired data that many studies of 
ethnic conflict are not able to capture. Even though many respondents were willing to 
speak on the record, considering the level of insecurity in the areas under investigation, 
and the nature of data related to protection tactics, publishing some information could 
potentially incriminate research participants or put them at risk of being labeled 
whistleblowers. Some of the data is sensitive. Some informants feared identifying groups 
in their communities who have engaged in violence out of fear of local powerbrokers. To 
protect informants and informant networks, many insights and quotations are linked to 
pseudonyms, or even composite figures. Moreover, to protect the identity of informants, 
data from all interviews was initially handwritten, then typed and uploaded to a secure 
cloud-based site to protect personal data and the confidentiality of participants.  
Many insights used within analytical narratives were attained through informant 
networks built while in the field, comprised of actors willing to speak openly and 
critically about illegal armament processes, processes of organization for retributive 
attacks, or direct evidence of corruption during responses to conflicts is particularly 
sensitive. Voluntary cooperation from respondents was attained through: 1) official 
approval from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation and 
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local officials; 2) my status as a graduate student (rather than NGO or aid worker), 3) 
contacting respondents through trusted networks established through research assistants 
and personal networks built through initial contacts in Nairobi, and; 4) upholding 
confidentiality as per the official IRB protocol. 
Overall, Kenya provides a relatively strong setting for analyzing ethnic violence, 
informal institutions, and local organizational responses. Communities in Northern 
Kenya struggle with inter-group conflict and the risk of violence on a daily basis, and 
thus are generally quite willing to engage critically and openly with the topic. Local 
scholars, politicians, peace practitioners, and even members of youth militias tend to be 
interested in offering insights into the conflicts that impact their communities, even with 
external actors. Research participants were, on the whole, open and transparent in 
discussions of potentially sensitive topics such as causes of communal violence, attitudes 
toward ethnic out-groups, corruption, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of state and 
civic actors in restraining violence and mitigating conflicts.  
 
Implications for Kenya, Divided Societies, and Non-state Conflict 
Compared to its neighbors, Kenya has proven more resilient to outbreaks of inter-
ethnic violence. The fact that more inter-group conflicts have not escalated across the 
highly vulnerable Northern periphery, the study suggests, is related, in part, to relatively 
robust civic organizations involved in day-to-day processes of conflict monitoring, threat 
response, and inter-group pact making. Forms of local communal adaptation compliment 
civic efforts to dampen the threat of rapid violence escalation. Across multiple conflict 
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corridors in Northern Kenya, many conflicts remain on the threshold of tipping toward 
violent conflict, but collective violence remains a rare outcome. The strength of 
communities and civic associations helps to control and contain violence under harsh and 
uncertain circumstances.  
Findings from the study, however, imply for Kenya that outsourcing local security 
and peacebuilding functions to non-state actors has limitations. Civic coalitions and 
informal institutional arrangements work well enough in some conflict settings, but it is 
not clear that informal systems transfer other areas to the same effect. In other words, a 
particular informal peacebuilding system may only function well for a particular set of 
conflict conditions. The major problems that have been experienced with the DPC 
institution, originally established in Wajir, across Kenya, support this point. Home grown 
and largely organic peace constituencies, may not be able to be reproduced—they may be 
epiphenomenal, and unique to very particular conflict settings.  
Compounding conflict pressures can overwhelm informal organizational 
structures and undermine local peace processes. Across Northern Kenya, local 
institutions are under great pressure, especially along international borders, and especially 
in relation to increasing developmental interests in previously marginalized areas. 
Communal resilience to inter-ethnic violence often breaks down following coercive state 
responses to local violence and symbolic acts of violence. Informal institutions may 
weaken over time as a conflict persists or spills across international borders. Kenya’s 
spectrum of local, informal institutional structures may be able to contain a majority of 
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threats; however, political and economic pressures related to rapid political and economic 
change in the Northern periphery often overwhelm informal peacebuilding organizations.  
Cases selected for the study capture variation with a single state, across an 
environmental context similar to the larger Sahel region of Sub-Saharan. Findings likely 
are generalizable for other periphery regions where pastoralism and inter-group conflict 
are inter-related such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. The primary 
implication for the larger region is that local peacebuilding processes may face similar 
scope conditions. Cohesive coalitions of local associations effectively contain escalation 
in most cases, yet the use of coercive force of state actors may fragment and undermine 
preventive efforts, and create windows for escalation.  
Nigeria is a similar case where coercive state responses to local conflicts impact 
and potentially exacerbate inter-group conflict dynamics. In particular, dynamics similar 
to conditions in Turkana and Isiolo are playing out between the Ijaw and Itsekiri 
communities at the local level in Warri, Nigeria. Conflict is escalating in Warri South 
West district in relation to competition over access to local political positions with power 
to distribute resources from a new Export Processing Zone. Analysis suggests military 
intervention to try to control local clashes only further exacerbated the conflict, 
increasing grievances around inequality in the state’s response (see, Blyth 2015). 
Understanding the interactive effects of state and non-state response to local conflicts 
remains relevant across a broad range of developmental states in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Beyond the African context, further comparative work in other regions of the 
world with limited state presence, and high vulnerability to inter-ethnic clashes, such as 
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Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, or Nepal could help to test the robustness of the 
approach. Comparing various informal coalitions and patterns violence across multiple 
countries would help assess to the generalizability of the proposed relationship between 
state and non-state modes of response to local conflicts across different conflict settings.  
Under storms of compounding conflict pressures, violence can spread even in 
areas with relatively strong civic organizations. Under conditions of state fragility, 
persistent human insecurity, and the indiscriminant use of force by the state, relatively 
resilient communities still have breaking points. Notwithstanding, local institutions are 
critical for fostering resilience to violence. The core actors necessary for effective 
preventive actions are peace elites who function as local monitors, local security actors, 
and coordinators of rapid response to crises. Where the state is weak and not capable of 
providing immediate security, local, informal institutional arrangements are important for 
containing violence. Informal coalitions comprised of local peace committees, faith based 
organizations, and councils of elders, unified through local peace elites, make violence 
less likely to escalate in communities vulnerable to collective violence. Where security is 
largely in the hands of citizens, organizational capacity for preventive responses can save 
lives. 
 
 
 310 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, W. M. 1989. “Dam Construction and the Degradation of Floodplain Forest on the 
Turkwel River, Kenya.” Land Degradation & Development 1 (3): 189–98.  
 
Adano, Wario R., Ton Dietz, Karen Witsenburg, and Fred Zaal. 2012. “Climate Change, 
Violent Conflict and Local Institutions in Kenya’s Drylands.” Journal of Peace 
Research 49 (1): 65–80. 
 
Akinwale, A. A. 2010. “Integrating the Traditional and the Modern Conflict Management 
Strategies in Nigeria.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10 (3).  
 
Albert, I.O. 2001. “The Role and Process of Action Research in the Management of 
Violent Community Conflicts in Nigeria.” In Researching Violently Divided 
Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues, edited by Marie Smyth and Gillian 
Robinson. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain 
Wacziarg. 2003. “Fractionalization.” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2): 155–94.  
 
Al Jazeera. 2015. “Kenyan Minister Denies Police ‘Death Squads.’” Accessed April 7. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/12/kenyan-minister-
denies-police-death-squads-2014129214858225364.html. 
 
Allen, Chris. 1999. “Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa.” Review of 
African Political Economy 26 (81): 367–84. 
 
Anderson, David. 1986. “Stock Theft and Moral Economy in Colonial Kenya.” Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute 56 (4): 399–416. 
 
Anderson, David, and Emma Lochery. 2008. “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift 
Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2 
(2): 328–43.  
 
Anderson, David M. 2002. “Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in 
Kenya.” African Affairs 101 (405): 531–55.  
 
Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. 2015. “Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and Its 
Enemies in Eastern Africa.” African Affairs 114 (454): 1–27.  
 
Aslaksen, Silje, and Ragnar Torvik. 2006. “A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in 
Rentier States*.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108 (4): 571–85.  
 
 311 
 
Atieno-Odhiambo, Elisha Stephen. 2002. “Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities 
of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya.” African Studies 61 (2): 223–49.  
 
Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of 
International Intervention. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ayittey, George B. N. 2006. Indigenous African Institutions. Ardsley, NY: Transnational 
Publishers. 
 
Azarya, Victor. 1996. Nomads and the State in Africa: The Political Roots of 
Marginality. Research Series; 9. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
Bailer, Stefanie, Thilo Bodenstein, and V. Finn Heinrich. 2013. “Explaining the Strength 
of Civil Society: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data.” International Political 
Science Review 34 (3): 289–309. 
 
Barkan, Joel. 1994. “Resurrecting Modernization Theory and the Emergence of Civil 
Society in Kenya and Nigeria.” In Political Development and the New Realism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 87–116. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 
 
———. 2012. “Ethnic Fractionalization and the Propensity for Conflict in Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania.” In On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions 
Within Societies, edited by Jeffrey Herbst, Terence McNamee, and Greg Mills. 
London, UK: Profile. 
 
Basedau, Matthias, and Jann Lay. 2009. “Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The 
Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict.” 
Journal of Peace Research 46 (6): 757–76. 
 
Bates, Robert. 1982. “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics 
in Contemporary Africa.” In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy 
Dilemmas, edited by Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola. Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press. 
 
———. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
———. Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict. Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard University. 
 
———. 2008. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. 1st ed. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 312 
 
Bayart, Jean-Francois, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou. 1999. The Criminalization of 
the State in Africa. James Currey. 
 
Belloni, Roberto. 2001. “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
Journal of Peace Research 38 (2): 163–80. 
 
Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2009. “War and Local Collective Action in Sierra 
Leone.” Journal of Public Economics 93 (11–12): 1144–57. 
 
Bell, Sam R., David Cingranelli, Amanda Murdie, and Alper Caglayan. 2013. “Coercion, 
Capacity, and Coordination: Predictors of Political Violence.” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 30 (3): 240–62. 
 
Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. 2006. “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments 
in Case Study Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (1): 455–76.  
 
Berman, Bruce. 1992. Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of 
Domination. East African Publishers. 
 
Berman, Bruce, and John Lonsdale. 1992. Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa. 
Ohio University Press. 
 
Berry, Jeffrey M. 2002. “Validity and Reliability Issues In Elite Interviewing.”  Political 
Science & Politics (04): 679–82.  
 
Bertocchi, Graziella, and Andrea Guerzoni. 2012. “Growth, History, or Institutions What 
Explains State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa?” Journal of Peace Research 49 
(6): 769–83.  
 
Blyth, Hannah. 2015. “Conflict Briefing: Warri South West, Delta State.” Accessed May 
11. http://www.library.fundforpeace.org/conflictbulletin-epz-ugborodo-1505. 
 
Boege, Volker. 2006. “Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation — Potentials 
and Limits.” Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. 
 
Boege, Volker, M. Anne Brown, and Kevin P. Clements. 2009. “Hybrid Political Orders, 
Not Fragile States.” Peace Review 21 (March): 13–21. 
 
Bollig, Michael. 2010. Risk Management in a Hazardous Environment: A Comparative 
Study of Two Pastoral Societies. Springer Science & Business Media. 
 
Bollig, Michael, Michael Schnegg, and Hans-Peter Wotzka, eds. 2013. Pastoralism in 
Africa: Past, Present and Future. New York: Berghahn Books. 
 313 
 
 
Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial 
Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 2014. Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of 
Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Branch, Branch, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, eds. 2010. Our Turn to Eat: 
Politics in Kenya since 1950. Berlin, Germany. 
 
Branch, Daniel. 2009. Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil 
War, and Decolonization. 1 edition. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
———. 2011. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. 1st edition. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Brass, Paul R. 1997. Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of 
Collective Violence. Princeton University Press. 
 
Brosché, Johan, and Emma Elfversson. 2012. “Communal Conflict, Civil War, and the 
State: Complexities, Connections, and the Case of Sudan.” African Journal on 
Conflict Resolution 12 (1): 33–60. 
 
Brown, Stephen. 2003. “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring ‘Ethnic Clashes’ in Kenya.” 
From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflict, 69–100. 
 
Bunker, Robert J. 2012. Non-State Threats and Future Wars. Routledge. 
 
Butler, Christopher K., and Scott Gates. 2012. “African Range Wars: Climate, Conflict, 
and Property Rights.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (1): 23–34. 
 
Buur, Lars, and Helene Maria Kyed. 2007. State Recognition and Democratization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Chiefs? Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Cameron, Lynne, Simon Weatherbed, and Evans Onyiego. 2013. “Living with 
Uncertainty Working Paper 8.” Open University. 
 
Carment, David, and Patrick James. 1996. “Escalation of Ethnic Conflict: A Survey and 
Assessment.” Carleton University, Online Resources. 
http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/429/docs/Escalation_of_Ethnic_Conflict_-
_A_Survey_and_Assessment.pdf. 
 314 
 
 
Carnegie Commission. 1998. Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive 
Summary. New York: Carnegie Corporation. 
 
Carpenter, Ami. 2014. Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad. New 
York: Springer. 
 
Carrier, Neil, and Hassan Kochore. 2014. “Navigating Ethnicity and Electoral Politics in 
Northern Kenya: The Case of the 2013 Election.” Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 8 (1): 135–52. 
 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. Inequality, 
Grievances, and Civil War. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chandler, David. 2013. “Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity: Rethinking 
‘hidden’ Agency and ‘resistance.’” Peacebuilding 1 (1): 17–32.  
 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?” Annual Review 
of Political Science 9 (1): 397–424. 
 
Chapman, Chris, and Alexander Kagaha. 2009. “Resolving Conflicts Using Traditional 
Mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso Regions of Uganda.” Minority Rights 
Group Briefing.  
 
Cheeseman, Nic. 2008. “The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction.” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 2 (2): 166–84.  
 
Chimp Reports. 2015. “Kenya’s Police Accused of ‘Eliminating’ Radical Muslims.” 
Accessed April 7. http://chimpreports.com/kenyas-police-accused-of-eliminating-
radical-muslims/. 
 
Chirot, Daniel, and Clark McCauley. 2010. Why Not Kill Them All?: The Logic and 
Prevention of Mass Political Murder. Princeton University Press. 
 
Chopra, Tanja. 2009. “When Peacebuilding Contradicts Statebuilding: Notes from the 
Arid Lands of Kenya.” International Peacekeeping 16 (4): 531–45. 
 
Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. 1979. “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: 
A Routine Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review 44 (4): 588–608.  
 
Colaresi, Michael P. 2007. Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and 
Conflict Escalation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 315 
 
Colletta, N.J., M.L. Cullen, World Bank. Environmentally, and Socially Sustainable 
Development Network. 2000. The Nexus Between Violent Conflict, Social Capital 
and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda. World Bank, 
Social Development Family, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development Network. 
 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56 (4): 563–95. 
 
Collins, Randall. 2009. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
 
De Figueiredo, Rui, and Barry Weingast. 1997. “Rationality of Fear: Political 
Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict.” Military Intervention in Civil Wars.  
 
Denskus, Tobias. 2007. “Peacebuilding Does Not Build Peace.” Development in Practice 
17 (4/5): 656–62. 
 
Desch, Michael C. 1996. “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International 
Organization 50 (2): 237–68.  
 
Donnan, Hastings. 1999. Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State. Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
 
Druckman, Daniel, and Mara Olekalns. 2011. “Turning Points in Negotiation.” 
Negotiation & Conflict Management Research 4 (1): 1–7. 
 
Duffield, Mark. 1997. “Ethnic War and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad 
Perspective.” In War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence, 
edited by David Turton, 203–16. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.  
 
Eaton, Dave. 2008a. “The Business of Peace: Raiding and Peace Work Along the Kenya-
Uganda Border (part I).” African Affairs 107 (426): 89–110. 
 
———. 2008b. “The Business of Peace: Raiding and Peace Work Along the Kenya-
Uganda Border (part II).” African Affairs 107 (427): 243–59. 
 
Edwards, Harry T. 1985. “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema.” 
Harvard Law Review 99: 668. 
 
Eisenstadt, S. N. 1973. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. 
Beverly Hills Calif.: SAGE Publications. 
 
 316 
 
Elder, Claire, Susan Stigant, and Jonas Claes. 2014. “Elections and Violent Conflict in 
Kenya: Making Prevention Stick.” United States Institute of Peace.  
 
Elkins, Caroline. 2005. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in 
Kenya. Macmillan. 
 
Erdmann, Gero, and Ulf Engel. 2007. “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review 
and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 
45 (1): 95–119. 
 
Eriksen, Siri H, Katrina Brown, and P Mick Kelly. 2005. “The Dynamics of 
Vulnerability: Locating Coping Strategies in Kenya and Tanzania.” Geographical 
Journal 171 (4): 287–305.  
 
Eriksen, Siri, and Jeremy Lind. 2009. “Adaptation as a Political Process: Adjusting to 
Drought and Conflict in Kenya’s Drylands.” Environmental Management 43 (5): 
817–35. 
 
Farson, Negley. 1953. Last Chance in Africa. Gollancz. 
 
Fearon, James D. 1991. “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science.” 
World Politics 43 (2): 169–95. 
 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” The 
American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715–35. 
 
———. 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” International 
Organization 54 (04): 845–77. 
 
Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” 
American Political Science Review 97 (01): 75–90. 
 
Fein, Helen. 1979. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish 
Victimization during the Holocaust. Free Press New York. 
 
Fjelde, H. 2009. “Sub-National Determinants of Non-State Conflicts in Nigeria, 1991-
2006 Sins of Omission and Commission: The Quality of Government and Civil 
Conflict.” Doctoral Thesis. 
 
Fox, Roddy. 1996. “Bleak Future for Multi-Party Elections in Kenya.” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 34 (04): 597–607.  
 
 317 
 
Frank, Emily. 2002. “A Participatory Approach for Local Peace Initiatives: The Lodwar 
Border Harmonization Meeting.” Africa Today 49 (4): 69–87. 
 
Fratkin, Elliot, and Eric Abella Roth. 2006. As Pastoralists Settle: Social, Health, and 
Economic Consequences of the Pastoral Sedentarization in Marsabit District, 
Kenya. Springer. 
 
Gagnon, Valère Philip. 2006. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Gakuo Mwangi, Oscar. 2006. “Kenya: Conflict in the ‘Badlands’: The Turbi Massacre in 
Marsabit District.” Review of African Political Economy 33 (107): 81–91. 
 
Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace 
Research 6 (3): 167–91. 
 
Gelsdorf, Kirsten, Daniel Maxwell, and Dyan Mazurana. 2012. “Livelihoods, Basic 
Services, and Social Protection in Northern Uganda and Karamoja.” Working 
Paper #4. Cambridge, MA: Feinstein International Center. 
 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies And Theory 
Development In The Social Sciences. MIT Press. 
 
George, Alexander L., and Jane E. Holl. 1997. The Warning-Response Problem and 
Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy. Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict. 
 
Goffard, Christopher. 2012. You Will See Fire: A Search for Justice in Kenya. W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
 
Goitom, Hanibal. 2014. “Global Legal Monitor: Kenya: Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 
Enacted.” Web page. December 30.  
 
Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 2009. Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the 
Ongoing Assault on Humanity. 1st edition. New York: PublicAffairs. 
 
Goldsmith, Paul. 1997. “Cattle, Khat, and Guns: Trade, Conflict, and Security on 
Northern Kenya’s Highland-Lowland Interface.” In A Case Study, A Paper 
Prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of 
Africa. 
 
———. 2000. “The Land of Jilali: Travels Through Kenya’s Drought-Stricken North.” 
African Studies Quarterly 4 (3).  
 318 
 
 
Greiner, Clemens. 2013. “Guns, Land, and Votes: Cattle Rustling and the Politics of 
Boundary (re)making in Northern Kenya.” African Affairs 112 (447): 216–37.  
 
Gurr, Ted. 2000. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Habyarimana, James P., Jeremy Weinstein, Daniel N. Posner, and Humphries Macartan. 
2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. Russell Sage 
Foundation Series on Trust. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Haer, Roos, and Inna Becher. 2011. “A Methodological Note on Quantitative Field 
Research in Conflict Zones: Get Your Hands Dirty.” International Journal of 
Social Research Methodology 15 (1): 1–13. 
 
Hatcher, Jessica. 2014. “The Oil Race Is on in the Cradle of Humanity.” Newsweek. 
November 26. http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/05/oil-race-cradle-humanity-
287236.html. 
 
Hendrix, Cullen, and Henk-Jan Brinkman. 2013. “Food Insecurity and Conflict 
Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks.” Stability: International 
Journal of Security and Development 2 (2). 
 
Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical 
Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 
273–85. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control. Princeton University Press. 
 
Hesselbein, Gabi, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and James Putzel. 2006. “Economic and 
Political Foundations of State-Making in Africa: Understanding State 
Reconstruction.” In Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2. London, UK: 
Crisis States Research Centre, LSE. 
 
Hoglund, Kristine, and Magnus Oberg. 2011. Understanding Peace Research: Methods 
and Challenges. Taylor & Francis. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press. 
 
———. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. University of California Press. 
 
 319 
 
Hydén, Goran. 2006. African Politics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ibrahim, Dekha, and Janice Jenner. 1996. “Wajir Community Based Conflict 
Management.” In USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn 
of Africa. 
 
Imobighe, Thomas A., African Strategic, and Peace Research Group. 2003. Civil Society 
and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. Spectrum Books Ltd. 
 
Jackson, Richard. 2002. “Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a 
Framework of Analysis.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20 (1): 29–52.  
 
Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The 
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood.” World Politics 35 (01): 1–24.  
 
Jha, Saumitra. 2008. “Trade, Institutions and Religious Tolerance: Evidence from India.” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=948734. 
 
Johannes, Eliza M., Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni. 2014. “Oil Discovery in Turkana 
County, Kenya: A Source of Conflict or Development?” African Geographical 
Review 0 (0): 1–23.  
 
Johansson, Emma. 2011. “Managing Communal Conflicts: The Role of the State.” In 
Managing Communal Conflicts: The Role of the State.  
 
Joseph, Richard A. 1983. “Class, State, and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria.” The Journal 
of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 21 (November): 21–38. 
 
Kahn, Herman. 2009. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. Transaction Publishers. 
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006a. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 2012. “Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending 
the Control-Collaboration Model.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24 (4): 658–
68.  
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek E Masoud. 2008. Order, Conflict, and 
Violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 320 
 
Kanyinga, Karuti. 2009. “The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity 
and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya.” Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 27 (3): 325–44.  
 
Kaplan, Oliver. 2013. “Protecting Civilians in Civil War The Institution of the ATCC in 
Colombia.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (3): 351–67. 
 
Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs. New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
———. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme 
Ethnic Violence.” International Security 30 (4): 45–86. 
 
Kavanagh, Michael. 2014. “Tullow Struggles to Please Locals at Its Oil Discoveries in 
Kenya.” Financial Times, July 16. 
 
“Kenya Exploration and Appraisal Update.” 2015. Tullow Oil Llc. January 22.  
 
Kiernan, Ben. 2009. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination 
from Sparta to Darfur. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press. 
 
Kimenyi, Mwangi. 2013. “Devolution and Resource Sharing in Kenya.” Brookings 
Institute. October 22.  
 
Kimenyi, Mwangi, and Ndungu Njuguna. 2005. “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has 
Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?” In Understanding Civil War: 
Africa, edited by Paul Collier. World Bank Publications. 
 
King, Charles. 2004. “The Micropolitics of Social Violence.” World Politics 56 (03): 
431–55. 
 
King, Gary, Robert Owen Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Enquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press. 
 
Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2001. “‘Ethnic Clashes’ and Winning Elections: The Case of 
Kenya’s Electoral Despotism.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue 
Canadienne Des Études Africaines 35 (3): 473–517. 
 
Kochore, Hassan. 2013. “(Re)building the Nation: Development, National Cohesion and 
Integration Discourse in Northern Kenya.” Oxford University.  
 
 321 
 
Krätli, Saverio, Jeremy Swift, and Institute of Development Studies (Brighton England). 
1999. Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature 
Review. 
 
Kumar, Chetan. 2011. “Building National ‘Infrastructures for Peace’: UN Assistance for 
Internally Negotiated Solutions to Violent Conflict.” In Peacemaking: From 
Practice to Theory [2 Volumes]: From Practice to Theory, edited by Susan Allen 
Nan, Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, and Andrea Bartoli. ABC-CLIO. 
 
Kumssa, Asfaw, John F. Jones, and James Herbert Williams. 2009. “Conflict and Human 
Security in the North Rift and North Eastern Kenya.” International Journal of 
Social Economics 36 (10): 1008–20. 
 
Kurimoto, Eisei. 1998. Conflict, Age & Power in North East Africa: Age Systems in 
Transition. J. Currey. 
 
Laitin, David D. 2007. Nations, States, and Violence. New York: University Press. 
 
Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1996. “Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21 (2): 41. 
 
Lake, David A., and Donald S. Rothchild, eds. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Large, Judith, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2006. Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: 
Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century. 2 Vols. Stockholm: International IDEA. 
 
Lawson, Letitia, and Donald Rothchild. 2005. “Sovereignty Reconsidered.” Current 
History 104 (682): 228–35. 
 
Le Billon, Philippe. 2003. “Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in 
Armed Conflicts.” Journal of International Development 15 (4): 413–26. 
doi:10.1002/jid.993. 
 
Lederach, John Paul. 2012. “The Origins and Evolution of Infrastructures for Peace: A 
Personal Reflection.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 7 (3): 8–13.  
 
Lemarchand, René. 1972. “Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: 
Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building.” The American Political Science 
Review 66 (1): 68–90. 
 
 322 
 
———. 2007. “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” African Affairs 106 (422): 1–20.  
 
Lemarchand, Rene. 2011. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Levy, Jack S. 2008. “Counterfactuals and Case Studies.” Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology, 627–44. 
 
Lewis, Peter. 1996. “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline 
in Nigeria.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (01): 79–103. 
 
Licklider, Roy. 2005. “Comparative Studies of Long Wars.” In Grasping the Nettle: 
Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace 
Press. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1969. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21 (2): 207–25. 
 
Lindenmayer, Elisabeth, and Josie Lianna Kaye. 2015. “A Choice for Peace? The Story 
of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya.” International Peace Institute. 
Accessed April 17, 2015.  
 
Lobell, Steven E., and Philip Mauceri. 2004. Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: 
Explaining Diffusion and Escalation. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Longman, Timothy. 2009. Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Lonsdale, J. M. 1977. “The Politics of Conquest: The British in Western Kenya, 1894-
1908.” The Historical Journal 20 (4): 841–70. 
 
Lonsdale, John, and Bruce Berman. 1979. “Coping with the Contradictions: The 
Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914.” The Journal of African 
History 20 (4): 487–505. 
 
Lustick, Ian. 1979. “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus 
Control.” World Politics 31 (03): 325–44. 
 
Lynch, Gabrielle. 2006. “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya 
1.” Review of African Political Economy 33 (107): 49–65. 
 
 323 
 
———. 2011. I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
MacGinty, Roger. 2008. “Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace.” 
Cooperation and Conflict 43 (2): 139–63.  
 
Malan, Jannie. 1997. Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa. Accord Durban. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press. 
 
Mazrui, Ali AlʼAmin. 1998. The Power of Babel: Language & Governance in the African 
Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
Mazurana, Dyan, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale. 2013. Research Methods in Conflict 
Settings: A View from Below. Cambridge University Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug. 1983. “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.” American 
Sociological Review 48 (6): 735–54. 
 
McMahon, Patrice C. 2007. Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and 
Transnational Networks in Eastern Europe. Syracuse University Press. 
 
Meagher, Kate. 2007. “Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys 
Vigilante Group of South-Eastern Nigeria.” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 45 (01): 89–115.  
 
———. 2012. “The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid 
Governance in Africa.” Development and Change 43 (5): 1073–1101. 
 
Menkhaus, Ken. 2005. “Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis.” Produced for review 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), prepared 
for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI). 
 
———. 2008. “The Rise of a Mediated State in Northern Kenya: The Wajir Story and Its 
Implications for State-Building.” Afrika Focus 21 (2): 23–38. 
 
———. 2013. “Making Sense of Resilience in Peacebuilding Contexts: Approaches, 
Applications, Implications.” Geneva Peacebuilding Platform.  
 
———. 2015. “Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland.” Danish Deming 
Group. 
 
 324 
 
Migdal, Joel S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mine, Yoichi, Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and Thandika Mkandawire, eds. 
2013. Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Mirzeler, Mustafa, and Crawford Young. 2000. “Pastoral Politics in the Northeast 
Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent.” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 38 (03): 407–29.  
 
Mkutu, Kennedy. 2001. Pastoralism and Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Department of 
Peace Studies, University of Bradford. 
 
———. 2003. Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region. 
Saferworld. 
 
Mkutu, Kennedy, and Gerald Wandera. 2013. Policing the Periphery: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Kenya Police Reserves. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies. 
 
Morgan, Forrest E., Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger 
Cliff. 2008. Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. 
Rand Corporation. 
 
Morton, Jonathan R. 2008. “Religious Peacebuilding Interventions in Sudan: A 
Comparison of Intrareligious and Interreligious Conflict Resolution Initiatives.” 
George Mason University.  
 
Mueller, Susanne D. 2008. “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 2 (2): 185–210.  
 
———. 2011. “Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in 
Kenya.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29 (1): 99–117.  
 
Mungeam, G. H. 1970. “Masai and Kikuyu Responses to the Establishment of British 
Administration in the East Africa Protectorate.” The Journal of African History 11 
(1): 127–43. 
 
Murdie, Amanda. 2014. Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International 
NGOs (Forthcoming). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
———. 2009. “Signals Without Borders: The Conditional Impact of INGOs.” PhD 
Dissertation, Emory University. 
 325 
 
 
Murdie, Amanda M., and David R. Davis. 2012. “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events 
Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs1.” International Studies 
Quarterly 56 (1): 1–16. 
 
Murithi, Tim. 2008. “African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and 
Conflict Resolution.” In Peace & Conflict in Africa, edited by David J. Francis. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
Murunga, Godwin R., and Shadrack W. Nasong’o. 2007. Kenya: The Struggle for 
Democracy. Zed Books. 
 
National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. 2005. 
“Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report.” Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Ndungu, James. 2009. “Herders, Guns and the State: Historical Perspective of the 
Dassanetch Frontier Areas and the Politics of Arms in Northern Kenya.” 
University of Nairobi Masters Thesis, Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Nilsson, Desirée. 2012. “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and 
Durable Peace.” International Interactions 38 (2): 243–66.  
 
Odendaal, Andries. 2013. A Crucial Link: Local Peace Committees and National 
Peacebuilding. Arlington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Harvard Economic Studies, v. 124. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Opalo, Ken. 2011. “Ethnicity and Elite Coalitions: The Origins of ‘Big Man’ 
Presidentialism in Africa.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. 
 
Orjuela, Camilla. 2003. “Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?” Journal 
of Peace Research 40 (2): 195–212.  
 
Osamba, Joshia. 2000. “The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in 
North-Western Kenya.” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (2): 11–37. 
 
Paffenholz, Thania. 2010. Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
 
 326 
 
Pearlman, Wendy. 2011. Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pearlman, Wendy, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2012. “Nonstate Actors, 
Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 3–
15.  
 
Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High.” 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/. 
 
Pkalya, Ruto, Mohamud Adan, and Isabella Masinde. 2003. Conflict in Northern Kenya: 
A Focus on the Internally-Displaced Conflict Victims in Northern Kenya. ITDG. 
 
Pkalya, Ruto, Mohamud Adan, Isabella Masinde, Betty Rabar, and Martin Karimi. 2004. 
Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Pokot, 
Turkana, Samburu, and Marakwet. Intermediate Technology Development 
Group–Eastern Africa. 
 
Posen, Barry R. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” In Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security, edited by Michael E. Brown. Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Posner, Daniel N. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
“Predicting Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana 
County.” 2014. Accessed November 24. 
http://www.thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-
precarious-case-turkana-county. 
 
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press. 
 
Putzel, James. 2005. “War, State Collapse and Reconstruction.” Monograph. September. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/839/. 
 
Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1972a. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory 
of Democratic Instability. 1st ed. Longman. 
 
———. 1972b. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. Merrill 
Political Science Series. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill. 
 
 327 
 
Raeymaekers, Timothy, Ken Menkhaus, and Koen Vlassenroot. 2008. “State and Non-
State Regulation in African Protracted Crises: Governance without Government.” 
Afrika Focus 21 (2): 7–21. 
 
Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Havard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. 
“Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Special 
Data Feature.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (5): 651–60. 
 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. “Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: 
Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the ‘Crucial Case’ of Papua New Guinea.” 
International Security 25 (3): 162–85. 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2010. “Between Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Between Social 
Engineering and Post-Colonialism.” Civil Wars 12 (1-2): 167–75.  
 
———. 2013. “Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace.” Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 38 (4): 271–87.  
 
Richmond, Oliver P., and Audra Mitchell. 2011. Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday 
Agency to Post-Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Risse, Thomas. 2013. Governance Without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas of 
Limited Statehood. Columbia University Press. 
 
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2009. “If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die”: How Genocide Was 
Stopped in East Timor. Princeton University Press. 
 
Ron, James. 2000. “Boundaries and Violence: Repertoires of State Action along the 
Bosnia/Yugoslavia Divide.” Theory and Society 29 (5): 609–49.  
 
Ross, Michael L. 2013. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development 
of Nations. Reprint edition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Rothchild, Donald. 1995. “Ethnic Bargaining and State Breakdown in Africa.” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1 (1): 54–72. 
 
———. 1973. Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and 
Decolonization. Published for the Institute of Race Relations London by Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Rubin, Barnett R. 2002. Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action. New 
York: Century Foundation Press.  
 
 328 
 
Rubin, Jeffrey Z., Dean G. Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim. 1994. Social Conflict: Escalation, 
Stalemate, and Settlement. McGraw-Hill Book Company.  
 
Ryan, Jordan. 2012. “Infrastructures for Peace as a Path to Resilient Societies: An 
Institutional Perspective.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 7 (3): 14–24.  
 
Saideman, Stephen M., and Marie-Joelle J. Zahar, eds. 2008. Intra-State Conflict, 
Governments and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance. 1 edition. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas, and Moses Shayo. 2013. “Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict.” 
American Political Science Review 107 (02): 294–325.  
 
Sampson, Robert J., and Per-Olof H. Wikstrom. 2008. “The Social Order of Violence in 
Chicago and Stockholm Neighborhoods: A Comparative Inquiry.” In Order, 
Conflict, and Violence, edited by Stathis N Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek 
Masoud. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schlee, Günther. 1985. “Interethnic Clan Identities among Cushitic-Speaking 
Pastoralists.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 55 (1): 17–38.  
 
———. 2008. Ethnopolitics and Gabra Origins. Vol. 103. Working Papers / Max Planck 
Institute for Social Anthropology. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology. 
Schlee, Günther, and Abdullahi A. Shongolo. 2012. Pastoralism and Politics in Northern 
Kenya and Southern Ethiopia. Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, N.Y.: James 
Currey. 
 
Scott-Villiers, Patta, Tom Ondicho, Grace Lubaale, Diana Ndung’u, Nathaniel Kabala, 
and Marjoke Oosterom. 2014. “Roots and Routes of Political Violence in Kenya’s 
Civil and Political Society: A Case Study of Marsabit County.” Institute of 
Development Studies.  
 
Selway, Joel, and Kharis Templeman. 2012. “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict 
Reduction in Divided Societies.” Comparative Political Studies 45 (12): 1542–71.  
 
Semelin, Jacques, and Stanley Hoffman. 2009. Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of 
Massacre and Genocide. Translated by Cynthia Schoch. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Shamaro, Roba. 2014. “The Politics of Pastoral Violence: A Case Study of Isiolo County, 
Northern Kenya.” Working Paper 095. Nairobi, Kenya: Future Agricultures. 
 
 329 
 
Shortland, Anja, Katerina Christopoulou, and Charalampos Makatsoris. 2013. “War and 
Famine, Peace and Light? The Economic Dynamics of Conflict in Somalia 1993–
2009.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (5): 545–61.  
 
Sisk, Timothy D. 1995. Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
———. 2011. Beyond Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and 
Peacemaking. Accessed October 6.  
 
Sisk, Timothy D., and Andrew Reynolds. 1998. Elections and Conflict Management in 
Africa. US Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Smock, D. R. 1997. “Building on Locally-Based and Traditional Peace Processes.” 
Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in Africa: Findings from USIP-
Funded Projects. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.  
 
Spencer, Paul. 2004. The Samburu: A Study of Gerontocracy in a Nomadic Tribe. Reprint 
edition. London: Routledge. 
 
Sperber, Amanda. 2015. “Little Mogadishu, Under Siege.” Foreign Policy. Accessed 
May 10, 2015. 
 
SRIC. 2006. “Terrorized Citizens: Proofing Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift 
of Kenya.” Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Stanislawski, Bartosz H. 2008. “Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not 
States, But Not ‘Ungoverned Territories,’ Either.” International Studies Review 
10 (2): 366–96.  
 
Steeves, Jeffrey S. 1997. “Re‐democratisation in Kenya: ‘Unbounded Politics’ and the 
Political Trajectory towards National Elections.” The Journal of Commonwealth 
& Comparative Politics 35 (3): 27–52.  
 
Stevenson, William B., Jone L. Pearce, and Lyman W. Porter. 1985. “The Concept of 
Coalition’’ in Organization Theory and Research.” Academy of Management. The 
Academy of Management Review 10 (2): 256. 
 
Stewart, Frances. 2000. “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities.” Oxford 
Development Studies 28 (3): 245–62.  
 
———. ,ed. 2008. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence 
in Multiethnic Societies. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 330 
 
Straus, Scott. 2012. “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the 
Dynamics of Restraint.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (02): 343–62. 
 
Sullivan, John P., and Robert J. Bunker. 2002. “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and 
Warlords.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 13 (2): 40–53. 
 
Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz. 2012. “Introducing the UCDP Non-
State Conflict Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (2): 351–62.  
 
Tablino, Paolo. 1999. The Gabra: Camel Nomads of Northern Kenya. Paulines 
Publications Africa. 
 
Taylor, David Ruxton Fraser, and Fiona Mackenzie. 1992. Development from within: 
Survival in Rural Africa. Routledge.  
 
Themnér, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2014. “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2013.” Journal of 
Peace Research 51 (4): 541–54.  
 
Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu. 2015. Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia 
Border Problem 1941–2014. University Press of America. 
 
Throup, David, and Charles Hornsby. 1998. Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta 
& Moi States & the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. J. Currey. 
 
Tongeren, Paul J. M. van. 2005. People Building Peace II: Successful Stories Of Civil 
Society. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Torvik, Ragnar. 2009. “Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While 
Others Do Not?” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25 (2): 241–56.  
 
Turton, David. 2003. War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence. 
Boydell & Brewer Ltd. 
 
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2013. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th 
Century. Cornell University Press. 
 
Van Tongeren, Paul. 2013. “Creating Infrastructures for Peace–Experiences at Three 
Continents.” Pensamiento Propio, March, 45–55. 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
 331 
 
———. 2003. “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality.” Perspectives on Politics 1 
(01): 85–99. 
 
———. 2007. “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Vasquez, Patricia I. 2013. “Kenya at a Crossroads: Hopes and Fears Concerning the 
Development of Oil and Gas Reserves.” International Development Policy | 
Revue internationale de politique de développement, no. 4.3 (November).  
 
Watson, Elizabeth E. 2010. “A ‘hardening of Lines’: Landscape, Religion and Identity in 
Northern Kenya.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 4 (2): 201–20.  
 
Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. 2nd ed. 
Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Wehr, Paul, and John Paul Lederach. 1991. “Mediating Conflict in Central America.” 
Journal of Peace Research 28 (1): 85–98. 
 
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Weiss, Taya. 2004. Guns in the Borderlands: Reducing the Demand for Small Arms. 
Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Wepundi, Mannasseh. 2012. “Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in 
Kenya: An Assessment.” Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies. 
 
Whittaker, Hannah. 2008. “Pursuing Pastoralists: The Stigma of Shifta during the ‘Shifta 
War’ in Kenya, 1963-68.” http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/8018. 
 
———. 2014. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya. Brill. 
 
Wilkinson, Steven I. 2006. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots 
in India. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. “Ethnic Politics and 
Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set.” 
American Sociological Review 74 (2): 316–37.  
 
 332 
 
Witsenburg, Karen M., and Wario R. Adano. 2009. “Of Rain and Raids: Violent 
Livestock Raiding in Northern Kenya.” Civil Wars 11 (4): 514–38. 
 
Wood, Reed M. 2014. “From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for 
Violence.” International Organization 68 (04): 979–99.  
 
World Bank. 2015. “The World Bank Microdata Library - Kenya.” 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya. 
 
Wulf, Herbert. 2005. Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Zartman, I. William. 1989. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. 2nd 
ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 2000. Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict“ Medicine.” 
Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
 
———. 2001. Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation. Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
 
Zartman, I. William, and J. Lewis Rasmussen. 1997. “Peacemaking in International 
Conflict.” Methods and Techniques. Washington DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press. 
 333 
 
APPENDIX: LIST OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS318 
Abdi, Osman Ibrahim. Chairman, Dadaab District Peace Committee (Nairobi: September 
11, 2014).  
 
Abdi, Abdishakur. Chairman, Moyale District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 31, 2014). 
 
Abdu, Philip. Peacebuilding Programs Manager, Sauti Moja Marsabit (Marsabit: 
September 10, 2014). 
 
Abduba, Lokho. Women’s Representative, Marsabit County Government (Marsabit: 
September 11, 2014). 
 
Abdulai, Maalim Abdul. Teacher, South Horr Primary School (South Horr: August 21, 
2014). 
 
Abdullahi, Abdi Rahaman. Chairman, Banisa District Peace Committee (Nairobi: 
September 11, 2014). 
 
Abubakar, Hussein Hassan. Chairman, Balambala District Peace Committee (Nairobi: 
July 28, 2014). 
 
Abubakar, Abdul Aziz. Program Manager, Community Organization Practitioners 
Association of Kenya (July 17, 2014). 
 
Adano, Galgallo Tuye. Councilor (former) and Gabra Elder, North Horr District (North 
Horr: September 30, 2014). 
 
Adano, Guyo. Peace Program Manager, Pastoralist Integrated Support Program 
(Marsabit: September 15, 2014). 
 
Adano, Elema. Chairman, North Horr District Peace Committee (North Horr: July 23, 
2014). 
 
Aftin, Maalim. Mandera Peacebuilding Programme Officer (former), United Nations 
Development Program (Nairobi: August 8, 2014). 
 
Akoule, Joseph. Chairman, SIKOM Peace Network and Reformed Warrior (Nairobi: 
August 5, 2014). 
                                                
318 All interview notes were transcribed and uploaded to password protected site. Position of participant is 
at time of interview or focus group. Full names and time and place of interview listed unless participant 
requested anonymity, or comments and contributions to research necessitate anonymity based on IRB 
protocol.  
 334 
 
 
Akuwam, Losike Catherine. Program Officer, Lokichoggio, Oropoi and Kakuma 
Development Organization (LOKADO) (Nairobi: August 19, 2014). 
 
Alew, Simon. Chairman, Pokot North District Peace Committee (Kitale: July 21, 2014). 
 
Ali, Shoba. Peacebuilding and Cohesion Manager, Pastoralist Women for Health and 
Education Isiolo (Nairobi: August 18, 2014). 
 
Alot, Magaga. Head of Corporate Communications, East African Community (Nairobi: 
July 19, 2013). 
 
Aluoch, Ruth. Program Manager, National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Management (Nairobi: July 24, 2013). 
 
Amfry, Amony. Program Manager, SAPCONE Turkana (Lodwar: August 6, 2014). 
 
Atani, Abdi. Teacher, North Horr Secondary School (North Horr: September 18, 2014). 
 
Atikine, Justine. Women’s Representative, Teso South District Peace Committee 
(Marsabit: September 17, 2014). 
 
Biko, Ahmed. Program Manager, National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Management (Nairobi: August 8, 2014). 
 
Bukuno, Hilary Halkano. Peacebuilding Specialist, Children’s Peace Program (Nairobi: 
September 21, 2014). 
 
Bulle, Abdishakur. Chairman, Wajir North District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 28, 
2014). 
 
Bungei, John. Kenya Country Director, Finn Church Aid (Kitale: July 22, 2014). 
 
Callaghan, Jay and Laura. Missionaries, Africa Inland Mission (Kurungu: August 13, 
2014). 
 
Carlson, Hanna. Program Manager – Strengthening Local Capacities for Peace, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung (Nairobi: July 17, 2013). 
 
Conflict Reporters, Turkana County Radio Station (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 2014).  
 
Demo, Rashid. Peace Programs Manager, PRASO – West Pokot (Nairobi: August 15, 
2014). 
 335 
 
 
Dida, Halima. Youth Representative, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 2013). 
 
Dokhe, Aboran. County Executive Committee Member, Marsabit County Government 
(Marsabit: September 15, 2014). 
 
Kabale, Duba. “Miss Tourism and Peace,” Marsabit County Government (Marsabit: 
September 12, 2014). 
 
Echele, Peter. Director, SAPCONE Turkana (Lodwar: July 31, 2014). 
 
Echuchuka, Lucas. Program Manager – Community Security and Resilience, United 
Nations Development Program (Lodwar: July 28, 2014). 
 
Edaan, Daniel. Program Manager, Arid and Semi-arid Lands Programme (Lodwar: July 
25, 2014). 
 
Ekadele, Patricia. Human Resources Officer, Turkana County Government (Lodwar: July 
29, 2014). 
 
Ekal, Joseph Areng. Chairman, Turkana County Peace Secretariat (Lodwar: July 30, 
2014). 
 
Ekiyeyes, Elias Hosea. Chairman, Turkana South District Peace Committee (Lodwar: 
July 23, 2014). 
 
Elema, Guyo. Deputy Director, Sauti Moja Marsabit (Marsabit: September 10, 2014). 
 
Elhussein, Iman. UNDAF Consultant, United Nations Development Program (Nairobi: 
July 22, 2013). 
 
Eregae, Immanuel. Chairman, Turkana West District Peace Committee (Lodwar: July 21, 
2014). 
 
Eripete, Peter. Secretary, Turkana County Peace Secretariat (Nairobi: September 11, 
2014). 
 
Esunyen, Naisei Erupe. Officer, Kenya Police Reserve (Sarima: August 22, 2014). 
 
Ewoi, Joseph. Program Officer, LOKADO Turkana (Nairobi: August 20, 2014). 
 
Eyaran, Emekwi. Program Manager, LOKADO Turkana (Nairobi: August 18, 2014). 
 
 336 
 
Freelance Reporters, International News Magazine (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 
2014).  
 
Frilander, Mads. Kenya Country Director, Danish Demining Group (Nairobi: July 18, 
2014). 
 
Gakunyi, Peter. Finance Administrator, Pastoralist Community Initiative and 
Development Assistance (Marsabit: September 10, 2014). 
 
Galdibe, Tumal Orto. Founder, University of the Bush and (former) UNDP Peacebuilding 
Consultant (Marsabit: September 13, 2014).  
 
Galmagar, Paul. Director, Sauti Moja Marsabit (Marsabit: September 10, 2014). 
 
Gambare, Gabriel. Director, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Diocese of 
Marsabit (Marsabit: September 15, 2014). 
 
Gatimu, Sebastian. Senior Researcher – Governance, Crime and Justice Division, 
Institute for Security Studies (Nairobi: August 8, 2014). 
 
Gitari, Christopher. Head of Office, International Center for Transitional Justice (Nairobi: 
August 8, 2014). 
 
Githaiga, Steve. CEO, Tana River Development Association (Nairobi: August 8, 2014). 
 
Godana, Denge Otuku. Chairman, Sololo District Peace Committee (Marsabit: July 23, 
2014). 
 
Godana, Godfrey. Deputy Director and Catholic Justice and Peace Coordinator, 
CARITAS Kenya (Marsabit: September 10, 2014). 
 
Godana, Hassan Ijema. Chairman, Tana River Delta District Peace Committee (Nairobi: 
July 22, 2014). 
 
Gorai, Steven Ali. CEO, Pastoralist Community Development Organization (PACODEO) 
(Marsabit: September 11, 2014). 
 
Gsilo, Yusuf. Elders Representative, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 23, 2014). 
 
Guleid, Mohamed. Deputy Governor, Isiolo County Government (Isiolo: July 25, 2014). 
 
Gurach, Gatama. Youth Representative. Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 2014). 
 
 337 
 
Guyo, Elema Diba. Dukana Ward Representative and Chairman of the County Security 
Committee, Marsabit County Government (Marsabit: September 11, 2014). 
 
Haji, Abdi. CEO, Supreme Council of Muslims (SUPKEM) (Nairobi: July 17, 2013). 
 
Hokofunacha, Daniel. Chairman, Chalbi District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 24, 
2014). 
 
Huka, Guyo Golicha. Program Officer for Commission on Cohesion, Integration, and the 
Coordination of Non-state Actors (Marsabit: September 9, 2014). 
 
Hussein, Farhiya. Program Manager, CARE Kenya (Marsabit: September 13, 2014).  
 
Ibrahim, Joseph Mursal. Member, Isiolo Peace Network (Nairobi: August 13, 2014). 
 
Irimati, Boniface. Chairman, Turkana Central District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 
30, 2014). 
 
Farhia, Jaafar. Member, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 2014).  
 
Kadenyo, Stephen. CEO, PeaceNet Kenya (Nairobi: July 15, 2013). 
 
Kahumbura, Bryan. Horn of Africa Analyst, International Crisis Group (Nairobi: August 
12, 2014). 
 
Kalunyu, Joseph. Bishop, Isiolo Diocese and Member of Isiolo Interfaith (Nairobi: 
August 21, 2014). 
 
Kamau, Kinyanjui. Director, National Council of Churches Kenya (NCCK) (Nairobi: 
July 16, 2014). 
 
Kanini, Elizabeth. Researcher – Pastoralist Violence Programme, SOMNIREC (Nairobi: 
August 8, 2014).  
 
Kapoko, Vivian. Program Officer – West Pokot, LOKADO Turkana (Nairobi: August 19, 
2014).  
 
Karani, Forole. Consultant, Food for the Hungry Marsabit (Marsabit: August 13, 2014).  
 
Kariyuki, Dominic. Director, Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli (Nairobi: July 18, 2014). 
 
Kassim, Ibrahim. Officer, Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (Nairobi: 
September 8, 2014).  
 338 
 
 
Katusya, Jennifer. Research Fellow, Security Research Information Centre (SRIC) 
(Nairobi: August 12, 2014). 
 
Kerrow, Kassim. Chairman, Mandera East District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 29, 
2014). 
 
Kibet, Ruth. Program Manager, West Pokot Justice and Peace Centre (Kitale: July 23, 
2014). 
 
Kibor, Johnstone. Senior Researcher, Security Research Information Centre (SRIC) 
(Nairobi: August 12, 2014).  
 
Kimengich, Dominic. Bishop, Diocese of Lodwar – Turkana County (Lodwar: August 1, 
2014). 
 
Kinaro, Fredrick. Business Council Representative, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 
2014). 
 
King’oro, Selah. Senior Research Officer, National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (July 23, 2013).  
 
Kinyua, Jane. Program Officer, Children’s Peace Program Crossborder Initiative (Kitale: 
July 21, 2014).  
 
Kiplagat, Bethuel, Former Chairman, National Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) (Nairobi: August 8, 2014).  
 
Kiptugen, Daniel. Program Manager, Oxfam Kenya (Nairobi: July 16, 2013).  
 
Kirimi, Steve. Program Manager, PeaceNet Kenya (Nairobi: July 15, 2013).  
 
Kiroket, Daniel. Ateker Coordinator, Mennonite Central Committee Kenya (Lodwar: 
August 5, 2014). 
 
Kitui, John. Regional Director, Christian Aid Kenya (Nairobi: July 23, 2014).  
 
Knezevic, Neven. Education and Peacebuilding Specialist for the Humanitarian Action, 
Resilience and Peacebuilding Section (HARP), UNICEF Regional Office 
(Nairobi: August 12, 2014).  
 
Kochore, Hassan. Research Fellow, National Museums of Kenya (Nairobi: September 8, 
2014).  
 339 
 
 
Korir, Cornelius. Bishop, Kitale Diocese of the Catholic Church (Kitale: July 22, 2014).  
 
Kokei, Fredrick. Priest and Peacebuilding Programs Manager, Catholic Justice and Peace 
(Kitale: July 22, 2014).  
 
Kumsaa, Asfaw. Program Manager, United Nations Centre for Regional Development 
(Nairobi: July 18, 2014).  
 
Kut, George. Consultant (former), UNDP Peacebuilding Programming (Nairobi: July 17, 
2013).  
 
Lalarar, Regina. Secretary, Samburu Women’s Association (South Horr: August 21, 
2014).  
 
Lambert, Augustine. Program Manager – Community Security and Resilience, 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Lodwar: July 27, 2014).  
 
Langaltei, Fred. Local Business Owner and Reformed Warrior (South Horr: August 14, 
2014).  
 
Lchagi, Amin. Community Health Manager, South Horr Dispensary (Kurungu: August 
14, 2014).  
 
Lealmusia, Hassan. Member, Reformed Warriors (Tuum: August 18, 2014). 
 
Lekatap, Frank. Livelihoods Manager, South Horr Environmental Project (South Horr: 
August 15, 2014).  
 
Lekenit, Ben. Unit Chairman, Rangers of Nyiro Community Conservancy (Kurungu: 
August 16, 2014).  
 
Lekenit, Boniface. Program Manager, Catholic Justice and Peace (Tuum: August 19, 
2014). 
 
Lekenit, Nabru. Officer, Kenya Police Reserve (Tuum: August 18, 2014).  
 
Lekipana, Christopher. Chief, Loiyangalani Ward (Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).  
 
Lekipana, Michael Basili. Chairman, Loiyangalani District Peace Committee 
(Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).  
 
 340 
 
Lemadada, Steven Lepaul. Teacher, Loongerin Primary School (Loongerin: August 15, 
2014).  
 
Lenaroshi, Moses. Chairman, Samburu South District Peace Committee (Nairobi: August 
14, 2014).  
 
Lenagaur, Jacob. Ex-Chief and Retired Army Major (Tuum: August 19, 2014).  
 
Lengolos, Joseph. Priest, South Horr Diocese (South Horr: August 21, 2014).  
 
Lenkurukuri, John. Chairman, Samburu Central District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 
22, 2014).  
 
Leokoe, Namugie. Teacher, Loongerin Primary School (Loongerin: August 15, 2014).  
 
Lepuleilei, Dominic. Chief, South Horr Ward, Samburu County (South Horr: August 15, 
2014).  
 
Leriano, Samson. Samburu Elder and Teacher, Loongerin Primary School (Kurungu: 
August 14, 2014).  
 
Lesas, Patrick. Assistant Chief, Loiyangalani Sub-location (Loiyangalani: August 22, 
2014). 
 
Lesas, Raphael. Former Chief, South Horr Sub-location (South Horr: August 21, 2014). 
 
Lesidka, Agnes. Local Business Owner and District Treasurer (Tuum: August 18, 2014).  
 
Lipale, Geoffrey. CEO, POKATUSA (Makutano: July 21, 2014).  
 
Locham, Raphael. Project Officer – Community Safety Programme, Danish Demining 
Group (Lodwar: July 30, 2014).  
 
Lodinyo, John. Founder, POKATUSA and Advisor to the Governor of West Pokot 
(Kitale: July 23, 2014).  
 
Lodukai, Lowa. Turkana Elder (Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).  
 
Lokinei, Johnathan Losokon. Turkana Elder and Chairman, Parikati Peace Committee 
(Tuum: August 18, 2014).  
 
Lolim, Grace. Women’s Peace Campaigner and Activist, Isiolo Peace Link (Nairobi: July 
25, 2014).  
 341 
 
 
Loo, Muga. Program Advisor, Isiolo District Peace Committee (Isiolo: July 16, 2013).  
 
Lorbert, Stephen. Samburu Elder (Uaso Rongai: August 19, 2014). 
 
Madegwa, Lauretta. Program Officer – Justice and Peace, CAFOD Kenya (Nairobi: July 
23, 2013).  
 
Makoha, Jacinta. Program Manager, Local Capacities for Peace International (Nairobi: 
July 22, 2014).  
 
Mamo, Molu. Cohesion and Integration Officer, Marsabit County Government and 
Former UNDP Peace Monitor (Marsabit: September 12, 2014).  
 
Marc, Alexandre. Chief Technical Specialist, Global Center on Conflict, Security and 
Development (GCCSD), World Bank (Nairobi: August 7, 2014).  
 
Marmone, Giordano. Anthopologist, University of Paris (Tuum: August 18, 2014).  
 
Mbogo, Jacqueline. Program Manager, Open Society Initiative (Nairobi: July 18, 2014).  
 
Mboya, Tom. Governance Consultant and Founder of Inuka Kenya Foundation (Nairobi: 
August 8, 2014).  
 
Members of Borana Militia (anonymous) (Marsabit: September 19, 2014).  
 
Members of Gabra Militia (anonymous) (North Horr: September 17, 2014).  
 
Members of Pokot Militia (anonymous) (Kitale: July 23, 2014).  
 
Members of Police. Police Chief and Asst. Chief, Rapid Deployment Unit (anonymous) 
(Kenya: August 18, 2014).  
 
Members of Samburu Militia (anonymous) (South Horr: August 14, 2014).  
 
Members of Samburu Militia (anonymous) (Tuum: August 19, 2014).  
 
Members of Turkana Militia (anonymous) (Parikati: August 18, 2014).  
 
Members of Turkana Militia (anonymous) (Sarima: August 22, 2014).  
 
Mills, Jeff. Analyst – Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group (Nairobi: July 18, 2014).  
 
 342 
 
Mirgichan, Joseph. Director of the Office of Cohesion, Integration, and Coordination of 
Non-state Actors, Marsabit County Government (Marsabit: September 9, 2014).  
 
Missionary, Seventeen Years Experience in Conflict-affected Community (anonymous) 
(Kenya: August 18, 2014).  
 
Mlee, Mary. Chairwoman, West Pokot Peace Committee (Nairobi: September 12, 2014).  
 
Mogaka, Stephen. Director, Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) at Global Center for 
Conflict, Security and Development (GCCSD), World Bank (Nairobi: August 7, 
2014).  
 
Mohammud, Abdia. Chairwoman, Isiolo Peace Link (Nairobi: August 20, 2014).  
 
Molu, Philip. Assistant Director of Governance, Pastoralist Integrated Support Program 
(PISP) (Marsabit: September 10, 2014).  
 
Moses, Aiyen. Chairman, Loima District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 26, 2014).  
 
Mpaayei, Florence. CEO, INUA Kenya Foundation (Nairobi: July 23, 2013).  
 
Muragu, Michael. Peace Programming Consultant and Former UNDP Consultant 
(Nairobi: July 18, 2013).  
 
Mursale, Hussein. Chairman, Isiolo District Peace Committee (Nairobi: August 14, 
2014).  
 
Muru, Lemosa. Ranger, Kenya Police Reserve (Tuum: August 18, 2014).  
 
Mushtaq, Najum. Regional Policy Coordinator, the Life and Peace Institute (Nairobi: 
August 8, 2014).  
 
Muthama, Thompson. Researcher, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) 
(Nairobi: July 17, 2013).  
 
Mutuku, Munini. Senior Program Officer, National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (NCIC) (Nairobi: July 23, 2014).  
 
Mwandoro, Samuel. Peace Programs Manager, National Council of Churches in Kenya 
(NCCK) (Nairobi: July 16, 2014).  
 
Nasieku, Sylvia. Women’s Representative, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 2013).  
 
 343 
 
Nderitu, Kevin. Program Officer, Peacebuilding, Horn of Africa Development Initiative 
(HODI) (Marsabit: September 12, 2014).  
 
Ndung’u, James. Program Manager – Arms Control and Policing, Saferworld Kenya 
(Nairobi: September 22, 2014).  
 
Ngala, Joseph. CEO, People for Peace Africa (Nairobi: July 19, 2013).  
 
Nganga, Daniel. Priest and Peacebuilding Officer, Catholic Justice and Peace 
Crossborder Programme (Kitale: July 20, 2014).  
 
Ngondi, Joseph. CEO, Climate Change Network Mandera (Nairobi: August 8, 2014).  
 
Njuguna, Esther. Project Officer, Arms Control and Policing, Saferworld Kenya (Nairobi: 
September 22, 2014).  
 
Njukia, Alex. Faith and Development Officer, World Vision International Kenya 
(Nairobi: July 24, 2013).  
 
Ntinyari, Lydiah. Officer, Kenya Police Reserves (Isiolo: July 25, 2013).  
 
Nyabera, Fred. Program Manager, Arigatou International (Nairobi: July 24, 2013).  
 
Obuoga, Benard Okok. Coordinator – Capacities for Peace, National Peace Initiative – 
Africa (NPI) (Nairobi: July 19, 2014).  
 
Ofalo, Davis. Director, Agency for Pastoralist Development (APAD) (July 28, 2014).  
 
Oil Exploration Company. Community Liaison (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 28, 2014).  
 
Oil Exploration Company. Engineer (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 2014).  
 
Oil Exploration Company. Security Officer (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 2014). 
 
Okalu, Barako. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Programme Manager, Pastoralist 
Community Initiative and Development Assistance (PACIDA) (Marsabit: 
September 10, 2014).  
 
Okole, Guyo. Technical Advisor, Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands 
Initiative (Regal I - USAID), African Development Solutions (ADESO) 
(Marsabit: September 11, 2014).  
 
 344 
 
Olow, Bishar Ali. Chairman, Wajir East District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 24, 
2014).  
 
Omar, Abdow Abdullahi. Chairman, Wajir West District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 
24, 2014).  
 
Omar, Jeremiah. Former Marsabit District Peace Committee Chairman and 
Administrative Secretary for the Anglican Church of Kenya, Marsabit Diocese 
(Marsabit: September 11, 2014).  
 
Ombaka, Brian. Program Manager, Strategic Applications International (SAI) Turkana 
(Lodwar: July 25, 2014).  
 
Ongunje, Philip. Director, Usalama Forum (Nairobi: July 15, 2013).  
 
Owiny, Adonijah. Program Manager, Solidarites International Kenya (North Horr: 
September 17, 2014).  
 
Pierli, Francesco. Professor, Tangaza University, Catholic University of East Africa 
(Nairobi: August 8, 2014).  
 
Ptonton, Elizabeth. Chief, West Pokot County Government (Makutano: August 2, 2014).  
 
Rono, John. Priest and Program Officer, Catholic Justice and Peace Crossborder Initiative 
West Pokot (Kitale: July 23, 2014).  
 
Sasaka, Anthony. Reverend and Peace Program Manager, Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli 
(Nairobi: July 18, 2013).  
 
Shah, Rufaa. Chairman, Mandera District Peace Committee (Nairobi: September 1, 
2014).  
 
Shamala, Immaculate. CEO, West Pokot Justice and Peace Centre (Kitale: July 23, 
2014).  
 
Sharamo, Roba. Team Leader, Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Unit, United 
Nations Development Programme Kenya (Nairobi: August 6, 2014).  
 
Sora, Ibrahim Adan. CEO, Community Initiative Facilitation and Assistance (CIFA) 
(Marsabit: September 12, 2014).  
 
Suleiman, Isaac. Local Business Owner and Chairman, Loiyangalani Fisheries Market 
Board (Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).  
 345 
 
 
Taigong, Julius. Director, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Turkana 
(Lodwar: July 28, 2014).  
 
Tari, Diba. Livelihoods Programme Officer, CARE Kenya (Marsabit: September 13, 
2014).  
 
Tuke, Guyo. Consultant, National Pastoralists Parliamentary Group (Nairobi: September 
20, 2014). 
 
Tuke, Galmagar. Communications Officer, Sauti Moja Marsabit (Marsabit: August 13, 
2014).  
 
Vasquez, Teresa. Head of Office, South Horr Catholic Health Centre (South Horr: 
August 21, 2014).  
 
Wairagu, Francis. Senior Researcher, Regional Centre on Small Arms (RESCA) 
(Nairobi: July 18, 2014).  
 
Wangamati, Sally. Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, Kisii University 
(Nairobi: August 8, 2014).  
 
Wario, Sora Adano. Director, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) 
(Marsabit: September 12, 2014).  
 
Warui, Miriam. Peacebuilding Program Manager, CARE Kenya (Nairobi: July 23, 2014).  
 
Wasonga, James. Lecturer IR and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University (Nairobi: July 30, 
2013).  
 
Wepundi, Manasseh. Former UNDP Peacebuilding Consultant and Peace Monitor 
(Nairobi: July 15, 2013). 
 
 
